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PREFACE 
The papers reproduced in this volume were first presented at 
an international seminar held under the auspices of the 
Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) at 
Luxembourg in December 1984. In preparing the papers for 
publication some latitude was given to authors to revise the 
original texts. In principle, however, there has been no 
substantial departure from the texts which were presented. 
Although there has not been space to reproduce in full the 
discussions on each paper, the value of such discussion to 
the seminar as a whole should not go without recognition. 
In opening the seminar, Richard Burke, Vice President of the 
European Communities with responsibility for the Communities 
Statistical Office, said that during the past decade the 
Statistical Office of the European Communities has organized 
a series of seminars on topics of interest to the 
international statistical community. The 1984 seminar 
continued this series but, at the same time, differed from 
its predecessors in a number of significant respects. The 
most important difference was that it did not concentrate 
only on technical aspects of the statistician's craft but 
also dealt with matters of statistical ethics which had 
implications and interests going far beyond the confines of 
the statistical profession. The purpose of the seminar was 
not to attempt to reach definitive conclusions. EUROSTAT's 
aim was rather to provide a forum for an exchange of views 
and experience on the range of important problems 
currently faced by statisticians arising from considerations 
of privacy and confidentiality and to encourage an informed 
discussion on possible strategies for maintaining the flow 
of statistical information in the face of these problems. 
The importance of the topic of this seminar was amply 
illustrated by the extensive public attention which it had 
received in recent years. This was reflected in the 
membership of the seminar which included participants not 
only from Member States but also from Canada, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. Many countries 
across the world had either adopted or were actively 
considering legislation to control the collection and 
dissemination of information. Such legislation typically was 
applicable to a far wider range of information than that 
handled by statisicians but it frequently made special 
provisions for statistics which went some way to ease the 
burden on the official statistician. At the same time, 
however, it imposed responsibilities upon him which he could 
not and should not evade. Of course, the problem did not 
affect only the statistician. It was also a matter of 
serious public concern which was expressed most commonly as 
the conflict between the decision maker's need to know and 
the individual's right to privacy. This conflict between the 
need for information and the genuine fears of the 
consequences of misuse of that information was critical. If 
the seminar could assist in the resolution of that conflict 
it would have made an important contribution to the solution 
of a major problem 
EUROSTAT was particularly fortunate in securing Mr. George 
Als, the Director General of the "Service Central de la 
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques" (STATEC) of 
Luxembourg, as Chairman for the seminar. Mr. Als had been 
actively interested in the subject matter of the seminar for 
many years. 
INTRODUCTION 
G. ALS 
Service Central de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, 
Luxembourg 
Government departments have long been regarded as 
unproductive. This somewhat unflattering reputation was 
elevated to the rank of an economic theory in the 1940s 
and '50s by Colin Clark and Jean Fourastié, who maintained 
that while in the secondary or industrial 
sector productivity showed rapid growth, in the tertiary 
sector - or the services as it is still known - it 
progressed extremely slowly. 
Yet now we find that a branch of that same civil service 
which has been treated so condescendingly in the past is 
suddenly achieving such astonishing increases in 
productivity that entire populations are as frightened of it 
as they are of atomic energy. 
What, then, has happened? Two things: 
- firstly, the arrival of the computer, an instrument as 
mysterious as the nuclear reactor; 
- secondly, the introduction of the national registration 
number for individuals, a kind of fissile material, 
capable of producing within the computer a chain reaction 
leading to an information explosion. A highly controlled 
reaction, say the statisticians; a threat, say the data 
protection experts. 
This raises three questions: 
- How is privacy threatened? 
- How far does this trend affect statistics? 
- What was this seminar expected to achieve? 
A. The problem of the protection of privacy 
An OECD report published in 1971 on "Computerized 
information and the protection of privacy" observed: 
"It is as though the information contained in printed works 
or written manuscripts were in solid form and the 
information stored in computers in gaseous form. Information 
has acquired the necessary mobility, penetrating power and 
capacity to transform itself into new shapes and 
dimensions". 
A number of potential dangers emerge from this, such as the 
ease with which information which is not strictly essential 
can be recorded, the ease with which unscheduled processing 
of information can take place, the ease with which 
information can be transmitted to non-authorized persons, 
the alteration or absolute erasure of data, and last but not 
least the linking of files. 
In the report quoted above, the OECD concluded that the 
problems posed by the computer were of an entirely new order 
and that neither the technical safeguards nor the existing 
legislation, in the form of the various administrative 
confidentiality requirements and the right to legal remedy, 
offered in themselves a satisfactory solution to the problem 
of data confidentiality. 
As early as 1970 the State of Hesse in the Federal Republic 
of Germany passed a law on data protection and in so doing 
became the first in the field, ahead even of the Swedish Law 
of 1974. Under the Hesse law a post of Commissioner 
responsible for data protection was created. During the 
1970s many countries were to follow this example but the 
complexity of the problems involved was such that the need 
for discussion at international level began to be felt. Two 
organizations in particular were involved in this: the OECD 
and the Council of Europe, and two international instruments 
resulted from their work: 
- the recommendations of the OECD Council meeting of 23 
September 1980 concerning the guidelines governing the 
protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal 
data; 
- the Council of Europe's Convention of 28 January 1981 
concerning the protection of individuals against automatic 
processing of personal data. 
This Convention contains a wealth of ideas common to all 
Community countries. Leaving aside the regulations 
concerning transborder flows, and given that the aim of the 
Convention was to guarantee every individual's right to 
privacy with regard to the automatic processing of personal 
data, the field can be reduced to five ideas. 
1. As far as the status of data is concerned, the Convention 
established the principles of purpose, relevance and 
time-limit: personal data should be recorded for definite 
and ligitimate purposes, the extent of such data should 
not be excessive in relation to these purposes, nor 
should such data be stored for a period exceeding that 
which is necessary for these purposes. 
2. Certain categories of data - i.e. personal data which 
reveal an individual's political, religious or 
philosphical beliefs and data relating to a person's 
private and family life - may not be subjected to 
automatic processing unless, as the Convention says, the 
particular national legislation involved provides for 
appropriate confidentiality safeguards. 
3. Appropriate safeguards must be taken for the protection 
of personal data. 
4. As an additional safeguard for the individual concerned, 
the Convention lays down a right of access to files; all 
persons should have the right to know if files exist in a 
particular area, to confirm whether a particular file 
contains data which concern them and to ensure that these 
data are corrected or erased in all cases where they have 
been processed in violation of national legislation. 
5. The use of this right of access can be restricted in the 
case of personal data used for statistical purposes or 
scientific research, provided it is clear that the 
privacy of the individuals concerned is not jeopardized. 
It is important to remember that these principles apply 
only when two conditions are met: 
- the data concerned must be personal data: 
depersonalized data are free from all restrictions; 
- the data must be processed automatically; the 
statistician retains his freedom of action with regard 
to data processed manually or with punch-card machines. 
B_. The protection of privacy, automatic data processing and 
progress in statistical documentation 
The OECD guidelines and the Council of Europe Convention 
were useful in that they set limits beyond which there are 
breaches of privacy. They were thus taken into account in 
much of the developing national legislation. They did not, 
however, go very far in resolving the official 
statistician's dilemma, namely what other considerations 
should be taken into account in striking a balance between 
the individual's right to privacy and the community's 
information requirements. More and more statisticians felt 
that their legitimate requirements were being overlooked. 
Data protection laws were introduced in the 1970s, in some 
countries without statisticians being consulted, and this 
resulted in problems. The suggestion made in 1984 by the 
Conference of the Directors General of the National 
Statistical Institutes of the European Economic Community 
for a seminar to discuss the problems of the "protection of 
privacy, automatic data processing and progress in 
statistical documentation" was thus a timely one. That the 
Conference did not shy away from such an unattractive title 
was surely to draw attention to the need not only to 
consider problems of the protection of privacy but also to 
consider these problems in relation to progress in 
statistical documentation. 
The fact was that statisticians felt themselves to be in 
something of a dilemma. Since the onset of the economic 
crisis, they have been obliged by budget austerity measures 
to make cuts and to rationalize, a necessity which is 
reinforced by the complaints of private individuals and 
firms who feel that the administrative burdens imposed on 
them are too great and who therefore urge statisticians to 
make greater use of administrative sources. If, however, 
statisticians attempt to do precisely that, they come up not 
just against the age-old obstacles of the various 
administrative confidentiality requirements such as 
confidentiality of tax data, but also against new obstacles 
arising out of legislation to protect privacy. 
When automatic data processing was still in its infancy, the 
statisticians' dream was that the linking of administrative 
and statistical files by using the registration number for 
natural persons would ultimately lead to all statistics 
being based on administrative sources. Such hopes have more 
or less disappeared because such linking of files has been 
denounced as a threat to individual privacy. 
In his opening address at the 43rd session of the 
International Statistical Institute in December 1981, the 
President of the Institute, Mr. Edmond Malinvaud, described 
the situation as follows: 
"In recent years progress in the use of administrative data 
has often come up against legislation aimed at protecting 
the public against possible abuses in the use of these 
files. Naturally, statisticians welcome the existence of 
legal safeguards to protect individual privacy; in 
particular, such safeguards should help to create a climate 
likely to bring about a more positive public reaction to 
statistical investigations. Nevertheless, these safeguards 
must be modelled in such a way that they do not prohibit the 
performance of certain statistical operations which pose no 
threat to individual privacy. However, cases have arisen 
where sometimes the new laws themselves and sometimes the 
way in which they are implemented have restricted 
unnecessarily the scope of statistical operations using 
administrative data". 
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C. What was this seminar expected to achieve? 
Statisticians, data protection specialists and researchers 
therefore urgently needed the opportunity to discuss 
together some of the practical problems created by the new 
legislation. The following are a few examples: 
- Under what circumstances is interlinking of statistical 
files or linking of statistical files with administrative 
files permitted? This is a crucial question which raises 
virtually no difficulties in Denmark but for which no 
solution has been found in other countries. 
- Can, as the Danish and Belgian reports suggest, the 
communication of administrative data to statisticians be 
considered justifiable provided it is certain that the 
flow is only one-way? Could the statistical office be 
given a general right of access to administrative data by 
means of the transfer of protocols between the office and 
the departments 'which have the information? 
- Should files of statistical surveys be depersonalized 
after the validation phase? The Swedish report feels that 
this is unwise because to do so is to neglect the needs of 
researchers and, more particularly, of historians and 
future generations. 
- The right of access to personal data in computerized files 
is restricted to the persons concerned. Should this apply 
to administrative files only and not to statistical files? 
Denmark, the United Kingdom and Belgium, for example, 
think that it should, since statistics are not likely to 
threaten privacy. 
- Can public and private institutes, in particular 
researchers, be given samples of names and addresses 
obtained from a population census or another file? 
Opinions differ; some countries do not regard it as a 
problem (e.g. the United Kingdom and Belgium), while 
others (e.g. France) do not feel it should be done. 
- Can a population census be used by municipal authorities 
(which supply census-takers) to update certain of their 
files of names and addresses? This seems a fairly harmless 
question, but could be very sensitive, as the example of 
Germany shows. 
- National legislation forbids the automatic processing of 
data of a personal nature revealing political opinions and 
religious and philosophical beliefs or relating to the 
individual's private life, but the Strasbourg Convention 
enables this restriction to be waived if domestic law 
providea for suitable guarantees. Has any country created 
these guarantees? 
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- The scope of the seminar clearly went beyond the old 
familiar question of statistical confidentiality. However, 
it is essential to remember the fundamental importance and 
specific nature of this confidentiality, very different 
from any other type, as indeed the Greek, Belgian and 
Dutch reports emphasize. The Greek report raises the 
question of statistical ethics: if the Minister to which 
the Statistical Office is answerable asks the Director of 
the Office of one of his staff for personal data obtained 
from surveys and censuses, can this request be refused? It 
is the moral question par excel 1 enee of the government 
statistician. What value statistical confidentiality if it 
does not apply in the face of political authority, which 
certainly does not require the data for scientific 
purposes? 
As those attending the seminar came from many different 
fields, it was possible for the data protection specialists 
and external research organizations, as well as the 
statisticians, both civil servants and others, to voice 
their opinions. 
There was general agreement about the need for a continuing 
discussion and for an exchange of experience about ways on 
which the problems were being resolved. There was also a 
general feeling that the statisticians should work towards 
peaceful cooperation with the data protection departments. 
This indeed is what we tried to do, keeping in mind 
Professor Flaherty's advice to statisticians: statisticians, 
says Professor Flaherty, - who is nothing if not sure of his 
ground - should develop 'a finely tuned political sense' and 
should aim towards peaceful coexistence with the data 
protection lobby, helped by summit conferences to bring 
about a reduction in the number of missiles deployed by 
either side. 
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PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA PROTECTION; 
A EUROSTAT VIEW (1) 
C.W.D. PEARE 
Statistical Office of the European Communities (2) 
SUMMARY 
EUROSTAT has always been very conscious of its 
responsibilities for preserving the confidentiality of data 
but, until relatively recently, it has been largely 
insulated from the effects of the growing public concern 
with issues relating to privacy. This insulation has arisen 
from the fact that, in general, EUROSTAT is not involved in 
the direct collection of data but relies on the national 
services acting as its agents. 
This paper describes some of the problems faced by EUROSTAT 
which arise from concerns with privacy and confidentiality. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
EUROSTAT has not been directly involved in the political 
discussion about privacy in Member States. The impact of 
considerations of privacy on Community statistics is, 
however, a matter of serious concern. This impact manifests 
itself in increasing difficulties for the national 
statistical offices acting on our behalf in the collection 
and compilation of statistics. There have indeed been 
instances where concerns with privacy in some countries have 
frustrated analyses required for Community purposes. On the 
other hand, EUROSTAT has always been directly involved and 
concerned with the problems of confidentiality, but in 
recent years it has been more and more necessary to reassure 
data providers that adequate measures are taken to protect 
material entrusted to us. 
Work at EUROSTAT is normally one step removed from the data 
subjects whether individuals, or collectives of individuals 
such as families, businesses, farms etc. Our role places us 
as intermediaries between data users (whose demands for 
timely, relevant and reliable information are continually 
increasing) and data providers who are experiencing growing 
problems in meeting our requirements. The problems of 
providing data affect us in two respects. There are firstly, 
the increasing difficulties of our data providers (usually 
(1) EUROSTAT: Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(2) This paper represents a personal view and should not be 
taken to reflect the position of the views either of the 
Commission of the European Communities or of EUROSTAT 
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national administrations) in providing the data we request 
and, secondly, even where the information can be collected 
there are questions of confidentiality facing national 
administrations. These latter may be constrained (legally or 
otherwise) from releasing, to EUROSTAT, information which 
may disclose aspects relating to individuals. In the case 
where such information may be provided to EUROSTAT the 
responsibility for ensuring its subsequent confidentiality 
is placed on EUROSTAT. 
As may be seen above our direct responsibilities insulate us 
to some extent from the immediate front line problems of 
confidentiality and privacy. However, the indirect aspects 
cannot be ignored. This paper concerns itself with some of 
the present and potential future effects of concerns with 
privacy and confidentiality as seen from the viewpoint of 
EUROSTAT. 
In view of our relatively limited direct experience in this 
area extensive use has been made of the work of others in 
preparing this document. In particular one should note the 
descriptions of problems experienced at national level which 
have been described in papers of the Conference of European 
Statisticians and also the attitudes and concerns which are 
manifested in the declarations of the Council of Europe and 
the OECD in respect to privacy and confidentiality of 
statistics. A selective bibliography is given in an annex. 
More extensive collections of reference may be found in 
several of the publications listed. (For example, in 
"Censuses, Surveys and Privacy", a collection of articles on 
problems related to privacy edited by Martin Bulmer, London, 
Macmillan 1979). 
1. DEFINITIONS J)F PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
Various definitions of privacy and confidentiality have been 
proposed in the literature. One approach to the problem is 
to be found in "A Framework for Planning U.S. Federal 
Statistics for the 1980s (U.S. Department of Commerce, July 
1978)" where the importance of a distinction between privacy 
and confidentiality is clearly drawn: 
"Privacy, on the one hand, has been variously defined 
as: (1) the right to be left alone, to be spared from 
unauthorized oversight and observations, and from 
searching inquiries about oneself and one's business; 
(2) the ability to control the use of information about 
oneself, whether to give it free circulation, limited 
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circulation, or no circulation at all, and (3) the 
right to participate in a meaningful way in decisions 
about what information will be collected and how that 
information will be used. The concept of autonomy is 
also used to describe this right. In one view, these 
definitions imply that a data subject must be fully 
informed about all uses of data sought and be given the 
right to withhold consent from any or all such uses. In 
the extreme, of course, the Government should not 
collect any information at all. 
Confidentiality, on the other hand, 
conditions of use and disclosure of da 
collected. The Government's needs for inf 
individuals, businesses, and institutio 
many different categories including 
population, as mandated in the Constitut 
benefits such as welfare, student loans 
insurance; collecting taxes; regulati 
enforcing laws; evaluating programs; and 
state of knowledge through statistics 
Hence, the Government collects or 
collected great amounts of data, some 
personal or capable of inflicting grea 
injury if made public. The challenge pos 
concerns for privacy and the enhancemen 
is therefore to refrain from collectin 
information and to maintain the necessa 
confidentiality for that which is collect 
involves the 
ta once it is 
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ns fall into 
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of it highly 
t competitive 
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g unnecessary 
ry degree of 
ed." 
A similar distinction is made by C. Hakim in a paper 
Confidentiality in Britian" (in M. Bulmer ed.) 
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confidentiality b 
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concern over confidentiality is likely to be greater 
where the information collected is considered to be 
private. " 
The essence of these, and other definitions, seems to be a 
distinction between "privacy" as "the right to be left 
alone" and "confidentiality" as "imposing conditions and 
responsibilities with respect to the presentation and use of 
data after its collection". For the statistician the 
distinction is perceived in the form that privacy affects 
his ability to obtain information, while concerns with 
confidentiality impose constraints upon the use which may be 
made of the information after its collection. This 
distinction between the two concepts is adopted in the 
present paper. 
2. THE IMPACT OF CONCERNS WITH PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
Concerns with privacy and confidentiality have had a number 
of very direct and important impacts on the ability of 
EUROSTAT to meet the continually increasing demand for 
harmonized information relating to Community Member States. 
Some of these effects have also been of major significiance 
to individual Member States such, for example, as the legal 
and constitutional difficulties which have been encountered 
in the Federal Republic of Germany with respect to the 
census of population and the micro-census. Concern with 
confidentiality of data has had an impact where Member 
States have found themselves in a position to collect 
information but unable, because of concerns with 
confidentiality, to make it available to EUROSTAT. This 
latter problem has arisen with farm structure surveys where 
several Member States, for legal or policy reasons, found 
themselves unable to provide the Commission with sample (or 
complete enumeration) data relating to individual holdings 
despite the willingness of the Commission to offer stringent 
guarantees in respect of confidentiality (see for example 
Council Directive 75/108/EEC of 20 January 1975 which lays 
down the procedures for the farm structure survey conducted 
in 1975. Article 10 section 2 reads "the individual data ... 
shall be communicated to the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities in such a form that the holdings 
concerned cannot be identified. Moreover, they may be 
divulged only to those persons responsible at the Office for 
the application of this Directive"). 
The effects of such restrictions on the availability of 
information to EUROSTAT are felt most directly by our 
customers. In the main, these are policy makers in the 
Commission, members of the European Parliament, other bodies 
and individuals with an interest in Community affairs. The 
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effects may take the form of non-availability of results 
(which is particularly frustrating where information has 
been available in the past) or restrictions on the quantity, 
quality or flexibility of information available. 
3. PRIVACY 
The fundamental problem underlining the difficulties which 
are recognized in the associated fields of privacy, 
confidentiality and data processing appears to be that of 
privacy. Concerns with confidentiality and the implications 
of data processing are largely expressed in terms of 
preserving the privacy of the individual or group to which 
information relates. 
It is almost universally recognized that, other things being 
equal, individuals (or collectives of individuals such as 
families, groups of workers, businesses, farms, etc.) have a 
right to privacy in matters which concern themselves alone. 
However, other things are not always equal, and it is 
accepted that, for specified purposes, this privacy may 
legitimately be invaded. Legitimacy is justified in terms of 
the striking of a balance between the right to privacy and a 
(society's) need to know. The individual will be required to 
make available information on his income to taxation 
authorities and will recognize the advantage of making 
available information on symptoms and medical history in the 
course of a medical consultation. In the former example, the 
breach of privacy will be accepted (with a greater or lesser 
reluctance) on the grounds that this is necessary for the 
running of society and in the latter example by the 
realization that there is a direct benefit in terms of 
improved diagnoses and treatment resulting from the 
revelation of personal medical information. Willingness to 
provide information which is regarded as economically or 
psychologically sensitive is very closely related to the 
acceptance that the breach of personal privacy is relevant 
and limited. Relevance arises in the sense that there is 
some direct or indirect advantage to the information 
provider and limitation in the sense that the information 
will be used only for the purposes specified. A breach of 
confidentiality whereby the information is divulged to other 
parties will generally be regarded as very damaging, and 
even further, a linkage of different elements of information 
to build up a more detailed profile of the individual is 
regarded as particularly threatening. It may be said that 
the importance of the sum of several pieces of information 
relating to an individual may be much greater than the total 
importance of the individual components. If relevance and 
limitation of diffusion are two aspects which may encourage 
the information provider to accept a breach of privacy, 
where does this leave the statistician in his search for 
information? The relevance of a statistical enquiry to the 
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indvidual will almost always be less direct than the medical 
example quoted above and will on many occasions appear to be 
vanishingly small to the respondent. Where response imposes 
a burden on a respondent which is significantly greater than 
the perceived benefit of the resulting statistics he may see 
his personal interest as being best served by refusing to 
respond or by seeking the discontinuation of the enquiry. 
Where information is provided, the respondent is generally 
seen as having a right to an assurance that diffusion of 
information provided will be limited in a closely prescribed 
fashion. 
Informing and/or persuading potential respondents of the 
relevance of statistical enquiries seems, with a few 
exceptions, to be a relatively neglected activity on the 
part of statisticians seeking to improve the quality of 
their data. It does seem that it will be more and more 
necessary for public relations expertise to become a part of 
the statisticians' armoury in the future. Limitation of 
diffusion of information needs to be well defined in that 
the respondent should be made aware of the uses to which the 
information will or may be put and assured that it will not 
be utilized for other specified or unspecified purposes. The 
potential benefits of such an approach have been well 
described in Margaret Martin "Statistical Legislation and 
Confidentiality Issues" (International Statistical Review 
1974 quoted in U.S. Department of Commerce op.cit. p. 255). 
"Even when responses to requests for information are 
required by law, the success of a statistical program 
depends in large measure on the willing cooperation of 
respondents. Respondents who understand the purpose of 
the inquiry, who sympathize with the intended use of 
the information, and who believe that providing the 
government with the requested information will not harm 
them are much more likely to answer truthfully and with 
a minimum of effort on the part of the data collection 
agency. One element in enlisting such cooperation is 
assurance of harmlessness to the respondent, and one of 
the most common methods for making such assurance in 
statistical data collection is the provision for 
keeping the replies confidential." 
As has been indicated above, from the EUROSTAT viewpoint, 
privacy is seen as an indirect problem, but this should not 
be taken to imply that it is not regarded as a potential 
source of serious difficulties. A deep concern is felt that, 
notwithstanding genuine concerns with privacy, the 
availability of information required for Community purposes 
should not be frustrated by artifical or exaggerated appeals 
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to the need to respect rights to privacy. As with national 
needs, a balance must be established between the right to 
privacy and the Community's need to know. At the same time 
it should be recognized that the Community's needs and 
priorities are not always identical to those of individual 
Member States. 
4. CONFIDENTIALITY 
The statistician cannot, and should not attempt to evade 
absolute responsibility for the confidentiality of data 
which have been provided to him directly or indirectly by 
respondents who have been assured that their privacy will be 
respected. Ethically this is a clearcut professional 
responsabi1 ity but, even on purely utilitarian grounds, the 
preservation of the relationship between the statistician or 
potential and actual respondents depends upon the latter 
being able to place trust on the statisticians' 
undertakings. (It might be emphasized that the ethical 
responsability of the official statistician in this context 
is possibly greater than that of his non-official 
counterpart because of the availability of power to compel 
response to official enquiries.). 
It has been said that no useful therapeutic drug is ever 
completely harmless in all circumstances; the same may be 
said of statistics. Any non-trivial information relating to 
a respondent has potential for harm and the statistician has 
the duty to ensure that, through its disclosure, the 
respondent is not harmed directly as a result of providing 
the information. The statistician can never give an absolute 
guarantee that indirect adverse effects from the provision 
of data can be avoided. For example, analysis may reveal the 
existence of particular groups, the members of which may be 
affected by subsequent policy or administrative decisions. 
The discussion of technical procedures for preventing 
breaches of confidentiality lies beyond the scope of this 
paper. Potentially such breaches can occur in many different 
ways but two broad classes of problem may be distinguished: 
a) those resulting from direct "attack" on the data files 
relating to individual respondents and b) those resulting 
from "disclosure" of information, for example, from highly 
refined detailed tabulations which may indicate that one or 
a small number of subjects lie within a particular multi-
dimensional classification. 
Within EUROSTAT the first of these groups of problems is 
generally approached by requesting information only in 
anonymous form and by limiting access to data files to those 
who are directly responsible for the processing of results. 
Further information relating to individual respondents is 
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not extracted from the (usually machine-readable) files 
except for purposes of investigating apparent anomalies 
encountered in processing. The key linking records numbers 
with actual identities and the identities of subjects 
normally remains with the Member States. The limitation of 
access to the files inhibits any approach, by unauthorized 
users, to identifying individual information by matching 
known characteristics with survey responses. 
The control of disclosure from tabulations may take several 
forms, the simplest of these being inspection and rounding 
of results. The most important technical difficulty in 
dealing with this type of danger to confidentiality results 
from the fact that a breach may be fully guarded against in 
terms of information available to the statistician but the 
existence of auxiliary information in the hands of others 
may lead to disclosure. (Take for example an industry where 
a very large proportion of those involved belong to an 
association and provide the association with information 
similar to that collected and published by an official 
agency. Unless account were to be taken of this external 
factor non-members of the association could find their 
information subject to disclosure by comparison of analyses 
derived from the two data sets.) Many of the technical 
devices and procedures which exist guard greater knowledge 
of the area of study and alternative sources of informations 
than is always available to the statistician. One of the 
consequences of this is likely, in the future, to imply an 
increasing need for the statistician to be aware of 
alternative (not necessarily published or available to him) 
sources of information in his field of study. In the 
EUROSTAT context this implies a continuation of the already 
close liaison with our colleagues in the Member States. 
5. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION AND OECD GUIDELINES 
In view of EUROSTAT's particular concern with the 
international flow of information the provisions of the 
Council of Europe Convention for the protection of 
individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal 
data and the recommendations of the Council of the OECD 
concerning Guidelines governing the protection of privacy 
and transborder flows of personal data are of particular 
interest. The Council of Europe Convention, which was opened 
for signature in January 1981, is directed primarily at 
ensuring the right to privacy of the individual as laid down 
in Art icle 1. 
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"The purpose of this convention is to secure in the 
territory of each Party for every individual, whatever 
his nationality or residence, respect for his rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right 
to privacy, with regard to automatic processing of 
personal data relating to him ("data protection")." 
The protection of privacy is seen as being safeguarded by a 
number of measures the most important of which, from the 
viewpoint of EUROSTAT, are those relating to transborder 
data flows as covered by Article 12. 
"1. The following provisions shall apply to the transfer 
across national borders, by whatever medium, of personal 
data undergoing automatic processing or collected with a 
view to their being automatically processed. 
2. A Party shall not, for the sole purpose of the 
protection of privacy, prohibit or subject to special 
authorization transborder flows of personal data going 
to the territory of another Party. 
3. Nevertheless, each Party shall be entitled to derogate 
from the provisions of paragraph 2: 
a. insofar as its legislation includes specific 
regulations for certain categories of personal data 
or of automated personal data files, because of the 
nature of those data or those files, except where the 
regulations of the other Party provide an equivalent 
protection; 
b. when the transfer is made from its territory to the 
territory of a non-Contracting State through the 
intermediary of the territory of another Party, in 
order to avoid such transfers resulting in 
circumvention of the legislation of the Party 
referred to at the beginning of this paragraph." 
The OECD Guidelines (1981) lay down a number of basic 
principles on the international flow of information and 
these are reproduced here: 
"15. Member countries should take into consideration the 
implications for other member countries of domestic 
processing and re-export of personal data. 
16. Member countries should take all reasonable and 
appropriate steps to ensure that transborder flows of 
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personal data, including transit through a member 
country, are uninterrupted and secure. 
17. A member country should refrain from restricting 
transborder flows of personal data between itself and 
another member country except where the latter does not 
yet substantially observe these Guidelines or where the 
re-export of such data would circumvent its domestic 
privacy legislation. A member country may also impose 
restrictions in respect of certain categories of 
personal data for which its domestic privacy 
legislation includes specific regulations in view of 
the nature of those data and for which the other member 
countries provide no equivalent protection. 
18. Member countries should avoid developing laws, policies 
and practices in the name of the protection of privacy 
and individual liberties, which would create obstacles 
to transborder flows or personal data that would exceed 
requirements for such protection." 
Both the Council of Europe Convention and the OECD 
guidelines are concerned with the transfer of data in 
general. The specific problems of statistical data are not 
treated in any detail. For example Article 5 of the 
Convention lays down conditions relating to the quality of 
data including a specification that "personal data 
undergoing automatic processing shall be preserved in a form 
which permits identification of the data subject for no 
longer than is required for the purpose for which these data 
are stored". Article 6 defines specific sensitive categories 
of data while Article 8, specifying safeguards for the data 
subject, lays down rights of access, rectification, erasure, 
etc. which may be availed of by any person covered by a data 
set. The only exceptions which are permitted to these 
general rules are laid down in Article 9 and these include 
the statement that restrictions on the exercise of rights 
specified in Article 8 may be provided only with respect to 
automated personal data files used for statistics where 
there is obviously no risk of an infringement of the privacy 
of the data subjects. 
The OECD guidelines appear to be rather less restrictive; in 
particular, paragraph 3 lays down that the guidelines should 
not be interpreted as preventing the exclusion from their 
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application of data which "obviously do not contain any risk 
to privacy and individual liberties". 
We do not yet have sufficient experience of the 
interpretation to be placed by Member States on these two 
documents to assess their implications for Community 
statistics. It does, however, seem possible that a 
restrictive interpretation of the terms of the Convention 
and the guidelines could have further adverse affects on the 
availability of statistical data to EUROSTAT. 
6. SOME PARTICULAR CONCERNS 
One area likely to be particularly affected by restrictions 
imposed to safeguard privacy and/or confidentiality is that 
relating to studies of the dynamics of populations. In a 
number of areas longitudinal studies are becoming an 
important source of information. From the viewpoint of 
privacy repeated questioning of the same subjects may be 
regarded as an excessive intrusion. From the viewpoint of 
confidentiality the preservation of identifiers or the 
linkage of information from successive surveys may be 
regarded as undesirable. This is not a problem which is 
specific to EUROSTAT but is seen as one area of potential 
development which may be inhibited by concerns with privacy 
and confidentiality. 
An area which frequently gives rise to concern is that of 
linkage of data. This has been touched on in paragraph 3 
above and is not a problem which directly affects EUROSTAT. 
The non-identifiable nature of almost all the data received 
by EUROSTAT precludes subsequent linkage of data files and 
any linkage, e.g. for panel studies, must be undertaken 
prior to transmission to us. Thus, any linkage of data-files 
by EUROSTAT without the full knowledge and cooperation of 
national offices is excluded. 
The proposals to give data subjects a right of access to 
data relating to themselves has been touched upon in the 
previous section. Most commentators on privacy and 
confidentiality in relation to statistical data have 
suggested that the need for this right of access is reduced, 
or even eliminated, where one is dealing purely with 
statistical records. The administrative difficulties which 
would face EUROSTAT in the event of such a right of access 
being granted appear to be enormous while the value of such 
a right to the data subject appears to be minimal. Almost 
all data received from Member States are in a form in which 
the individual respondent cannot readily be identified and 
copies of these data files are (presumably) retained by 
Member States. It, therefore, appears reasonable to suggest 
that where national legislation may give such a right of 
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access the requirements to fulfil this right should be 
satisfied by access only to the national data sets, possibly 
with provision for amendments to be forwarded to Luxembourg 
where such appear to be justified. 
7. SOME CONCLUDING QUESTIONS 
It has been suggested that publicity of steps taken to 
ensure confidentiality will help to reassure respondents. Is 
it not also possible that such publicity will inspire or 
increase the doubts of respondents? 
Confidentiality and statistical reliability of sample 
results are quite closely associated. If the numbers of 
subjects in a particular group are few enough to endanger 
the confidentiality of information it is probable that they 
are also insignificant statistically. Should more use be 
made of this aspect in reassuring respondents of the 
statistician's disinterest in information in a form which 
may breach confidentiality requirements? 
Despite the many concerns which have been expressed, 
official agencies have a very good record of preserving 
confidentiality in the past. Should this not be stressed 
more by statisticians? 
It has been suggested that respondents to statistical 
surveys should always be clearly informed as to whether or 
not response is voluntary. This would be particularly 
important where the respondent is faced with an official 
request for information (implying some form of compulsion to 
respond). Should this proposal be regarded as a matter of 
absolute statistical ethics or should it be treated as a 
matter of practical judgement which may yield differing 
solutions from survey to survey or from country to country? 
Has the concern, justifiable though it may be, for privacy 
and confidentiality gone to far? Or at least, has the time 
come for statisticians to be less defensive about their role 
in discussions and should they not stress more the benefits 
to be obtained from the availability of reliable, relevant 
and timely statistics? The availability of such statistics 
should place a minimum burden on respondents and imply the 
smallest possible invasion of their privacy. If these 
requirements are achieved, and if confidentiality of the 
information relating to individuals is respected, the 
statistician appears to have no need to make any apologies 
for practising his profession. 
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DISCUSSION 
Mr. JENSEN (Danmarks Statistik) opened the discussion: 
The concepts of privacy, confidentiality and data protection 
were extremely important in the production of statistics, 
and thus for the activities of central statistical offices 
and the overall level of information in any country. General 
statistics which threw light on society formed a significant 
part of such information. Although there were many 
differences in this field, there were also many points of 
similarity from country to country. It was therefore natural 
that the European Community countries cooperated. 
Cooperation was also, obviously, in the interest of 
BUROSTAT. Against this background, Danmarks Statistik 
welcomed most warmly the fact that EUROSTAT organized this 
conference. It was hoped it could be used to create a common 
basis for the policies of the individual countries without 
diminishing the role of statistics in any of them. This 
presupposed however, that the basic concepts were clearly 
stated and that agreement was reached on fundamental points 
of view. Mr. Peare's paper provided a very good introduction 
to this debate. 
This paper strengthened his conviction that the concepts of 
privacy and confidentiality ought to be precisely defined, 
otherwise the basic points of view would become all too 
easily fudged and a muddled discussion would result. It gave 
briefly more detailed reasons for this view. Firstly, as far 
as 'privacy' was concerned, Mr. Peare concluded, after a 
painstaking review, that the concept could best be defined 
as "the right to be left alone". Of course, many people took 
the concept to mean this, but in the real world this idea 
would be practicable only on desert islands - where, 
obviously, many of the other good things in life were 
missing. In other words, the concept thus expressed was 
unrealistic in modern society, which was based to a large 
extent on the interaction of society and the individual -
both with respect to information and otherwise. If the 
concept were to be used as a basis for meaningful 
reflections on statistics in general - the aim of which was, 
precisely, to throw light on social activities - then it 
would have to be defined more concisely. Everyone knew that 
it was unpleasant to have to put up with controls and 
checks, but everyone also knew that such arrangements were 
to a certain extent necessary and would remain so as long as 
everyone was not one hundred per cent honest. He proposed 
the following definitions: 
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'Privacy is the right of the individual not to be exposed to 
controls other than those which are the direct result of 
concrete considerations', or, to put it briefly, 'the right 
to be free from unnecessary controls'. 
The real problem with regard to privacy was that - in the 
abstract it was difficult to maintain a proper balance 
between these two important considerations. The problem was 
first and foremost administrative and political. Less 
obvious were the reasons why, in the public debate of the 
issue, the problem had to a certain extent been associated 
with statistics, since statistics had nothing to do with 
checks on the individual. When it came to the social 
functions of statistics, the opposite was rather the case, 
in that they provided the individual with a basis for 
checking up on the activities of society. 
The question then was what could be done to counter the 
effects of such criticism. 
A main step would be consistent enforcement of the principle 
of 'confidentiality', but this would require a definition of 
the concept that would exclude the possiblity of passing on 
basic statistical information, not only to the public but 
also to all administrative bodies. If exceptions were 
unavoidable, they should be well-defined and have a firm 
legal basis. 
On the one hand, the concept of confidentiality should, in 
an international context, apply only to properly identified 
information on individuals and the economic activities of 
such individuals. There may be many reasons why information 
on minority or special groups of one kind or another should 
be kept secret, but these reasons differ so much from 
country to country and from one branch of statistics to 
another that it was not possible to lay down regulations 
which would be sufficiently comprehensible or well-defined 
for use at international level. One decisive point here was 
that considerations of privacy can, by the very nature of 
things, be of relevance only in connection with identified 
information, since without it no controls would be possible. 
Mr. BAUMANN (der Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz) 
commented as fol lows : 
The first of a new series of meetings to discuss economic, 
political and administrative questions bearing on statistics 
had recently taken place in Wiesbaden. He had delivered the 
opening address, entitled "Data protection and statistics -
adversaries or allies?" The meeting concluded that neither 
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option properly described the data protector's function. In 
fact, both activities had a duty to ensure maximum data 
protection. He then reviewed very briefly the main points 
emerging from the judgment of the Federal Constitutional 
Court concerning the Population Census Law 1983. 
1. The principles were established that: 
- the individual had a fundamental right to determine how 
his personal data should be divulged and used; 
- exceptions to this right - e.g. for a compulsory census -
were permissible only if it was predominantly in the 
public interest and there should be a constitutional legal 
basis for this; 
- the use to which these data were to be put should be 
specifically stated in the legal documentation and their 
use should be restricted to this purpose; 
it was therefore no longer possible to regard data simply as 
an administrative aid; 
- the citizen had a right to an explanation and should be 
informed about the recording and use of his data; 
- no data were 'unimportant', because data were relevant 
only in the context in which they were used. 
One of the main points as far as the Federal Constitutional 
Court was concerned was that the citizen who was obliged to 
provide information should be assured that the data he 
provided would be protected right along the line. The Court 
therefore argued that any activity on the part of the State 
which did not help to build up his trust - by making the 
data processing procedure public and strictly partitioning 
off the areas of use - would, in the long term, serve only 
to make people less ready to cooperate because of the doubts 
they would have. 
2. These principles affected statistics in 
ways : 
the following 
- data collected for statistical purposes should not in 
principle be passed on for administrative purposes; 
- strict personnel and organizational precautions should be 
taken to ensure that statistical data were not, despite 
this basic principle, used for administrative purposes; 
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- the persons obliged to provide information should be given 
a comprehensive description of the type, scope and purpose 
of the statistical surveys and their right to information 
should be guaranteed. 
- before any decision was made about the compilation of 
statistics, the legislator should ascertain whether a 
system which was less sensitive from the citizen's point 
of view would be possible. 
3. A number of questions inevitably resulted from this, in 
connection with both data protection and statistics, and 
these would affect not only the Federal Republic of Germany 
but also Eurostat and the Community as a whole. 
3.1. How did Eurostat and other Community institutions 
guarantee statistical confidentiality? What legal provision 
was there for this and on what legal grounds were any 
unjustified demands for the transfer of data rejected? 
3.2. There were rules on the transborder transfer of data 
(Chapter 3) and the essential 'principles of data protection 
(Chapter 2) in the Council of Europe Convention. 
An effort should be made - and this would be very 
reassuring - to ensure that these principles applied not 
only to the Member States but also to the EC institutions 
themselves. 
3.3. Section 1.3.b. of the OECD Guidelines expressly stated 
that the guidelines should not be interpreted as preventing 
the exclusion from their application of data which 
'obviously do not contain any risk to privacy and 
individual liberties'. This rule could hardly be reconciled 
with the abovementioned principle of the Federal 
Constitutional Court that there were no 'unimportant' data. 
3.4. The German legislator should look into every 
statistical survey where the provision of information was 
compulsory in order to find out whether there was an 
alternative. It would be useful for the Member States to 
exchange experiences in this field: in this context it was 
pointed out that in the case of the EC Labour Force Sample 
Survey it was left to the Member States to decide whether 
the statistics should be collected on a voluntary basis; 
this gave rise to problems, because any compulsory 
information should have a legal basis. 
Mr. FORECAST (CSO London) made the point that: 
In the U.K. all inquiries to individuals, with the exception 
of the census of population, were voluntary. This, he 
thought, was the best guarantee of privacy since those 
questioned could reply or not as they wished. The second 
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technique for ensuring public cooperation was to explain 
fully why the questions were being asked and how the 
information would be used. With regard to the census, the 
questionnaires were fully tested in pilot surveys to ensure 
that they met with public acceptance. As well as this they 
had to obtain the agreement of interested Ministers. 
Mr. EMBLETON (CSO Dublin) commented: 
The problem of the publication of data which, of itself, did 
not reveal confidential information but which, when taken in 
conjunction with other available information, could do so, 
was becoming increasingly important. There now existed many 
non-governmental sources of statistics, some good, some bad 
and it was impossible for the official statistician to be 
aware of all their activities. Furthermore agencies 
connected with the European Communities sometimes had 
information relating to enterprises, not available to the 
national statistical services. On the question that concern 
for privacy and confidentiality had gone too far, he thought 
that concern for confidentiality could never go too far. 
From the statistician's viewpoint, the emphasis on privacy 
might have gone too far, since it was presenting an obstacle 
to the collection of the required material. The main problem 
nowadays was one of non-response, due not to a concern over 
confidentiality, but simply to annoyance at the volume of 
information being asked of the public. 
Mr. DAMANN (Referatsleiter, Bundesbeauftragter für den 
Datenschutz, Bonn) made the following comment: 
It was stated in point 2 of the paper that difficulties had 
arisen when statistical offices in the various Member States 
had either wanted, or had been required, to make available 
to EUROSTAT data capable of yielding information about 
individual holdings or persons. Such difficulties had 
arisen, it seemed, despite the Commission's allegedly 
stringent confidentiality safeguards. As an example of such 
safeguards Council Directive 75/108/EEC of 20 January 1975, 
Article 10, point 2 was quoted. From the point of view of 
data protection one was led to wonder whether the existing 
safeguards were adequate to provide effective 
confidentiality of statistical data, and in particular 
whether the protection they afforded was as effective and 
comprehensive as that providing statistical confidentiality 
within the Member States themselves. He asked the following 
quite specific questions: Was there embodied within 
Community law a principle of statistical confidentiality 
which automatically applied whenever information about 
individuals could be obtained from data collected for 
statistical purposes? 
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The author then replied: 
He did not disagree with Mr. Jensen's view that the 
definition of privacy as "the right to be left alone" was 
unrealistic as an absolute guide to action in a modern 
society. However, he felt that it was important for 
statisticians and others to recognize that the collection of 
information frequently involved an invasion of privacy which 
should be openly acknowledged and justified. Public 
confidence could be created and retained only if it was made 
clear that statisticians were sensitive to concerns about 
privacy and that they took all reasonable steps to minimize 
intrusion into the privacy of others. 
In answer to the queries of the German delegates about the 
steps taken to ensure confidentiality of data at EUROSTAT it 
was pointed out that, not only did the economy legislation 
relating to particular surveys include stringent safeguards 
similar to those quoted in respect of the Farm Structure 
Survey, but the treaties establishing the European 
Communities contained specific provisions to ensure the 
confidentiality of data required by the Community 
institutions in the course of their work. Reference should 
be made to Article 47 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community and to Articles 213 and 
214 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community. 
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DATA CONFIDENTIALITY: 
CURRENT PRACTICB AND RESTRAINTS IN FRANCE 
J. BEGUE and C. MOREAU Institut National de la Statistique 
et des Etudes Economiques 
SUMMARY 
In France, the protection of private information collected 
by means of compulsory statistical surveys is guaranteed by 
a law passed in 1951 on the obligation to make returns, the 
coordination of surveys and statistical confidentiality. 
Statistical offices have always been careful to ensure that 
the principles laid down by this law are rigorously applied 
and have quite naturally extended these principles to cover 
other sources of data which they have been called upon to 
process, such as administrative files to which they have 
been given access and the results of optional surveys. 
The 1978 law on automatic data processing, data files and 
civil liberties, which was aimed at protecting the public 
against the dangers arising from a proliferation of 
statistical offices without, however, fundamentally altering 
their application of the principles of confidentiality. 
In this paper the presentation of the legal framework 
established by the two laws already mentioned is followed by 
a description of how that framework is applied in practice 
to statistical operations. This entails a review of the 
following aspects: the physical security of data, the 
dissemination of statistics from administrative files, the 
utilization of user identifications, the risks of indirect 
identification in depersonalized files or statistical tables 
and the linking up of files. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The principle of statistical confidentiality in France is 
embodied in a law of 1951 introducing the system of 
compulsory public surveys. In this law a distinction is 
established between private information, which may not be 
disclosed under any circumstances, and personal data of an 
economic or financial nature whose disclosure is not, under 
certain circumstances, entirely prohibited. 
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In theory, the data protection policies which statistical 
offices have implemented in order to stay within the law 
apply only to compulsory surveys but they have been extended 
quite naturally to cover the other sources of data on which 
statistical operations depend, namely optional surveys and 
administrative files, both of which may moreover be subject 
to other secrecy requirements. 
In strengthening the legislation relating to the protection 
of personal data, the 1978 law on automatic data processing, 
data files and civil liberties also imposed new restrictions 
on statistical offices, though it hardly entailed any 
significant changes regarding the application of secrecy 
requirements. 
After describing the legislation pertaining to public 
statistics work in France, this paper goes on to describe 
some practical aspects of the implementation of these 
requirements. 
1. THE LAW ON STATISTICAL CONFIDENTIALITY 
The system of compulsory statistical surveys was introduced 
by Law No. 51/711 of 7 June 1951 (amended by several later 
versions) on the obligation to make returns, the 
coordination of surveys and statistical confidentiality. 
Alongside the obligation to make returns this law provides 
for the coordination of public statistical surveys with the 
aim of keeping their number within reasonable bounds. Above 
all the law provides a guarantee for respondents to these 
surveys that any data they supply will be protected. 
The provisions to this effect contained in Article 8 of the 
Law vary depending on whether the data involved are 
"personal data concerning the private and family life of 
individuals including, in general, the circumstances and 
behaviour of such individuals in the private sphere" or 
whether they are personal data of an economic or financial 
nature. Unless countervailing provisions exist in the code 
of criminal procedure, the former "may not under any 
circumstances be disclosed by the institution to which they 
have been entrusted". As far as personal data of an economic 
or financial nature are concerned, the Law simply states 
that such data "may not under any circumstances be used for 
purposes of tax inspection or for the imposition of economic 
sanctions on an individual" and goes on to impose certain 
conditions on the disclosure of data of this nature. 
In the section concerned with the need to ensure 
confidentiality, the Law of 7 June 1951 invokes an article 
of the code of criminal procedure (Article 378) which deals 
in broad terms with the question of professional secrecy. 
This article provides that: "(...) all (...) persons who, as 
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a result either of their station in life, their profession 
or any temporary or permanent position they may hold, are 
entrusted with information of a confidential nature and who 
disclose that information to third parties, shall, unless 
obliged or authorized by the law to act as an informant, be 
liable to one to six months imprisonment and a fine of 
between 500 francs and 8000 francs". 
Although in theory the provisions of the Law of 7 June 1951 
apply only to compulsory statistical surveys, the public 
statistical offices afford the same confidential status to 
data collected from the optional surveys which they are 
sometimes called upon to carry out (regionally based 
surveys, opinion polls, short-term economic surveys). These 
surveys are optional because of the personal nature of the 
questions they contain. 
Moreover, if in the 1950s most statistics were compiled on 
the basis of data collected by means of surveys (population 
censuses, polls) and thus were subject in principle to the 
1951 Law, it is nevertheless true that data contained in the 
administrative files of various government departments were 
already being used to produce statistics in certain areas, a 
practice which has increased steadily since then. For 
example, the use of civil status documents has long provided 
a means of compiling up-to-date demographic statistics, 
while from 1950 onwards the annual declarations of wages and 
salaries which employers are required to submit to the tax 
and welfare authorities (and which we shall return to later) 
have been a major source of data for the compilation of 
statistics on wages and salaries. 
Strictly speaking, this use of administrative data does not 
fall under the confidentiality requirement of the 1951 Law. 
What does apply, however, are the general requirements for 
the protection of personal data deriving from the obligation 
to respect professional secrecy. Furthermore, such use of 
administrative data is subject to any confidentiality 
requirements which a particular government department may 
have. Clearly, such requirements, while not always amounting 
to an absolute prohibition, nevertheless place severe 
restrictions on the use of administrative data. However, 
while such requirements must be respected by statistical 
offices whenever they are given access to certain 
administrative files, they are not generally any more 
restrictive than the requirements which would result from a 
strict application of the 1951 Law. 
For more than 30 years, then, this law has been the point of 
reference for virtually all statistical operations 
regardless of the origin of the data being processed. 
Needless to say, the law applies to both indirect and direct 
disclosure of data, even though this is not explicitly 
stated. Indirect disclosure of data may result from the 
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publication of statistical tables which, by virtue of 
certain of the criteria they use or as a result of 
cross-checking, could lead to the identification of the 
statistical units concerned; it could also result from the 
dissemination of personal data files which have in theory 
been depersonalized but which could in practice still lead 
to certain of the individuals concerned being recognized. 
As far as direct disclosure of data is concerned, we have 
already seen that the 1951 Law rules out entirely the 
dissemination of private information (the period of 
application of this prohibition now being 100 years, since 
the passing of the 1979 Law on public records) and only 
admits the disclosure of personal data of an economic or 
financial nature provided the conditions imposed by the law 
are respected. This is a distinctive feature of the secrecy 
requirements for business statistics which we will not 
discuss any further here. Apart from this, there is no 
significant difference as regards data secrecy requirements 
between the two spheres (private information and personal 
data of an economic or financial nature), though it should 
be mentioned that in the case of individual entrepreneurs 
and members of their families who are employed in the 
business, no clear demarcation line between the two exists. 
2. THE 1978 LAW ON AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING, DATA FILES AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIE S 
The strict application of the principles established or 
assimilated by the 1951 Law never gave rise to any real 
problem as regards the compilation of social or demographic 
statistics. There is no known case of violation of 
statistical confidentiality and the statistical offices, who 
have always taken for granted that data relating to 
respondents to surveys or employees must be kept 
confidential, did not feel that the progress of their work 
was impeded in any serious way. 
Thanks in large part to the progress made in the 1960s and 
above all in the 1970s in the field of automatic data 
processing, it seemed to the statistical offices that their 
own work could expand without this posing additional risks 
for the individuals seen as statistical units. Indeed, 
whatever the techniques of data file administration and 
statistical compilation, they were confident that the 
existing legislation allowed them to guarantee the 
confidentiality of the data which they held. 
Be that as it may, this legislation was extended by Law 
No. 78-17 of 6 January 1978 which, in France as in other 
countries, was passed in order to protect the public against 
the dangers arising from the growing computerization of 
society. This law, which applies to any and every 
collection, storage and processing of personal data (in 
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particular by computer) regardless of the origin of such 
data (administrative or otherwise) and regardless of its 
purpose, provides for no exception whatever for statistical 
offices or, more generally, research institutions. 
It is interesting to note that one of the reasons - though 
not the only one - for introducing this law was the public 
anxiety aroused by a media-orchestrated campaign opposing 
the planned computerization of the national identification 
register for natural persons. This register is administered 
by INSEE (the National Economic Studies and Statistical 
Institute) as part of its responsibility for managing the 
large-scale files which cut across several government 
departments, and entries are restricted to details of civil 
status (surname, first names, data and place of birth) and 
an identification number corresponding to each person on the 
register. The planned computerization measures gave rise to 
fears that a kind of super-file might be created containing 
all the data held by government departments, thereby 
constituting a threat to civil liberties. 
A detailed discussion of the 1978 Law is provided in the 
paper presented by Mme. Lenoir, who is Director of 
Regulations at the National Commission for Data Processing 
and Civil Liberties (CNIL), an organization called into 
being by the 1978 Law. Nevertheless it is necessary to 
mention here the new restriction which this law imposes on 
statistical offices. 
No automatic processing of personal data, i.e. data which, 
as defined by the law, may lead to direct or indicrect 
identification of the person or persons concerned, may be 
undertaken without: 
- the prior passing of a regulation (and sometimes even of a 
law), after consideration of the reasoned opinion of the 
CNIL, when the data to be processed are for use by the 
State, by a public institution or by a regional or local 
authority, 
- a prior declaration to the CNIL in all other cases. 
Nevertheless statistical operations which quite obviously 
pose no threat to either privacy or civil liberties, may, 
depending on the standards set by the CNIL, be subject to 
what is known as a "simplified declaration" procedure. Thus 
one category coming under this simplified procedure is the 
automatic processing for statistical purposes of personal 
data relating to natural persons and concerning their status 
as individual entrepreneurs or members of their families 
working in the business, provided that this processing is 
undertaken by the public services and bodies called into 
being by the Law of 7 June 1951. Fitting into the same 
category is the processing of data on natural persons 
collected by means of surveys carried out by the State and 
37 
by public institutions of an administrative nature, provided 
these surveys use relatively low sampling fractions (i.e. a 
sample comprising less than 5X of the population under 
survey) and provided the questions asked in the survey 
pertain to routine categories of information which are not 
"sensitive". 
For automatic data processing carried out by public bodies 
and requiring an act of legitimation, that act of 
legitimation must in particular specify: 
- the purpose for which the data are being processed, 
- the categories of personal data which are to be recorded 
and the categories of authorized recipients who are to 
have access to these data. 
When data are to be processed using the national 
identification register for natural persons, a decree of the 
Council of State, passed after considering the opinion of 
the CNIL, is required. . Certainly, the existence of a 
national identification number makes the linking up of files 
far more of a technical feasibility. 
On the technical level, the law on automatic data 
processing, data files and civil liberties stipulates that 
all persons who process or cause to be processed personal 
data must "take all necessary precautions to maintain the 
security of... (those) data and in particular to ensure that 
the data are not distorted, damaged or disclosed to 
unauthorized third parties". 
Besides these provisions concerning the automatic processing 
of personal data, the Law of 6 January 1978 provides a 
certain number of safeguards for persons supplying 
government departments or any other bodies with information 
concerning themselves regardless of whether that information 
is to be automatically processed or not. 
To this effect the Law of 6 January 1978 provides for a 
"right of access" allowing persons to acquaint themselves 
with the data which concern them in personal files, and 
establishes the principle of the right to correction if 
these data should prove to be wrong. 
The law provides that (article 27): 
"persons requested to supply personal data must be informed of 
- the compulsory or optional nature of replies 
- the consequences which the withholding of replies might 
have for them 
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- the natural or legal persons who will receive the data 
which they supply 
- their right of access and their right to correction 
When personal data are collected by means of questionnaire, 
these requirements must be stated on that questionnaire 
(...)". 
The law also prohibits the collection and storage of 
"personal data which reveal, either directly or indirectly, 
a person's racial origin, political, philosophical or 
religious beliefs or trade union membership", except in 
cases where this is felt to be in the public interest or 
where a decree of the Council of State, based on the 
proposal or assent of the CNIL, has been passed. 
Although the Law of 6 January 1978 certainly provides 
individuals with a considerable measure of protection as 
regards the use of personal data concerning them, it has 
nevertheless not altered in any radical way the policies 
applied prior to the law by statistical offices with regard 
to the processing of personal data for statistical purposes. 
With the exception of the right of access and the right to 
correction, the protection already afforded under the Law of 
7 June 1951 to those supplying information in compulsory 
public statistical surveys was essentially the same as that 
introduced on a general level by the Law of 6 January 1978. 
The Law of 6 January 1978 does indeed provide legal 
protection for the data collected in optional surveys and 
ensures observance of certain rules with precise provisions, 
but these rules were already an integral part of the 
professional ethics of statistical offices. The main impact 
of the law on statistical offices was the requirement that a 
certain number of administrative operations be carried out 
prior to the surveys and processing planned. 
Only the principle of end use may be a source of 
difficulties for the statistical offices. This principle 
has already had negative repercussions during the 
1982 population census, since the CNIL refused to 
grant authorization for the use of data from the 
Directorate-General for Taxes' file on domestic rates for 
checking that the collection of housing returns was 
complete, on the grounds that this was not a valid end use 
for the fiscal file. 
ST.PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF OBSERVING DATA CONFIDENTIALITY 
Having outlined the legislation on the protection of 
personal data concerning the circumstances and behaviour of 
individuals in the private sphere, it is appropriate at this 
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stage to see how such legislation is applied in practice in 
the collection and dissemination of INSEE data. What follows 
is not a comprehensive and detailed review, but a brief 
description of some of the principal types of measures 
adopted. 
(a) First, as a matter of record only, since a full 
description would be too long and wearisome, precautions 
are taken at the various premises of the institution to 
guarantee the physical security of data: surveillance of 
entrances and exits, controlled access to computer rooms 
and especially tape libraries etc. Generally speaking, 
the following approach is adopted for protecting 
confidential data stored on magnetic files: 
- except in special cases, all INSEE files can be 
consulted by all INSEE users and only by INSEE users; 
- only users responsible for a group of files are 
authorized to amend or destroy them; 
- files of general interest may be consulted by everyone 
and software of general interest is open to all users; 
- exceptions may be made to these rules, but they must 
satisfy definite procedural requirements; 
- lastly, access to certain highly confidential files or 
groups of files is strictly reserved for certain 
users. 
At the data base level, protection of access to the 
different elements is normally taken into account when 
designing the management tools. In addition, an external 
non-INSEE system for protecting all magnetic tape or 
disk files has been placed on the IBM 3033 computer 
owned by the Centre National d'Informatique de Paris I. 
(b) Processing by INSEE of the data collected by government 
departments in the course of their management tasks is 
generally subject to a protocol which lays down the 
conditions under which the institution may disseminate 
statistical results obtained from personal data 
supplied. This applies, for example, to the processing 
by INSEE of the annual income returns (D.A.S) supplied 
by the Directorate-General for Taxes which are used to 
prepare statistics on annual income by activity of the 
firm, location and characteristics of the income earner. 
Very often the protocols contain the same rules 
governing the dissemination of statistics prepared from 
these data as those applied to the data from statistical 
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surveys. Disclosure of personal (non-identifiable) 
information is always subject to the prior agreement of 
the originating government department. 
(c) During the processing of these administrative files the 
identifications of the individuals concerned are 
removed, as in the case of survey files, as soon as 
preparation of the statistical operating files has been 
completed. This is the case, for example, with the 
information system on civil servants operated jointly by 
the Directorate-General for the Administration of civil 
servants and the INSEE. The system involves the 
centralized processing of the computer salary files of 
government departments which makes it possible to 
collect statistical data on civil servant employment and 
salaries in government departments. The information 
collected is always depersonalized. Each individual is 
identified by his number in the national identification 
register for natural persons (NIR), but in no case does 
this provide a clue to the individual's identity. It is 
used solely for processing the information collected. 
The personal information held centrally by the INSEE 
cannot, whatever its origin, be disclosed or even 
consulted for other INSEE work or for the work of other 
departments. It is not until all the preliminary 
processing has been completed that copies of the files, 
without the identifications of course, can be made 
available to users. 
In certain cases, however, for example when it is 
necessary to monitor a sample of individuals over a 
period or to regroup data on an individual contained in 
several files of the same type, the identifications are 
kept at INSEE for a longer period. In the case of the 
permanent demographic sample, for example, whose primary 
aim is to provide statistics on population movements and 
changes of occupation on the basis of data from 
successive general population censuses, civil statistics 
documents and the electoral register, the NIR is used as 
a permanent identification in the computer file 
produced. The names and first names of the persons in 
question are not kept in the computer file. And, 
naturally, the INSEE discloses only data which precludes 
direct or indirect identification of the persons in the 
sample and which therefore do not contain the NIR. 
Similar provisions also exist for the study of mortality 
by socio-professional category. 
It should be noted that these two operations involving 
the use of the national identification register for 
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natural persons were the subject of a decree of the 
Council of State, passed after considering the opinion 
of the CNIL, pursuant to Article 18 of the Law of 
6 January 1978 on automatic data processing, data files 
and civil liberties referred to above. 
Similarly, during the processing already described of 
annual returns made by employers to the tax 
administration, the use of the NIR (which is authorized 
for income files) is extended in order to permit 
grouping of salaries paid to the same person by one or 
more employers during a given year which appear on 
different income returns, as well as to allow the career 
of individuals in a sample of income earners to be 
followed over successive years. Here too, the 
information produced of course no longer contains any 
factor which might allow identification of the persons 
in the sample. However, simply removing an 
identification number is not always sufficient, as we 
shall see below. 
(d) The legislation laying down rules for the protection of 
personal data collected for a statistical purpose does 
not prohibit subsequent dissemination, particularly for 
research needs, but stipulates that such personal data 
must be strictly depersonalized, i.e. must not permit 
identification, even indirect identification, of the 
individuals concerned. 
The best example in this respect is the general 
population census whose results are of interest to a 
great number of external bodies (local authorities, 
regional public bodies and study organizations). The 
INSEE laid down precise arrangements for the disclosure 
of the detailed files of the 1982 census on the basis of 
the recommendations of the National Commission on Data 
Processing and Civil Liberties in a resolution adopting 
a standard agreement protocol between the INSEE and the 
communes laying down rules governing the use by communes 
of the data from the 1982 census. Two types of 
processing are available for the files, depending on the 
precision of the geographical detail in question. In all 
cases, the number of the building, the number of the 
dwelling and the day and month of birth of the 
inhabitants are removed. In addition, in files where 
identification by district is retained: 
- the code showing the relationship with the head of 
household is replaced by a two-category code (head of 
household/other): 
- only a two-digit "profession" code is included, i.e. 
the professional activity is indicated only at the 
socioprofessional category code level, which is highly 
aggregated. 
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In files prepared from the one-in-four survey of the 
census returns in which no indication of geographical 
location at a fine level (district) is retained, and in 
the one-in-twenty survey files, the district 
identification codes are erased. In the case of rural 
communes, the commune and locality codes are erased. 
Finally, as regards the individual, the identification 
codes of the area of the place of work are erased if 
they appear on the return. 
Furthermore, when publishing statistical results 
relating to natural persons, precautions are taken to 
avoid the risk of indirect identification arising from 
the small number of persons appearing in certain 
sections of the tables. In general, one applies by 
analogy a rule on the dissemination of results 
concerning undertakings established following an 
agreement in the National Statistics Council (a 
consultation body on statistical programmes set up by 
the 1951 Law) according to which no result relating to a 
group of less then three units may be disseminated. 
And finally, one should note that samples of persons or 
households taken from the population survey cannot be 
disclosed to external bodies. 
(e) If one wishes to guarantee strict depersonalization 
of the data processed one must use somewhat 
complicated but proven methods when comparing data from 
different sources. One of the most "classical" is the 
"double-blind" method. It was used to compare the file 
relating to the 1980 survey on French health expenditure 
with the files of the national employees' sickness fund 
(CNAMTS) to check the number of cases of hospitalization 
declared in the survey. The procedure developed for this 
purpose by the INSEE and approved by the CNIL was as 
fol lows : 
1. INSEE provided the CNAMTS, on a manual data medium, 
with a list of the names of persons who had declared 
in the survey that they had been hospitalized under 
the general social security system as insured persons 
or as their dependants. 
In addition to the number of the survey 
questionnaire and serial number of the person in 
question, the list contained the name, first name, 
sex, month and date of birth of the person 
hospitalized during the three-month period of the 
survey or during the previous year. If the person 
hospitalized was a dependant, the name, first name, 
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sex and age of the insured person on whom they were 
dependent were also supplied to the CNAMTS. The list 
also contained the place and the starting and 
finishing dates of hospitalization if known. 
It must be stressed that these data were supplied 
with the aim of helping the CNAMTS in the search for 
data which it already holds on the persons in its 
field of responsibility. 
2. CNAMTS undertook to provide CREDOC (Research Centre 
for the Study and Observation of Standards of 
Living), a research body conducting the survey 
jointly with the INSEE and responsible for processing 
this part of the data, with a list showing the 
information supplied by the primary sickness funds on 
hospitalizations recorded in the health survey with, 
as the sole link-up, the number of the questionnaires 
supplied previously by the INSEE, but without the 
name and address. As a result, CREDOC received only 
non-nominative data. 
3. INSEE provided CREDOC with depersonalized data from 
the health survey, the only reference being the 
questionnaire number without the name and address. 
Only a commune category code and ZEAT code, a 
highly aggregated area code containing several 
administrative regions, were included. 
4. CREDOC linked up the data from the health survey 
supplied by the INSEE and the sickness fund data on 
hospitalizations supplied by the CNAMTS. The only key 
for the link-up was the questionnaire number, and the 
linked data were therefore completely depersonalized, 
as were the constituent data. 
5. In order to avoid any subsequent individual 
identification, CREDOC was not able to return to 
CNAMTS the detailed tape which it produced, but only 
the statistical tables. 
6. CREDOC supplied INSEE with the detailed linked tape 
so that the Institution would have all the data 
available on the sample which it itself had compiled, 
with a view to further studies. 
Earlier, the INSEE had destroyed the individual 
identification codes in its possession (address 
files) with the same aim of ensuring the anonymity of 
the files in circulation. 
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ANNEX 
Law No. 51-711 of June 7,1?51_.(*)onLegalObligation, 
Coordination, and Secrecy in the Field of Statistics 
The National Assembly and the Council of the Republic have 
deliberated. 
The National Assembly has passed, 
The President of the Republic has enacted the following law: 
Paragraph 1 - (Amended by Decree No. 72-1103 of December 8 
1972) 
A National Board of Statistics attached to the National 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies shall be 
established. It shall be responsible for the coordination of 
the statistical surveys of government departments and 
institutions, excepting internal statistical work which does 
not involve the assistance of persons from outside 
government service. This Council shall establish yearly a 
programme covering the totality of surveys planned for the 
year and shall set their approximate dates and the 
time-limits to be given to the natural and legal persons for 
response. The programme and its implementation procedures 
shall be determined by the Minister having supervisory 
authority over the National Institute of Statistics and 
Economic Studies. 
The membership of the National Board of Statistics and its 
operating procedures shall be established by a decree which 
shall specify in particular the manner in which the 
representation of the appropriate natural and legal persons 
and of the Parliament and the Economic Council will be 
ensured. 
(*) Amended by the Appropriation Bill for 1969 No 68-1172 of 
December 27 1968 (Official Gazette of December 29; page 
12349), the Law of Public Records No. 79-18 of January 3 
1979 (Official Gazette of January 5 1979; page 43), 
Decrees No. 59-1350 of November 16 1959 (Official 
Gazette of November 29 1959; page 11451), No. 62-275 of 
March 12 1962 (Official Gazette of March 14, 1962; page 
2662), No. 72-1103 of December 8 1972 (Official Gazette 
of December 13 1972; page 12830). 
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The National Board of Statistics shall be headed by the 
Minister of Economic Affairs, who shall delegate his powers 
to the Chairman of the Board. 
Paragraph 2 - Every statistical survey conducted by the 
public authorities, excluding internal statistical work not 
involving the assistance of persons from outside government 
service, shall be submitted for prior approval by the 
Minister having supervisory authority over the National 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies and by the 
Minister responsible for the area in which the survey is to 
be taken. 
Approval may only be granted if the survey fits into the 
framework of the program provided for in the preceeding 
paragraph, if it is provided for by a specific law, or if 
there is a situation of imperative need or emergency. 
Paragraph 3 - The natural and legal persons shall be 
required to respond accurately and within the set 
time-limits to the statistical surveys having received the 
approval defined in Paragraph 2. 
Paragraph 4 - (Amended by the Appropriation Bill for 1969 
No. 68-1172 of December 27 1968). 
Professional or inter-professional organizations may be duly 
appointed by the public authorities to act as intermediaries 
in the conducting of statistical surveys. Authorization 
shall be granted or withdrawn by a joint order of the 
Minister having supervisory authority over the National 
Institute of Statistics and the Minister responsible for the 
sector concerned. 
When a questionnaire having obtained approval is 
disseminated in this way by a duly appointed organization, 
the concerned parties shall have the option of responding 
through the said organization or directly to the public 
authority in charge of the survey. 
Duly appointed organizations shall give the information they 
have gathered to the public authority in charge of the 
survey within the time-limit of the contract. ("arrêté 
d'agreement" - order of appointment). 
Paragraph 5 - (Repealed by Decree No.62-275 of March 12 
1962). 
Paragraph 6 - (Amended by Law No. 79-18 of January 3 1979). 
Subject to the provisions of Articles 29 and 89 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, personal information contained on 
questionnaires having obtained the approval provided for in 
Paragraph 2 and which concerns personal and family life and, 
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in general, facts or behaviour of a private nature, shall 
under no circumstances be released by the depositary 
department before a period of one hundred years since the 
carrying out of the census or survey has elapsed. 
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Employees of public authorities or organizations called upon 
to act as intermediaries for surveys according to the terms 
established in Paragraph 4 are subject to the obligation of 
professional secrecy provided for in Article 378 of the 
Penal Code. 
The censuses and statistical surveys conducted in accordance 
with the provisions of the present law shall be considered 
as public records. 
Paragraph 7 
1959)* 
(Amended by Decree No. 59-1350 of November 16 
In the event of failure to respond, subsequent to formal 
notice, within the time-limit set by the said notice, or in 
the event of a knowingly inaccurate response, natural or 
legal persons may be subject to an administrative fine 
imposed by the Minister having supervisory authority over 
the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies as 
advised by the National Board of Statistics. 
The amount of the first fine thus incurred by a natural or 
legal person shall not exceed 10 000 francs. 
* The fines provided for by this Paragraph are expressed in 
francs of 1959, that is, in centimes. 
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In the event of a repetition of the offence within a period 
of three years, the amount of the fine shall be increased to 
a minimum of 20 000 F and a maximum of 100 000 F for each 
infraction. For firms of over one hundred salaried 
employees, in the event of a repetition of the offence 
within a three-year period, the fine shall be 200 F minimum 
and 1 000 F maximum per employee, not exceeding a total of 
200 000 F. 
These fines shall be collected according to the terms 
provided for by the provisionally applicable Law of March 
13, 1942 concerning the collection of public claims other 
than those of internal revenue and State-owned properties. 
However, every failure to respond, subsequent to formal 
notice and within the time-limit set by the said notice, and 
every knowingly inaccurate response to questions concerning 
personal and family life, shall be punished by a fine of 100 
to 600 F and, in the event of a relapse, of 200 to 12 000 F. 
This fine shall be imposed according to the procedure 
provided by the Enactment of November 2 1945, regarding the 
collection of cumulative fines. 
Paragraph 8 - All provisions laid down by law or regulations 
to the contrary of the present law are hereby repealed. 
Paragraph 9 - The present law shall be applicable in the 
Overseas and Associated Territories. 
The rules of application of the present law shall be 
prescribed by decrees of the Council of State based on the 
Report of the Minister for Economic Affairs or on the Joint 
Report of the Minister for Economic Affairs and the Minister 
for Overseas France. 
The present law shall hereby be enforced as the law of the 
State. 
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DISCUSSION 
M. WEIDES (Service central de la Statistique et des Etudes 
économiques, Luxembourg) opened the discussion: 
He remarked on the parallelism between the situations in 
France and Luxembourg as regards ensuring the 
confidentiality of data obtained for the purposes of 
official statistics as well as the new problems raised by 
the proliferation of data banks containing personal data. 
This position arose naturally from the fact that Luxembourg 
drew largely upon the French and Belgian experience in 
drafting the relevant legislation. He noted that in France a 
higher degree of confidentiality was stipulated for personal 
data relating to an individual's private life than for 
economic or financial matters. In Luxembourg the levels of 
confidentiality of the two classes of information were 
treated as equal and he asked whether there was any value in 
ascribing different degrees of confidentiality to different 
classes of data. The proliferation of data banks, both 
public and private, and the fear of their misuse and the 
cross-linking of information had led the authorities in 
Luxembourg, as in France, to introduce very restrictive 
rules governing their operation. These concerned the initial 
collection of data, its purpose, its storage, its 
processing, its transmission to third parties and its 
ultimate use. These rules tended to make the task of the 
statistician very difficult. Thus persons conducting 
inquiries were obliged to inform their subjects of the exact 
uses to which the information would be put, of their right 
of access and rectification and whether the inquiry was 
statutory or voluntary. All this introduced a quite 
unnecessary atmosphere of mistrust into the inquiry. He 
asked whether provision could be made in future legislation 
to take account of the special position of the statisticians 
and remove these artificial barriers to their work. 
During the course of the discussion other quest ions were put 
to Mr. Begué concerning the use of tax files as a source of 
statistics on individuals and the degree of cooperation 
between the statistical services and the Commission 
nationale de l'informatique et des libertés. 
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The author replied to the discussion : 
He said that the different rules regarding confidentiality 
of personal and economic data provided for statistical 
purposes arose from the legislation under which such data 
were collected. Data on individuals could in no 
circumstances be released. The legislation relating to the 
collection of statistical data on enterprises did not, 
however, specify a similar complete embargo on their 
release. Tax files were not used as a source of statistical 
data on individuals. Good relations had been consciously 
developed between the statistical services and the 
Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés. The 
Commission recognised that the use made by the statisticians 
on information relating to individuals was not such as to 
threaten liberty or privacy. It therefore did everything 
possible to facilitate the work of the statisticians. The 
collection of statistics in France was not greatly 
inconvenienced by the legislation on the protection of 
individualized data. 
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STATISTICS AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 
Mme. N. LENOIR 
Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés 
0. INTRODUCTION: SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
It appears odd at first sight that there should be any link 
between statistics and individual liberties. 
Indeed : 
- statistics deal not with individuals but with groups or 
social categories; 
- statistical data are the product of anonymous aggregates 
and therefore preclude identification of individuals; 
- the aim of statistical data is to provide more knowledge, 
in contrast to management data which serve as a basis for 
decisions on individuals (wages and salaries, granting of 
social security benefits, levying of taxes etc.). 
Nevertheless, this state science par excellence (if only by 
etymology) has always been linked with the individuals who 
provide the information on which statistics are based. 
- Ever since statistical surveys have existed, it has been 
necessary to overcome the reluctance of individuals to 
complete survey questionnaires. As a result, there have 
sometimes been incidents during the general population 
census, although the latter is now a well established part 
of French life. 
- It is true that the growth in the number of surveys and of 
statistical application of different types of data, 
facilitated by the advent of data processing, increases 
the risk of the violation of privacy by the disclosure, 
whether intentional or not, of confidential data. 
- Furthermore, statistics on production or services, insofar 
as they introduce an element of standardization, are often 
seen as a particularly burdensome means of monitoring the 
work of individuals. 
- Finally, like any science, statistics may be abused or 
contain serious errors of methodology and thus serve to 
lend legitimacy to actions which are pernicious or 
inopportune. 
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These risks of abuse, as well as the recognition of the wish 
of private individuals to preserve their privacy, have led 
to the establishment of protection for statistics, 
particularly public statistics, either by means of 
legislation or the introduction of practices on the 
initiative of researchers and statisticians, particularly 
those of the National Economic Studies and Statistical 
Institute (INSEE)U) . 
The legal framework for statistics in France, which forms 
the subject of this report, is relatively restrictive 
(1 and 2). One should even say that it sometimes acts as a 
brake on the development of research, and consideration 
should therefore be given to ways of relaxing this framework 
(3 and 4). 
1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: LAW OF 7 JUNE 1951 ON THE OBLIGATION TO 
MAKE RETURNSL THE COORDINATION OF SURVEYS AND STATISTICAL 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND ITS IMPLEMENTING DECREE 
The years following the Second World War, which were a 
period of reconstruction and growth, saw the introduction of 
modern planning techniques and the concomitant development 
of the government statistical apparatus, notably with the 
creation of the INSEE in 1946 as a directorate of the 
Ministry of Economics and Finance. This established 
statistics as an aid to governments in shaping their 
policies on the basis of prior information on the social and 
economic fabric. 
In the absence of electronic data processing, the 
favourite method of gathering data at the time was the use 
of surveys. But since any survey was likely to be viewed by 
individuals as an investigation if not an intrusion into 
their private lives, legislation was introduced in 1951 
permitting public authorities to conduct obligatory surveys 
on condition that a guarantee was given to those concerned 
that the information collected would remain confidential. 
Refusal to complete the questionnaires for surveys declared 
obligatory by the Minister of Economics and Finance carried 
a maximum fine of FF 10 000 imposed by the Minister. In 
order to arrive at a social consensus on the survey 
programmes to be conducted each year, the 1951 law set up a 
Statistical Survey Coordination Committee, which was 
replaced in 1972 by the National Council on Statistics. 
Under a Decree of 17 July 1984, the latter was itself 
replaced by the National Council on Statistical Information 
(CNIS). This consultative body, whose secretariat is 
(1) These practices are described in Mr. Begué's report. 
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provided by the INSEE has the same composition as its 
predecessors: it brings together the "vital elements of the 
nation" with members of Parliament, members of the Economic 
and Social Council, representatives of diverse public 
authorities, trade unions, local authorities, researchers, 
the association movement etc. The most significant change 
introduced by the 1984 reform is that it widens the field of 
action of the new Council, which now no longer simply 
delivers its opinion on the annual survey programme of the 
public services but also discusses plans for processing 
management-file data for statistical purposes, as well as 
the computerized processing of statistical surveys or 
management data. Indeed, for reasons of cost, reliability 
and availability, statistics are increasingly prepared from 
existing files, which have therefore become information 
repositories of national importance. 
2. GENERAL PROTECTION OF DATA: LAW OF 6 JANUARY 1978 ON 
AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING, DATA FILBS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
But in addition to public statistics, and even surveys and 
data processing subject to the opinion of the CNIS, there 
are numerous statistical applications and studies for 
commercial, research and other purposes. Statistics are not 
the exclusive domain of government statisticians, but are 
used by all types of bodies with the widest variety of 
statutes and objectives. Until recently, one had to rely on 
the voluntary observance of professional ethics, such as the 
code of ethics laid down by the survey institutes belonging 
to the SYNTEC professional organization. 
The Law of 6 January 1978 on automatic data processing, data 
files and civil liberties, which deals with the protection 
of data in general, applies primarily to statistics and 
makes no provision for exceptions or derogations. One might 
have thought that since statistics are anonymous, the law 
would not apply to them. This is not the case, since 
automated data processing systems, and even manual files, 
are subject to the law if the data collected are 
name-linked, i.e. allow direct or indirect identification of 
a natural person. Because of the principles which it sets 
out, the 1978 Law provided the opportunity for laying down a 
code of statistical ethics, and it was up to the National 
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Commission for Data Processing and Civil Liberties 
(CNIL) (1), an independent administrative authority, to work 
out precise rules. 
These rules, which stem from the 1978 Law or the CNIL, apply 
in addition to those laid down by the Law of 7 June 1951. 
They are all the more important when the latter law does not 
apply, in which case they go some way to plugging a legal 
loophole. 
The constraints placed on statisticians by the law on 
automatic data processing and civil liberties are of various 
types. 
Firstly, the law imposes the requirement of transparency. As 
in the case of all automated processing of name-linked data, 
processing of statistics prepared from personal data from 
surveys, or from existing files, must be declared to the 
CNIL. The CNIL examines the measures taken to preserve the 
confidentiality of the data processed and ensures that the 
processing is consonant with the tasks of the body 
submitting the declaration. 
The 1978 Law, on the other hand, imposes requirements 
concerning the methods used. Needless to say, it prohibits 
the collection of data by any fraudulent, dishonest or 
illicit means. But above all it establishes the principle of 
"informed consent" for respondents, particularly when 
questionnaires are used. Respondents must be informed 
whether replies are compulsory or optional, and of the 
consequences of failure to reply. They must also be told for 
whom the information collected is destined, and that they 
have a right to access and correction. This right subsists 
for as long as the data are kept in a name-linked form. This 
was pointed out by the CNIL, for example, in the case of 
census questionnaires retained by the administration which 
(1) Created by the 1978 Law, the CNIL has 17 members 
(members of parliament, members of the superior courts, 
members of the Economic and Social Council, and 
appropriately qualified persons). Its statutes give it 
total independence vis-à-vis the executive, and its 
members cannot be bound by instructions from any 
authority. The CNIL ensures that the procedures and 
principles laid down in the law are respected. In 
part icular, i t : 
- records all automatic processing of data and delivers 
opinions on the processing of data by the public 
sector ; 
- lays down "simplified" standards governing the most 
common types of automatic data processing; 
- ensures that individuals are able to exercise their 
right of access to data held on them in magnetic or 
manual files. 
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bear a reference number to a file containing the names and 
addresses of the persons covered by the census. 
Lastly, when delivering opinions of the processing of data 
from the public sector, the CNIL works on the principle of 
end use, according to which a body is allowed to process 
only those data relevant to its work. The processing of 
statistics, like other operations, is subject to the 
observance of this principle which in effect helps 
strengthen professional secrecy. The principle is applied 
both to sampling and the use of management files. Both are 
allowed only if the "source" files are connected with the 
final purpose of the research or statistics in order to 
avoid the use of the final purpose as justification for the 
exchange of confidential data between different statistical 
bodies which would not normally have the right of access to 
such data. 
3. THE CNIL'S "CASE LAW": BALANCING THE R I G H T S O F 
INDIVIDUALS SUPPLYING INFORMATIONFOR R E S E A R C H O R 
STATISTICS AGAINST THE INTEREST OF STATISTICS 
The need to defend the interest of statistics as a 
scientific tool for obtaining knowledge is a constant 
preoccupation of the CNIL. However, the CNIL cannot go as 
far as to obviate the application of the 1978 Law, which 
does not allow any exemptions for the processing of 
statistical data, not even for the right of access on which 
the Council of Europe Convention (1) allows restrictions to 
be imposed when files are used for statistical purposes or 
scientific research. Nevertheless, the Commission has sought 
to simplify the procedures for declaring statistical files 
and to facilitate the use of certain administrative data. 
The first step taken by the CNIL was to issue "simplified 
standards" laying down the conditions to be met by 
statistical processing operations in order for them to 
qualify for a simple "declaration of existence". Processing 
operations outside the bounds of the standards must be 
declared in the normal way or, in the case of processing 
operations by the administration, submitted to the CNIL for 
an opinion. Two standards were adopted in 1981, and a third 
was in the process of being adopted in November 1983. The 
first standard, covering individual enterprises, applies to 
sectors. The second is concerned with sample surveys carried 
(1) Convention for the protection of individuals from the 
dangers inherent in the automatic processing of personal 
data, opened for signature in January 1981 and ratified 
by France at the end of 1983. 
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out by the government and public administrative bodies, but 
is restricted to surveys using samples of less than 5* of 
the population covered by the survey. The third standard has 
a much broader scope and, in addition, has the advantage of 
providing for changes in statistical methods. It allows for 
several possibilities: the use of an administrative source 
for survey samples or for obtaining statistical results; the 
coupling of data from one sample survey with information 
taken from an administrative file; and the comparison of 
administrative files on the condition, of course, that the 
secrecy regulations applying to each administrative unit and 
its particular field are observed. 
The CNIL then allowed survey institutes to submit a single 
annual declaration per series of surveys instead of one 
declaration per survey, which would have been too onerous. 
But the Commission, in praetorian style, also felt it 
appropriate to relax certain conditions laid down by the 
law, whose strict application would have impeded research. 
Firstly, it exempted certain social science and medical 
researchers for the requirement of obtaining the prior 
consent of handicapped patients on whom certain data were 
collected, on the grounds of the psychological reactions 
that certain questions to such persons might produce. On the 
other hand, with political surveys, the Commission showed 
itself to be much more strict and requires any bodies 
carrying out such surveys to obtain the written agreement -
as they are required to by law - of the respondents. The 
survey institute argued that this procedure would be certain 
to produce biased survey results, since only those with deep 
political convictions were likely to agree to sign survey 
questionnaires. As a result, they asked for an exception to 
be made. 
Secondly, the CNIL developed the concept of "broader end 
use" on the basis of which it approved the use for 
statistical purposes of data taken from administrative 
files. But this concept nevertheless remains of limited 
application, since it extends only to internal statistics 
produced as a by-product or from surveys conducted by bodies 
with the same aims as the service managing the processing of 
source data. 
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With the exception of the possibilities offered by the 
concept of "broader end use", access by researchers and 
statisticians to files, and especially administrative files, 
is limited by the principle of end use, and especially the 
older principle of professional secrecy. 
4. MOVBS TOWARDS ADAPTING DATA PROTECTION LAW TO RBSEARCH 
AND STATISTICAL NEEDS 
The work of researchers and statisticians raises two sets of 
ethical questions. 
- The first relates to the end use of statistical work, 
which may prove incompatible with the spirit of the 
research work and pose a threat both to individuals and to 
the general interest. This is the case when statistics are 
falsified in order to manipulate public opinion. It also 
applies when personal data collected or prepared in the 
course of a research project are used as a basis for 
decisions relating to individuals prejudicial to the 
individuals concerned. 
- The second set of questions concerns the methods used, 
both as regards the facilities provided for statisticians 
for gaining access to information and particularly the 
guarantees of anonymity given to research subjects. 
But here, as we have seen, French law provides only 
incomplete answers. Given the substantial growth in 
statistical needs, it is understandable that there are those 
who ask whether it would not now be appropriate to update 
the Law of 7 June 1951 (see above), or even to prepare 
special legislation governing research and statistics. In 
return for certain new possibilities granted to them, such 
legislation should require researchers to observe a common 
code of ethics whatever the field in question and whatever 
their personal status might be, since one of the major 
difficulties in regulating statistics is the extremely 
varied nature of the research and statistical field. 
The new regulatory instrument, if it materializes, should at 
all events achieve a balance between the interests of 
research and statistics and the preservation of individual 
liberties, including the respect of privacy. 
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Regarding the first set of questions: 
Under certain conditions it might be appropriate to provide 
researchers with access to data held by public 
administrations. This would require a change in current 
legislation on professional secrecy. The CNIL, which is 
studying the problems posed by the creation of statistical 
records on cancer by bringing together information from the 
most diverse sources (analysis laboratories, hospitals, 
anti-cancer centres etc.), has virtually arrived at the 
conclusion that these databanks will be legal only if there 
is a change in the secrecy regulations. Should this change 
be restricted to the medical field? Should it be extended to 
all public statistics by, for example, granting the INSEE a 
general right of access to administrative data subject to 
the conclusion of protocols between the INSEE and the public 
administrations in possession of the information? 
Should one not also seek to introduce a certain flexibility 
as regards the collection of personal data, at least in 
certain circumstances? Cancer records are a good example of 
instances in which it is difficult to tell those being 
researched, who often have little or no knowledge of the 
reality of the illness from which they are suffering, of 
what is behind the questions they are being asked. 
It should also be possible to make it easier to use the 
general population census for obtaining samples. Under 
current legislation, only the INSEE has this possibility and 
it is forbidden by the statistical secrecy principle to pass 
on the information to any other body conducting surveys. 
As regards the second set of questions: 
It would appear advisable to accept the principle of a 
"functional separation" of data managers and researchers set 
out in a Recommendation of the Council of Europe of April 
1982. According to this principle, "personal data collected 
for research must not be used for other purposes. In 
particular, they must not be employed for taking decisions 
or measures directly affecting the person concerned, except 
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in the context of the research project or with the consent 
of the person concerned". This principle is, in effect, 
aimed as much at protecting the persons being researched as 
at safeguarding researchers and statisticians from pressure 
and suspicion. 
The penalties for the violation of the privacy of 
respondents have already been laid down in various penal 
statutes. Article 378 of the Penal Code, invoked by the 1951 
Law on statistical secrecy, provides for penalties of up to 
FF 8 000 and imprisonment for periods of up to 6 months. The 
law on automatic data processing and civil liberties also 
contains numerous provisions for the imposition of severe 
penalties, notably for the fraudulent collection of data, 
failure to take security measures to preserve the integrity 
and confidentiality of data (Article 42), the disclosure of 
name-linked information, even as a result of imprudence or 
negligence, when such disclosure is prejudicial to the 
reputation or esteem of the person concerned or constitutes 
a violation of that person's privacy (Article 43), as well 
as a change in the end use of the data processed 
(Article 44). 
These penalties could equally well be applied to research 
and statistics. It is in order to make researchers more 
accountable that the CNIL ensures that all processing of 
statistical data is declared to it, not only by the 
requesting body but also by the head of the research 
project. This principle of joint responsibility could be 
incorporated into law. 
The CNIL has a decisive influence on shaping the security 
measures to be taken to guarantee the anonymity of research 
subjects. One must also recognize that professional secrecy, 
which, in particular, forbids the exchange of information 
between administrations, even for statistical purposes, 
provides ample justification for the introduction of 
cryptography or depersonalization techniques such as the 
"double blind" method. In the event of a relaxation of the 
rules governing the access of statisticians to information, 
it would be absolutely essential to tighten the security 
regulations. The CNIL is therefore working on a standard 
security regulation within the framework of its regulatory 
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powers. This standard regulation could be supplemented by a 
special regulation applying to the processing of statistical 
data. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Whatever their justification, whatever their - for the most 
part - disinterested aims, there can be no question of 
granting research and statistics any immunity whatever as 
regards the protection of personal data. A legal framework, 
supplemented by guidelines on public statistical programmes 
drawn up by the National Council on Statistical Information 
and by CNIL guidelines on automatic data processing, should 
make it possible to satisfy the social need for more 
detailed statistical information, while at the same time 
respecting the rights of the individual to a "human 
identity", to quote the phrase used in the first Article of 
the Law of 6 January 1978 on automatic data processing, data 
files and civil liberties. 
DISCUSSION 
PROFESSOR KEIDING (University of Copenhagen) opened the 
discussion : 
Since he worked as a biostat istician with social science 
applications, he could look at the question of data 
protection from the outside. He doubted whether the general 
public was aware of the distinction between administrative 
and statistical uses of the many registers now being 
compiled, and strongly supported Mme. Lenoir's 
recommendation that the principle of "functional separation" 
should be strengthened. Nowadays statistical data could no 
longer be defined simply as tables since the individual 
record was the basic statistical item of data, particularly 
where longitudinal records were concerned. The consequences 
of incorrect data could therefore be very serious since the 
effects of even slight errors might accumulate. The measures 
necessary to ensure correctness were rather close in 
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substance to administrative uses of the registers which made 
functional separation more difficult to accomplish for the 
authorities and less easy for the public to believe. He saw 
no simple solution to these problems. 
The data protection agencies represented another aspect of 
the question of forming public opinion. Professor Keiding 
asked for some further precision as to how current aspects 
of public opinion were represented in the CNIL and how the 
CNIL ensured that the public was aware of and appreciated 
its work. 
Mr. JOHNSTON (United Nations Statistical Office) posed a 
number of questions concerning the mandate of the CNIL: 
(a) Was this confined to data processing within government 
departments or did it extend to data on individuals 
collected in the private sector, e.g. banks, insurance 
companies, credit-card companies? (b) was it concerned with 
data collection plans, data processing, the compilation of 
statistics and the dissemination of the data? He noted 
that the concept of "final use of data" was emphasised in 
Mme. Lenoir's paper and asked whether this was important for 
the CNIL's work in the private as well as in the public 
sector. 
The author replied to the discussion : 
She gave further information about the Commission Nationale 
de l'Informatique et des Libertés. This was an independent 
administrative authority. It had seventeen members drawn 
from the legislature, the judiciary, the executive and the 
"forces vives" of the nation represented by the Economic and 
Social Committee. The Commission was concerned with all 
data-registers whether public or private. 
Anyone wishing to set up a register must make a declaration 
to the Commission giving full details of its nature and 
purpose and must receive the authorization of the 
Commission. The functioning of the register was then 
supervised by the Commission. 
Public opinion was not represented on the Commission as 
such, nor could it be defined for this purpose. However, the 
work of the Commission received wide publicity. An annual 
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report of the deliberations and decisions was published and 
was given to the press. Important cases were widely reported 
in the press and might be the subject of press conferences. 
Decisions of the Commission were available to the public in 
municipal offices, while the general public had access to 
the register of registers maintained by the Commission. No 
special dispensations or derogations applied to statistics: 
if a statistician wished to extract data from a file, his 
activities concerned the Commission in the same way as those 
of any other user. 
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DATA PROTECTION IN A NATIONAL 
REGISTER-BASED STATISTICAL SYSTEM 
L. THYGESEN 
Danmarks Statistik 
SUMMARY 
The main source for social and demographic statistics in 
Denmark is data from administrative registers. A coherent 
statistical system has been developed on this basis since 
1970 and was used, for example, to carry out the 1981 census 
of population and housing. For this system to function, the 
statistical service must have access to identified personal 
data from registers and a common, unambiguous personal code 
number must be used. 
To establish and maintain such a system, great importance 
must be attached to a data policy which provides the public 
with a guarantee that personal data will not be misused. In 
this paper a number of problems relating to data policy are 
discussed in the light of Danish experience. 
0. INTRO DUCTION 
It has been recognized for very many years that information 
on individuals must be used when compiling social statistics 
(e.g. results of population censuses). This has been 
necessary to enable the basic data to be checked and any 
errors found in them rectified. From an early stage, 
statisticians were aware that this required protection of an 
individual's identity. 
The development of data processing methods over the past few 
decades has widened the scope for using personal data for 
statistical purposes and, in so doing, made it possible to 
analyse social phenomena which previously could not be 
explored. 
At the same time, however, there is in most countries 
increasing concern about the uses to which computerized 
personal data may be put. This is mainly attributable to the 
fact that public authorities have created large personal 
registers in order to be able to administer legal provision 
of ever increasing complexity. The existence of registers 
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has made the individual citizen afraid that he might be kept 
under surveillance and has led to demands for restrictions 
on the use of the registers. 
Although statistics consist only of statements about groups 
of people and not about individuals, the use of personal 
data in statistics has not gone unnoticed in the public 
debate. On the contrary, statistics have been one of the 
favourite targets of criticism, perhaps because it has not 
always been understood that they can serve a useful purpose. 
In Denmark the use of administrative registers for 
statistical purposes is probably more widespread than in any 
other country; nowadays virtually all the personal 
statistics compiled form a coherent system based on the 
administrative sources. The whole system is founded on the 
coordination of data using common personal identifiers. 
A statistical system like that in Denmark focuses attention 
on problems of data policy. It is vital that the statistical 
services have access to the administrative registers and 
this access can be ensured only if the public remains 
confident that personal data can be used for statistical 
purposes only. 
Starting with the Danish experience, this paper discusses 
the problems associated with data protection in a 
statistical system which is based mainly on administrative 
registers. By way of introduction, Section 2 briefly 
examines the principles underlying the Danish statistical 
system. This is followed by a discussion of the aims of data 
policy and the means which can be used in a number of 
practical problems related to dissemination of statistics, 
data collection and data processing. 
1.THECOMPILATION OFSTATISTICS IN DENMARK 
The compilation of statistics in Denmark is more centralized 
than in many other countries. The central statistical office 
(Danmarks Statistik), which is responsible for most social 
statistics of a general nature, is an independent public 
body which was set up under a special law. 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, one of the aims of the 
strategic planning undertaken by Danmarks Statistik has been 
to set up a coherent system of personal statistics based on 
information from administrative registers kept by various 
authorities. This stems from that fact that the actions of 
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public administrative authorities in Denmark are based to a 
large extent on information in registers relating to the 
"objects" of administrative action, e.g. citizens, 
businesses and buildings. 
1.1. The administrattive registers 
In 1924 a statutory duty was laid on every municipality in 
Denmark to set up a local population register, i.e. a file 
containing information about all persons living in the 
municipality. These registers were to contain identifying 
information such as occupation, name, birth date and place 
of birth. Apart from these, the most important items of 
information were the address, family circumstances, 
nationality. 
The municipalities had to continuously update the files 
using information on births, marriages, deaths, etc. 
obtained from various public authorities while the 
individual citizen was obliged to report any changes of 
address directly to the registration office. 
A major reform of the population register system took place 
in 1968. The municipal registers continued in being but in 
addition a central population register, or CPR, was created. 
This is a computerized register covering the whole of the 
Danish population. The central register and the local 
registers are updated as part of one coordinated 
administrative process. 
An important part of the reform was the introduction of a 
permanent and unique identification number for every 
citizen: The Person Number. This number was regarded as a 
practical necessity for the operation of the central 
population register. In addition, it was to be introduced in 
every area of public administration, thus replacing the 
large number of numerical systems which had hitherto been 
used by the various administrative departments. 
The main reason for setting up the CPR was the wish to avoid 
duplicate registers and the use of extra resources which 
that involved. Another reason was the prospect of a tax 
reform involving the introduction of a PAYE system, which 
would be difficult to operate without a very reliable system 
for identifying persons living in Denmark. 
Information from the CPR is used by the public 
administrative bodies in almost all areas relating to the 
individual citizen. This means that there are many 
opportunities to identify and correct or remedy errors and 
defects in the information contained in the register. 
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In the years following the creation of the CPR, the use of 
computers by the Danish authorities greatly increased and 
large personal registers were created to administer the 
collection of taxes, the payment of pensions, etc. All these 
registers, which are valuable sources for statistics, use 
the Person Number as identifier. 
In 1977 a law was introduced which set up a nationwide 
buildings and dwellings register to be used by the municipal 
authorities. It was thought that the information in the 
register on the size and layout of dwellings could be used 
as a basis for future population and housing censuses. 
Special care was taken to ensure that the details of 
addresses given in the CPR and in the building and housing 
register corresponded exactly to one another so that 
information on individuals and information on housing could 
be linked automatically. Experience has shown that this 
system offers a high degree of reliability. 
Finally, mention should be made of the central business 
register, which contains basic data on both enterprises 
(legal units) and establishments (local units). The 
register, set up under a statutory provision in 1975, is 
kept by Danmarks Statistik. The law in question presupposes 
the existence of a unique numbering system for 
establishments which can be used by public administrative 
authorities and other bodies. 
1.2. The principles underlying the system jjf personal 
statistics 
The Danish system of personal statistics has developed 
progressively since 1970 in parallel with the creation of 
the administrative registers on which it is based. The first 
step was to reorganize the annual vital population and its 
movements, with information broken down by sex, age, place 
of residence (municipality), etc. Statistics on income, 
employment, etc. then followed. The basic development work 
was not completed until 1981. 
The system's effectiveness was demonstrated by the 1981 
population and housing census which was carried out without 
sending questionnaires to the public but solely by collating 
information already available in the system. This kind of 
census could, in principle, be carried out every year. 
The statistical system is concerned mainly with persons. It 
also contains information on the dwellings where these 
persons live and on the places of employment where they 
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work. In the system, these three types of objects are linked 
by means of the unique identifiers for each subject: person 
number, the exact address of a dwelling and a single code 
for the place of employment. 
Each object has a number of characteristics, such as age, 
employment, and number of rooms in the dwelling, which can 
constitute useful statistical information regarding the 
situation of the individuals concerned. 
The aim of the system is to create a statistical description 
of the person's social and demographic situation and of 
changes in this situation. The description is intended to 
enable many types of statistical analysis to be made. There 
will often be a need for analyses which cut across 
traditional statistical branches and which require data from 
many different types of register. 
The basic information on the three objects mentioned 
(persons, dwellings and places of employment) and on the 
relationship between them is contained in a number of 
independant statistical registers. Each of these registers 
is designed to be used for a single statistical area (e.g. 
education statistics) and contains the data required for 
this purpose. At present there are 35 statistical registers. 
Two or more registers are combined to extract anonymous 
statistical data only if this is required for an actual 
survey. 
Most of the registers are updated once a year although some 
are updated more frequently. The updating work normally 
consists of a statistical revision of extracts from one or 
more administrative registers. The basic information is 
compared, checked and amended so as to obtain the best 
possible overall view of the characteristics which form part 
of these statistics. The sources for a statistical register 
often consist of many administrative registers because the 
combinations of data which occur in the administrative 
registers are not relevant to those who use the statistics. 
Since the coordination of data using person numbers is an 
essential part of the updating procedure, information 
extracted from the source registers must contain personal 
ident ifiers. 
The time lag between the date on which the data are 
collected and the updating of the various registers ranges 
from two months to one year, depending on the updating 
procedures used for the source registers. 
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2. D ΑΤΑ POLICY OF THE CENTRAL STA TISTICAL OFFICE 
The type of statistical system established in Denmark 
requires that the statistical processing of the registers 
takes place centrally. 
It is often suggested that the administrative authorities 
which have control over information should themselves carry 
out statistical surveys, thus avoiding the need to pass on 
personal data. One point in favour of this approach is that 
those keeping the register are normally themselves among the 
most important users of these statistics and therefore know 
what is required and, at the same time, are very well 
acquainted with the characteristics of the register and are 
therefore in the best position to update it. But, as was 
indicated in the previous section, if administrative 
information is to be made generally suitable for statistical 
purposes, it is essential that the information from several 
sources be combined at an individual level. The data policy 
of the Central Office must therefore guarantee access to 
personal data. 
Since public opinion and policy-making bodies are very much 
on their guard against the unauthorized use of personal 
data, the recognition that data protection is vital for the 
central statistical office must be the starting point when 
devising a strategy for data policy. It is essential that 
the general public and politicians have no misgivings 
whatsoever about handing over personal data to 
statist icians. 
A leak of personal data would naturally have disastrous 
consequences for the work of the statistical service. The 
suspicion that a leak might occur must be clearly dispelled. 
Indeed, there must be no possibility of one occurring. 
Experience has shown that even totally unjustified 
suspicions which are publicized in the news media can be 
very harmful and difficult to allay. 
It is not sufficient for management to recognize the 
importance of data protection and lay down rules regarding 
which personal data may be used and how they should be 
processed. Every member of staff at the central office must 
be made aware of the importance of data security. It is here 
that data security must be guaranteed. 
In day-to-day work involving the handling of data and 
contact with customers, decisions must be taken on many 
questions which may seem trivial or innocuous but which, 
when combined, constitute the data protection of the 
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Statistical office. It is a difficult task for a management 
to ensure that every one understands and accepts the reasons 
for the data protection rules and that they take them 
ser iously. 
If this aim is to be achieved, the central office must 
pursue an active data policy. It is dangerous if data 
protection provisions are regarded as a necessary evil which 
is forced on the statistical office from outside, e.g. by a 
data inspection board. The central office must therefore 
take the initiative itself and lay down data security 
criteria. This must be done in the knowledge that the 
precautions may involve extra expenditure and inconvenience, 
which have to be weighed against the benefits obtained. 
It is important that data security should not be regarded as 
something statistic, i.e. as a set of rules laid down once 
and for all. In the first place, observance of the rules 
must be continuously monitored or the rules will gradually 
lose their importance and come to be regarded as ridiculous. 
Responsibility for this monitoring work should be assigned 
according to the division of responsibility in the various 
departments of the organization. In addition, the 
effectiveness and suitability of the rules must be kept 
under constant review so that any necessary amendments can 
be made. 
While data protection within the organization must be 
maintained at a high level, it is management's task to 
inform the public and those who make decisions about what is 
being done. Many people have wildly exaggerated ideas about 
what data Danmarks Statistik handles and what these data can 
or must be used for. 
The first step is therefore to ensure that the public really 
has no reason to feel anxious because the statisticians deal 
in a careful and considerate way with confidential data 
("internal" marketing of data security). Next, data security 
must be publicized "externally" i.e. steps must be taken to 
ensure that the public is not afraid of the statistical 
organization. Efforts must be made to create an 
understanding that statistical registers are not harmful if 
effective data protection is provided. The organization 
cannot be "sold" externally unless it has its own house in 
order. 
Data protection is at one with the main aim of the central 
office's work, namely, to give users of statistics the best 
possible service. There will often be an apparent conflict 
between the two aims. But each must be given due weight if 
the central office is to continue to have access to the 
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administrative registers. If the statistics produced by the 
central office cannot be regarded as effective or useful, it 
is no use claiming that the data protection provisions work 
well. 
The following subsection contains a discussion of the 
balance to be achieved between these two aims in the case of 
the dissemination of statistics, data collection and data 
processing. First, a short account will be given of certain 
aspects of Danish data protection legislation. 
2.1 Legislation on registers 
At the end of the 1970s, as in many other countries, Denmark 
introduced legislation on registers which lays down general 
rules for the establishment and management by public 
authorities of computerized registers containing personal 
data. The law specifies that a Data Surveillance Authority 
("Registertilsyn") should be set up with the task of 
supervising registers and the special data protection rules 
laid down for each individual register. 
Under the law, every instance in which several registers are 
linked must be notified to the supervisory board, which can 
lay down conditions governing the way in which this record 
linkage is made. 
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By and large the law has made it easier for Danmarks 
Statistik to carry out its work. Clear rules have been laid 
down for a number of questions, and it is an advantage for 
Danmarks Statistik that it does not provide the only 
guarantee that information will not be misused. 
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2.2. Dissemination of statistics 
Both the central statistical offices and users of statistics 
have good reasons for wishing statistics to be presented in 
a form which makes them immediately available to users for 
further processing and analysis. 
However, it is difficult or impossible for the central 
office to find the resources to study user's problems in 
sufficient depth or to assist directly with any analytical 
work which users would like to carry out. 
On the other hand, the central office has an obligation to 
provide users with the best possible conditions for using 
the basic data collected; this is especially important in a 
country like Denmark where statistics are produced centrally 
and where, in many areas, users have little possibility of 
themselves collecting basic information of the same quality 
as that provided by the central office. 
For the major users of statistics, publications are not 
sufficient. From them it is important to have access to 
analytical facilities which can test new methods or give 
answers to new questions in a rapid and flexible manner. It 
would be inconvenient if this work required communicating 
with third parties. 
Many users might therefore wish to receive copies of or 
'extracts from Danmarks Statistik's registers. But, as 
mentioned earlier, there is a well-established tradition at 
Danmarks Statistik, which is now backed up by legal 
authority, that personal data are not passed on. 
The central office must find solutions to this problem which 
satisfy users and which also enable it to maintain its 
central role in the production of statistics and its access 
to information from registers. One technical solution is to 
supply machine-readable information, usually on magnetic 
tape, which must have a high level of breakdown so that it 
can be used in a flexible way. This type of information 
would not be suitable for publication. A borderline case is 
the system which has become increasingly popular in several 
countries, including the USA, namely the supply of "model 
data", where each record deals with one of the "objects" 
covered by the statistics (a person, family, undertaking, 
etc.). The objects, of course, must not be identified. 
Supplying very detailed information may raise a number of 
problems which have to be considered before deciding whether 
this form of statistical service should be provided. The 
danger that the statistics might reveal information about 
individuals or undertakings must be taken into account in 
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any statistical work. The possibility of providing very 
detailed information which cannot be published increases the 
risk of such disclosures taking place unless measures are 
taken to prevent it. 
The following measures might be taken: 
- limiting the number of recipients; data should be supplied 
only for a specific purpose and be regarded as 
confidential by users; any analytical results intended for 
publication must be submitted to the statistical office in 
advance. 
- limiting data contents; the degree of detail must be 
defined on the basis of a concrete assessment of the aims 
specified and of the possibility that users might 
recognize the "subjects"; thus, for example, sample data 
might be supplied instead of full information; 
- the suppression of certain data of the introduction of 
"interference" in the data without fundamentally altering 
the results which can be derived from them (see for 
example "Report on statistical Disclosure and 
Disclosure-Avoidance Techniques, US Department of Commerce 
1978): this procedure, however, has not been adopted by 
Danmarks Statistik. 
Moreover, the supply of very detailed information gives rise 
to other problems apart from those relating only to data 
security. There is a risk that users might publish figures 
which are not statistically reliable or are difficult to 
compare with the official statistics. 
An example of how the supply of detailed statistical 
information is dealt with in Denmark is provided by the 
so-called "lovmodel" (law model) which Danmarks Statistik 
has developed in collaboration with the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. 
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An important task for a central statistical office is to 
supply information which enables Parliament, the government 
and the administrative authorities to calculate the 
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consequences of a particular piece of legislation. This 
applies not least to calculations made when preparing new 
legislation or amending existing laws. In such situations it 
is necessary to examine the ways in which legislation will 
affect both individuals, the family or groups of persons as 
well as society as a whole, where, for example, it is useful 
to know the overall effects of legislation on budgetary 
matters. As a rule, the calculations have to be made in a 
hurry and require a highly flexible statistical basis. At 
the same time it is desirable to be able to analyse the way 
in which one law interacts with others. 
Danmarks Statistik has established the statistical basis of 
the law model using the statistical registers to form "model 
populations". The information exists in the form of 
information on non-identified persons or families forming a 
representative cross-section of the population. Each model 
population is intended to be used within one or more 
legislative areas and thus there is no universal model 
population which can be used for calculations relating to 
all the possible consequences of legislation. At present 
there are 15 model populations. 
The system also contains a computerized model of existing 
and contemplated legislation on taxes and subsidies. 
The users (at present 10 Ministries and administrative 
departments) have access via terminals to Danmarks Statistik 
computer installation where the law model is run. The users 
carry out their model calculations themselves but can draw 
on the systems' joint facilities, including the model 
populations. 
Access to the model is given only to central government and 
the model cannot be used to produce statistics. 
2_._3_. Data collection 
Since this paper is mainly concerned with statistics based 
on administrative registers, the question of information on 
respondents obtained in interviews or postal inquiries will 
not be discussed here. However, problems of data policy also 
arise when data is collected from administrative 
authorit ies . 
Danmarks Statistik has a general legal right to ask for 
information from the authorities. However, the question as 
to the form in which the information can be requested has 
been a subject of some debate. Thus, at the end of the 
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1970s, certain municipalities claimed that Danmarks 
Statistik was not entitled to ask for information about 
individual recipients of social assistance on the grounds 
that this information was protected by confidentiality 
provisions. The information in question was to be used for a 
new set of social statistics and the method of collection 
was devised so as to minimize the amount of reporting 
required of the municipalities. The case, which led to a 
great deal of public debate, was settled by the Danish 
Supreme Court, which clearly upheld Danmarks Statistik's 
contention that the information should be provided. 
There is also the question as to what types of personal data 
Danmarks Statistik should collect. Of course, Danmarks 
Statistik's position on this question must depend in part on 
the type of statistics which users would like to see 
produced. In addition, however, the law on registers lays 
down direct restrictions on the information that can be 
recorded on a person's political and religious beliefs, etc. 
2.4. Data processing 
One of the main purposes of data policy is to prevent the 
basic data over which the statistical service has control 
from falling into the hands of unauthorized persons or being 
used for purposes other than those originally intended. The 
dangers arising here range from various types of accidental 
leaks of personal data due to careless gossip or negligent 
handling of information on the part of an official to 
attempts at industrial espionage or intelligence gathering. 
The probability that an attempt will be made to gather 
intelligence must be regarded as negligible since Danmarks 
Statistik does not possess information of great interest to 
intelligence services. On the other hand, there is a real 
risk of accidental leaks. Even though such a leak, if it 
occurs, will not normally harm the individuals covered by 
the information, it is important to take steps to prevent 
this happening. This also applies to the risk of a 
"political" attempt aimed at proving that the statistical 
service does not take sufficient care of its personal data; 
if an attempt to steal personal data were successful, the 
harmful effects would be incalculable. To provide effective 
protection against these risks, various data security 
measures have to be taken. However, the most important thing 
is to recognize that there is a need for vigilance in every 
part of the service and that the problems may appear to be 
trivial or absurd to individual members of staff if they 
cannot be convinced of their importance. 
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As regards electronic data processing, the following special 
security precautions have now become standard practice: 
- restrictions on and control of physical access to certain 
areas, e.g. to the magnetic tape library; 
- the authorization of persons who will have access to files 
with confidential information; 
- systematic checks on the use of files; 
- rules regarding the dispatch of magnetic tapes. 
At Danmarks Statistik these rules are supplemented by very 
stringent provisions on the handling of files containing 
particularly sensitive personal data. Thus, all personal 
identifiers in a register of diagnosed cancer cases which is 
being used for an epidemiological analysis must be encoded 
and may be retransformed to obtain the person numbers only 
for those few individuals whose personal data have to be 
corrected. 
Introducing rules of this kind inevitably involves a great 
deal of extra work and, hence, an additional strain on 
resources. However, the problems involved in safeguarding 
lists of errors and other transcripts containing personal 
data which are used by the staff in various statistical 
departments are much greater. Such material may be made 
accessible only to persons who need to examine it during the 
course of their work. The material must therefore be locked 
up when it is not being used and the doors of the offices 
concerned must be locked when no one is inside. 
Contrary to what one might expect at first sight, the 
greatest security risk is associated with manual data 
processing. Here, maximum care must be taken when handling 
confidential information. 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The way in which official statistics are organized varies 
from one country to another. This is due, inter alia, to 
differences in legislation or the way in which society is 
generally organized and this includes the mode of operation 
of the public administrative authorities. There are also 
differences, determined by past history, in the public's 
attitude towards statistics and the registration of 
individuals. 
The data policy of each statistical service must, of course, 
adapt itself to the conditions existing in the country 
concerned. The experience gained in Denmark is therefore not 
quite the same as that gained in other countries. Readers 
will doubtless be familiar with many of the thoughts on data 
policy which have been presented in this paper and which 
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involve the need to reconcile conflicting considerations. 
There is a common interest in ensuring that personal data 
are protected and that the interests of individual citizens 
are not put at risk by statistical activities, although 
there is no clear answer as to how this should be done. 
DISCUSSION 
Mme. LENOIR (Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des 
Libertés) opened the discussion : 
French statisticians were dazzled by the possibilities for 
statistical analysis offered by the Danish system. In 
Denmark the manipulation of the various registers for the 
compilation of statistics was concentrated in Danmarks 
Statistik while there were, presumably as in France, many 
requests from local administrations and private bodies for 
statistical data. It would be interesting to know whether 
all such requests had to be channelled through Danmarks 
Statistik as well as whether the linking of the registers 
was done solely for statistical purposes or whether there 
were cases in which this might have use for administrative 
purposes. Finally she asked for some information of a 
historical nature on the steps involved in setting up the 
Danish system. 
Mr. RAPAPORT (Statistics Sweden) remarked as follows: 
In Sweden they received between 20 000 and 30 000 requests 
per annum for extracts from the central register from people 
wishing to check the information about themselves. Initially 
the authorities were apprehensive about this feature in the 
operation of the register but later were very much in 
favour. People were able to check for themselves that there 
was nothing sinister in the register and their usual comment 
was "But I knew that already". There was no quick way of 
gaining the public acceptance required to operate a central 
register system effectively. This had to be built up by a 
policy of creating an informed public opinion over a long 
t ime. 
Professor FLAHERTY (Uni versity of Western Ontario) raised 
the point: 
There had been no big debate about the 1981 census in 
Denmark. In view of the intense debates in the adjoining 
countries was the 1981 census carried out so discreetly that 
it aroused no public attention? 
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Dr. BAUMANN (der Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz) 
remarked: 
It was clear that the most important source of population 
statistics in Denmark was the administrative register 
system, taken in conjunction with a unique identification 
number for each citizen. In the case of the Federal Republic 
of Germany this form of statistical inquiry was ruled out by 
the judgment of the Constitutional Court concerning the 
census. The Federal Constitutional Court dealt with this 
question in connection with the examination of whether or 
not there was at present any simpler alternative to the full 
enumerations of the population. Its rejection of the Danish 
solution was based on the fact that the use of data from 
different registers required that technical, organizational 
and legal measures be put into effect before these data 
could be collated. This would, according to the Court, be a 
decisive step in that the individual citizen's entire 
personality would be registered and catalogued. The 
collating of available data was, therefore, in no way a 
simpler method. 
Mr. CARIANI (Istituto Centrale di Statist i ca) asked: 
Could further information be provided about the problem of 
updating certain items of information in the register 
notably those relating to occupation. 
The author replied to the debate: 
The local administration was not entitled to obtain 
information about identifiable individuals from the 
register, while applications from the courts had also been 
successfully resisted by Danmarks Statistik. As regards the 
history of the Danish system, this had its origin largely in 
ideas developed in other countries, in particular these of 
the Norwegian statistician, Professor Norbotten in the 
1960s. When Danmarks Statistik was founded, Parliament 
proposed that it should make use of administrative data from 
other bodies, so that the lines of work were established. 
Individuals were not entitled to know what was registered 
about them as in Sweden. Less than 100 requests for such 
information were received in a year. The cost of instituting 
such a system would be very considerable and it would make 
the risk of leakage of personalized data somewhat greater. 
Considerable efforts were made to inform the public about 
the census so as to illustrate the use made of the register. 
However the news media showed little interest. The data 
Surveillance Authority was neither particularly in favour 
nor particularly against a census being carried out. There 
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had been some public debate but this occurred in the 1970s 
when the law on public registers was being passed. Some 
mention of this was made in the paper. 
The question on updating occupation was one of the big 
problems of the register system. However, they did have 
information on place of work and the activity carried on 
there. There was also information on occupation from tax 
registers and unemployment registers. With a view to 
improving the occupational data possibilities based on these 
various sources were being examined. 
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STATISTICS AND PRIVACY - THE OFFICIAL PRODUCTION 
OF STATISTICS AT A CROSSROADS 
EDMUND RAPAPORT, POL.MAG., JUR.KAND. 
Statistics Sweden 
SUMMARY 
From about the beginning of the 1970s those concerned with 
the production of statistics have been grappling with 
certain problems relating to the use of primary data. This 
problem is derived fundamentally from the apprehensions of 
the general public and of legislators about the detrimental 
effects of the collection and storage of data for those whom 
the latter concern. In this paper, this and connected 
problems are described and discussed on the basis of certain 
experience that has been gained, chiefly in Sweden. 
Questions concerning legal safeguards for confidentiality 
and privacy, data security and record linkage in the 
production of statistics are taken up. Finally, certain 
hypotheses relating to the situation concerning the 
production of statistics are put forward in the light of 
current opinion trends and also some thoughts of relevance 
to the latter regarding a desirable line of policy. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The well-known problem with which the official statistical 
agencies are grappling today can be summarized briefly in 
this way. They now find themselves in a field of force whose 
opposite poles consist, on the one hand, of an intensified 
and more clearly articulated demand for statistical 
information, a markedly improved production potential 
chiefly due to automatic processing techniques but also due 
to advances in methodology - and reduced financial 
resources. On the other hand, they are opposed by the 
apprehension felt by the general public about statistical 
activities in respect of the preservation of confidentiality 
and personal privacy. The first three factors - demand, 
techniques and methods, finance - can be dealt with by 
rational and logical methods. The fourth factor - fears 
about imperfect confidentiality safeguards and encroachment 
on the personal sphere - can only to some degree be met in 
the same rational manner. Such problems are elusive, are 
largely to be found at the psychological level and, despite 
the volume of material which has by now been written in this 
field, must be said to be still insufficiently investigated 
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and, to an even lesser extent, to be solved. These fears, 
also standing diametrically opposed to the three other 
factors, constitute the issue that gives rise to the tension 
in this field. 
It is probably no exaggeration to say that in this situation 
the official producers of statistics find themselves at a 
crossroads; before choosing a path to follow, they need to 
obtain a better understanding of the pre-conditions for 
various lines of action, they must obtain a better 
perception of the effects of different measures and 
projects - in short to obtain a better foundation on which 
to base their policy. This does not mean that today they are 
unaware of this discussion and are unprepared. Quite the 
contrary, people are acutely aware of this and related 
problems, and this discussion is continuing both internally, 
and between statisticians and non-statisticians. In 
particular, the serious difficulties encountered by the 
official statistical agencies in various countries have 
contributed to this state of affairs. However, it seems 
essential that this discussion should be made more profound, 
and should not abate, so that we can have guidance about the 
attitude to be taken in these matters and about what is to 
be done in the future. 
The intention of this paper is to contribute to the 
underlying basis of the discussion at the EUROSTAT seminar 
from the viewpoint of certain developments and certain 
experience gained mainly in Sweden of the aspects in 
question. I shall be chiefly focusing attention on questions 
relating to 1) legal safeguards for confidentiality and 
privacy, 2) data security and 3) problems relating to record 
1inkage. 
1. DEVELOPMENTS IN SWEDEN 
Sweden, the first country in the world to do so, passed a 
statute (the Data Act) in 1974 which regulates the automatic 
processing of personal data. A special authority, the Data 
Inspection Board both issues the licenses or permits needed 
before an automated register containing individual data can 
be set up, and ensures that the Act is complied with. No 
exception has been made in the Act for data for statistical 
purposes: on the other hand, in the explanatory introduction 
to the Act, it is recommended that special regard should be 
paid to the needs of statistics and research. Since 
practically all the compilation of statistics at Statistics 
Sweden - our official statistical agency - is computerized, 
this Act and its accompanying regulations mean that a 
permit is required for most of the statistics produced - for 
the setting up of new files, the linkage of files, and 
for the supplementing of files with the inclusion of fresh 
data, etc. Unlike what is usual in the data legislation of 
other countries, it is laid down in the Swedish legislation 
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that extracts from statistical registers must be supplied 
if requested by those to whom the data relate. In 
accordance with the provisions of this legislation, in the 
1983/84 fiscal year some 24 000 people asked Statistics 
Sweden to supply them with some 145 000 register extracts. 
The legal safeguard for primary data for statistics is 
mainly formulated in a clause in our special Secrecy Act; 
the protection given is regarded as being substantial. 
Statistics Sweden has however called for certain 
improvements in this safeguard and we have good prospects of 
having our request met. Our most immediate requirement is a 
better safeguard against the risk of being forced to supply 
particulars to a court or some other public authority. I 
must emphasize here that our call for increased protection 
has not been put forward because we have had any experience 
in practice of such a case. On the contrary, confidentiality 
safeguards have functioned satisfactorily in Sweden - and 
this also seems to be the view of statistical agencies in 
other countries. 
Since 1947 all individuals in Sweden have been allotted a 
personal identity number which is unique for them (it 
consists of a person's date of birth and of an additional 
four digits. Nowadays all undertakings and other juridicial 
persons also have a unique registration number. Naturally 
this system is an excellent aid for identification in 
contexts involving automatic processing technology. It is 
also used by Statistics Sweden throughout in its processing 
of statistics and is today regarded as an absolutely 
necessary instrument in its work. Were the personal identity 
number system to be abolished, the result, for Statistics 
Sweden, would be the widespread disruption of the work 
carried out. I must also mention that since the 1960s 
Statistics Sweden has been made responsible for about 4/5 of 
the whole of Sweden's extensive statistical activities and 
that the agency keeps a large number of registers, including 
two total ones - one of the population and one of 
enterprises with several institutional units. 
As I mentioned above, special permission must be obtained 
from the Data Inspection Board - or from the Government -
before there is any linkage of records in different files. 
In 1979 the Government commissioned Statistics Sweden to 
draw up and present proposals for a new Census of Population 
and Housing in 1985 which was to be based entirely on the 
linkage of existing registers at Statistics Sweden and other 
authorities; the general public were to be relieved 
completely of their obligation to fill in and send in 
household returns forms, as they had been required to do 
previously. In January 1983 Statistics Sweden presented 
proposals in line with the Government's requirements. Our 
agency proposed, nevertheless, that some particulars 
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though very few - should be collected from the general 
public since the linkage of existing registers alone would 
not prove sufficient. Six months after the presentation of 
our proposals and their circulation to some 80 authorities 
and organizations for their comments, a major daily 
newspaper "discovered" our proposals and raised the alarm. 
Our proposals were claimed to be a threat to the privacy of 
the individual. This led to a widespread debate, its 
consequence being that the Government ultimately rejected 
our proposals and instead submitted to Parliament a statute 
proposing a "conventional" Census of Population and Housing 
in which particulars would be collected from the general 
public on forms. Notwithstanding, this new statute is also 
based on a considerable interlinkage of existing registers; 
this method has in fact been increasingly used in censuses 
of population ever since the 1960 Census. However, this 
statute was not passed unanimously by Parliament either, 
which had been the case with all previous censuses of 
population. Although the measure received the support of a 
majority in Parliament, all the political parties to the 
right of the Social Democrats voted against it. 
In the past the scope of data collection for statistical 
purposes and linkage issues have from time to time given 
rise to a public debate. Especially noteworthy was the 
controversy with the Data Inspection Board, in particular, 
during the middle of the 1970s, in regard to the 
introductory interview survey in the statistical series 
called "Living Conditions in Sweden". The data to be 
collected were held to be too comprehensive and too 
sens it ive. 
A question that has not been solved is the attitude to the 
preservation of identifiable statistical units for future 
research purposes. There are two conflicting opinions; on 
the one hand, it is held that the safeguarding of personal 
interests ought to necessitate the anonymising of primary 
data or their complete destruction and, on the other, there 
is the view that identifiable units, just as the material as 
a whole, should be preserved at any rate in the case of 
material regarded as valuable from the viewpoint of 
research. In Sweden, above all because we have our system 
with personal identity numbers, it has been considered that 
the prospects are good for the carrying out of longitudinal 
research and of research that is based on record linkage; 
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this method has therefore been widely used. But in Sweden, 
too, as in other Western countries, this remains a matter 
for discussion: the opinion that individual data are the 
property of the respondent is gaining increasing ground as 
also are the apprehensions about the storage of individual 
units. The Data Act, such as it is interpreted and applied 
at the present time, is based on the view that registers 
containing individual units, after being used for the 
purpose for which they were intended, should be anonymised 
or destroyed. 
2. LEGAL DATA SAFEGUARDS FOR STATISTICAL UNITS 
In all countries with established arrangements for the 
production of statistics, it has been considered for a long 
time that statutory safeguards for primary statistical units 
are a ncecessity. In brief, the arguments for these 
safeguards are these. Seen from the viewpoint of the 
respondent, there is the requirement that individualized 
information, which is often detailed and sensitive, should 
be protected from access by unauthorized persons and from 
being used for purposes other than those intended; from the 
viewpoint of the producer of statistics, regard must be paid 
to the endeavour to avoid non-response in respect of data 
and create trust in reliable particulars. In addition, it is 
usually maintained that the use of the statistics results in 
compilations that do not reveal who is the individual 
respondent. 
The techniques vary in the prescribing of legal 
confidentiality safeguards. Variations also occur between 
and within different countries in the level of safeguards 
that statistical activities are assured. In the latter 
respect, special attention has been focused on the 
conceivable risk that the body responsible for the 
statistics may be forced to supply individual particulars to 
a court of law for specific administrative purposes. No 
example of this happening in reality seems to be available. 
However such a contingency has in itself been regarded as 
being a threat, in respect of public opinion, to statistical 
production. 
In the 1970s and the 1980s an increasing number of statutes 
regulating data activities have been passed. These statutes 
also affect, to a varying degree, the compilation of 
statistics. Above all, attention should be focused 
especially in this context on the demand for the control of 
statistical activities, too, in view of possible risk for 
individuals (or juridicial bodies), the demand for 
information on existing registration and its content and the 
demand for the storage for a limited time of the original 
part iculars. 
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maintained that the only way to create security protection 
against this form of unauthorized access is to have separate 
computers for public and for confidential information. 
I should perhaps mention here one method that aims at 
creating further protection for primary statistical units 
which is at present being studied at Statistics Sweden. This 
method requires that all general identifiable data which are 
processed or stored at Statistics Sweden should be 
enciphered. 
A security problem in statistics which is well known is the 
danger that, in certain circumstances, the tabulations are 
of such a nature that it is possible for the individual 
units that are behind the tables to be disclosed. This 
phenomenon generally appears in cases of a distorted 
distribution of the population recorded or when particulars 
are recorded at a low geographic level. There are various 
rules of thumb and various methods whereby disclosure can be 
guarded against. In recent years rather advanced 
dataprocessing techniques have been evolved to enable checks 
of disclosure hazards to be made and protection against 
disclosure to be provided. Absolutely watertight protection 
can rarely be achieved, but nowadays there seems to be a 
general consensus that the protection is adequate if the 
costs of eliminating it seem unreasonably high in comparison 
with the information gain. 
The anonymization of the primary statistical units can also 
be regarded as a technical method for the safeguarding of 
confidentiality. In itself it is a simple technical method 
to carry out. In particular it must be borne in mind that 
anonymization is not a reliable security method because -
depending on the size of the population or the sample, the 
existence of extreme values, access to other register data 
etc - there is a danger that at least some of the units in 
the population can be re-identified. I shall be referring in 
the next section (record linkage) to special disadvantages 
from the statistical viewpoint of anonymization. 
4. RECORD LINKAGE 
Record linkage as a valuable statistical tool is well known 
nowadays and well established. This method can be used to 
expand the variable content, to improve statistical quality 
and to check on accuracy. It is a cheap method both in 
regard to the resources for statistical production and to 
the burden put on respondents. Frequently, especially in 
longitudinal studies, record linkage is the only way by 
which the required information can be extracted. 
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The obstacles and difficulties involved in regard to 
statistical techniques are numerous and often substantial. 
Where the actual linking of statistical items is concerned, 
there are, in principle, two possible procedures. One 
procedure - practically the only one used in Sweden - is to 
use a unique concept for identification. The main 
difficulties encountered here are the defects and errors in 
the identification concept which can give rise to "a miss". 
The other procedure involves matching with the aid of some 
other non-unique information e.g. name, address, variable 
values. The difficulties here are naturally far greater but 
a large number of statistical works devoted to this type of 
matching method are now being written. Among the special 
problems connected with record linkage to which I wish to 
draw particular attention are the discrepancies between the 
target population and the register population, 
dissimilarities between definitions, lack of agreement 
between the aim and the available worksheet data and similar 
differences. 
Where the record-linkage method is concerned, there is one 
special and important difficulty - that is the opposition 
from large groups of respondents, from political parties and 
from organizations. The opposition takes the form of both 
statutory regulations that govern record linkage, and of 
reactions from public opinion. The adverse effects for 
statistical work are well known both in Sweden and 
elsewehere. 
It is hard to analyse and discuss rationally and in greater 
detail the apprehensions expressed about statistical record 
linkage. From the debate one can discern distrust of 
record-linked statistical units being used for what are 
called "administrative purposes" - even though the 
statisticians concerned have given assurances to the 
contrary - and that intentional or unintentional leakage 
from statistical data compilations may arise despite 
assurances by statisticians of high-level technical 
safeguards and the non-existence of examples of such 
leakage. The fear has also been expressed that statistical 
material might prove a hazard for private individuals in the 
event of war or a coup d'état. However, one may well ask 
whether the opposition is not mainly derived from a profound 
emotional aversion to there being somewhere - that is also 
in statistical archives - all too much information about the 
individual, about the household, about the enterprise. This 
is indicated by, for instance, the phrase that is rather 
frequently used: record linkage creates a total and 
revealing picture of the individual, even though every 
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informed and reflecting person must see that it must be 
absurd to think of record linkage as giving, in the 
psychological or literary sense, anything but a fraction of 
the true picture of a human being. 
If it is to be possible to carry out longitudinal studies, 
it is of course vital for the data material that is 
needed to be preserved. A pre-condition that is equally 
self-evident in countries where there are unique 
identification concepts is, too, that these concepts must 
not be abolished. However, both in Sweden and at the 
international level, there is a tendency today for rules and 
attitudes to be characterized by the reverse: statistical 
data compilations must be destroyed or at least anonymized 
after being used for the primary purpose for which they were 
intended. This new attitude which has emerged in public 
opinion and among legislators was scarcely known previously. 
The sorting of data is now mentioned as the principal method 
whereby privacy can be safeguarded, for instance in the 
Council of Europe's Convention for Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (1980). 
The Council of Europe's Recommendation on the Protection of 
Personal Data Used for Statistics or Scientific Research 
(1983), the OECD's "Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy, etc." (1980) and the European Science Foundation's 
"Statement concerning the Protection of Privacy and the Use 
of Personal Data for Research" giving anonymization as the 
security method but opening the door to the possibility of 
complete preservation to meet the needs of future research. 
On the other hand, nothing is said about future research 
needs in the very detailed ruling concerning statistical 
issues by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 
December 1983 in regard to the Census of Population Act: in 
this ruling anonymization was indicated as a necessary 
security method. As I mentioned above, in Sweden the life of 
each automated register containing personal data is now 
limited in time also in the case of statistical data files 
with anonymization or destruction as the security method. 
5. SOME PARTICULAR ISSUES 
In this concluding section I shall put forward as a basis 
for discussion certain hypotheses and certain questions 
ensuing from them. Here I feel it is important to underline 
my declared aim - these are topics for discussion which is 
why I shall formulate them so incisively. 
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a. In their attempts to calm the fears of the general 
public, statistical agencies have principally concentrated 
on assurances of a high degree of confidentiality for 
primary statistical units. They have not been particularly 
successful. One may well wonder whether our efforts should 
not be focused more on showing the value and importance of 
statistics in easily read, convincing and concrete examples 
from various fields such as communications, education and 
medical research. Of course it is important not to neglect 
confidentiality safeguards and data security and to inform 
about them, especially as an "accident" could do enormous 
damage to public opinion - but the general willingness to 
take part, and to let statistical production function 
undisturbed, depends more on the general public's assessment 
of its positive value. 
b. Those who produce statistics have not become 
sufficiently involved in questions concerning legislation 
pertinent to statistical work and have not actively sought 
to influence what happens in that respect. The consequence 
has been that insufficient regard has been paid to 
statistical needs in Acts of Parliament and other statutes. 
There are probably grounds for paying, in the future, more 
regard to questions relating to legislation in order to 
prevent legislation which impedes the rational production of 
meaningful statistics. 
c. It appears that there has been an important change in 
the general attitude to data collection and data storage in 
the Western world. This is expressed more plainly in the 
above-mentioned ruling by the Federal Republic of Germany's 
Federal Constitutional Court in regard to the proposed 1983 
Census of Population: the Court laid down the right to 
"informational self-determination" - a new principle and 
right for the person to whom the data relate, a kind of new 
or extended right of ownership in regard to the information 
about oneself. For the producers of statistics this point of 
view should enhance the need to open and strengthen the 
dialogue with the respondents in order to convince them - on 
the basis of a recognition of the changed attitude - that 
statistics are of use to society. To put it another way: the 
change in the manner of making contact with public opinion 
is said to mean a shift from "deciding" to "negotiating". 
What I have said here also has a bearing on the use of 
administrative data in statistical production. 
88 
d. The trend towards the destruction, entirely or partly 
(anonymization), of primary data is a hazard for society. 
Such destruction makes any broad and prolonged statistical 
studies difficult or impossible. Inherent in this trend is 
an unhistorical view of the development of society, one 
which does not pay regard to coming generations. Certainly 
one may well ask where historical research would stand today 
if this view had been the one subscribed to by our 
forefathers. Very little of the discussion of these 
questions has been seen up to now. Nor have the voices of 
statisticians been heard on this question to any appreciable 
extent. Should we not act? 
DISCUSSION 
MR. BARNES (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 
London) opened the discussion: 
He drew attention to the dissimilarities and similarities 
between the situations in Sweden and the United Kingdom. The 
changes in public opinion in regard to the census of 
population were less marked in the UK than in many other 
countries, perhaps because the 1981 census was less 
controversial than elsewhere or perhaps because most 
inquiries for social data in the UK were on a voluntary 
basis. A similarity with Sweden was the irrationality behind 
the fears of supplying information which should not be 
countered by solely rational argument. It was most important 
that the case for the census be believed and it was 
insufficient to speak of the harmlessness of the census and 
of the guarantees of secrecy. A public-relations and not 
simply a publicity approach was needed. 
Statisticians needed to keep in touch with draft legislation 
to ensure that no legislation was enacted which might give 
the courts the right to demand, as evidence, information 
given under a guarantee of statistical secrecy. 
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As in Sweden, there was considerable pressure in the UK from 
users for better access to statistical data bases. However, 
public-use tapes were not provided from the census, being 
prohibited under census legislation. He agreed on the value 
of data protection legislation in calming people's fears in 
furnishing statistics. Mr. Barnes supported the view in the 
paper that positive information on the use of statistical 
data was of greater value in securing public cooperation 
than arguments seeking to calm fears about disclosure. He 
agreed also that statisticians should make their voice heard 
when data protection legislation was being drafted. The 
principle of "information self-determination" which emerged 
in the Federal Republic of Germany had not, as yet, made its 
appearance in the United Kingdom. With regard to the 
stocking of statistical data for historical studies, the 
position in the UK was that census records remained 
confidential for 100 years. 
Mr. EMBLETON (Central Statistics Office) enquired: 
When it was envisaged that the 1985 Swedish census might be 
taken on a record-linkage basis, were any soundings of 
public opinion made? Similarly, when it was decided to 
revert to the traditional style census, were any soundings 
of public opinion made? 
Dr. BURGIN (Statistisches Bundesamt) pointed out: 
Most of the inquiries conducted by the Statistisches 
Bundesamt were multi-purpose and had many users in 
government, science and the economy. It would be impossible 
to inform the respondents of all the uses. What was needed 
was for the administration and politicians to emphasize 
the essential nature of statistical data. As 
regards statisticians influencing discussion of relevant 
legislation, he recalled that the president of the 
Statistisches Bundesamt had protested, without success, 
against precisely those features of the 1983 Census Act 
concerning the passing on of data which were subsequently 
judged unconstitutional. There was no possibility of 
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retaining statistical records relating to identifiable 
individuals for historical purposes. As things stood, such 
records must have personal identification removed as soon as 
possible. 
Dr. DAMMAN (Bundesbeauftragte für Datenschutz) stated: 
He did not agree that emphasizing the value of a survey was 
more important than emphasizing the confidentiality aspects: 
both were equally important and much of the failure of the 
1983 Census could be attributed to a neglect of both 
aspects. As regards different climates of opinion in the 
different countries mentioned by Mr. Barnes, these could 
change very quickly - witness the contrast between the 
Federal Republic and the Netherlands in 1970 and the 
similarity in the 1980s. Resentment against a number of 
unfavourable factors, not connected with statistics, were 
projected by the public on the census of population. Census 
preparations coincided with the electoral campaign, there 
was tension between the public and the administration, fear 
by the public of computers, awareness of the computer 
related problems of unemployment and deteriorating 
employment conditions. 
Mr. REDFERN noted: 
It was difficult to give the general public convincing 
reasons for the taking of a census. The value of the census 
in calculating "rate support grants" was much emphasized in 
the UK but this did not seem to him to be a very convincing 
reason. 
Mr. HARRIS remarked: 
He agreed with Dr. Damman that, viewed from outside Germany, 
the 1983 census of population project had not been 
sufficiently presented or defended. He suspected also that 
there was a "domino effect" involved, starting with the 
Netherlands, passing next to Germany and now showing signs 
of appearing in Sweden. 
Mr. JOWELL (Social and Community Planning Research) was of 
the opinion : 
He thought that there was little real evidence for the 
thesis that the public was growing tired of the burden of 
answering surveyors. This thesis should not, therefore, be 
91 
produced as a justification for replacing traditional survey 
methods by record linkage. 
The author replied to the discussion : 
He was surprised at the large measure of agreement for the 
views in his paper which he had thought were quite 
controversial. On the question of the changes in 1985 census 
plans, the original proposal for a record-linked census had 
had government approval and Statistics Sweden had been 
instructed to draw up a detailed scheme. The questions of 
the effects on privacy emerged suddenly and was taken up by 
newspapers with the result that plans were modified and it 
was decided to revert to the traditional style census. A 
disquieting feature of the 1985 census was that the census 
law was not accepted unanimously in Parliament but only with 
a majority. He felt that there was a big public relations 
problem here. Statisticians were not normally very skilled 
in public relations and it would be useful if experts in 
this field could be employed. 
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CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY 
CURRENT SITUATION AND PRACTICE IN IRELAND 
F.A. EMBLETON* 
Central Statistics Office, Dublin 
CENTRALIZED STATISTICAL SYSTEM 
Through the Central Statistics Office, Ireland operates what 
is primarily a centralized statistical system. When the 
Office was set up in 1949 it was placed under the aegis of 
the Department of the Taoiseach (i.e. Prime Minister) 
primarily to underline its independence and central role in 
collecting and coordinating statistics. As in other 
countries, of course, many statistics result from the 
activities of other Departments of the State as a by-product 
of the administration of various Government programmes and 
schemes. However, the Central Statistics Office alone 
conducts all the official nation-wide statistical inquiries. 
Confidentiality 
Fundamental to the standing and public image of the Office 
are the guarantees of confidentiality which the Office 
extends to the suppliers of information. Confidentiality 
from the viewpoint of the supplier is the set of constraints 
and conditions governing the use and disclosure of 
information while it is being collected and once it is 
collected. "Confidentiality" however is extremely difficult 
to define in a form which will be universally unambiguous to 
the suppliers of the basic information, to the collecting 
agency which becomes the custodian of the information, to 
the legal authority which may be called on to interpret the 
guarantees and to potential users. In Ireland, the 
guarantees are supplier-orientated and enshrined in basic 
legislation - the Statistics Act 1926. 
Statistics Act 1926 
The act covers the collection, compilation and publication 
of statistics. It empowers the relevant Minister of 
Government, which since 1949 is the Prime Minister, to 
specify by statutory order the subject matter and respondent 
group for statistical inquiries. Under the Act the Prime 
Minister "may collect, compile, abstract and (subject to the 
provisions of this Act) publish statistics relating to any 
matter affecting the general economic and other activities 
and conditions" in the State. There is also provision for 
other Government Departments, should it be necessary, to 
* The views expressed are personal and should not be taken 
as representing or reflecting the position or views of the 
Central Statistics Office. 
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collect statistics under the Act but subject to prior 
consultation with and coordination by the Prime Minister. 
There are penalties laid down for failure to supply 
information formally requisitioned under the Act and, 
equally on the other hand, for revealing individual return 
without the consent of the supplier. Happily nobody has ever 
had to be prosecuted for disclosing confidential information 
collected as part of statistical inquiry. While a number of 
inquiries are carried out by formal requisition under the 
Act, for example the annual Census of Industrial Production 
and the periodical Census of Population, there is a large 
volume of information collected by means of voluntary 
inquiries, that is without recourse to a statutory order. 
However, equal guarantees of confidentiality are given by 
the Office to respondents to such voluntary inquiries. In 
other words, these inquiries are also conducted as if fully 
statutory in nature. 
In the case of voluntary inquiries, there is in any event 
the protection afforded by the "Official Secrets Act 1963". 
This Act specifically prohibits a civil servant from 
communicating official information, which includes 
information collected for statistical purposes, to any 
person unless he or she is duly authorized to do so in the 
course of and in accordance with his/her duties. All Central 
Statistics Office staff, on appointment, sign a notice which 
sets out the principal provisions of the Act. 
Specific Confidentiality Provisions of the Statistics Act 
Returning to the 1926 Statistics Act, the particular 
provisions relating to disclosure and use of statistical 
information which, as already stated are applied even if the 
inquiry is a voluntary one, are set down in Article 13. 
Article 13 stipulates that: 
(i) no individual schedule, form, questionnaire or other 
document or any part thereof, verbal information or 
answer relating to any individual person, business or 
concern shall be disclosed without the consent of such 
person, business or concern; 
(ii) so far as is reasonably practicable, no report, 
abstract, summary or other publication shall contain 
information so arranged as to enable the identification 
of particulars relating to any individual person, 
business or concern without the written consent of that 
person, business or concern. 
These two conditions extend also to records or documents 
which are not open to public inspection but which have been 
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inspected, examined or copied for statistical purposes by an 
Office of Statistics - the latter being defined also by the 
Act. 
In practice, Article 13 imposes constraints on the detail 
which may be published or otherwise made available. Where 
appropriate, rules are applied to avoid disclosure of 
information which may be attributable to an individual 
responding unit. For example in the case of business 
inquiries, no information is generally published where there 
are less than 3 reporting units. Where there are at least 3 
but 1 or 2 are dominant, figures are also not published. 
However where the information is considered to be important 
and of general use, a pragmatic approach is adopted. In such 
instances, the Office seeks the consent of the unit or units 
involved, as provided for in Article 13, to publish the 
information. This approach has met with success on many 
occasions; of course if no consent, then no publication. 
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The above are examples of the so-called "active" approach to 
indirect disclosure. We do not apply this rigorously in 
publishing Foreign Trade Statistics where the "passive" 
approach is adopted and where if a complaint is made, we 
attempt to rectify the position. 
One further aspect merits mention. We do not take into 
account any additional sources of information which users 
may have at their disposal and which, in conjunction with 
our published data can unlock the puzzle. 
Restrictions on Access 
Needless to say the constraints imposed by the guarantees of 
confidentiality extended to respondents restrict access to 
statistics and are not therefore universally appreciated. 
Official collection agencies consider it essential that 
the suppliers of the basic data are fully protected by 
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Ρublic access/inspection 
There is another dimension to access which highlights 
another restriction in the existing legislation. This is the 
matter of opening to the public individual records after 
some lengthy period has elapsed - say 100 years. Again the 
main interest centres on Census of Population records which 
to future generations can be a rich store of historical, 
social and cultural information on their ancestors. The 
Irish Statistics Act under which the Censuses of Population 
are taken, does not presently cater for such public access 
in the future - the absence of any provision for it is 
legally interpreted as excluding any possibility of it. For 
some, this is a matter of regret. Indeed one can readily 
appreciate the usefulness of Census records in 100 years 
from now and the question of accommodating this type of need 
would appear to merit sympathetic consideration. In so 
doing, however, existing Census records which may be 
undergoing processing or are stored on computer tapes (even 
if names and addresses are omitted) would have to be 
excluded; that is to say that such records could not 
retrospectively be made available. To do so would be a 
serious breach of contract in respect of the existing 
guarantees of confidentiality given to householders and 
others making Census returns heretofore. 
Mention is made of this and other access restrictions to 
demonstrate that in Ireland, as alsewhere, there are 
changing demands, often legitimate and meritorious, which 
legislation needs to take stock of periodically. This is not 
put forward to suggest or imply that the present Irish 
Statistics Act is in anyway deficient - indeed the contrary 
applies where guarantees of confidentiality are concerned -
but to highlight the changed circumstances, principally 
brought about by modern statistical processing techniques 
and under which present day data demands are far in excess 
of those experienced as recently as 20 to 30 years ago. 
Statistical legislation, no less than other laws, need to 
keep pace with developments and thus provide the means of, 
on the one hand, protecting the individual respondent while, 
on the other, allowing for the maximum use of the 
information to facilitate full study and analyses of the 
social and economic conditions of the nation. 
Record linkages 
A further issue pertaining to confidentiality and to the 
protection of privacy to which we in Ireland must direct 
some attention in the not too distant future is the linkage 
of individual records whether derived from administrative 
sources or direct statistical inquiries. In the case of 
administrative sources, the increased use of computers in 
public administration has resulted in the establishment of 
data files covering transactions involving the individual 
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and the State, relating to social transfer payments, tax 
collection and other such activities. The potential use and 
linkage of these records or statistical purposes, if the 
required designatory and other basic characteristics are 
included on the records, have not gone unnoticed although in 
our case they have not been developed. The statistical 
benefits to be derived are obviously enormous and given the 
costs of collecting primary data (i.e. directly from 
individuals) it is incumbent on Government Agencies, 
including the Statistical Office, to maximize the use of any 
available information. This applies equally to the linkage 
of existing statistical files which may contain diverse 
information on the same reporting unit. 
The approach raises fundamental questions with regard to 
confidentiality and the right to privacy. Here the right to 
privacy is interpreted as the "right to know" and, more 
importantly, the right to limit or control the release and 
use of information relating to oneself. Privacy of course 
extends beyond statistical aspects - it applies to 
information in the broadest sense pertaining to an 
individual or indeed to groups of individuals. The right to 
privacy is a particularly sensitive issue and in to-day's 
society, not to mention in "1984", is one which is likely to 
excite passions and arouse hostility. Indeed it has been 
noted that protests about this issue become contagious in 
that they migrate quickly from one country to another. This 
of course is greatly accelerated by the present day range of 
news media which tend to give such protests instant and 
considerable prominence whether or not they are valid. The 
public attitude of course is often contradictory in that, on 
the one hand, the demand is made that public authorities use 
existing information rather than collect it anew, while on 
the other hand, objections are voiced if attempts are made 
to collate the required information from existing sources. 
Presently, in Ireland, there is no legislation relating to 
the privacy aspects as raised here. Neither is there a 
debate, or what could be described as the beginning of a 
debate, on the issues in question. The issues however have 
been commented on and more frequently so in recent times. 
They are issues to which we must become increasingly alert 
and, in my view, there is a rapidly emerging need to enact, 
sooner rather than later, appropriate legislation to protect 
the privacy of, and provide full confidentiality to, the 
suppliers of the basic information. 
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PROTECTION OF PRIVACY, AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING 
AND PROGRESS IN STATISTICAL DOCUMENTATION 
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
J. WERNER and E. SUDFELD 
Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden(*) 
SUMMARY 
Part 1 of this paper contains a description of the legal 
situation regarding the confidentiality of statistical 
information, data protection and the individual's control 
over the information collected on him. Part 2 examines the 
effects on Federal statistics of the recognition, contained 
in the Federal Constitutional Court's judgement regarding 
the Census of Population Act, that the individual has a 
right to control the use of information relating to himself. 
Possible ways and means of meeting the new requirements 
imposed on statistical surveys in the Federal Republic of 
Germany are discussed in Part 3. 
1. CONFIDENTIALITY OF STATISTICAL INFORMATION, DATA 
PROTECTION AND THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO CONTROL THE USE 
OF DATA RELATING TO HIMSELF 
1.1 Background: the confidentiality of statistical 
informat ion 
1.1.1 The Federal Statistics Act (FeSA) 
1.1.1.1 Constitutional proviso and confidentiality of 
statistical information 
Under the Basic Law (Constitution) of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, any State intervention affecting the fundamental 
rights of citizens must have a legal basis. This is known as 
a "Gesetzesvorbehalt", or constitutional proviso. 
Statistical surveys represent an intervention of this kind 
and, as such, may be carried out only under a public 
statute. 
The Federal Statistics Act (FeSA)(in German, Das Gesetz über 
die Statistik für Bundeszwecke) of 3 September 1953, which 
was the first piece of legislation to codify the law 
relating to Federal statistics, laid down the framework 
within which statistics for Federal purposes were to be 
compiled. With a few exceptions, individual surveys were 
conducted in accordance with specific laws. These laws also 
contained provisions regarding the confidentiality of the 
data collected and thus formed the basis for the provision 
in the FeSA regarding the duty to observe confidentiality, 
which applies to all statistics used for federal purposes. 
Under this provision, details of individual personal or 
material circumstances collected for the purposes of 
(*) Mr. J. Werner wrote Section 1 and 2.1, while Mr. E. 
Südfeld prepared Sections 2.2. and 3. 
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compiling Federal statistics were not to be divulged by the 
persons entitled to receive information unless there was 
legislation on statistical matters which provided otherwise, 
such as the 1970 Census of Population Act. 
The legislators regarded the abovementioned provision, also 
referred to as the "statistical secrecy" provision, as a 
necessary correlate of the general duty, laid down at the 
same time, to provide information in statistical surveys. If 
those questioned were obliged by the State to provide true 
and complete information, they had to be sure that the 
details which they provided would be kept secret. 
Given status as a lex specialis the provision regarding the 
duty to preserve the confidentiality of statistical 
information took precedence over existing duties to observe 
secrecy, such as the obligation to observe official secrecy 
placed on all civil servants. It therefore already met the 
requirement which is nowadays laid down by commissioners for 
data protection, everywhere, namely that data protection 
should, wherever possible, be governed by concrete 
provisions on specific areas rather than by general laws. 
The provision on the confidentiality of statistical 
information was also a forerunner of later legislation on 
data protection in other respects. Thus, the legal 
definition of the property requiring protection given in the 
Federal Data Protection Act (FDPA)(Bundesdatenschützgesetζ) 
adopted 24 years later, namely "personal data", is partly 
derived from the references to the confidentiality of 
statistical information contained in the FeSA. 
1.1.1.2 Meaning of 
informat ion 
the confidentiality of statistical 
The section in the FeSA regarding the duty to observe 
confidentiality basically provides that "persons entitled to 
receive information" should maintain absolute secrecy 
regarding "individual information on personal or material 
circumstances" collected for the purpose of compiling 
federal statistics. 
The "individual statistical information" requiring 
protection includes all the information provided by an 
individual to enable a set of federal statistics to be 
compiled. This applies to all data, regardless of whether 
they relate to natural or legal persons. In addition, 
information of this kind may not appear in publications. On 
the other hand, summary information based on data collected 
from several persons obliged to provide information need not 
be kept confidential, since it does not relate to individual 
cases . 
The duty to observe confidentiality is placed on "persons 
entitled to receive information". The latter comprise the 
persons and agencies officially entrusted with the task of 
compiling federal statistics. The main agencies and persons 
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concerned are the Federal Statistical Office and its staff, 
and - by virtue of the federal structure of the Federal 
Republic whereby the Länder are in general responsible for 
enforcing laws - the Statistical Offices in the Länder and 
their employees. 
In order to clarify the extent of the duty to maintain 
confidentiality and to ensure its observance, the duty laid 
down in the Revenue Code to disclose information to tax 
offices is waived in the case of individual statistical 
information and failure to observe the confidentiality of 
such information is a punishable offence. 
Detailed statistical information may be passed on, 
exceptionally, to a strictly limited number of persons and 
agencies, subject to special conditions. 
Potential recipients of individual statistical information 
include the relevant supreme Federal and Land authorities 
and the agencies designated by them. The bodies in question 
normally consist of those ministries whose area of work is 
covered by the statistics concerned and agencies acting on 
thei r behalf. 
In addition, if one of these potential recipients requests 
the passing on of individual information, this must have 
been expressly authorized in the regulation governing the 
set of statistics concerned and the survey documents must 
have made it clear to the persons questioned that this would 
happen. 
If all these conditions are met, the various statistical 
offices as well as the other authorities and agencies 
involved in surveys have not only the right but also a duty 
to pass on these data. 
1.1.2 The Federal Statistics Act (FSA) 
(Das Bundesstatistikgesetz) 
1.1.2.1 The FSA as a further development of the FeSA. 
The experience gained in implementing the FeSA and the new 
requirements laid down for statistical surveys were taken 
into account when drawing up the Federal Statistics Act (Das 
Bundesstatsistikgesetz) of 14 March 1980, which replaced the 
FeSA and is currently in force. 
The revised definition of the confidentiality of statistical 
information contained in the FSA reflects in particular the 
developments in the area of data protection and criminal 
law. 
1.1.2.2 Meaning of the confidentiality of statistical 
information as laid down in the FSA 
The principle of the absolute confidentiality of individual 
statistical information, which was at the heart of the 
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provisions in the FeSA governing the confidentiality of 
statistical information, was also incorporated into the FSA. 
Apart from the inclusion of more detailed definitions, the 
area of application of the principle of the confidentiality 
of statistical information was extended in some respects and 
restricted in others. The FSA also laid down additional 
conditions regarding the passing on of data; these, however, 
cannot be regarded as extending or limiting the 
confidentiality of statistical information since the scope 
for passing on information has changed. 
The more precise definitions concern, firstly, those who 
have a duty to observe confidentiality. The term "persons 
entitled to receive information" was replaced by the phrase 
"officials and persons specially employed by the public 
authorities to compile Federal statistics". As a result of 
this change all the persons concerned became subject to the 
provision in the Penal Code which made the unauthorized 
disclosure of individual information collected for public 
administrative purposes punishable by imprisonment of up to 
one year or by a fine. In addition to staff of the Federal 
and Land statistical offices, these persons also include 
enumerators and interviewers as well as persons not 
enmployed by the offices mentioned who are engaged in 
processing Federal statistics or in similar tasks. Under the 
"Commitment" Act (Das Verpflichtungsgesetz), persons in this 
position who are not officials must formally undertake to 
fulfil their obligations in a conscientious manner, in 
particular the obligation relating to the confidentiality of 
statistical information. 
The provisions waiving the duty to inform and notify tax 
offices was made more precise in that it now applies to 
persons and agencies engaged in the compilation of Federal 
and Land statistics. 
In addition, it was expressly stated that information gained 
from statistical data on individuals may not be used for 
taking measures against the person concerned. This 
prohibition on using data in a way which is prejudicial to 
an individual ensures that personal data cannot be used by 
the public authorities when making decisions affecting 
individuals and, as such, it is likely to allay any 
irrational fears which the person questioned may sometimes 
experience. 
The confidentiality of statistical information was initially 
extended in such a way that all persons not engaged in 
compiling Federal statistics but who received detailed 
statistical information had to observe confidentiality in 
the same way as persons and agencies involved in compiling 
the statistics mentioned. This closed a loophole in the 
FeSA. 
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Moreover, it was expressly stated that the transfer of 
personal data between persons and agencies engaged in 
compiling federal statistics is permissible if such 
transfers are required for the purpose of compiling the 
statistics. As a result, these persons and agencies also 
have a fundamental duty to observe the absolute 
confidentiality of personal data. 
The provisions regarding the special treatment of 
identifying characteristics derived from the German data 
protection legislation. They stipulate the deletion of any 
data, in particular names and addresses, which can be used 
to identify persons obliged to give information and other 
persons concerned if such data are no longer required to 
carry out work connected with the compilation of federal 
statistics. The names and addresses of persons obliged to 
provide information must be separated from the other data 
and be kept in a special locked container. These provisions, 
incorporated into the Act at the instigation of the Federal 
Commissioner for Data Protection, are designed to take 
account of the special features associated with the 
processing of data for statistical purposes. Since the 
individual is of interest not as a person but only as a 
statistical parameter, data on him should be processed in as 
anonymous a form as possible, on condition that this can be 
justified on statistical grounds and does not involve an 
excessive amount of work. Thus, names and addresses must be 
physically separated from the data to be evaluated and kept 
in a safe place. If they are not required for statistical 
purposes, no identifiers (which may include not only names 
and addresses but also other prominent characteristics) can 
be stored in any shape or form. 
On the other hand, when the FSA's provisions regarding the 
confidentiality of statistical information were drafted, it 
was necessary to incorporate additional cases where the duty 
to observe the confidentiality of statistical information 
did not apply. 
On the basis of relevant provisions in the Federal Data 
Protection Act, the duty to observe confidentiality no 
longer applies if "in a specific case the person concerned 
expressly consents to the transmission or publication of the 
personal data provided by him". In this way, those who drew 
up the law indicated that they did not regard it as their 
duty to forbid the disclosure of personal data if the 
individual concerned did not appear to raise any objections 
to this. 
In addition, in order to meet the greatly increased demand 
for personal data, especially for research purposes, a 
provision was included which makes it possible to transmit 
"depersonalized" personal data. This provision states that 
the data must be altered in such a way "that they can no 
longer be attributed to persons obliged to provide 
information or other individuals". If this condition is met, 
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the Federal Statistical Office or the Land statistical 
offices may pass on the data to anyone interested. Absolute 
anonymity of personal data is almost impossible to achieve 
and, therefore, when this provision is applied, it must be 
possible in each individual case to provide data which 
cannot be "re-personalized" and which, at the same time, 
provide the person receiving it with sufficient information. 
The group of potential data recipients was also widened. It 
now also includes "other officials and persons assigned 
special tasks by the public authorities". The former 
comprise persons who carry out public duties in 
administrative bodies which were previously not regarded as 
being entitled to receive information, while the latter 
include the staff of scientific institutes carrying out work 
for public bodies. This group, too, is defined in such a way 
that criminal proceedings may be taken in the event of 
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1.2 Supplementary provisions under data protection 
legislation 
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the legal position of the persons concerned and the special 
measures required to protect data and ensure that data are 
processed in a proper manner. 
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Under the FDPA, persons on whom data are processed have the 
following special rights: the right to be informed about the 
data on them which have been stored; the right to rectify 
these data if they are erroneous; the right to block the 
data if it is impossible to establish whether they are 
correct or erroneous and if the conditions governing their 
original storage are no longer met; and the right to delete 
the data if their storage is inadmissible and the conditions 
governing storage which were originally met no longer apply. 
Since the majority of statistical data are rendered 
anonymous at an early stage, these rights are of practical 
relevance only in the case of data which are stored in data 
files so that they can be used in subsequent surveys. 
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The FDPA requires that persons processing personal data 
introduce extensive technical and organizational 
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These measures include controls on physical access to data 
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Since all these measures are costly, they are to be carried 
out only on condition that the cost involved is in 
reasonable proportion to the protection which it is hoped to 
achieve. 
Where data are processed by agencies which do not form part 
of statistical offices but work on their behalf, there is a 
duty to carefully select the agency paying special regard to 
the suitability of the technical and organizational measures 
which it has taken. 
In addition to the provision in the Penal Code which 
provides for sanctions against persons who fail to observe 
the confidentiality of statistical information, the FDPA 
also includes a penal provision which makes it a punishable 
offence to alter, recall or procure protected personal data 
from data files locked away in containers. Penalties range 
from a fine to a maximum of two years' imprisonment. 
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To enable the general public to monitor the data processing 
activities of public authorities and to improve the legal 
protection of the individual, details of stored data are 
published in the Federal Gazette. These details, to be 
published immediately after the data have first been stored, 
include the type of data involved, the tasks for which they 
need to be obtained, the group of persons concerned, the 
agencies to which the data will be regularly transmitted and 
the nature of the data which are to be transmitted. As 
regards statistical data, the FDPA requires details to be 
published only if the general public has not already 
received the information concerned through other channels, 
e.g. via the publication of the legal act governing the 
survey in question. 
As publications of this kind are unable to produce any real 
improvement in the legal situation of the persons concerned 
owing to the huge volume of information to be communicated, 
they are in future to be replaced by extending the data-file 
register which must be kept by the Federal Commissioner for 
Data Protection. 
Responsibility for ensuring that the Federal Statistical 
Office observes the data protection provisions is assigned 
to the Federal Minister of the Interior (FMI). 
In particular, the latter must ensure that a record is kept 
of the type of personal data being stored, the tasks for 
which these data are required and the identity of those who 
regularly receive them. 
The Federal Statistical Office therefore keeps records of 
stored data which contain all the requisite information, 
relating to all the physical features of a data file. 
Extracts from these records are forwarded to the FMI. 
The FMI has also to set up a system of supervision to ensure 
that the data processing programs to be used for processing 
personal data are employed in a proper manner. The first 
task of this system is to ensure that the programs 
themselves meet the requirements of data protection 
legislation. The aim of this supervision is to safeguard the 
integrity of the program throughout the period when it is 
used. 
Under an Order issued by the FMI, an internal "data 
protection commissioner" has been appointed at the Federal 
Statistical Office. His task is to give advice on data 
protection matters and to ensure that data protection 
provisions are observed. 
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The FMI has so far not issued any general administrative 
regulations regarding the implementation of the FDPA in his 
area of competence. 
Under the FDPA, the office of Federal Commissioner for Data 
Protection was created as an overall external supervisory 
authority to ensure that data protection provisions are 
observed. The Commissioner must be provided with any 
information which he requests and be allowed to inspect any 
documents connected with the processing of personal data. In 
addition, he has unrestricted access to all official 
premises. The Commissioner must be notified of all data 
files which are operated automatically. Details are then 
entered in a register which anyone may inspect. 
If the Commissioner ascertains that the federal 
administrative authorities have contravened data protection 
provisions, he may submit a complaint to the supreme federal 
authority with responsibility in that field. He may, at the 
same time, suggest ways of remedying the deficiencies and 
improving data protection. The Commissioner, to whom any 
citizen may submit a complaint, presents a report on his 
work once a year to the Bundestag. 
The Länder have also appointed data protection 
commissioners, although their legal status differs 
considerably in some respects from that of the Federal 
Commissioner. They are responsible for supervising the 
administrative procedures used in cases where the Länder 
implement legislation relating to federal statistics. 
1.3 New requirements arising from the right of the 
individual to control data relating to himself 
With its decision on the 1983 Census of Population Act, the 
Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) expressly acknowledged 
the existence of the individual's right to control 
information relating to himself (henceforward referred to as 
the "information control right") as a concretizati on of the 
general right to privacy. This has far-reaching consequences 
for the collection and processing of personal data. 
1.3.1 Definition of concept 
The Court interpreted the information control right as 
meaning that the individual has the power, in principle, to 
control the disclosure and use of personal data relating to 
himself. A legal system "in which citizens are no longer 
able to know who knows what about them or when and under 
what circumstances such information is collected" cannot 
therefore be reconciled with the information control right. 
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This and other statements made by the Court clearly show 
that it does not regard the information control right purely 
as a right of individual liberty but as a precondition of a 
proper 1 y-fune t i on ing free democracy. 
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1.3.2 General requirements for the collection and processing 
of personal data for statistical purposes 
Restrictions on the information control right which are in 
the overriding public interest are permissible by law. 
While the constitutional proviso primarily applied hitherto 
to the collection of individual statistical information, it 
is quite clear that legislators must now draw up provisions 
covering events occurring at every stage of data collection 
and processing which significantly affect the fulfilment of 
the fundamental rights of the individuals concerned. For 
this purpose, they must issue regulations which conform with 
the principles of legislative clarity and or 
proportionality. 
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The proportionality criterion involves the principle of 
"prohibition of excess". Under this, the actual measures to 
collect information which are planned must always be those 
compatible with achieving the desired administrative purpose 
which represent the least inconvenience for the persons 
concerned. "Superfluous data", i.e. data which can be of no 
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assistance in performing public duties, and data on the 
individual's absolutely inaccessible private life ("data 
without social significance") may not be collected or 
processed. 
Those responsible for drawing up legislation must also 
consider methodological questions. Thus, for example, they 
must ascertain whether a full survey could be replaced by a 
sample survey or whether a survey where there is an 
obligation to provide information could be replaced by one 
where information is given voluntarily. Similarly, they must 
give precedence to a "depersonalized" survey as opposed to 
one where personal data remain identifiable if the purpose 
laid down can be achieved equally well in this way. 
The special treatment accorded to individual statistical 
information is based on the assumption that the latter will 
be used for statistical purposes only. Consequently, the FCC 
has laid down that it may be passed on only in anonymous 
form, although it is sufficient if this anonymity is of a de 
facto kind. The passing on of information in an 
individualized, non-anonymous form is possible only if the 
purpose for which it is to be used is laid down by law. 
A factor of great practical significance and one which was 
ultimately responsible for the failure to carry out the 
population census was the great value attached by the Court 
in respect of the information control right to the principle 
that statistical activities should be separated from 
administrative enforcement procedures. 
As regards the plans to update registers of residents using 
the statistical data obtained, the Court stated that a legal 
provision governing the compilation of statistics may not 
link together things which "tended to be incompatible". In 
particular, the Court considered it incompatible that, on 
the one hand, the Census of Population Act guaranteed the 
non-detrimental use of the data collected and that, on the 
other hand, one of the purposes of the register was in fact 
to enable measures to be taken against individuals. 
The FCC's statements will have to be carefully examined to 
determine exactly what they mean. However, one point is 
already clear: the use of non-anonymous statistical data for 
administrative enforcement purposes, which would appear to 
be wholly reasonable since it avoids asking questions on two 
separate occasions and involves less administrative work, is 
permissible only if very restrictive conditions are met. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the reservations which the 
Court itself expressed regarding a "combined survey", that 
is, a survey in which, in its own words, personal data were 
collected simultaneously on various questionnaires to be 
used for statistical purposes and the enforcement of 
administrative decisions. These reservations are based on 
the fact that "the linking together of two different 
purposes involving different requirements is highly 
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disconcerting for the individual citizen who cannot fully 
understand the scope of automatic data processing and, as 
such, can jeopardize the reliability of the information and 
its suitability for statistical purposes". 
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Other organizational safeguards for the information control 
right are the requirements that surveys be conducted in such 
a way as to cause the least possible inconvenience to the 
individuals concerned, that enumerators and other survey 
officials should be carefully selected, and that data should 
be given effective protection during the collection process. 
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The duty to keep records of all personal data of a 
statistical nature which are transmitted is also designed to 
reinforce the legal protection enjoyed by the persons 
concerned. 
Finally, in view of the individual's inability to know 
exactly what is involved in automatic data processing and in 
order "to afford legal protection at an early stage by 
taking timely precautions", the FCC stresses the importance 
of the participation of independent data protection 
commissioners in providing effective protection. 
2. CONSEQUENCES FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS 
2.1 Consequences for legislators 
The new requirements to be met by offical statistics as a 
result of court decisions regarding the information control 
right can be fulfilled only with the assistance of those 
responsible for drawing up laws and regulations. 
2.1.1 Consequences 
FSA 
for those responsible for drawing up the 
The FCC has expressly called on legislators to draw up 
provisions covering a number of circumstances. Since the FSA 
reduces the need for legislation governing individual sets 
of statistics by itself laying down as many general rules as 
possible for the compilation of statistics, it is here that 
the legislators should concentrate their efforts to 
implement the information control right in specific areas. 
In addition to provisions which make it unnecessary to have 
regulations for individual sets of statistics, it may also 
prove necessary to incorporate general rules in the FSA 
which would then have to be embodied in specific provisions 
in individual laws. 
For the practical implementation of the information control 
right, a distinction must first be made between survey 
characteristics and auxiliary information. 
Since the FCC considers that personal data collected for 
statistical purposes are subject to fewer restrictions when 
being processed solely because they immediately lose their 
identifying features, legislators must focus their attention 
on regulating what happens to the data during the period 
when it is possible, exceptionally, to identify the persons 
to whom the data relate using the auxiliary information 
which is still available. 
In this connection, the first task will be to define the 
terms "survey characteristics" and "auxiliary information". 
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It is particularly important to make a cleai—cut distinction 
here, since the data in question are to be processed in 
different ways. 
Thus, legislators must precisely define at what point 
typical auxiliary information such as names and addresses 
must be separated from the survey characteristics. They must 
also specify the point at which the identifiers must be 
removed. If legislators feel unable to include generally 
binding provisions in the FSA, corresponding provisions must 
be incorporated into the laws governing individual sets of 
statistics. In this case, they will have to decide whether 
the FSA should not at least include a provision in the form 
of a blanket clause. 
If legislators consider that the auxiliary information needs 
to be used for subsequent surveys, the FSA will also be the 
appropriate place to lay down provisions to this effect. 
Other factors of general importance include provisions in 
survey procedures. Legislators must become much more active 
in this area than in the past, since the FCC attaches 
special significance to procedural provisions in 
safeguarding the information control right. 
In the context of the FSA, this would primarily comprise 
provisions governing "typical" procedures such as the 
collection of data by enumerators, interviews, "voluntary" 
surveys and those where persons are obliged to provide 
information. Where necessary, legislators could draw up 
provisions on the selection of enumerators and interviewers 
which were aimed at preventing conflicts of interest arising 
for these persons because of their other activities, and 
other provisions on the legal situation of the persons 
questioned, particularly as regards meeting their obligation 
to provide information. 
The FSA could also contain clauses to the effect that a 
statistical survey may be undertaken only by agencies which, 
in accordance with a legal provision, meet all the 
requirements for an effective separation of statistical work 
from other activities. 
Generally binding provisions could also be included which 
specified under what conditions personal data may be 
regarded as anonymous or released for publication (e.g. in 
tabular form). 
As an effective measure to prevent attempts to identify 
persons covered by data, legislators could incorporate a 
provision in the FSA making such attempts a punishable 
offence. 
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The FSA would also be a suitable place for laying down rules 
regarding the participation of the Federal Data Protection 
Commissioner in statistical surveys. 
The requirement laid down by the FCC that legislators should 
ensure that questionnaires are compatible with the 
underlying legal provisions could also be covered by an 
additional clause in the FSA. 
Other possible additions to the FSA would probably not be 
able to replace provisions relating to specific areas in the 
laws covering individual sets of statistics. For instance, a 
clause might be added which makes it permissible to pass on 
statistical data on individuals. However, assuming that the 
law continues to permit the transmission of statistical data 
on individuals, legislators will probably be able to do no 
more than lay down a general framework in the FSA within 
which specific laws could allow data to be passed on. 
Similarly, owing to the circumstances peculiar to each 
survey, it is unlikely that a regulation covering the 
obligation of statistical authorities to provide persons 
questioned with relevant information could be adopted 
without specific provisions covering actual cases. 
2.1.2 Consequences for legislators 
specific sets of statistics 
responsible for laws on 
Legislators responsible for laws on specific sets of 
statistics are likely to be faced by a need to adopt a whole 
series of amendments to take acccount of the information 
control right. In future, when they draw up new laws 
governing statistics they must also consider methodological 
aspects. 
There is virtually no legislation which distinguishes 
between survey characteristics and auxiliary information. If 
it was thought inadequate that, in the course of the 
administrative enforcement of laws relating to statistics, 
the persons questioned were told which questions were 
designed solely to facilitate the carrying out of the survey 
and which would be statistically analysed, this would be a 
sufficient reason to amend almost all the laws covering 
statistics. 
In general, the survey procedure to be adopted should not be 
laid down in such a way that all the factors affecting 
fundamental rights are covered. Here, there is as yet no 
evidence as to what general provisions in the FSA can 
achieve. Amendments will probably be required at least in 
respect of surveys of an unusual type. 
There are virtually no provisions regarding the facts which 
have to be explained to respondents when a survey takes 
114 
place. Here, too, it is doubtful whether a general provision 
in the FSA can fill this gap. 
It also appears extremely unlikely that a separation and 
deletion provision in the FSA could meet the requirements 
laid down by the FCC for a sufficiently specific provision. 
All legislation governing individual sets of statistics 
which authorizes the collection of personal data might have 
to be supplemented by provisions of this kind. 
However, there can be no doubt that the individual laws 
which provide for the passing on of statistical information 
relating to individuals need to be amended. Scarcely any of 
these laws take account of the limitations which in future 
will be imposed in information which is passed on. 
Furthermore, in cases where it is planned to combine 
personal data from various statistical sources, such actions 
must be expressly covered in the individual laws governing 
the collection of the data which are to be combined. 
If the legislators were to decide to enact individual laws 
on statistics relating to specific areas rather than draw up 
an "amending law", they would almost certainly have to 
examine methodological questions in the process. In the view 
of the FCC, the legislators must decide in every individual 
case whether the procedures used are in line with the latest 
scientific findings as regards the degree of inconvenience 
which they cause. If, for example, modern sampling 
techniques produce results which are just as good as those 
obtained by a full survey, instructions to hold a full 
survey would contravene the principle of proportionality and 
therefore be unconstitutional. 
2.1.3 Consequences for persons drawing up laws and 
regulations 
In some areas the FCC has not specified how the information 
control right is to be safeguarded. It has merely stated 
that the legislators are free to decide whether they will 
authorize those who draw up regulations to introduce 
relevant provisions or whether they will allow the 
administrative authorities scope to take their own 
decisions, with rules setting up a system of supervision to 
ensure that these decisions are carried out correctly. The 
main purpose here is to ensure proper administrative 
enforcement of the laws on statistics; for example, it is 
necessary to make sure that the questionnaires contain only 
questions which are covered by the underlying law. 
The technical and organizational measures required for an 
effective segregation of statistical data should also be 
ment ioned. 
Measures to avoid conflicts of interest among enumerators 
and other survey officials need not be stipulated by law 
either. 
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2.2. Consequences for the conduct of statistical surveys 
The judgement of the FCC on the 1983 Census of Population 
Act does not only have consequences for legislators. It also 
lays down guidelines which the authorities engaged in 
statistical work must observe when collecting, preparing, 
processing and presenting statistical data. 
2.2.1 Collection of data 
The obligation derived by the FCC from the principle of 
proportionality to the effect that the "least detrimental" 
means should be employed, i.e. the means which interfere 
least with fundamental rights, is of central importance 
especially during the data collection stage. It means, inter 
alia, that the statistical offices have a duty, when 
carrying out surveys, to consider whether the purposes for 
which the information is required could not be achieved with 
procedures which interfered less with fundamental rights. 
The degree of such interference depends to a large extent on 
how comprehensive the questions in a given survey are, the 
degree to which individual questions are concerned with the 
private life of the persons providing the information and 
whether those questioned in the survey are obliged to 
provide information. 
Consequently, a survey involving voluntary participation is 
the "least detrimental" data collection procedure of all. 
However, even if participation in a statistical survey is 
voluntary, the information control right is guaranteed only 
if the person concerned can consciously decide whether or 
not to provide information and determine how data on him can 
be used. This presupposes that the person knows why the data 
are being collected. Thus, the statistical offices are also 
bound by their duty to provide explanations and other 
information in the case of surveys where information is 
given on a voluntary basis. 
However, in cases where the provision of information must be 
compulsory, those responsible for the survey must determine 
whether the purpose for which the information is collected 
can be achieved by asking fewer questions and making those 
which are asked less closely related to the social status of 
the persons questioned. In this connection, special care 
must be taken to ensure that no data are collected which 
might lead to a social stigma being attached to the persons 
concerned. 
The extent to which a statistical survey interferes with the 
rights of a person providing information is also determined 
by the identifiers such as names, addresses, personal 
distinguishing features, etc. which are used when the survey 
is carried out. If the purpose for which information is to 
be collected allows it, surveys based on anonymous data are 
to be given precedence over surveys which use identifiers 
during the collection stage. However, if identifiers are 
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included in the questionnaire they must be listed as 
auxiliary information, together with the survey 
characteristics, in the legislation covering the survey 
concerned. In accordance with the principle of 
proportionality, this auxiliary information must be kept to 
a minimum. 
The degree of inconvenience caused by a survey is also 
affected by the number of persons who must provide 
information (the coverage of the survey) and their 
relationship to the total number of those who might be asked 
to provide information (sampling ratio). The greater the 
number of persons asked questions in a survey is and the 
higher the sampling ratio becomes, the greater the 
"detriment" caused by the survey is bound to be. 
The degree of interference in the information control right 
is also affected by whether the survey is carried out using 
enumerators or interviewers or whether other agencies not 
connected with the statistical offices are called in. If it 
is not possible to incorporate guarantees of a legally 
proper involvement of these agencies in the legislation 
governing individual surveys, the services of such agencies 
must be dispensed with. If they are invited to take part, 
there must be no possibility of conflicts of interest and it 
must be possible to segregate these agencies from other 
administrative bodies. 
To summarize what has been said about the consequences of 
the FCC's judgment on data collection activities, 
particularly with a view to future developments, it can be 
expected that : 
- greater significance will in future be attached to 
"voluntary" surveys as far as federal statistics are 
concerned; 
- fulfilling the obligation to provide explanations and 
other information will make survey work more costly and 
more time-consuming; 
- discussion will in future focus more on the methodological 
aspects of data anonymity; 
- the involvement of enumerators and interviewers and of 
data collection agencies not connected with the 
statistical offices will have to be properly justified. 
2.2.2 Preparation and processing 
The FCC's demand for specific conditions governing data 
processing as well as the requirements regarding the 
segregation of statistical sources and the removal of 
identifiers at an early stage are highly relevant to 
preparation and processing of work. 
For the statistical offices, this means that more 
organizational records and data flow characteristics will 
have to be prepared so as to provide a clear description of 
the conditions under which data in individual surveys are 
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processed and the procedures involved in such processing, 
thus ensuring that the operations involved in the processing 
of personal data are 'made clear to anyone who is interested, 
including the data protection commissioners. 
The requirement that data can be depersonalized at an early 
stage is met by separating and deleting, as soon as 
possible, auxiliary information which might help to identify 
the persons covered. 
Effective segre 
particular phil 
already been 
implementai ion 
legislation and 
have been taken 
The letter's 
gat ion 
osophy 
drawn 
of Fe 
arrangements, normally based on a 
of data security requirements have 
up in the course of the general 
deral and Land data protection 
practical measures designed to meet them 
in the 
general 
exemplary by the FCC. 
required in th 
have to be pai 
third parties 
occasionally as 
rules may, for 
such companies. 
In the context 
is area. 
d in fut 
(e.g. 
ked to 
example 
of pre 
factor of particular 
control right is the 
statistical surveys are 
data concerned 
consequence to 
are in 
the ind 
for one or more of th 
"statistical" combining 
surveys with i 
pose any pro 
personal, "iden 
Federal and Land Statistical Offices. 
approach has been described as 
Further legal provisions are not 
However, particular attention will 
ure to the security measures taken by 
service companies) which are 
assist in carrying out surveys. Legal 
have to be drawn up to "segregate" 
paration and processing of work, a 
significance for the information 
extent to which data from various 
combined with one another. Where the 
the form of aggregates, this is of no 
ividual who has provided information 
e sets of statistics concerned. The 
of personal data records for various 
dentifying features removed are unlikely to 
blems either. "A genuine" combination of 
t ifiable 
by means of common id 
Without such a 
judgment of the 
" data records from various surveys 
entifiers must have legal sanction. 
sanction, it would be at variance with the 
FCC. 
To summarize what has been said about the consequences of 
the judgment for preparation and processing work, it is 
clear that : 
- the accelerated introduction of organizational records and 
data flow charts will lead to additional expenditure; 
- the separation and deletion obligation connected with the 
requirements that data should be depersonalized at an 
early stage will lead to changes in organizational 
procedures and a substantial increase in expenditure; 
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- the number of outside agencies involved in preparation 
work will gradually go down; 
- it will become more difficult to combine personal 
"identifiable" data records from various sets of 
statistics. 
2.2.3 Présentât ion 
The presentation of data by the statistical offices is not 
affected by the FCC's judgment except where the publication 
or passing on of personal data is concerned. The judgment 
does not affect the dissemination of aggregate data via 
publications, statistical information system, etc. 
According to the FCC's judgment, personal data collected in 
a survey may, assuming it is expressly authorized by law, be 
passed on, on condition that this is for the purpose of 
purely statistical processing by other agencies and that the 
measures required to protect the individual's right to 
privacy can be reliably guaranteed. On the other hand, the 
arguments put forward by the FCC indicate that it might be 
inadmissable to pass on personal "identifiable" data to 
facilitate the enforcement of administrative decisions. As a 
direct result of the judgment, the Federal Statistical 
Office has for the time being suspended the transmission of 
any personal data which retain identifying features until a 
decision is made regarding amendments to the relevant legal 
provisions. Depersonalized personal data, i.e. data on 
individuals which cannot be traced back to the persons 
covered, may continue to be passed on and published by the 
statistical offices. 
Since the scope for passing on "identifiable" personal data 
has been drastically reduced, it is probable that demands 
for depersonalized personal data will increase. In the view 
of the FCC, the demands for the anonymity of personal data, 
as explained above, should not be set too high. Opinion is 
tending to favour a de facto anonymity, a solution which has 
already been discussed, inter alia, by experts in the field. 
To summarize the above, it would appear that: 
- the judgment does not affect practical work concerned with 
presentation of statistical results except for those 
exceptional cases where the results consist of personal 
data ; 
- the passing on of "identifiable" personal data will 
continue to be subject to drastic restrictions, probably 
in the longer term as well; 
- in contrast, the passing on of depersonalized personal 
data will be made easier. 
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3. THE WAY OUT OF THE DILEMMA 
3 . 1 Short-term reac t_io n s of leg is 1 ato r s , the federal 
departments concerned and the statistical offices to the 
judgment of_ the J^dej^al Constitutional Court 
The discussion of the effects of the judgment on the work of 
legislators and on the actual conduct of statistical surveys 
by the statistical offices has already shown that many steps 
have to be taken as a result of the judgment. Not all the 
work which is needed can be carried out at once. The 
question therefore arises as to the extent to which the 
legislators concerned and the administrative authorities 
have a right to defer the requisite implementation of the 
Court's judgment. 
3.1.1 Deferment of implementation of Constitutional Court's 
guidelines. 
When a statutory rule is incompatible with the Basic Law, 
the rule normally has to be declared null and void. However, 
if the present legal arrangements governing statistics can 
be implemented in a constitutional manner, bearing in mind 
the decision of the FCC, it is not absolutely imperative, at 
least in theory, to withdraw the legislation on which these 
arrangements are based. If such a view is taken, it would 
appear sufficient that the legislators rectify the state of 
affairs which is unconstitutional within a suitable period. 
In practice, however, deferring implementation in this way 
would not be of much value because, although the statistical 
offices had stated it might be possible to carry out the 
1984 Microcensus in a manner which did not conflict with the 
judgment of the FCC, the survey in question was postponed. 
It still appears doubtful whether a census on distributive 
trades and catering due to be held in 1985 can be carried 
out on the basis of a law introduced before the FCC 
delivered its judgment on the census of population, although 
the statistical offices are endeavouring to organize the 
survey in such a way that it conforms with the FCC's 
guidelines. 
3.1.2 Bringing collection and processing procedures in the 
statistical offices into line with the guidelines 
Most current sets of statistics are in fact compiled in 
accordance with the FCC's guidelines. 
The measures taken in this regard include the statistical 
offices' efforts to make the contents of questionnaires used 
in individual surveys conform as closely as possible to the 
working of the law on which the survey in question is based 
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and, where doubts arise, to dispense with one or more 
questions in the questionnaire in accordance with the 
principle of legislative clarity. 
The statistical offices are also attempting to comply with 
the obligation to provide explanations and to the 
information laid down by the Constitutional Court and are 
endeavouring to depersonalize data at an early stage by 
designing survey documents in an appropriate way (with 
identifiers on detachable sheets) and by taking 
organizational measures affecting data preparation. 
Compared with the situation before the FCC's judgment, this 
involves additional work. The extra expenditure thereby 
incurred may be regarded as the price which has to be paid 
for improved data protection. 
The steps taken to adjust to the new situation include the 
practical suspension by the statistical offices of the 
provisions regarding the passing on of personal data. 
Provisions of this kind are found in no fewer than 30 laws 
governing individual sets of statistics. 
3.1.3 Requisite amendment of legislation governing 
individual sets of statistics 
Although the statistical offices are endeavouring to 
organize data collection in a constitutional manner in 
accordance with the guidelines laid down by the FCC, the 
requisite amendments must be made to legislation on specific 
sets of statistics by the legislators and, during the 
preparatory stage, by the responsible federal departments, 
since such amendments cannot be postponed indefinitely. 
The preparatory work on drawing up a new Census of 
Population Act began very soon after the FCC's judgment was 
handed down and will soon be completed. The draft of a 
Microcensus Act complying with the principles embodied in 
the Court's judgment has also been prepared, as have drafts 
for an amended law on higher education statistics. 
Work is also under way on drawing up an omnibus law 
(amending law) to bring the legislation underlying the other 
current sets of statistics into line with the guidelines 
contained in the FCC's judgment. In particular, this affects 
the provisions governing the passing on of personal data 
contained in over 30 specific laws, the inclusion of more 
precise details in survey programmes and, finally, 
organizational and procedural rules. 
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3.1.4 Further development of the Federal Statistics Act 
In addition to the adaptation of legislation on individual 
sets of statistics the FCC's judgment has also made it 
necessary to amend the basic Federal Statistics Act. This is 
now taking place, together with the revision of the 
individual laws on statistics. 
The revision of the Federal Statistics Act also, as 
mentioned above, mainly affects the provisions 
regarding exceptions to the confidentiality of statistical 
information, the passing on of data and procedural rules. It 
remains to be seen whether the amendments which have to be 
made to the Federal Statistics Act can be used not only to 
bring the Act into line with the FCC's guidelines but also 
to introduce legal provisions for important innovations in 
the further development of federal statistics. 
3.2 Longer-term arrangements to_ bring the plans, methods, 
procedures and organizational measures adopted for 
federal statistics into line with the judgment 
The revision of the relevant legislation in accordance with 
the guidelines contained in the FCC's judgment means, first 
of all, that the compilation of federal statistics must be 
made to conform with standards imposed from outside by the 
highest court in the land. In the longer term, the most 
significant factor will be whether those responsible for 
federal statistics can take the principles embodied in the 
judgment and use them as a basis for actively shaping the 
plans, methods, procedures and organizational measures 
required for such statistics. For this purpose, the judgment 
offers a number of points of reference, which will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
3.2.1 The development of a modern demand-orientated 
programme 
In its judgment the FCC stressed how important statistics 
were for carrying out vigorous policies in conformity with 
the Basic Law. However, if federal statistics are to provide 
comprehensive, continuous and up-to-date information on the 
economic, social and ecological situation, it is especially 
important that they be geared to respond to urgent needs. 
For this purpose, all the bodies engaged in drawing up plans 
for federal statistics should give early consideration to 
the question of which problems will occur in future and 
which will require an urgent solution. 
This is the only way to ensure that the information required 
for decision-making can be made available in good time. 
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Therefore, over the next few years, the planning of the 
programme of statistics is to be based on present and future 
social, economic and technical developments and will cover 
all important official activities. 
Under this plan, programme development work will be carried 
out in stages: long-term overall planning, long-term outline 
planning and short-term detailed planning. During the 
overall planning stage, the general needs for quantitative 
information both for the present and for the foreseeable 
future will be determined and described. A second stage 
(outline planning) will follow, based on this overall 
planning. The object of this stage is to establish the 
extent to which the general need for information previously 
determined can be met by an overall statistical system. By 
comparing the need for information thus determined 
(information useful for statistical purposes) with existing 
data, it is possible to identify shortfalls which must then 
be met rationally in a way which imposes the least possible 
burden on the persons questioned. This will be followed by a 
third stage (detailed planning), during which plans for 
individual sets of statistics will be drawn up, based on the 
outline planning. 
3.2.2 The discussion of methods and procedures 
The discussion of methods and procedures will become 
important during the outline planning stage, if not earlier, 
i.e. during the stage when plans have to be drawn up to 
remedy data shortfalls in a rational manner which imposes 
the least possible burden on those providing the 
information. 
Little progress is likely to be made with surveys of a 
traditional type, particularly in the case of new fields of 
investigation now being covered by statistics (e.g. the 
black economy, the use of new technologies, the social 
situation of certain groups of the population). The many 
different demands which have to be met when examining these 
areas require that those responsible for compiling federal 
statistics be much more flexible than in the past when 
designing and carrying out surveys. 
Making greater flexibility a reality poses particularly 
difficult problems for legislators. However, only 
legislation can prepare the ground to enable statistics in 
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the Federal Republic of Germany to gain the necessary 
flexibility, of the kind taken for granted in other western 
countries when official statistics are compiled. 
In this connection, an important contribution could be made 
by making legal provision for small-scale surveys with 
voluntary participation, which could be carried out with 
simpler procedures than those used for normal surveys where 
the giving of information is compulsory and for the 
large-scale surveys based on voluntary cooperation which 
have been carried out so far. Particularly in view of the 
new fields of investigation now being introduced, 
legislators would be taking on an impossible task if they 
attempted to specify every characteristic which was to be 
covered by the survey programme. 
The inclusion in the Federal Statistics Act of appropriate 
legal provisions governing the organization and the conduct 
of small-scale surveys based on voluntary participation is 
an essential prerequisite if those responsible for compiling 
federal statistics are in future to be able to meet the 
demands made upon them. 
3.2.3 Further developments in the organization of federal 
statistics 
In explaining its judgment, the FCC laid stress on the 
principle of separating administrative enforcement and 
statistical work. As already mentioned, this reflects in 
particular the view that data collected for a specific 
administrative purpose may in principle be used only for 
this purpose and, where appropriate, for statistical 
purposes as well. On the other hand, "identifiable" personal 
data collected for statistical purposes may not be used for 
administrative purposes. 
The FCC's view underlines the relevance of the so-called 
"one-way-street system" which has already been frequently 
discussed by statisticians. The basic idea is that the 
system of federal statistics, as in certain other western 
countries, should be developed so that it becomes a sort of 
one-way-street for personal data. Under this system, the 
statistical offices will obtain their data by means of 
primary surveys which they carry out themselves and by using 
information from public administrative authorities for 
purely statistical purposes ("secondary statistics"). 
Combined surveys designed to serve the purposes of both 
administrative enforcement and statistical compilation will 
not be allowed. In these "one-way street" models steps must 
also be taken to ensure that statistical offices have access 
to all administrative records and that, when the latter 
contain information of relevance to the statistics as a 
whole, the statistical offices should be able to use this 
information, at least in anonymous form. This would ensure 
that the largest possible volume of statistically analysable 
data flowed into the system of federal statistics. 
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On the output side, the one-way-street principle would make 
it impossible to pass on identifiable personal data. Such 
data would be made available to users only in a 
depersonalized form. 
A broad flow of statistically analysable data into the 
system of federal statistics would, however, also require 
changes in the rules for processing the material. Most 
standard tabulation programs would have to be shortened, 
while special and additional processing operations would 
become more important. To meet these requirements, greater 
attention would have to be focused on individual problems 
and projects, which would also affect the internal 
organization of the statistical offices. Given the situation 
described, these steps would automatically produce a greater 
flexibility in planning and in work procedures. 
DISCUSSION 
M. DE VRIES (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek) opened the 
discussion : 
The judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court had 
introduced a state of real uncertainty into the work of 
compiling statistics and was of considerable interest and 
importance to other countries also, and particularly to the 
Netherlands. Mr. De Vries asked the following questions 
arising from the paper: 
(1) To what extent were personalized data arising from 
surveys available to the staff of the Statistisches 
Bundesamt? 
(2) It was mentioned that the costs involved in data 
protection must be in reasonable proportion to the 
protection achieved: how were these norms determined? 
(3) Was there a contradiction between the statement in 
Section 1.3.1 that, when personal data were collected 
for statistical use, it was not necessary to specify a 
definite purpose and the statement in section 1.3.2 that 
there was a duty to explain to persons questioned the 
purposes of a survey? 
(4) What was now the position as regards the passing on to 
third parties of statistical data on individuals? 
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(5) What was the position as regards the passing on, for 
administrative purposes, of information collected for 
statistical purposes? 
Before proceeding with the discussion, Mr. WERNER and Mr. 
SUDFELD (Statistisches Bundesamt) replied to these quest ions 
of Mr. de Vries: 
(1) Personalized data, with identification, from surveys 
were accessible only to those officials directly 
concerned with the organization of the surveys. The 
material necessary for the identification of individuals 
was removed from the records at as early a stage as 
possible in the processing and thereafter the magnetic 
tapes were available to members of staff of the 
Statistisches Bundesamt needing to work on them. Insofar 
as the combining of individualized data from different 
sources was concerned, this would require a specific 
legal authorization. 
(2) On the relationship between data protection measures and 
their costs, the Federal Protection Law gave some 
guidance. The relevance of the measures and their cost 
must be in reasonable relationship to the protection 
afforded and the risks to which the data were exposed. 
In deciding such questions the Data Protection officials 
as well as of the official working with the data were 
consul ted. 
(3) The Constitutional Court recognized that a statistical 
inquiry was in a somewhat different situation to that of 
an inquiry by a police or registration official. Whereas 
in the latter cases, the precise purpose of the inquiry 
must be stated, a certain flexibility was acceptable in 
the case of a statistical inquiry. 
(4) It was mentioned in the paper that the passing on to 
third parties of information on identifiable individuals 
had been stopped for the time being and there was no 
doubt that such transfers would be very limited in the 
future. On the other hand the Court allowed the passing 
on of anonymized data and had made the conditions 
required for doing so more liberal. In particular no 
great obstacles should be put in the way of supplying 
data for scientific research. 
(5) With regard to the passing on of data for administrative 
purposes, insofar as aggregate data were concerned there 
was no problem. The passing on of individualized data 
was, however, completely forbidden. An inquiry having 
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both administrative and statistical purposes was no 
longer permitted. Statistical data might be extracted 
from administrative records although the position was 
still not clear where the administrative records related 
to identifiable individuals. 
Mr. BEGUE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques) remarked: 
Referring to the use of administrative records for 
statistical purposes in the Federal Republic he asked 
whether, when a new system of administrative records was 
being introduced, there existed arrangements for 
consultation with the statisticians to ensure that their 
needs were taken into account. Such arrangements existed in 
France, organized by a National Council for Statistical 
Informat ion. 
Mr. FLAHERTY (University of Western Ontario) intervened: 
He asked the authors to comment on how, since there were 
good Statistics Acts and good Federal Data Protection Acts 
in existence in April 1983, the census of population had 
nevertheless run into difficulties. He noted that the 
Federal Minister for the Interior had appointed a data 
protection officer to work in the Statistisches Bundesamt 
and asked for some information on the status and method of 
work on this official. He expressed surprise at the remarks 
(Section 1.3.2) that the use of non-anonmyous statistical 
data for administrative purposes appeared wholly reasonable, 
in view of the considerable controversy on this point. 
Mr. RAPAPORT (Statistics Sweden) asked: 
Whether it was now possible to carry out longitudinal 
surveys in the Federal Republic following the judgment of 
the Constitutional Court. 
Mr. BARNES (Office of Popula t ion, Censuses and Surveys) 
enqui red : 
Whether the Constitutional Court defined what was meant by 
"depersonalization" of records or gave any advice as to 
where lines should be drawn. Clearly name and address 
identified individuals but sometimes, even without name and 
address, unique combinations of characteristics, especially 
in small geographic areas, might be sufficient to identify 
peop1 e. 
Dr. BAUMANN (der Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz) 
pointed out: 
A remark of Mr. Rapaport said that future strategy should be 
to stress to the public the value and importance of 
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It had not been expressed sufficiently clearly that the 
topic of the seminar, "Protection of privacy" had been 
considered primarily from the point of view of the 
processing of data recorded for statistical purposes in the 
discussion. The judgment of the Federal Constitutional 
Court, however, quite clearly stated that this kind of 
protection should be introduced much earlier: the legislator 
had to take action to ensure the protection of privacy 
during the actual recording of data. For this reason 
according to the judgment, the following measures were 
necessary: 
- the person who was obliged to supply information had a 
right to explanations and information, about which he 
should be notified in writing; 
- the person obliged to supply information should be allowed 
to hand the questionnaire to the enumerator - who would 
not have inspected it - in a sealed envelope or to send it 
by post; 
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- it should be possible for the person obliged to supply 
information to give this only to enumerators who had 
absolutely no conflict of interests; 
- personnel and organizational measures should be adopted to 
ensure that during the survey the offices involved were 
hermetically sealed from the other administrative 
departments. 
Mr. JENSEN (Danmarks Statistik) remarked as follows: 
The principle of "information control right" could be 
applied only in a very general way, since no one could 
control his data through all the stages of processing in a 
statistical office. The creation of ways and means to 
guarantee information control in the general sense was a 
matter which should be dealt with in the legislation on data 
protection. This was the case in Denmark. A specific set of 
rules was formulated for every single register and these 
detailed rules were made public. In this way the Danish 
population had every opportunity to follow and, in a general 
sense, control the use and the circulation of individual 
information. 
Mr. HARRIS (EUROSTAT) pointed out: 
The present position as regards German statistics was a 
matter of great concern to the Commission. The Commission 
was being obliged to tailor Community legislation to meet 
German requirements and this situation gave rise to problems 
with other countries. It also gave rise to problems with 
Community legislation since the Commission was, under the 
Treaties, entitled to ask Member Countries for the 
information it needed to do its work. Noting the 
recommendations in favour of voluntary surveys and public 
relations he felt that there was need for a profession of 
"official statistician". Such professionals would be not 
only numerate but also highly literate with a feel for 
politics and publicity. He welcomed Mr. Werner's thesis that 
a fairly general statement of use in regard to statistical 
surveys should be acceptable. If one had conducted a 
household survey for use in employment policy, it would be 
far too rigid an interpretation of the Court's judgment to 
forbid certain cross-classifications simply because they had 
not been and could not have been foreseen at the outset. 
Mr. SCHOETTL referred to the principle of proportionality, 
well known in France, whereby the limitations imposed by the 
police on liberty of individuals should be strictly confined 
to the needs of the general policy aim involved. He asked 
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whether the application of this principle in the collection 
of German census statistics was accepted unanimously or 
whether it gave rise to criticism. He asked whether there 
was not at least some debate in Germany on the principle of 
"information control right". The logic of this principle was 
that it conferred on individuals a veritable copyright on 
all the information relating to them. This could affect not 
only the compilation of statistics, but also the very 
functioning of the State itself. 
Mr. BIEVER (Commiss ion consul t at i ve pour la protect ion des 
données nomi nat i ves) made the following points: 
(i) Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
guaranteed the right to privacy. It was not evident 
that having regard to its jurisprudence the Court of 
Human Rights in a case similar to that before the 
Federal Cons t i t i t utiona1 Court, would decide exactly 
the same thing (judgment Malone). 
(ii) The distinction between personal and anonymous data 
was sometimes unclear, particularly in the case of 
identification as belonging to a group. 
(iii) The problem of protection of personal data and meeting 
the needs of statisticians must be reconciled. 
Otherwise there was the risk that the experience of 
the Federal Republic would be repeated in other 
countries. 
(iv) If one wished to give the public more complex 
information about the value of statistics, one should 
not, at the same time, ask for their interconnection 
with other files held by the administration. These two 
procedures risked being profoundly contradictory. The 
principle of finality which should apply to each data 
base was thus violated. 
The author (Mr. WERNER) replied to the main points raised: 
With regard to the question of Mr. Begué, in order for 
administrative data relating to individuals to be used for 
statistical purposes in the future, the uses would have to 
be clearly specified in advance in the enabling legislation. 
The prospects for such an arrangement in the present climate 
of opinion were poor, as the necessary political will was 
lacking. 
He agreed with Mr. Flaherty that the paper left a gap in 
that it did not discuss the failure of the 1983 census 
despite the apparent adequacy of the data protection 
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legislation in force at that time. However the authors had 
confined themselves to the legal situation and did not 
attempt a description of the psychological situation 
prevailing at the time of the census. 
The data protection officer in the Statistisches Bundesamt 
had a double function: he was leader of the legal and data 
protection groups and had a grade immediately under that of 
head of department. In the past, contact with the data 
protection office had been mainly in regard to specific 
problems. Since the Court judgment, a committee had been set 
up to ensure regular contact between the Statistisches 
Bundesamt, the Federal data protection office and the 
Länder. 
On Mr. Flaherty's third question, it was a simple statement 
of fact that a joint statistical/administrative survey 
could, in certain cases be the most efficient arrangement. 
The paper pointed out that the conditions under which such a 
survey could be carried out were very restrictive and needed 
to be examined. 
In reply to Mr. Rapaport's question, longitudinal studies 
were still possible provided that this use of the data was 
previewed in the legal basis for the study. It must have 
been stated that the data might be linked over a period of 
time, so that an immediate anonymization of the data was not 
possible. 
On the question of "depersonalization" posed by Mr. Barnes, 
the Karlsruhe judgment simply spoke of the practical 
anonymization of records, which was rather less precise than 
the principles contained in the existing Statistics Acts. 
This left rather greater scope for the Statistisches 
Bundesamt which must examine the practical situation with 
regard to each inquiry and to assess the risk that data 
might be identified from it. 
He said that Mr. Schoettl was incorrect in believing that 
the Karlsruhe judgment conferred on the individual an 
absolute right of control over his own data. This right 
could be limited by the appropriate legislation. This, he 
thought, was consistent with the view of the European Court 
of Human Rights mentioned by Mr. Biwer, that there were no 
absolute rights in the protection of information, at least 
insofar as information of concern to the State was 
concerned. The Court recognized that there was such an 
absolute right in regard to information of an intimate 
nature. 
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The author (Mr. SUDFELD) continued: 
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STATISTICS AND ADMINISTRATION 
Prof. Dr. W. BEGEER, W.F.M. DE VRIES, H.D. DUKKER 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 
SUMMARY 
This paper by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics 
provides an outline of the particular status that a bureau 
of official statistics should possess within society. This 
is illustrated by noting the difference between 
administrative and statistical information: in the process, 
the terms "administrative immunity" and "potentially 
censurable or vulnerable entity" are introduced and 
expiai ned. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
Although the title of the seminar is "protection of 
privacy", and these words are generally taken to mean 
maintaining the secrecy of individual data, the authors 
intend to give a wider meaning to the subject. 
Public servants are generally forbidden to discuss 
individual data with unauthorized persons or to release such 
data to them. Their work will, however, make it necessary to 
use individual data and this will often result in the 
exchange of data with colleagues and the transmission of 
data to other - possible even prosecuting - authorities. In 
such cases, secrets are still being kept from unauthorized 
persons, but the group of authorized persons can be very 
large and, to some extent, defined by the people involved 
themselves. 
The authors feel that in the field of statistical 
information, the protection of privacy should be more widely 
interpreted than in the cases described above. In order to 
develop this idea, they make a distinction between 
information needed for administrative purposes and 
statistical information, which, in turn, involves a 
discussion of the specific aim of statistical information. 
With an eye to the importance of good statistical 
information, they describe the status which should, in their 
view, be accorded to "official" statistical offices and also 
extend the concept of privacy by using terms such as 
"administrative immunity" and "potentially censurable or 
vulnerable entity". 
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1. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION AND S TATISTICAL INFORMA TION 
Administrative information is taken to mean information at 
the level of the individual, which is required for 
administrative or governmental purposes. In principle, this 
description involves a process of interaction between the 
administrative or governmental body and the individual 
entities. Information about individuals is used for 
administrative or government action that concerns the 
individual entities. In some cases, the information is 
already available and is used as needed. 
In other cases, (additional) information is requested before 
action is taken. One well known example is the way that 
income tax is organized. A certain level of basic 
information is permanently available, comprising at least 
the name and address of taxable persons. In most cases, 
their old files are also available. In order to calculate 
the taxes payable, additional information (tax return) is 
requested, whereupon, perhaps after checking the requested 
information, the tax payable is determined. 
Statistical information is taken to mean information about 
groups of individual elementary units, compiled from 
information about individual entities, that has been 
transformed in such a way that it is not possible to 
identify information from specific entities. 
This description contains a number of concepts that require 
further explanation. Firstly, it always concerns information 
about groups or information about "phenomena". The typically 
American expression "her statistics are" concerns another 
meaning of statistics than the one we have in mind. 
Information about a group can be a total, but statistics are 
more often expressed as (frequency) distributions across 
categories. Additionally, group information is based on 
information about individual entities. It may comprise 
information from all the individual entities belonging to 
the group (comprehensive survey) or from only one part of it 
(sample). It is even possible for information obtained at 
the level of individuals to concern entities that do not, 
themselves, belong to the group involved. At this point one 
is confronted with the well-known difference between "sample 
population" and "target population". Where certain phenomena 
are the subject of time series, the statistical information 
obtained is often based on (parts of) groups whose 
composition is subject to variation. 
In all these cases, however, information about individuals 
is transformed into information about groups in such a way 
that a reverse transformation is not possible. This last 
requirement can have far-reaching consequences for the 
statistical information to be obtained. After all, when 
there are few entities in a given category and the category 
is described in terms of a large number of attributes, it 
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may become possible to identify the individual entities 
concerned. It is also possible that different "statistics" 
about a single group may be combined and thus lead to 
identification of individual entities. In such cases, one 
refers to "disclosure" of individual data. This is not a 
field in which a statistician may adopt a. purely 
deterministic approach, since the vital question is not 
whether it is possible to identify individual entities with 
complete certainty - even the possibility of making 
statements, with a high degree of probability, about 
individual entities is, in fact, unacceptable. Conversely, 
it is never possible to state with absolute certainty that, 
in a given situation, disclosure of individual data is 
impossible. The rather normative pronouncements made above 
are to be regarded as setting standards, applying to the 
concept of "statistical information" within the framework of 
"official" statistics. This rider contains two constraints. 
Firstly, we would not apply these standards to statistical 
information in general and, secondly, we do not state that 
statistical offices should always aim, regardless of the 
circumstances, at non-iden t i fi ab i 1 ity or the avoidance of 
any possibility of disclosure. The question of standards 
applying to offices for "official" statistics will be 
discussed later. 
By differentiating between administrative information and 
statistical information we did not mean that the latter 
cannot be obtained from the former. The individual entities 
supplying the information required for administrative 
purposes will, of course, bear in mind the possible 
consequences of the information supplied from the 
administrative or governmental viewpoint. As a result, the 
information supplied may to some extent be distorted (or 
touched up?). From another angle, it is quite conceivable 
that certain forms of administrative information will be of 
such a high quality that for statistical purposes these are 
preferred to possible alternatives. 
The aim of statistical information (in the context of 
"official" statistics) is quite different, and on another 
level, from that of administrative information. It may be 
the collection of information for the preparation, 
monitoring and evaluation of policies. The word "policy" is 
taken here to mean the adoption of measures or the taking of 
action in relation to phenomena or groups, not to their 
individual entities. Both purposes require good statistical 
information (although, of course, good information is also 
needed for administrative purposes). 
2. THE STATUS WHICH SHOULD BE ACCORDED TO "OFFICIAL" 
¡STATISTICAL OFFICES 
Bearing in mind the importance of good statistical 
information, it is desirable for an office of official 
statistics to be "independent". By "independent" we mean 
that decisions concerning the statistics programme are not 
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influenced by (party) political preferences. Among other 
things, that means that there must be no possibility of 
suppressing or delaying the availability of information that 
is politically unwelcome. (Conversely, there must be 
safeguards to prevent the office concerned taking a 
completely unilateral decision not to compile certain 
information that may be wanted by others.) Where a certain 
programme is being carried out by the office, it must be 
impossible for any outside organization to influence the 
statistical results. In other words, "adjustment" of the 
results, by organizations outside the office must be 
prevented. In this context, a description of the status of 
the Nederlands Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 
(CBS)(Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics) can serve as 
an example. 
The cornerstone of administrative statistical policy in the 
Netherlands is the Royal Decree of 9 January 1899 (Official 
Journal 43), also known as the Decree establishing the 
Central Bureau, and the Central Commission for Statistics 
(CCS) . 
The first paragraph of article 2 of the aforesaid Royal 
Decree reads: "The Central Bureau of Statistics collects, 
processes and publishes, insofar as available resources 
allow, those statistical assignments considered by the 
Director General to be of practical or scientific value". 
The wording makes it clear that statistical policy is, in 
the first place, in the hands of the Director General of the 
CBS. His decisions are, however, subject to constraints and 
he is accountable to higher authority. 
The first constraint is clear: the available resources. The 
Minister of Economic Affairs is politically responsible for 
the CBS and the CCS. He influences statistical policy in the 
first place, - subject to approval by Parliament - by making 
resources available. 
The second constraint on the decisions of the Director 
General is to be found in the second paragraph of article 2. 
This runs: "The Bureau will undertake new statistical 
research or assignments, and bring research or assignments 
to an end, only with the approval of the Central Commission 
for Statistics". 
This authorization system does, of course, give the Central 
Commission for Statistics very considerable influence on 
statistical policy. 
Like every public servant, the Director General is 
accountable to his Minister. As part of such accountability, 
nevertheless, he can invoke his dependence on the 
authorization policy of the CCS. Similarly, the 
accountability of the Minister to Parliament is tempered by 
the authorization policy that the CCS is empowered to 
define. 
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The third constraint on the decision of the Director General 
follows from the third paragraph of the aforesaid article 2. 
This reads: "The Central Commission, acting either on its 
own initiative or on behalf of our Minister of Economic 
Affairs, instructs the Director General of the Bureau to 
collect, process and publish statistical assignments. He is 
bound to accede to this instruction unless, as a result of 
an objection to an assignment decided on by the Commission 
itself, he appeals to our Minister." 
The aforesaid constraint is a policy tool for the Minister 
and a right of the CCS - though subject to the final 
responsbi 1 ity of the Minister of Economic Affairs. 
Article 2, in its entirety, is a balance structure in which 
the government and parliament always form the keystone, 
notwithstanding the responsibilities assigned to the CCS and 
to the Director General of the CBS. 
The independent position described above is one prerequisite 
for obtaining good statistical information. Such a position 
can guarantee two desirable effects: everyone in the public 
service is entitled to assume that the statistical 
information is not manipulated in any way and that all work 
is "for the general good". One consequence of this may be 
that a greater willingness on the part of the individual 
entities to provide information exists or can be promoted 
than would be the case in the absence of independence. In 
addition, independence is a virtually essential prerequisite 
if the administrative immunity discussed later on is to be 
credible. 
3. ADMINISTRATIVE IMMUNITY 
Administrative immunity is taken to mean that information 
supplied by an individual (for statistical purposes) will 
not lead to any administrative consequences. The aim here is 
to ensure that the respondent can be "relaxed" in supplying 
the information. Particularly where the information 
concerned involves (planned) action, attitudes or 
relationships which could be linked to administrative 
consequences, the guarantee of administrative immunity can 
result in more accurate information at the level of the 
individual than would be the case were it to be collected as 
administrative information. We approach this subject with 
some caution. In the case of statistics about personal or 
household incomes, it is often better to use the appropriate 
administrative information. In the Netherlands at least, the 
information concerned is so complex that the respondent 
often has to take a great deal of trouble over it and 
to consult his or her own bookkeeping in order to 
provide correct data. This trouble is taken for a tax 
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return - because the persons' own interests are involved 
and, in principle, checks by tax authorities can be 
expected - but probably not for statistical research on a 
voluntary basis. On the other hand, income (or parts of 
same) that are not revealed to, or discovered by, tax 
authorities may well emerge through a specific statistical 
survey where administrative immunity is granted. It will be 
clear that each case must be studied on its merits to see 
whether the procurement of statistical information requires 
direct surveys or the use of administrative information. 
In this respect, it should be noted that where 
administrative information is used by the "official office 
of statistics", administrative immunity cannot and will not 
be granted by the body first receiving individual 
information. The office of statistics must, however, use the 
data so obtained exclusively for statistical purposes. This 
means, for example, that if the statistical office finds 
inconsistencies in the original data provided by the 
individual, or discovers on the basis of information from 
another source that in some cases the individual information 
is incorrect, no statement to this effect will be made to 
the body originally receiving the information. Should the 
statistical office receive information at individual level 
from two or more administrative organizations and be able to 
link together information about the same individual entity, 
this linked information may not be "fed back" to the 
administrative organizations involved. It is clear that 
this - explicit - methodology can give rise to, or 
strengthen, a feeling of trust in the statistical office. 
With reference to our earlier comments about the desirable 
"independent" status of an "official office of statistics", 
it is now more evident that this status can help to promote 
public confidence in the administrative immunity granted. 
Within this context, census experience is very important. 
Either legislatively or in practice, there is a link between 
pure statistical work and assistance to administrative 
organizations. After all, a census is often used to check 
the population register(s). If this is based on appropriate 
legislation, it is clear to everyone that administrative 
immunity is non-existent. Provided that this does not 
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endanger the quality of the statistical information (in our 
opinion the main aim of a census), no objection can, in 
principle, be made. It has been found, however, that this 
intermingling of functions does indeed endanger statistical 
information. Although it is not possible to guarantee that 
personal reservations or resistance with respect to a census 
would decrease if this intermingling of the two functions 
were abolished, we believe that in the present circumstances 
it is important to move in that direction wherever this has 
not yet occurred. 
4^ THE CONCEPT OF "POTENTIALLY CENSURABLE 0E_ VULNERABLE 
ENTITY" 
Earlier on, a distinction was drawn between administrative 
and statistical information - both terms then being 
explained. We also hope that the concept of "administrative 
immunity" is now clearly understood. We now come to a 
concept that is much more difficult to describe, and 
probably even more difficult to apply - that of "potentially 
censurable (or vulnerable) entity". To some extent, this 
concept is an extension of "administrative immunity". In the 
latter case, the important thing was that the individual 
entities supplying information for statistical purposes 
should suffer no direct consequences as a result. 
Sooner or later, statistical information can have 
consequences either for all or a subgroup of the respondents 
or for a "third party". Since statistical information 
generally plays a part in governmental policy, many examples 
can be given of indirect consequences which can be linked to 
information supplied by respondents. In itself, we do not 
see that this gives rise to any great problems. In a 
democratic system, statistical information that has 
been obtained and supplied in an independent way is 
extremely valuable. Those individual citizens and directors 
of companies and organizations who recognize this value 
will - at least that is our hope - be prepared to supply 
individual information which, once transformed into 
statistical information, can result in policy measures being 
taken by the government. 
It is, however, not impossible that certain groups will 
cultivate a mood of opposition to particular statistical 
research because of their general desire to deprive the 
government of the instruments it needs to carry out its 
policies. The well-known resistance to censuses, even where 
these have a purely statistical purpose, can to some extent 
be seen as resistance to a government whose activities 
permeate many aspects of the daily life of citizens. This 
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phenomenon is part of a problem which concerns the entire 
structure of the State. Official offices of statistics can 
do very little to alter this situation, but in making that 
comment we have assumed that the census has a purely 
statistical purpose. If that is not the case, it is 
advisable to take action which will sever any link between 
statistical and administrative information. 
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The possibility of this latter type of measure is one of the 
reasons for our comment that the concept of "potentially 
censurable entity" can be an extension of the concept of 
"administrative immunity". After all, although no direct 
consequences result from the statistical information 
supplied, a certain group nevertheless becomes the target of 
administrators government officials. In such cases, we feel 
that the expression "potentially censurable entity" is 
appropriate. 
To a certain extent, a comparable situation would exist if 
statistical research were to reveal that certain (small) 
subgroups were especially liable to be involved in 
particular ­ for example criminal ­ actions. The subgroup 
can be an ethnic minority or a group restricted to a 
particular area or suburb. A very real danger then exists 
that the statistical information concerned may result in 
discriminatory treatment based on the mere fact that someone 
belongs to that subgroup. In this case, too, statistical 
research gives rise to a potentially censurable entity. 
At the beginning of this paragraph, we also noted the 
possibility of consequences for or measures directed against 
a "third party". To illustrate this, we would like to 
present three examples. 
The first example involves the possibility of statistical 
research results proving that the policy adopted by a 
democratically­controlled organization (government, local 
council) has undesirable consequences. This organization, 
then, is our "third party". In this case, we should not 
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speak of a potentially censurable entity. After all, we 
believe that statistical information must be usable for 
determining and monitoring policy. 
As a second example we can take a statistical survey of 
examination results in science subjects. If the statistics 
are split up to show examination results achieved by the 
students of different establishments, a "third party" is 
created since, although the examination results relate to 
individual students, the results achieved by economics 
students at the University of "X" constitute data about the 
Economic Sciences faculty at that university. The statistics 
could make it possible to compare data concerning the 
Economics faculties at different universities. In principle, 
this then creates a "potentially censurable entity". After 
all, inferior results at one faculty compared to another can 
be taken to suggest that teaching standards are lower there, 
or something similar. 
A third example can be drawn from statistics on causes of 
death. If such statistics are split up into small regions, 
differences between these regions can become apparent. This 
can give rise to the formulation of (scientific) hypotheses 
or the testing of previously formulated ones. Let us now 
assume that in one particular respect a certain region 
compares very badly and that only one doctor is working in 
that region. In this case, this doctor is our "third party" 
and a potentially censurable entity. 
In general, we believe it is necessary to make a distinction 
between a situation in which all - or at least certain - of 
the respondents can suffer adverse consequences from 
statistical information and a situation in which a "third 
party" exists. In the first case, the concept of 
"potentially censurable entity" can be seen as an extension 
of administrative immunity. In the latter case, the concept 
is more individual. 
In addition, we have also shown by examples that some cases 
do not necessarily involve a potentially censurable entity, 
while others do. We hope that our treatment of the examples 
has made it clear that there are no black and white 
situations. In fact, it is a case of drawing a dividing line 
somewhere on a continuum. 
The question now arises as to what operational value should 
be allocated to the concept of a potentially censurable 
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entity. We believe that whenever the question of a 
potentially censurable entity can arise, it is necessary to 
be very reserved in supplying statistical information. 
In contrast to an individual scientific researcher, or a 
purely scientific research team, an official office of 
statistics has to exercise restraint in the publication of 
research results. Such an office is usually part of central 
government, but should have a separate status within the 
government structure and take great care to maintain that 
status. Other government organs exist for the preparation, 
execution and supervision of policy, and others still for 
carrying out administrative, governmental, investigative and 
prosecutory tasks. Above all, an official office of 
statistics must ensure that confidence in its independence 
and integrity is maintained. It provides statistical 
information on behalf of all echelons of society, and can do 
so only if it avoids any appearance whatever of 
participation in the administrative and governmental system. 
This may mean that certain detailed statistical information 
cannot be made available. Feelings of frustration may result 
because from a coldly scientific viewpoint this information 
may be considered valuable or useful in terms of measures to 
be taken. This code of conduct must not be based on more or 
less arbitrary principles, and in order to avoid this danger 
it must be possible to discuss the policy adopted by the 
official office of statistics by means of concrete 
situations, for example within the framework of a 
statistical commission. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents and explains a number of concepts. 
Statements are also made about the desirable status of an 
official office of statistics and about the policy that such 
an office should pursue. To some extent, this status and 
policy may be motivated by pragmatic considerations. By this 
we mean that a particular status and policy can help to 
improve the statistical information obtained, by promoting 
confidence in the office. The very choice of a pragmatic 
argument is an ethical process, and we make no secret of the 
fact that our statements are also motivated by outright 
ethical considerations. The hypothetical example drawn from 
statistics on causes of death, whereby a certain doctor 
could be named in relation with unfavourable "results", is 
relevant in this context. Let us assume for a moment that 
the doctor concerned did, in fact, deserve to be denounced, 
as his poor professional standards could result in the death 
of a number of people. Is concealment of such statistical 
information justified? Although we would find the decision 
very difficult if the example did occur in reality, we would 
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still be inclined to answer "yes". If we adopted any other 
attitude, there would be nothing whatever to stop the 
existence of other potentially censurable entities being 
revealed, or being notified through professional channels to 
detection systems. 
We hope that the concepts we have described, and the views 
expressed, will provide food for discussion. 
DISCUSSION 
Mr. REDFERN opened the discussion: 
He addressed himself to three main points out of the many 
interesting and provocative points in the Dutch paper. He 
agreed that the independence of the statistical organization 
from the administrative departments and from central 
government in general, as was the situation in the 
Netherlands, Denmark, and several other countries, was 
highly desirable in order (1) to maintain the 
confidentiality of personal data and (2) to ensure a fair 
presentation of the statistical results. In the United 
Kingdom the statistical service had always been firmly a 
part of central government but the two objectives mentioned 
had been assured to a large extent by the statisticians' 
adherence to their professional ethics and traditions. 
He believed that the method of record linkage would be 
increasingly used to provide statistics in the future and 
this method required that the organization carrying out the 
linkage, was and was seen to be, independent to 
administrative departments. He supported the views in the 
paper in being firmly against censuses and surveys carried 
out for statistical purposes being used for the up-dating of 
population registers. However, he disagreed with the final 
theme of the paper, that the publication of information 
about any "potentially censurable entity" should be 
restricted. He believed that the principles of 
confidentiality should be applied to individuals but not to 
groups. The main aim of the census of population was to 
distinguish the characteristics of one group from those of 
another and this almost inevitably resulted in the 
possibility of administrative action which would favour one 
group to the detriment of another. 
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Mr. EMBLETON (Central Statistics Office, Dublin) stated: 
References to general opposition to the census of population 
should not be interpreted as implying total opposition. 
There were variations between countries but in general the 
opposition came from a well organized and articulate 
minority who managed to receive extensive media coverage. 
There was a danger that strict adherence to the concept of 
"potentially censurable or vulnerable entity" would result 
in a position where a decreasing proportion of information 
collected at official inquiries was published. 
Mr. TONDER (Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo) intervened: 
He expressed surprise at the idea of "potentially censurable 
or vulnerable entity". He did not think that if a group of 
persons felt that statistical information could give rise to 
measures aimed particularly against them, this constituted a 
problem of privacy in the sense of the discussion of the 
seminar. He thought that if the statistics showed that a 
policy adopted by a democratically controlled organization 
was bad, these statistics should be published. The only case 
in which statistics might be withheld was where there were 
doubts about their quality of accuracy. 
Mr. BEGUE (Institut de la Statistique et des Etudes 
Economiques) remarked : 
Statistics almost always showed up differences between 
groups. For example they showed the differences in wages 
between men and women, leading to policies reducing the 
advantages enjoyed by men. Other examples could be given, 
dealing with grouping by nationality, by occupation, by age. 
He thought it would not be possible to set objective limits 
for the application of the principle of "potentially 
censurable or vulnerable entity" and in the extreme case it 
would not be possible to publish any statistics at all. 
Mr. BUERGIN (Statistisches Bundesamt) added: 
He agreed with Mr. Tonder that statistical data should not 
be withheld provided the conditions of accuracy and 
anonymity were met and data-protection rules complied with. 
He quoted the example of "cause of death" statistics which 
were important to identify regions with particular health 
problems. The statistics were grouped so that individual 
cases did not appear, before being passed on for scientific 
study. 
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Mr. HARRIS (EUROSTAT) noted: 
The comments on the paper had been mainly directed to the 
subject of "potentially censurable or vulnerable entity" and 
considered that Professor Begeer had done a great service in 
drawing attention to this very real problem. In the United 
Kingdom it had particular reference to the laws on racism. 
There might be strong reasons for not publishing figures 
which showed a certain racial group in a particularly 
unfavourable light. 
Mr. BRUENGGER (Bundesamt für Statistik, Bern) stated: 
Switzerland had viewed the developments on the German 1983 
census with great concern, as there had been risk of a 
protest movement also building up in Switzerland. Referring 
to Section 3 of the paper he agreed with the German position 
that statisticians should not be given a "blank cheque" as 
regards data linkage; each use of a data register for 
statistical purposes or record linkage should have specific 
legal authorization. 
Mme. LENOIR (Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des 
Libertés) raised the point: 
In reference to the notion of "potentially censurable or 
vulnerable entity" which brought into question the whole 
subject of statistics as a science, all statistics could be 
interpreted incorrectly. Statisticians had a responsibility 
to present the facts fairly and accurately but it was not 
their responsibility if the figures were subsequently 
manipulated for some political purpose. 
The Chairman intervened: 
He asked what would be the position if a government minister 
asked for information concerning individuals. 
The author replied to the discussion: 
He firstly answered the Chairman's question. The minister 
would not get information on individuals; no one would get 
such information. The CBS had complete autonomy in ensuring 
that data on individuals remained confidential. 
He was pleased that the paper had provoked such a lively 
discussion and remarked that he was not inventing problems 
but merely posing them. His experience as Director General 
of the CBS had made him very familiar with the practical 
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problems arising and it was simply not true that one could 
publish everything, provided only that it was accurate and 
that nothing confidential was divulged. The CBS was required 
to publish useful information and his task as Director 
General was to judge what was useful. He would be very 
pleased if a conference could define what information should 
be published. In practice, however, he had to make rules and 
set limits and try to observe them in a consistent fashion. 
With regard to Mr. Embleton's remark that only minority 
groups were opposed to the census, he thought this might be 
so initially but these groups were effective in creating a 
climate of opinion which turned politicians and the silent 
majority against the census. At all events a pilot survey 
revealed that a non-response of 40 percent was to be 
expected at a census in 1985 and the Dutch Government 
decided in the circumstances not to proceed with the 
inquiry. 
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THE N. I.S. AND PROTECTION OF PERSONAL PRIVACY 
E. VAN LANGENDONCK 
Institut National de Statistique 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nature protection, protection of the environment, protection 
of privacy - phrases which are very much in vogue these days 
and are inextricably linked to Man's identity and quality of 
life. 
Science and technology have advanced to a level where 
personal privacy is threatened and there are demands for 
protective measures. The more discussion, justified or not, 
there is about protection, the more we see, or think we see, 
our privacy eroded or threatened. 
But there is a very real danger of taking things too far. 
Privacy might very well find itself ultimately the victim of 
excessive "protection measures", measures which impinge 
heavily on the very freedom we so much value. 
The Nationaal Instituut voor de Statistiek (National 
Institute for Statistics - NIS) in Belgium, whose work 
involves the collection and recording of personal data, is 
certainly no idle bystander in this field: it is closely 
involved in all these problems and we therefore propose to 
examine the present situation in Belgium. 
2. THE BELGIAN NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS 
The Royal Decree of 7 August 1939 provided for the 
centralization of all statistical services in Belgium, and 
part of the work assigned to the National Institute for 
Statistics was to carry out the major periodical censuses 
and surveys and compile all national statistics. Surveys and 
information recording activities which form part of the 
everyday work of other administrative departments and 
cannot, practically, be separated from that work would 
continue to be carried out by those departments. 
The responsibilities of the NIS were consolidated, so to 
speak, by the Law of 4 July 1962, which empowered the 
government to carry out statistical and other surveys on the 
country's demographic, economic and social situation and 
constitutes the special legal basis for the surveys carried 
out by the NIS. This Law provides that the surveys required 
under its provisions must be carried out by the NIS. 
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However, as we will see below, the Law also makes an 
exception - as did the earlier Royal Decree of 7 August 
1939, whereby surveys can be delegated to other government 
departmen t s. 
3. STATISTICS ACT OF 4 JULY 1962 
The Statistics Act of 4 July 1962 distinguishes two 
principal types of survey: statistical surveys carried out 
for purely documentary purposes (Chapter 1, Articles 1 to 4) 
and surveys carried out for administrative purposes 
(Chapter II, Articles 5 to 8 ) . 
The purpose of the documentary statistical surveys is to 
collect personal data which may be used only by the National 
Institute for Statistics and only for drawing up anonymous 
general statistics. Personal data are thus collected on a 
strictly confidential basis and can be used only for this 
purpose. 
All surveys carried out by the NIS should theoretically fall 
into this category. In fact, however, the Institute carried 
out certain surveys, in particular to monitor economic 
activity, while other departments dealing with economic 
questions, such as the Ministries of Economic Affairs, 
Agriculture and Transport, also need personal data of the 
kind collected by the NIS for statistical purposes, either 
in order to carry out their work with a view to possible 
future administrative regulations or for drawing up or 
implementing regulations. 
To avoid duplication, therefore, the Statistics Act of 4 
July 1962 enables the NIS to carry out administrative 
surveys as well: when personal data are indispensable for 
preparing, drawing up or implementing an administrative 
regulation, the Crown can require special surveys to be 
carried out so that the data can be made available to 
designated government departments, with the exception of the 
tax offices. 
The NIS draws up statistics using these data, and the 
personal data can be transmitted to the designated 
government departments. 
In theory, these special surveys carried out for 
administrative purposes should also be carried out by the 
NIS, but the Law, as we saw above, makes an exception if the 
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survey is part of the department's everyday administrative 
work and is inextricably linked to it because of its special 
pu rpose. 
The majority of the special surveys which come under 
Article 5 - or rather, all with occasional exceptions - are 
carried out by the NIS, which makes the relevant personal 
data available to the designated department as well as using 
them to draw up its own statistics. 
4. DIFFICULTIES OF OBTAINING INFORMATION 
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The Institute has on several occasions tried to cut down the 
amount of information it requests and to simplify the 
questionnaires. However, nothing has come of any of the 
discussions. In fact, the Institute has had its work cut out 
to avoid enlarging the questionnaires. Proposals to abolish 
this or that set of statistics have always been met by 
opposition from interested parties who wanted it retained. 
Businesses, the first victims of the recession, are trying 
to cut back wherever they can. Often, in their view, 
statistics are of no value and certainly of no direct 
benefit to industry, with the result that they pay 
increasingly less attention to statistical returns and 
answer questionnaires less and less carefully and less and 
less promptly. 
Many ordinary people do not know the first thing about 
statistics, let alone believe that they serve any useful 
purpose, coming to regard the requirement to give personal 
information increasingly as an infringement of their privacy 
and freedom. Opposition to giving certain information is 
growing, whether in the form of avoidance or of plain 
refusal. 
149 
Automation and the existence of data banks have only 
aggravated concern about the erosion of personal privacy, an 
accusing finger is pointed at the computer, which can 
consolidate data from different data files and in no time at 
all build a complete picture of a person or business. 
The cries of alarm are getting louder in Belgium too and 
they have not been without result. 
Apart from the Statistics Act of 4 July 1962, which, as we 
have seen, provides an adequate guarantee for the protection 
of the individual, there are two other documents worth 
noting in the field of statistics: the Law of 8 August 1983 
concerning a national register of natural persons, which, as 
we will see later, includes a number of measures governing 
the use of stored data, and the Bill for the protection of 
certain aspects of personal privacy, submitted to Parliament 
in November 1983. 
We will try below to show how these two texts will or could 
affect the work of the NIS and what the Institute's position 
is regarding these questions. 
5.LAW OF 8 AUGUST 1983 
NATURAL PERSONS 
CONCERNING A NATIONAL REGISTER OF 
The Law of 8 August 1983 lays down the conditions 
national register of natural persons. 
for 
The national register is a computerized system for the 
input, storage and transmission of information concerning 
the identity of natural persons. 
The purpose of the national register is not to centralize 
information about the population but to safeguard the 
transmission or retrieval of certain basic data specified in 
the Law. The following data are contained in the register: 
name and forenames, date and place of birth, sex, 
nationality, main place of residence, date and place of 
death, profession, civil status, composition of family. 
It includes persons registered in the municipal residents' 
or aliens' registers and in the registers held at diplomatic 
missions or consulates abroad. 
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When a person is first entered in the national register, he 
is given an eleven-figure identification number. The 
identification number, which is also entered in the 
municipal residents' register, simplifies data therefore 
between the various government departments and organizations 
of public benefit authorized to use this identification 
number and exchange data of a personal nature. 
Access to the national register can be extended by Royal 
Decree to the public authorities (national, district, 
municipal-provincial and local), the institutions of public 
benefit referred to in the Law of 16 March 1954 (e.g. Social 
Security Service, National Employment Office), notaries and 
sheriff's officers, in respect of information which they are 
authorized to have by virtue of a Law or Decree. 
Access to the register can be extended to certain 
institutions under Belgian law which perform functions in 
the public interest (e.g. mutual insurance societies) after 
a decision by the Council of Ministers following 
consultation with the Advisory Committee for the Protection 
of Privacy set up by the Law of 8 August 1983. The 
composition and rules of procedure of the Committee are 
governed by Royal Decree of 20 April 1984. 
The identification number may not be used without 
authorization or for any purpose other than that authorized. 
This is to prevent private institutions requesting 
individuals to tell them their identification number. 
The identification number may only be used after 
consultation with the Committee and authorization by a Royal 
Decree discussed by the Council of Ministers. The 
Committee's opinion is published together with the Royal 
Decree in the Belgian Official Gazette. The Royal Decree 
lays down the purposes and limits of its use. 
It has not yet been decided precisely what it will be 
possible to use the identification numbers for, but they 
should at least be able to be used in dealings with the 
national register and with the person concerned or with 
persons legally obliged to supply information about that 
person, such as an employer in his dealing with the National 
Social Security Service. Measures must also be taken to 
ensure that the number cannot be used to collate data 
i 1 legally. 
The job of the Advisory Committee for the Protection of 
Privacy is, either on its own initiative or at the request 
of the Minister of Justice, to give its opinion on all 
questions involving the protection of privacy in connection 
with the Law, with due regard to developments in the use of 
automated information management technology. The Committee 
is authorized to carry out in situ checks and also looks 
into complaints made to it about the implementation of this 
Law. 
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What does this mean in practical terms for the NIS? 
As we have seen, the King can grant access to the national 
register to the public authorities for information they are 
authorized to have by virtue of a Decree or Law. 
The first stage in the implementation of this provision, 
after obtaining the favourable opinion of the Council of 
State, was to submit for the King's approval a draft Decree 
giving NIS officials to be designated by the Minister for 
Economic Affairs access to information in the national 
register. However, this does not include the identification 
number, without which the NIS cannot draw up certain 
anonymous general statistics. 
As we saw above, the use of identification numbers cannot be 
allowed without the approval of the Advisory Committee for 
the Protection of Privacy. To obtain this, the Institute 
will have to explain why it needs the numbers, what it 
intends to do with them and what links will be established 
with existing administrative data files for the purpose of 
drawing up anonymous general statistics. 
The collation of personal data, even for statistical 
purposes, is one of the most sensitive areas in the use of 
personal information, especially in the eyes of the general 
public. However, the collation of data is in fact in the 
general interest. 
The NIS will therefore have to produce a lengthy document 
carefully setting out its programme and its procedures. 
The draft Royal Decree authorizing the use of identification 
numbers and determining the purposes and limits of this use, 
must then be submitted for consideration by the Council of 
Ministers. 
However, it is not enough for the NIS simply to have access 
to the identification numbers of the national register: 
other departments and services which can use these numbers 
must be authorized to transmit them together with other data 
to the NIS to enable the Institute to make certain 
combinations for the sole purpose of drawing up anonymous 
general statistics. 
The NIS is confident that its aims will be realized. 
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6. Β ILL FOR THE PROTECTION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PERSONAL 
PRIVACY 
On 10 November 1983, a Bill for the protection of certain 
aspects of personal privacy was submitted to Parliament by 
the Minister of Justice. 
One of the aspects dealt with in this Bill (Chapter II) is 
protection against the erosion of the personal privacy of 
natural persons caused by the use of automatic processing of 
personal data by the government or private sectors. 
The automatic processing of personal data means any set of 
operations carried out in whole or in part by automated 
means which involves the inputting, storage, alteration, 
erasure, retrieval or dissemination of personal data, and 
the carrying out of logical or arithmetical operations on 
those data. 
Personal data are considered to be data relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person. 
Persons asked to provide personal data must be informed of 
the compulsory or non-compulsory nature of the answers, the 
possible consequences of a refusal to supply all or part of 
the information requested, the purpose for which the data 
will be used, and the persons or categories of persons 
authorized to receive the data. 
The person concerned has the right of access to the data and 
can demand amendments. This right does not exist, however, 
in the case of automated data files of which the sole 
purpose is the compilation and dissemination of anonymous 
general statistics, because these data do not constitute a 
threat to personal privacy. 
Certain data can have such an effect on a person's life that 
processing is either forbidden or subject to strict control. 
The computerized processing of personal data relating 
directly or indirectly to race or ethnic origin, sexual 
behaviour, political, ideological or religious beliefs or 
activities and membership of a trade union or friendly 
society is in principle forbidden. 
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Persons in charge of computerized files of personal data 
must keep records showing for each processing operation the 
nature of the data, the purpose, the interconnections 
involved and the persons to whom the personal data will be 
given, and they must supervise the updating, alteration or 
erasure of data. 
Before computerized files of personal data are opened, a 
report must be submitted to the Ministry of Justice giving 
all the information necessary for the identification of all 
the computerized files and the subsequent monitoring of 
their operation. 
The Ministry of Justice keeps a register of computerized 
files of personal data: it is accessible to the public so 
that anyone can find out about the existence of a file, its 
purpose, the data processed, the conditions of use and 
conditions of access. 
Interconnections, links or any other method of collating 
data or computerized files of personal data, to safeguard 
personal privacy, can be forbidden or regulated by means of 
a Royal Decree discussed by the Council of Ministers after 
the opinion of the Advisory Committee for the Protection of 
Privacy has been heard. 
The transmission in any form between Belgian territory and 
another country of personal data which have been processed 
automatically or compiled for such processing can for the 
same reasons also be forbidden, made subject to prior 
authorization or otherwise regulated, in accordance with a 
Royal Decree discussed by the Council of Ministers after the 
opinion of the Advisory Committee has been heard. 
The King can thus make use of the authority vested in him, 
within the limits of any international treaty which takes 
precedence over national law. 
The job of the Advisory Committee for the Protection of 
Privacy - the Committee set up by the Law of 8 August 1983 
on the national register - is, either on its own initiative 
or at the request of the government, parliament, the 
attorneys general or the courts, to give opinions on any 
matter relating to the application of this Law, with due 
regard inter alia to technological developments. 
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However, none of the provisions listed above - apart from 
the one relating to the Advisory Committe - are applicable 
to computerized files of personal data kept by international 
public-law institutions of which Belgium is a member, or to 
the computerized files of the National Institute for 
Statistics, exept in the case of the special surveys 
referred to in Article 5 of the Statistics Act of 4 July 
1962. 
To carry out the work assigned to it by the Royal Decree of 
7 August 1939, the Institute must have access to the 
greatest possible amount of personal data. It may use these 
data only for drawing up anonymous general statistics and 
the publication, dissemination or communciation of personal 
data is forbidden. This restriction is laid down 
specifically in Chapter 1 of the Act of 4 July 1962 on 
surveys carried out for purely documentary purposes. 
Although the NIS is a Directorate General of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, it regards any other Directorate General 
of this department and any other department or service as a 
third party. The fiscal legislation also provides that the 
NIS is beyond the tax authorities' powers of investigation. 
The NIS thus provides the necessary guarantees for the use 
and confidentiality of personal data supplied by natural and 
legal persons, so that there is no danger of the erosion of 
personal privacy even when the data are processed by 
computer. The Bill therefore rightly provides that the Law 
should not be applicable to this. 
The Law will, however - at least unless it is amended -
apply to the special surveys referred to in Article 5 of the 
Statistics Act of 4 July 1962. 
The only possible explanation as to why these should still 
be subject to the Law is that the personal data collected 
can be communicated to another ministerial department. 
This means that persons supplying information for any survey 
based on Article 5 (mainly agricultural statistics and 
monthly statistics on industrial activity) must be made 
aware of the obligatory or non-obligatory nature of the 
answers, the consequences of a refusal to give information, 
the purposes for which the data are required and the 
categories of persons authorized to receive the information. 
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This is not such a problem for the NIS: what is more serious 
is the right of inspection of the person concerned, the fact 
that for each processing operation a document has to be 
drawn up stating the nature of the data processed, the 
purpose of the processing, the interconnections involved 
etc., that a report has to be submitted to the Ministry of 
Justice before computerized files of personal data can be 
opened, giving all the information necessary for the 
identification of all the computerized files and the 
subsequent monitoring of their operation. 
As has been said earlier, in accordance with Article 5 of 
the Statistics Act, the NIS can carry out surveys to provide 
government departments expressly designated by the King in 
an implementing Decree with information about individuals 
which is indispensable for an administrative regulation. The 
Act also provides that the NIS may use this personal 
information to compile anonymous general statistics, as it 
can data collected under Article 1 (surveys intended solely 
for documentary purposes). 
The reasons why the Law of 4 July 1962 made specific 
provision for the transmission of personal data to other 
government departments was to avoid duplication: otherwise, 
the departments concerned would be forced to carry out the 
same surveys as the NIS, which would mean unnecessary extra 
work for both the respondents and the administration. 
There is no difference between the computerized processing 
by the NIS of data obtained under Article 5 and the 
processing of other data collected by the Institute. In the 
Institute's view the confidentiality of the former is 
adequately safeguarded and publication is forbidden, so that 
there is no danger of erosion of personal privacy through 
computerized processing. 
Indeed, the government department which received personal 
data from the NIS in accordance with the Royal Decree 
providing for the survey will in any case be subject to the 
new Law if it processes the data automatically. 
We might add that the data obtained under Article 5 of the 
Statistics Act are very often not data concerning 
individuals since they relate to legal and not natural 
persons. 
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It must be stressed that if the Bill becomes law in its 
present form, it will be a very serious obstacle to the 
Institute's work in view of the complex procedures proposed 
for authorization, transmission of data, right of inspection 
etc. Furthermore, it is not always possible to determine 
beforehand how the data collected will be processed or what 
statistics will be drawn up. 
The existing laws and regulations, in particular the 
Act of 4 July 1962, provide the necessary safeguards 
for the use and confidentiality of the personal data 
collected - including those collected under Article 5 of 
the Act - so that the NIS feels that the fears of a 
threat to personal privacy are unfounded. 
In view of all these factors, it is felt that the 
restrictions provided for in the Bill should be deleted, so 
that the NIS's computerized files of personal data will be 
totally excluded from the provisions of Chapter II. 
However, this is not all. 
Administrative, and above all fiscal, data coming from other 
authorities which collected them, are frequently used by the 
NIS, in accordance with the Royal Decree of 7 August 1939 on 
the centralization of statistics, frequently used by the NIS 
to compile very useful anonymous general statistics. This 
method avoids duplicating the collection of data and 
therefore saves money for the administration and for the 
individuals concerned. 
The communication of data from other computerized files to 
the NIS for the purpose of drawing up anonymous general 
statistics, should also be excluded for the provisions of 
Chapter II. 
Under the Bill as it stands, before transferring data to the 
NIS, the department which collected them would have to go 
through a series of formalities which will inevitably cost 
time and money. Furthermore, data can only be transferred if 
the persons from whom the data were collected have first 
been informed. Statistical processing of previously 
collected data which the NIS subsequently finds out about, 
or which it becomes necessary or desirable at some point to 
process to obtain general statistics, would therefore be 
prevented. 
Excluding the communication to the NIS of data collected by 
other departments from the provisions of the law would 
therefore help the smooth operation of the statistical 
services. 
157 
This would mean that the persons concerned would not be 
informed that they are also included in the computerized 
file of the NIS, but this would be in no way damaging in 
their interests. It is only useful for a person to know that 
he is included in a computerized file in that this gives him 
the opportunity to be informed of the data held on him and 
correct any inaccuracies. Since the person involved is 
already entered in a computerized file of the department 
which originally collected the data, he had the opportunity 
of correcting any inaccuracies through that department, 
which would in turn have informed the NIS. 
The Bill also provides, on the other hand, that the right of 
inspection cannot be invoked in the case of computerized 
files of personal data, the sole purpose of which is to 
compile and disseminate anonymous general statistics 
because, according to the Explanatory memorandum, these data 
do not constitute a threat to personal privacy. 
We can therefore conclude that the formalities laid down in 
the Bill for the communication of data recorded in a 
computerized file are unnecessary for the protection of the 
interests of the persons as far as communication of data to 
the NIS is concerned, and unnecessary formalities are best 
avoided. 
The NIS will also endeavour to keep the special surveys 
carried out under Article 5 of the Statistics Act from 
coming within the scope of the law and to ensure that the 
communication of data from other computerized files of 
personal data to the NIS for the purpose of drawing up 
anonymous general statistics is also excluded from the 
provisions. 
At its meeting on 3 September 1984, the Hoge Raad voor de 
Statistiek, the government's advisory body on statistics, 
expressed the same opinion and urged the Minister of 
Economic Affairs to make every effort to get the proposed 
amendments accepted. 
Finally, we would also like to point out that the NIS's 
approach to confidentiality is even stricter than that 
provided for in the Bill. As has been said, in the Bill 
personal data, i.e. data which require special protection, 
are considered to be data relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person. 
The NIS, on the other hand, considers individual data, i.e. 
data which must be confidential, to be any information 
relating to a natural or legal person, whether identifiable 
or not. 
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It has been suggested, in particular by the university 
research centres, that the NIS is too strict and its 
attitude a serious hindrance to scientific research. In 
their view, there can be no objection to the communication 
of anonymous data which cannot be linked to a physical or 
legal person and their confidentiality should only be 
safeguarded if identification is possible. 
They also refer to the Strasbourg Convention on the 
protection of individuals with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data, signed by Belgium on 7 May 
1982. 
Researchers also take every opportunity of drawing attention 
to the principles adopted at the Bellagio Conference in 1978 
on privacy, confidentiality and the use of official micro-
data for research and statistical purposes. 
The availability of aggregated statistics or special tables 
does not satisfy the needs of the researcher, and according 
to one of the principles adopted by this Conference national 
statistical offices must ensure that researchers working in 
the public interest have ample and practical access to data, 
within the bounds of the accepted concepts of personal 
privacy and the legal requirements for the protection of 
confidentiality. 
If there is any change in the Statistics Act - and in view 
of the constitutional reform this has become necessary 
these questions will undoubtedly arise and reference will be 
made to the law on the protection of privacy, to the 
Strasbourg Convention on the protection of individuals with 
regard to automatic processing of personal data and to the 
principles adopted by the Bellagio Conference in order to 
obtain, above all for the sake of the researchers, a more 
flexible attitude on the part of the NIS towards anonymous 
data with no means of identifying individuals. 
7. CONCLUSION 
As the official statistical organization, the NIS is a 
scientific body and must therefore take extreme care of the 
documentation it compiles and ensure the confidentiality of 
personal data. 
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To ensure the accuracy and honesty of replies, the Institute 
has always made every effort to allay the fears of the 
respondents that their data might be published or used for 
anything other than the authorized purposes. 
The strongest card of the NIS, the official body for 
compiling general statistics, is the guarantee of the 
confidentiality of personal data, a guarantee which is 
logically, and quite rightly, the counterpart of the right 
to request the necessary information. This guarantee should 
make it possible for the NIS to be exempted from certain 
measures for the protection of the individual - measures 
which might be desirable, useful or necessary elsewhere but 
which, for the official statistical service, are 
unnecessary, indeed superfluous, obstacles which threaten 
the normal, smooth and efficient running of the Institute. 
DISCUSSION 
Professor WHELAN (Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Dublin) opened the discussion: 
In his own country, Ireland, legislation regarding privacy 
and data protection had not yet been enacted or even widely 
discussed. However, he expected that it would become an 
important issue in the years ahead. Mr. Van Langendonck's 
paper described recent initiatives regarding data protection 
in Belgium, another relatively small country. The paper was 
therefore of particular interest. This paper raised a number 
of important issues and prompted several questions. It 
seemed that the recent legislation in Belgium might 
seriously inhibit the work of the INS and that the Institute 
was pressing to have various amendments implemented. The 
major problems appeared to arise not in relation to 
documentary or "pure" statistical surveys but in relation to 
studies which fulfilled a dual role, i.e., administrative 
surveys or the processing for statistical purposes of 
administrative data. It would be interesting to know in what 
ways the data from administrative surveys which the INS 
conducted were used by other Departments to whom they were 
transmitted. Were they used by these Departments to produce 
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aggregate (though possibly detailed) statistical results, or 
were they used to administer various schemes (such as grants 
etc.) on a person-by-person basis? 
In Ireland there was no compulsory population register - the 
nearest equivalent was the Electoral Register which listed 
all those eligible to vote. It had, on occasion, been 
suggested that there should be a National Population 
Register and so the author's comment on the Belgian Register 
and the regulations governing its use were of considerable 
interest. He asked (a) what statistics the INS hoped to 
derive from the Register and (b) what "existing 
administrative data files" it hoped to link with the 
Register. 
Professor Whelan's next comment related to the proposed 
legislation for the protection of certain aspects of 
personal privacy. The "computerized processing of personal 
data relating directly or indirectly to race or ethnic 
origin, sexual behaviour, political, ideological or 
religious beliefs or activities and membership of a trade 
union or friendly society" was in principle forbidden. Did 
this mean that survey research on all these topics was now 
prohibited in Belgium? If not, how were the exceptions for 
bona fide survey research on these topics embodied in the 
Bill? 
The author replied: 
The census operation involved using two forms. One was 
destined for the commune and was used to update the 
population register. The other was sent to the INS and was 
used for compiling statistics. The agricultural census 
provided an example of a combined administrative and 
statistical inquiry. The INS used this to compile global and 
anonymous statistics. The Ministry of Agriculture used 
individual data from this inquiry for paying compensation 
for frost-damage, obligatory slaughter of cattle etc. The 
population register might be consulted by interested 
persons. It was not linked with any other register. 
He then suggested that it might be useful to send a 
questionnaire to the national authorities asking questions 
on the following lines: 
i) How is the census of population carried out? 
ii) Are the individual data used for administrative as well 
as for statistical purposes? 
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iii) May the statistical office pass on data for 
identifiable individuals? 
iv) What impact do laws designed to protect the 
confidentiality of individual data have on statistical 
work? 
v) How independent is the national statistical service 
from other branches of government? 
vi) What is the position as regards the keeping of census 
material as national archives? 
There was some discussion about how such an approach should 
be managed. In any case, some of the information would come 
from a study commissioned by EUROSTAT and already in 
progress of census practices in member countries. 
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DATA PROTECTION ISSUES AS THEY AFFECT POPULATION CENSUSES 
AND SOCIAL SURVEYS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
R. BARNES 
Office of Population Censuses & Surveys, London 
SUMMARY 
The collection of information in population censuses and 
social surveys frequently presents the dilemma how to 
preserve individuals' rights with regard to confidentiality 
of the information they have given, on the one hand but 
manage to exploit data for bona fide statistical and 
research purposes as fully as possible, on the other. To a 
large extent, these are conflicting aims and quite where the 
line will be drawn will vary from country to country. This 
paper describes the way the problem has been dealt with by 
those who carry out population censuses and government 
social surveys in the UK. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
Before dealing with the specific position of the United 
Kingdom, this paper addresses some general issues of data 
protect ion. 
First, it seems useful to draw a distinction between privacy 
and confidentiality - terms which are sometimes used 
interchangeably and concepts which are often confused. 
Privacy is concerned with the int rus iveness of the 
information that is demanded or requested of people in the 
first place - and their rights in this regard. 
Confidentiality is about what is done with the information 
after it has been obtained. The two are closely linked, but 
the issues are separate; if people are uncertain about 
confidentiality, they may be more likely to resent and to 
resist what they see as an invasion of their privacy. This 
paper is concerned with confidentiality as that is what data 
protection is principally about. 
The second general point is perhaps self-evident. In most 
countries, population censuses and social surveys can be 
carried out only if the population is broadly supportive of 
them, or at least not antagonistic towards them. One general 
pre-requisite of public acceptance is belief in the 
confidentiality of the information and the assurances and 
undertakings that are given. The postponement of the 1983 
Census in West Germany and the abandonment of the 1981 
Census in the Netherlands are ample demonstrations of what 
can happen when public support and confidence are lacking. 
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A third general point is the underlying question of what is 
the basis of the case for data protection ­ whether in law 
or not. 
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Whether their fears are real or imagined, people are likely 
to be more worried about data protection when they are 
uncertain about the uses to which data are put (and this may 
explain why information given willingly for one purpose, 
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e.g. income details given to tax authorities, is often 
withheld for another, i.e.' income is generally considered 
unacceptable as a census topic in some countries - including 
the UK). 
1. THE UK POSITION 
In many ways, recent experience in the UK in moving towards 
data protection legislation provides a good case study of 
the issues involved and serves as an illustration of many of 
them. 
Until 1984 there was very little general legislative 
protection of statistical data. What there was, for official 
data, comprised specific Acts of Parliament relating to 
particular statistical collections - e.g. the Agricultural 
Statistics Act of 1979 and the Statistics of Trade Act of 
1947. In the field of population censuses and social surveys 
there has been no legislative provision governing the 
conduct of surveys although the census has been, and still 
is, subject to the provisions of the 1920 Census Act for 
Great-Britain and the 1969 Census Act for Northern Ireland. 
These Acts provide certain safeguards of the confidentiality 
of data and prescribe penalties for breaches of these 
safeguards by the census takers. Section 8(2) of the 1920 
Census Act for Great-Britain is as follows. 
"If any person -
(a) being employed in taking a census, without lawful 
authority publishes or communicates to any person 
otherwise than in the ordinary course of such 
employment and information acquired by him in the 
course of his employment; or 
(b) having possession of any information which to his 
knowledge has been disclosed in contravention of 
this Act publishes or communicates that information 
to any other person; 
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and shall on 
conviction be liable to imprisonment with or without 
hard labour for a term not exceeding two years or to a 
fine, or to both such imprisonment and fine." 
The Census Acts are closely and diligently observed in 
practice but even so their interpretation is sometimes in 
doubt - even today. For example, one clause of the 1920 Act 
says that the census authorities "shall be subject to the 
control of, and comply with any directions given by, the 
Minister of Health". The interpretation of this was 
challenged last year, in evidence given to a Parliamentary 
Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, on the ground 
that this clause could enable any Minister of Health to 
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demand to see individual census records and so undermine the 
confidentiality undertakings given in the census. It so 
happened that legal opinion found that, in fact, the 
Registrar General "would not be bound, nor even entitled, to 
comply with such a direction and if he did so he would be 
committing [an] offence." The point of this account in the 
present context is that it shows the limited extent to which 
data are clearly protected by law. 
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Until the advent of general data protection legislation, a 
number of measures have been taken in the UK to protect data 
and to maintain "good practice". First, the census: the 
following is a list of the main measures taken to ensure the 
confidentiality and security of the data collected during 
the 1981 Population Census. 
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As far as 
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practical, enumerators were not used in 
they were likely to be widely known. It 
was not possible to guarantee that the enumerator 
would not know anybody in the area (except by 
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incurring huge travel costs by employing enumerators 
in areas far away from their homes). In these cases a 
sealed return system was also used so that completed 
forms were not seen by enumerators. 
A security firm was used to transport boxes of 
completed forms to processing offices. This was under 
the protection of a special contract to prevent the 
unauthorized use of information by the security firm 
or any of its employees. 
In England and Wales two processing offices were used 
so that the forms from the area around one office were 
processed by the other office, and vice versa - so 
even the coders and data processors would not see the 
forms relating to their neighbours. All Scottish 
census forms were processed in Edinburgh but the work 
was organized so that processing staff did not see the 
forms for the area in which they lived. 
Staff at the processing centres were required to wear 
passes whenever on the premises. Visitors were 
admitted only under escort and were never allowed to 
see census forms. 
After use the forms are kept under special secure 
storage conditions for 100 years - with protection 
against unauthorized access and against damage (fire, 
water/damp, mites, etc.). 
Names and addresses were not fed into the computer. 
Computer arrangements and general confidentiality 
provisions were inspected by independent assessors, 
the British Computer Society, who reported on the 
arrangements and stated that 
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With government surveys carried out by the Office of 
Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS), reliance is also 
firmly placed upon the diligence and integrity of those who 
undertake the enquiries. In fact, so far, the record is very 
good indeed and in over 40 years of survey research it is 
hard to remember a single blemish. Moreover, in very few 
surveys are names and addresses recorded and, where they 
are, they are usually not transferred to computer file. 
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Naturally a price has to be paid for the protection of data, 
and this is in terms of restrictions placed on the 
dissemination and use of data. 
Census data for example are only released in the form of 
statistical aggregates for areas not smaller than an 
enumeration district (ed) and even then, as has been 
described, additional safeguards are imposed by the 
introduction of random error. We do not, in the UK, make 
available any census records of identified individuals to 
anybody outside the census offices - even to other central 
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The question of whether or not the census authorities are 
able, under existing legislation, to make available public 
use sample tapes is not altogether clear. The 1920 Census 
Act is open to different interpretations on this but the 
point was covered by a government statement in a White Paper 
on the 1981 Census of Population: Confidentiality and 
Computing (Cmnd 8201), published in 1981 which stated that 
"Such a tape should have to conform to three criteria. 
First, the item of data to be recorded on the tape 
would have to be chosen and coded so as to protect 
confidentiality. Second, the uses of the tape would 
have to be sufficient to justify its costs. Third, 
statutory authority for the release of the tape would 
be required. ...Moreover new legislation might be 
needed because there is doubt whether the Census Act of 
1920 provides statutory authority. 
The Registrars General invite the British Computer 
Society or any other interested body or person to make 
proposals on the form of a public use tape that would 
serve a wide range of users whilst effectively 
protecting confidentiality." 
So far no proposals have been put forward. 
The price paid with regard to sample survey data is in many 
ways similar, although in this case, because the data are 
not collected under statute, we do provide computer tapes 
(by definition sample tapes) containing individual records -
but not names or addresses. This we do either direct or 
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through a Data Archive which is attached to one of the 
universities. But one of the conditions of release of these 
tapes is that, before they leave OPCS, the data on them are 
"anonymized" by broad banding certain variables such as 
occupation and, especially, the area codes. The point of the 
broad banding is a recognition of the fact that, in 
principle, if very different in practice, it may be possible 
to identify an individual from a unique combination of 
character is t ics. 
Names and addresses of sub-samples of persons from 
population censuses and government surveys are sometimes 
used as a basis for follow-up enquiries provided these 
enquiries are carried out by OPCS or their agents. Even then 
there is a danger of public misunderstanding and disquiet on 
the question of confidentiality. For example the names and 
addresses of a sample of persons identified in the 1971 
Census as having nursing qualifications but not employed as 
nurses currently, were passed t o t h e Social Survey Division 
of OPCS for a follow-up study. The fact that the survey 
organization and the census organization were both parts of 
the same Office was not always understood by persons outside 
and allegations of breaches of the confidentiality 
undertakings given at the time of the 1971 Census, continued 
to be made from time to time long after the event. The same 
case was also cited, although for different reasons, in the 
report of the Data Protection Committee set up in July 1976 
under Sir Norman Lindop. That report, published in December 
1978 (Cmnd 7341), contained the following passage. 
"Where data are collected for statistical purposes the 
information is sometimes also used for the construction 
of registers for future statistical enquiries... fol low-
up surveys, if unexpected by the data subject, can 
cause understandable and needless alarm. This is 
illustrated by the concern which was expressed when a 
number of women who had disclosed in the 1971 Census 
that they were former nurses were subsequently...asked 
to give further information about their reasons for 
leaving the profession. ...In our view, the fact that 
information will be used to construct registers for 
further enquiries would normally be made clear at the 
time the information is collected." 
In fact by the time of the 1981 Census it was decided that 
no follow-up enquiries of the census should take place 
unless these were approved at the time the main census 
arrangements were approved by Parliament. 
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2. THE MAIN ISSUES 
Data protection legislation is now an accomplished fact in 
the UK, as in many other countries. However, a number of 
issues relating to confidentiality of census and survey data 
still remains. Some of the main ones seem to be as follows. 
(i) Is formal data protection legislation sufficient to 
secure public trust? 
(ii) Should the legislation relate only to computerized 
records and should individuals be allowed to inspect 
and correct where necessary, the data holdings which 
relate to them? Does it matter, for data protection 
purposes, whether statistical records are complete 
and accurate? 
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APPENDIX 
THE GOVERNMENT STATISTICAL SERVICE CODE OF PRACTICE 
ON THE HANDLING OF DATA OBTAINED FROM STATISTICAL ENQUIRIES 
1. These guidelines on the handling of data obtained from 
statistical inquiries by the Government Statistical Service 
apply equally to information obtained from compulsory 
(statutory) or voluntary statistical inquiries. 
2. Statistical inquiries are identified as such to the 
respondent, either on the forms to be completed or by the 
interviewer. Respondents are informed when response to an 
inquiry is compulsory under statute. 
3. Confidentiality during the collection, storing, 
transferring and processing of information about 
identifiable statistical units is safeguarded at all times. 
If such information is transferred: 
- the department that originally collects or, if an outside 
organization carries out the collection, sponsors the 
collection of information, satisfies itself with the 
safeguards applied to the data both by itself and by those 
to whom the data may be transferred; and 
- the transferring department obtains prior written 
assurance from the receiving department or outside 
organization that it will apply the safeguards in this 
code, and also accept any limitations that may be imposed 
concerning the use of further transfer of the information. 
4. Information about identifiable statistical units is not 
used for other than statistical purposes or transferred to 
another department or outside organization for such purposes 
unless : 
- this is provided for by law and no undertakings have been 
given to the contrary; or 
- in voluntary inquiries either the respondent was so 
informed when the information was collected, or has 
subsequently given consent in writing. 
5. Information about identifiable statistical units is not 
transferred to another department for statistical purposes, 
or to organizations and bona fide researchers outside 
government departments for statistical purposes, unless: 
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- this is provided for by law and no undertakings have been 
given to the contrary; or 
- in voluntary inquiries either the respondent unit was so 
informed when the information was collected, or has 
subsequently given consent in writing; or 
- prior written authorization has been given by a minister 
in the department in possession of the information, and 
the transfer is not forbidden by law, and no undertakings 
have been given to the contrary. 
6. Where it is not forbidden by law and where no 
commitments have been entered into to the contrary, a 
department may transfer anonymous information about 
statistical units to another department or to organizations 
and bona fide researchers outside government departments. 
7. All reasonable care is taken that information about 
identifiable statistical units, or tables or other analyses 
from which such information can be deduced, is not published 
or made generally available or otherwise transmitted, except 
as specified elsewhere in this code, unless the respondent 
concerned has given consent. 
8. Where 
may be of 
department 
respons ib 1 
in England 
place of 
Scot land, 
long-term 
Wales are 
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information about identifiable statistical units 
interest to future historians and researchers a 
may preserve the information in an archive 
e for the preservation of public records, such as, 
and Wales, the Public Record Office or such other 
deposit appointed by the Lord Chancellor; or in 
the Scottish Record Office. Arrangements for the 
preservation of such information in England and 
made in accordance with the Public Records Acts of 
1967, while in Scotland there are analogous non 
arrangements. The preservation in such an archive 
tion about identifiable statistical units only 
takes place under the following conditions: 
if the information was collected under statute, only as 
provided for by statute; 
otherwise, only if the preservation is not forbidden by 
law or where undertakings have not been given to the 
contrary, and where the department, in the light of any 
appropriate consultation, no longer considers the 
information to be sensitive. 
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DISCUSSION 
Dr.VAN HOESEL ( Universi ty of Leiden, Nederland) opened the 
discussi on : 
He remarked that his institute in the University of Leiden 
was both a producer and a user of statistics. However, 
because most of the opinions expressed at the Seminar had 
been those of producers, he would look at the subject from 
the point of view of the user. He thought that the 
régulât ions'apply ing to data files in the UK were extremely 
user-unfriendly. Most files of data collected for 
statistical purposes contained a large amount of information 
which would be of value to social scientists but existing 
regulations precluded all possibility of extracting it. This 
represented a considerable waste of public money. Although 
he would like to see them improved still further to permit 
direct access in certain circumstances, better facilities 
for users existed in the Netherlands. 
He agreed that good data protection measures were also in 
the interest of users, since by increasing public 
confidence, they improved the quality of the statistics. 
However, too much emphasis on protection simply increased 
suspicion and was counter-productive. There were too many 
groups, public and private, surveying the UK population and 
the market was being spoiled as had been the North Sea by 
overfishing. He thought a code of conduct for data 
collection was needed, which might be administered by the 
central statistical service. He suggested the use of TV 
spots to introduce important surveys, covering the 
relevance, conduct and data production arrangement. 
He was not in favour of destroying important data or part of 
the data such as names and addresses as the possibility 
should exist for the scientific community to check on the 
results produced by statisticians. Names and addresses were 
in any case needed for recurrent surveys. 
In summary he proposed: 
(1) to give users the facility to squeeze all relevant 
information from data files 
(2) to restore the market of respondents by stopping 
over-exploitations 
(3) not to destroy data. 
Mr. REDFERN asked whether one of the reasons for the passage 
of data protection legislation in the UK was to permit the 
control of trans-national data flows and to conform to the 
Council of Europe conventions on this point. 
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Mr. HARRIS remarked that many of the countries entering into 
data protection legislation had taken account of the Council 
of Europe guidelines or OECD codes. The same might be true 
of a code of conduct. He asked whether there had been any 
experimentation in the UK in the lines of asking respondents 
whether they objected to the information they had given 
being supplied, with identification removed, for other 
government or research purposes. 
Mr. EMBLETON asked whether any requests had been made in the 
UK for the introduction of public-use samples. He asked 
also, whether census forms were released after 100 years and 
whether this did not comprise a technical breach· of the 
confidentiality regulations. 
Mr. BARNES, replying to the debate, said that they did try 
to perceive the needs of the users of statistics as well as 
those of the producers. The balance in the UK was in favour 
of the producer but he remarked that it was, perhaps, no 
coincidence that a very successful census had taken place in 
the UK in contrast to the experience of some other countries 
with more liberal arrangements for public-use files. The 
situation as regards public-use tapes was under continuous 
review. 
On the subject of TV publicity, Mr. Barnes said that in the 
UK they preferred a low-key approach to surveys which were 
about to be launched and had found this the most successful 
over a long period. 
On page 169 there was an account of an examination of 
processing and storage arrangements for the census carried 
out by the British Computer Society. This provided a 
valuable independent check of the type Dr. Van Hoesel had 
referred to. 
In reply to Mr. Embleton he said that a meeting of the 
Economic and Social Research Council had, indeed, recently 
considered the question of public-use tapes and it remained 
to be seen whether a request for such tapes would emerge. As 
far as he knew the current Census Act, that of 1920, did not 
cover the point of releasing census forms in 100 years time. 
The issue had provoked no public discussion at the 1981 
census. 
They had not tried asking, in the course of a survey, 
whether the respondent objected to his information being 
passed on. The nearest they came to it had been to ask 
whether the respondent would object to being included in a 
later survey; about 85% did not object. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF DATA PROTECTION IN THE UK: 
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR OFFICIAL STATISTICS 
T.J. ORCHARD 
Central Statistical Office 
SUMMARY 
After twelve years of consultation and discussion the UK has 
legislation to control the use of computers to store and 
process information on living individuals. The Data 
Protection Act of 1984 clearly defines terms such as 
personal data, processing, data user and data subject; lists 
eight data protection principles; sets out the 
responsibilities and powers of a Data Protection Registrar; 
specifies the contents of a Register; and states the rights 
of individuals. 
The main concern of the Registrar is that the activities of 
data users do not harm any data subject. Since statistics 
present information about groups of people rather than 
individuals it is inconceivable they will do any harm. The 
legislation therefore takes a fairly relaxed line with data 
used for statistics and it seems unlikely that the 
activities of government statisticians will be restricted by 
it. 
Personal data used for statistical purposes must be 
registered but, provided the statistics are not made 
available in a form which would allow any living individual 
to be identified, they are exempt from the provisions giving 
individual data subjects the right of access and they also 
do not have to be completely accurate. 
0. INTRODUCTION: THE HISTORY 
The United Kingdom now has a Data Protection Act "to 
regulate the use of automatically processed information 
relating to individuals and the provision of services in 
respect of such information". 
The legislation comes at the end of a period of discussion 
and consultation on computers and privacy going back to 
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1967. The first steps towards data protection legislation 
were taken by individual Members of Parliament, who 
introduced four Private Members Bills between 1967 and 1972. 
None of these succeeded because they did not have the 
support of the government but there was genuine public 
concern about the threat to privacy from the increasing use 
of computers to store data on individuals and this pressure 
led to the setting up of an official committee to examine 
the problem. This was the Younger Committee which published 
its report in 1972 and laid the foundations for todays 
legislation. Indeed the eight data protection principles of 
the Act are based on the ten principles given in the Younger 
Committee Report. 
When the Younger Committee Report was published the 
government said it would produce a White Paper setting out 
its views. This White Paper (Cmnd 6353) and its supplement 
(Cmnd 6354) were finally published over three years later, 
at the end of 1975. It announced the government's intention 
to produce legislation. The next step came six months later, 
in July 1976, when the government appointed a Data 
Protection Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Norman 
Lindop to "advise the government on the permanent control 
machinery needed to secure that all existing and future 
computer systems holding personal information, in both the 
private and public sectors are operated with appropriate 
safeguards for privacy; and to consider and refine the 
objectives to be incorporated in legislation establishing 
permanent safeguards". 
The interests of statisticians were represented on the 
Lindop Committee by a university professor of statistics. 
The committee also consulted very widely and obtained 
evidence from professional bodies such as the Royal 
Statistical Society as well as the Central Statistical 
Office and government departments. In this way the views of 
statisticians were fully taken into account with the result 
that the legislation now has a fairly liberal approach to 
data used for statistical purposes and recognizes 
statisticians' long tradition of protecting the 
confidentiality of information on individuals. The Lindop 
Committee report specifically said there seemed to be no 
need for subject access to data used for statistics and that 
data files could be linked and data could be transferred if 
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there were adequate safeguards to protect the privacy of 
individuals. They also recommended that individuals should 
be told if data being collected for statistics may also be 
used to construct registers for further inquiries. 
They considered the benefits of a Universal Personal 
Identifier and the threat this posed to privacy. They 
suggested that the Data Protection Administrator should be 
vigilant to prevent a drift towards using a particular 
identifier widely and that a UPI should not be introduced 
without there being legislation for it. 
At the time the Lindop Committee was working on its report, 
the Council of Europe, the OECD and the BBC were also 
looking into problems associated with computers and privacy. 
Their deliberations culminated in the Council of Europe 
Convention (for the protection of individuals with regard to 
automatic processing of personal data) and the OECD 
Guidelines (governing the protection of privacy and 
transborder flows of personal data). 
There was little progress in the UK on legislation because 
the government changed in 1979 but in 1981 the Home 
Secretary announced the government's intention to introduce 
legislation, which would enable it to ratify the Council of 
Europe Data Protection Convention. In April 1982 they 
published a White Paper (Cmnd 8539) explaining their 
proposals and shortly after this the Data Protection Bill 
was first published. 
In the UK, proposals for new legislation are discussed, and 
amended, by both Houses of Parliament. This process often 
takes a long time and it was not completed before the 
General Election in 1983 so the Bill was lost. After the 
election the government re-introduced the Bill and it 
finally received its Royal Assent in July 1984, twelve years 
after the Younger Committee published its report. 
It will take some time both to establish the office of the 
Registrar, to set up the register and for data users and 
bureaux to adapt their systems to the requirements of the 
legislation - particularly so far as providing for subject 
access is concerned. The data protection scheme will 
therefore be implemented in stages. Following the 
appointment of the Registrar, in the autumn of 1984, there 
will be a period of six months when the Registrar will be 
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able to receive applications for registration (and will not 
be able to refuse registration) and during which it will not 
be an offence to operate unregistered. After this there will 
be an eighteen-month period in which it will be an offence 
to operate unregistered, but during which the Registrar will 
not be able to exercise his powers so as to secure 
observance of the data protection principles. The Act will 
thus not be fully operational until the autumn of 1987. 
1^ THE COVERAGE OF THE ACT 
The Data Protection Act covers data about identifiable 
living persons which are held and processed by equipment 
operating automatically, and where the processing is carried 
out by reference to the data subject. By "identifiable" is 
meant not only information which identifies an individual by 
name but also information containing other personal 
identifiers such as national insurance or membership numbers 
where the key to translate the codes into names is held by 
the data user, even if it is not stored in the computer. But 
a person who merely stores data which have yet to be 
processed and which he does not intend to process is 
excluded from the definition of data user. So too is anyone 
who may have access to data by virtue, say, of a computer 
terminal and is capable to extracting the information 
constituting the data (one element of "processing") but who 
has no control over the contents and use of the data. That 
is not to say that the Act does not apply at all to such a 
person because he is not a data user himself. If he is a 
servant or agent of a data user he will have certain 
responsibilities arising out of the Act. 
The Act defines a number of key terms and it is necessary 
for each of these to be taken together with the rest in 
order to see the provisions in their entirety before 
deciding whether particular data files come within the scope 
of the Act. 
data - information recorded in a form in which it can be 
processed by equipment operating automatically in 
response to instructions given for that purpose. 
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personal data - data consisting of information which relates 
to a living individual who can be identified from 
the information, including any expression of 
opinion about the individual (for example "is a 
poor credit risk"), but not any indication of the 
intentions of the data user in respect of that 
individual (for example "I intend to promote X"). 
data subject - a natural individual who is the subject of 
personal data. Data on businesses are therefore 
outside the Act except in so far as the data may 
also be about a natural person e.g. one-man 
bus iness. 
data user - means a person who holds data, to be processed 
by equipment operating automatically in response 
to instructions given for that purpose and who 
also, either alone or with others, controls the 
contents and use of the data. 
computer bureau - a person carries on a computer bureau if 
he provides other persons with services in respect 
of data. Such services are said to be provided if 
a person, as agent for other persons, causes data 
held by them to be processed by equipment 
operating automatically in response to 
instructions given for that purpose, or if he 
allows other persons the use of equipment for so 
processing information. 
processing - in relation to data this means amending, adding 
to, deleting or re-arranging the data or 
extracting the information constituting the data 
and, in the case of personal data, means 
performing any of these operations by reference to 
the data subject. This does not apply to any 
operation performed of preparing the text of 
documents (i.e. word processing activities). 
disclosing - in relation to data, includes disclosing 
information extracted from the data. 
Although it is not defined in the Act, "for statistical 
purposes" means processing to produce statistics which are 
not made available in a form which identifies any data 
subject. 
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2. THE DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
At the heart of the Data Protection 
principles governing the collection 
data, the quality 
data shall be put 
access to data 
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All 
data 
with overseeing the 
of the principles will 
users but only the 
eighth principle will apply in the case of computer bureaux. 
Schedule 1 of the Act lists the principles and also provides 
details of how the 
cases by defining 
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and in others by detailing factors wh 
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contravened. The eight principles 
their interpretation are: 
e interpreted, in some 
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1) "The information to be contained in personal data shall 
be obtained and personal data shall be processed, fairly 
and lawfully". 
An important factor to take into account in determining 
if the data were obtained "fairly" is to determine if the 
person supplying the information was misled or deceived 
as to the purposes for which it is to be held, used or 
disclosed. 
Information is also "fairly" obtained when the supplier 
is either authorized or required to supply it under any 
enactment. So collection of statistical information under 
the Statistics of Trade Act 1947 will for example be 
deemed to be a "fair" collection. 
Of specific interest to statisticians is a further 
provision later in the Schedule which means that personal 
data used for historical, statistical or research 
purposes (and where no damage or distress is likely to be 
caused to any data subject) are not regarded as being 
obtained "unfairly" where such use was not disclosed when 
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the data were obtained, as for example in the case of 
information originally collected for administrative 
purposes. Data collected for statistics can also be used 
for administrative purposes without this use being 
disclosed, provided the use is described in the register 
and the Registrar does not decide that the use would make 
the original collection unfair. 
2) "Personal data shall be held 
specified and lawful purposes". 
only for one or 
To comply with this principle such purposes must be 
specified in the register and that includes statistical 
purposes. For example specifying the purposes directly to 
data subjects will not be sufficient in itself to meet 
this principle. 
3) "Personal data held for any purpose or purposes shall not 
be used or disclosed in any manner incompatible with that 
purpose or those purposes". 
To comply it means that personal data can only be used 
for those purposes which have been registered and 
similarly, disclosure is only permitted to those 
described in details stated in the register entry. 
4) "Personal data held for any purpose or purposes shall be 
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to that 
purpose or those purposes". 
The Act provides no guidance on what is meant by 
adequate, relevant or excessive. Formal guidance would 
presumably be difficult since none of the terms are 
absolute concepts, each needing to be judged in context. 
It is possible that the Registrar «ay provide some 
élaborât ion. 
5) "Personal data shall 
kept up to date". 
be accurate and, where necessary, 
Any question whether or not data are inaccurate depends 
on whether they are incorrect or misleading as to any 
matter of fact, and whether a claim by a data subject for 
compensation as a result of the inaccuracy is likely to 
succeed in the courts. In the case of personal data held 
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solely for statistical purposes it seems impossible to 
imagine any purely statistical use causing damage to be 
suffered by any data subject because the data used were 
inaccurate. 
Data which are themselves inaccurate when received by a 
data user, either from the data subject or a third party, 
are not regarded as inaccurate providing: they accurately 
record the information received, carry an indication that 
they have been so obtained, and if the data subject has 
notified the data user that he regards the information as 
incorrect or misleading, they also carry an indication to 
that effect. 
6) "Personal data held for any purpose or purposes shall not 
be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or 
those purposes". 
There is a specific relaxation here for statistical 
purposes. Where personal data are held for historical, 
statistical or research purposes and not used in a way 
that damage or distress is caused the data may be kept 
indefinitely. 
7) "An individual shall be entitled -
(a) at reasonable intervals and without undue delay or 
expense -
(i) to be informed by any data user whether he holds 
personal data of which that individual is the 
subject; and 
(ii) access to any such data held by a data user, and 
(b) where appropriate, to have such data corrected or 
erased". 
By undue expense is meant no more than the maximum 
prescribed fee. In deciding whether access has been given 
at reasonable intervals it will be necessary to consider 
the nature of the data; the purposes for which the data 
are held; and the frequency with which data are altered. 
Thus where the data are particularly sensitive, are used 
for a purpose which is potentially prejudicial to data 
subjects, or are frequently changed, the Registrar might 
judge it appropriate for access to be granted more often 
than where none of these considerations applies. The 
correction or erasure of personal data is appropriate 
only when necessary for ensuring compliance with the 
other data protection principles. 
But this principle will not apply to most statistical 
data. The European Convention on Data Protection with 
which the UK Act seeks to comply, acknowledged the 
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special case of statistical and research data and granted 
an exemption from subject access in certain 
circumstances. This exemption appears in the Act as 
fol lows : 
"Personal data held only for - (a) preparing statistics; 
or (b) carrying out research, are exempt from the subject 
access provisions; but it shall be a condition of that 
exemption that the data are not used or disclosed for any 
other purpose and that the resulting statistics or the 
results of the research are not made available in a form 
which identifies the data subjects or any of them". 
This allows personal data to be transferred from one data 
user to another for statistical purposes without losing 
the exemption from subject access. 
8) "Appropriate security measures shall be taken against 
unauthorized access to, or alteration, disclosure or 
destruction of, personal data and against accidental loss 
or destruction of personal data". 
This applies to all data users and also to computer 
bureaux which provide services to data users for the 
processing of data. Two factors which will be considered 
when determining whether this principle has been 
contravened are: the sensitivity of the data in question 
and the harm which would result from a breach of the 
security measures; and the circumstances surrounding 
their storage (including the reliability of staff having 
access to the data). 
3. RIGHTS OF DATA SUBJECTS 
Data subjects will generally enjoy certain rights subject to 
certain exemptions as described in the next section. The 
main right is that of access to personal data but in 
addition the legislation provides in certain circumstances 
for compensation for inaccuracy, loss or unauthorized 
disclosure and it also provides for rectification and 
erasure of data. 
The right of access to personal data means that an 
individual is entitled to be informed by any data user 
whether the data held include personal data of which that 
individual is the data subject and, at the same time, to be 
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supplied with a copy of the personal data in an intelligible 
form. The data user must provide this information within 
forty days of receiving a valid request. The data need not 
be that which existed when the request was made but nothing 
can be done to the data which would not have been done if 
the request for access had not been made. 
Again where an individual suffers damage as a result of the 
loss, destruction or unauthorized disclosure of personal 
data by the data user he will be entitled to compensation 
through the courts for this and any distress caused. As in 
the case of compensation for inaccuracy it will be a defence 
if the data user can prove that he had taken such care as in 
all the circumstances was reasonably required to prevent the 
loss, destruction, or unauthorized disclosure in question. 
The right to rectification and erasure through the courts is 
in addition to the Registrar's powers to order rectification 
or erasure in connection with the seventh data protection 
principle, that is only where it is necessary for ensuring 
compliance with the other principles. A court is able to 
order rectification or erasure on the application of a data 
subject where the data relating to him are inaccurate within 
the meaning of the Act or where he has suffered damage by 
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reason of the unregistered disclosure of personal data in 
circumstances entitling him to compensation, and where there 
is a substantial risk of further unauthorized disclosure. 
4. EXEMPTIONS 
One exemption has already been referred to, namely the 
exemption from giving subject access in the case of personal 
data held for preparing statistics or carrying out research 
(see under the seventh principle above). 
More generally the main exemption is in the field of 
national security where personal data are fully exempt from 
the operative provisions of the Act. If an exemption is 
necessary for these purposes they are neither required to be 
registered nor subject to the Registrar's powers. There are 
however a number of other exemptions. Personal data held for 
the purposes of prevention or detection of crime; the 
apprehension of prosecution of offenders; or the assessment 
or collection of any tax or duty may be exempt from the 
subject access provisions. Similarly personal data may be 
exempt from the non-disclosure provisions if failure to 
disclose is likely to prejudice any of these purposes. The 
Secretary of State has powers to place restrictions on the 
right of subject access to personal data concerning health 
and social work. 
Personal data held solely for payrolls and accounts (that is 
for the purposes of calculating pay, pensions and other 
monies payable in respect of employment; and for the 
purposes of keeping accounts of money paid and received and 
of goods or services supplied and recieved) are exempt from 
registration provided certain conditions are met and data 
subjects do not have a right to subject access or to seek 
compensation for inaccuracy, loss or unauthorized disclosure 
or to obtain rectification or erasure; but the exemption 
only applies where the data are used solely for the 
specified purposes and where disclosures of the data are 
confined to the circumstances set out in the Act. The same 
exemptions apply to personal data held for certain domestic 
or other limited purposes that is personal data held by an 
individual and concerned only with the management of his 
personal, family or household affairs; or held by an 
unincorporated members club and relating only to the members 
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of the club; or held by a data user only for the purpose of 
distributing articles to the data subjects and consisting 
only of their names and addresses. 
The requirement to provide a copy of personal data within 
forty days of a request is modified for examination marks to 
be forty days from the data of publication of the marks, 
provided this is not more than 5 months later. 
5. REGISTRATION 
The register to be maintained by the Registrar will provide 
one of the means by which the United Kingdom will be able to 
ratify the Council of Europe Convention. It will do so by 
meeting the obligation laid down in Article 8a of the 
Convention to ensure that persons should be able to 
establish the existence of an automated data file, its main 
purposes and the identity and location of the controller of 
the file. As a consequence the public will therefore be able 
to consult the register and discover the uses to which 
automated personal data are put by data users. The other 
main use of the register is as a tool for the Registrar in 
his function of overseeing compliance with the legislation 
and, in particular, observance of the data protection 
principles. 
All data users who hold personal data will be required to 
register with the Registrar. Each registration will 
comprise: 
(a) name and address 
(b) a description of the personal data to be held, and of 
the purpose or purposes for which the data are to be 
held or used 
(c) a description of the source or sources from which the 
data user intends or may wish to obtain the data 
(d) a description of any persons to whom the data may be 
disclosed 
(e) the names or a description of any countries or 
territories outside the United Kingdom to which the data 
may be transferred 
(f) one or more addresses where requests from data subjects 
requiring access should be sent. 
In addition, for each registration a fee will be payable. 
There are no details at the moment but the Registrar will 
specify the form in which applications for registration can 
be made and also the level of detail required. Because of 
the part it plays in the scheme, it will be a criminal 
offence to operate as a data user without registering. 
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Applicants for registrations who hold personal data for more 
than one purpose will be entitled to either submit a single 
application or to make separate applications, when they wish 
to do so, in respect of any or each of those purposes. In 
the former case the application might make separate mention 
of each purpose or summarize these purposes into a more 
general, composite purpose. However the Registrar will be 
able to refuse an application when he considers the ensuing 
register entry would provide insufficient information about 
the matters to which it relates or where he considers a 
breach of the principles is likely. Such a refusal may 
result in more information being supplied or additional 
applications for registration being made. 
In deciding whether to submit a single application or a 
number of separate applications, applicants are likely to 
have in mind both the fact that a separate registration fee 
will be payable for each application and also the fact that 
a separate application for subject access will have to be 
made in respect of each register entry. It will therefore 
not necessarily be in the interests of a user holding data 
for widely differing purposes to make a single registration 
since, on an application for subject access, he may have to 
search his entire range of systems for data relating to the 
person concerned, and for which only one fee would be paid. 
The implication here for statistical users in particular, 
where typically a number of surveys or projects are likely 
to exist at any one time, is that it will not be essential 
to separately register each individual survey or project. On 
the other hand there may well be considerations of the kind 
already mentioned that would encourage a data user 
particularly one with a number of large systems - to make 
more than one application. One other factor might be a data 
user's wish to separate the registration of those of his 
systems where a right to subject access will exist from 
those where it will not. 
6. THE POWERS OF THE REGISTRAR 
Under the Data Protection Act it is an offence to hold and 
process personal data without there being an entry in the 
register for this. The first power of the Registrar is thus 
to refuse an application for registration when he thinks the 
data protection principles would not be complied with. 
It is also an offence to hold, use, disclose or transfer 
data except as described in the entry in the register; and 
computer bureaux must protect the data as stated in the 
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eighth principle. If the Registrar thinks a registered user 
has contravened or is contravening the data protection 
principles in a way that may cause any person damage or 
distress he can serve the user with an Enforcement Notice. 
This specifies the steps to be taken, within a stated time, 
to comply with the principles being contravened. For example 
inaccurate data may have to be corrected or erased. 
If the Registrar thinks an Enforcement Notice will not 
secure compliance with the data protection principles he can 
serve the user with a Deregistrat ion Notice. This will 
remove the offending entry from the register and force the 
user to stop holding or processing the data. 
The third type of notice the Registrar can serve is a 
Transfer Prohibition Notice. This is served on a user to 
prevent the transfer of data from the UK to a State which is 
not bound by the European Convention. 
Data users have the right to appeal against the notices, and 
refusal of registration, to a Data Protection Tribunal. This 
tribunal will consist of a chairman and an equal number of 
people representing data users and data subjects. It is 
expected this will only be one of each. 
When offences have been proved to have been committed a 
court may order that the data connected with the offence 
should be forfeited or destroyed. 
7. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE REGISTRAR 
The Act lays down the general duties of the Registrar: 
- He should set up and maintain a register and provide 
facilities for making the information in the entries 
available for inspection by members of the public at all 
reasonable hours and free of charge. 
- He will, on payment of a fee, supply any member of the 
public with a duly certified copy in writing of the 
particulars in any entry. 
- He should promote the observance of the data protection 
principles by data users and persons carrying on computer 
bureaux. 
- He should consider complaints that the data protection 
principles are being contravened when these are made 
without delay by a person directly affected and will tell 
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the complainant the result of his consideration and what 
action he proposes to take. 
He should encourage trade associations or other bodies 
representing data users to prepare, and to disseminate to 
their members, codes of practice for guidance in complying 
with the data protection principles. 
He must prepare an annual report to lay before each House 
of Pariiament. 
IMPLICATIONS 
STATISTICS 
OF THE DATA PROTECTION ACT FOR OFFICIAL 
The Act has only just received Royal Assent so we can only 
guess what effect it will have on the activities of the 
Government Statistical Service. It is thought that users of 
personal data for statistical purposes 
- will have to register their data, the purposes for which 
the data are used and the persons to whom the data may be 
disclosed or transferred. The descriptions will have to be 
precise; "for statistical purpose" is unlikely to be 
sufficient to include the use of data to produce registers 
for subsequent studies. 
- will not need to provide subject access 
- are unlikely to have to ensure that their data are 
completely accurate. (This is not stated explicitly in the 
Act but when he exercises his powers the Registrar must 
take account of the harm done by non-compliance with the 
data protection principles. Inaccuracies in data users for 
statistics cannot harm individuals.) 
- will not be prevented from freely transferring anonymized 
data and producing Public Use Samples. 
- will have to ensure that individuals cannot be identified 
from the statistics but will not have to take any more 
measures to suppress table entries with small numbers than 
is the normal practice now. 
- will not need to inform data subjects when data collected 
for administrative purposes are subsequently used to 
produce statistics. 
- will not be able to allow data collected for statistical 
purposes to be used for administrative purposes. 
- will only be able to transfer personal data to countries 
which have signed the Council of Europe Convention. 
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It thus seems unlikely that the new Data Protection will 
place undue restriction on the activities of government 
statisticians in the UK. Indeed there will be some benefits, 
for example the Data Protection Registrar will be able to 
reinforce the assurances given by the Registrar General that 
the information collected by population census will be 
confidential, will only be used for statistical purposes, 
and will not be transferred to another government 
department. 
In the absence of a Universal Personal Ident 
little scope for linking data files in 
practice of collecting statistical 
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DISCUSSION 
Prof. ZIGHERA (Université Paris X-Nanterre) opened the 
discussion : 
He regretted that, although both the OECD and the Council of 
Europe had concerned themselves with the question of data 
protection, the political authorities of the European 
Communities had appeared less interested by this class of 
problem. He had a number of questions of detail: 
What was the situation referred to on page 180 in which a 
person would store data without ever processing it? 
The purposes of data files needed to be specified when they 
were being established. If it was proposed to use them for a 
new purpose, how could this be dealt with? 
The holder of a data file was obliged to provide to 
interested people copies of the entries concerning 
themselves. In certain situations this could lead to a flood 
of requests for information which was too large or too 
costly to be managed. What would happen in these 
circumstances; 
He noted, with concern, proposals to suppress information 
for small groups of individuals by combining it into larger 
groups. He pointed out that, in certain modern methods of 
analysis involving classification by many variables, such 
small groups were extremely important although they would in 
no way be identified in the final results. 
Prof. LOSANO (Università di Milano) remarked as follows: 
He expressed his appreciation for Mr. Orchard's explanation 
of a legal text which continental jurists found very 
complicated. He admitted being surprised by the author's 
statement that the UK Data Protection Act would, in 
substance, resemble similar laws already in force in 
continental Europe. The problems arose not so much from the 
legal activities connected with the implementation of this 
law (it was widely known that the British legal system was 
different from the continental one), as from two specific 
points, viz. the very broad powers of the data guarantor (or 
Registrar) and the applicability of the law to only part of 
the United Kingdom. 
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The Registrar had very wide-ranging and ill-defined 
technical duties, so much so that mapping these out would be 
possible only after the Data Protection Act had been in 
force for a few years. This personality - along with the 
Data Protection Tribunal - nevertheless held power of 
decision for all technical problems. Thus, an appeal to an 
ordinary judge (as provided for in Section 14) could be made 
only in respect of legal problems, but could not call into 
question the data processed automatically once these had 
been verified by the Registrar and the Data Protection 
Tribunal. He was therefore to all intents and purposes a 
special judge; this was an optimum solution from the 
technical point of view but one which in Italy was simply 
out of the question because its Constitution - shaped by 
specific historical events - prohibited the institution of 
special judges. 
The final section of the Data Protection Act excluded 
the application of these rules in the Channel Islands, 
which had a long tradition of legal autonomy vis-à-vis 
the United Kingdom. No other European law on privacy 
contained a clause of this type. This could lead to 
the Channel Islands - already considered by many as a tax 
haven - becoming in the future an informatics haven as well. 
Professor Losano was aware that the two examples quoted were 
closely bound up with Anglo-Saxon legal traditions and 
therefore had their own undoubted consistency and 
acceptability within that context. His concern was that 
these specific aspects would in future be turned against the 
United Kingdom to deny her access to personal data stored in 
a foreign country: the latter could base its refusal to make 
the data available on the law which prohibited (except when 
expressly authorized) the transfer of personal data to a 
country which offered no legal guarantees equivalent to 
those it could itself provide. This could prove a major 
hurdle to the compilation of statistics at European level. 
Mr. HARRIS (EUROSTAT) remarked as follows: 
A number of Member states would not have been happy to see 
the European Commission involving itself in the question of 
data protection legislation. He could not say offhand 
whether, in fact, such involvement would be in accordance 
with the Treaties establishing the Community. It was to be 
regretted that neither the OECD nor the Council of Europe 
had been able to accept the invitations which they had 
received to the present Seminar. 
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Mr. SÜDFELD (Statistisches Bundesamt) asked: 
With regard to the statement of purposes for which a data 
file was being established, in what degree of detail should 
these purposes be spelled out. 
The President : 
Referring to the sentence on page 191 "will not be prevented 
from freely transferring anonymized data and producing 
public use samples", he asked whether these were anonymized 
samples and if so how could one use anonymized samples for a 
survey? Also the later phrase "will not need to inform data 
subjects when data collected for administrative purposes are 
subsequently used to produce statistics" appeared to 
contradict the principle that the purposes of a data file 
should be declared initially. 
The author replied to the various questions raised as 
follows : 
"Files created but never used" referred to files of back-up 
data retained for security purposes only and these were 
excluded from public-access provisions. The entry in the 
Register in respect of a data file could be amended by the 
addition, to the stated list of purposes, of another purpose 
not originally foreseen. The "run on the bank" situation was 
not, he thought, likely to arise but in any case a "search 
fee" could be charged for each item of information sought, 
thereby restraining excessive demands. 
The Registrar had already been appointed and was working on 
the setting up of his office and was discussing with 
organizations the procedure he would have to follow. The 
timetable had not been set down for the implementation of 
the legislation. It was thought that preliminary work would 
be completed by mid-1985. At that time a date would be fixed 
from which people would have two years in which to register 
their data. 
The author did not think there was any risk of the Channel 
Islands' becoming a data haven. The Act could be extended, 
by Order in Council, to the Channel Islands. As regards the 
powers of the Registrar, he could not fine individuals but 
could initiate prosecutions. His powers really consisted in 
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the issuing of notices. For example he could prevent data 
being transferred or could deregister data users, thereby 
preventing them from operation. 
He did not know in what level of detail uses of data files 
must be described: this had yet to emerge, depending on the 
attitude of the Registrar. 
The procedures for transforming anonymized data and 
producing public use samples already eixsted with regard to, 
for example, the census of population. The procedures could 
continue provided they were registered as uses of the data 
file. If administrative data were subsequently used for 
statistics, an amendment of the register would suffice; 
there would be no need to notify the data suppliers. 
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DO STATISTICIANS NEED A CODE OF CONDUCT? 
R. JOWELL 
Social & Community Planning Research 
SUMMARY 
Unlike their colleagues in other fields, statisticians have 
long resisted adopting a professional code. They should now 
reconsider their position. But they should not repeat the 
mistakes of other codes. Instead they should devise a new 
model - an educational code - that recognizes the inherent 
conflict between different statistical goals and does not 
attempt to prescribe blanket remedies. A possible model for 
such a code (the draft ISI statement) is attached as an 
Appendix. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
When statisticians, researchers or data analysts get 
together they are always in danger of reinforcing their 
frequently stated position that rules and regulations 
imposed upon them by governments are draconian and mostly 
unjustified. After all, they protest, statisticians are 
concerned only with the population's (or sub-population's) 
aggregate characteristics, never with individuals and their 
identities. The names of people or organizations who supply 
characteristics. Having served their purpose, the names are 
then ignored or forgotten. To those whose job it is to 
collect, analyze and preserve data, this approach to 
individual identities is and always has been one of their 
professional norms, part and parcel of the statistical 
tradition. Why then, they repeatedly ask, do others 
implicitly suspect their professional practices and seek to 
restrain them in various inconvenient and counterproductive 
ways? Or, as the programme notes for this seminar put it, 
has not "the distrust of government ... gone too far?" 
In this paper I argue that statisticians share some 
responsibility for the introduction of laws which now affect 
their work, since they have, over the years, been remarkably 
insensitive to the growing fears of legislators and civil 
libertarians in many countries. Instead of bolstering their 
professional practices, conceding the dangers, attempting to 
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erect their own barricades against possible dangers and 
potential malpractices, statisticians have, on the whole, 
largely denied the existence of a problem and, when finally 
they began to address the issue, they did so too defensively 
or, at least, too complacently. 
Unlike other disciplines and professional groups (not only 
doctors, lawyers, architects and the like, but also 
sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists and many 
others), statisticians have not succeeded in codifying their 
professional values and norms. Until the American 
Statistical Association produced a rather thin interim code 
(1980), statisticians had implicitly or explicitly rejected 
the notion that professional norms ought to be written down 
and subjected to scrutiny. Indeed, it took over 30 years of 
repeated attempts for American statisticians to produce 
their code. 
Meanwhile, the International Statistical Institute (ISI) had 
been trying vainly on and off for a similar period to 
produce its own statement of professional ethics. Now, as 
the ISI's one hundredth anniversary approaches, an agreed 
draft statement (Appendix 1) looks as if it may finally be 
adopted. As chairman of the committee charged with devising 
that statement, I would not, however, be unduly surprised 
if, in the event, the statement fails to clear its final 
hurdle at the next ISI Session. Caution (or prudence?) may 
again prevail. 
What follows are extracts from and amendments to a paper 
given at the ISI plenary session in 1981, at which I was 
invited to discuss the case for an international 
professional code for statisticians (Jowell, 1981). As will 
be seen, after examining the advantages and disadvantages of 
various types of codes, I was and am persuaded that a code 
would be useful, but only if it is one that seeks to inform 
and guide practice rather than one which vainly attempts to 
regulate or control it. Statistical work is much too diverse 
to be subjected to universal rules and edicts. 
I should stress, however, among this audience, that what 
follows refers to all statistical data collection and 
analysis, not specifically or even principally to government 
stat ist ics. 
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1. THE CASE FOR A CODE 
It would be comforting to believe that the surge of interest 
in ethics and code formulation among statisticians during 
the 1970s (an interest generally shared, incidentally, by 
social scientists), stemmed from a new concern about 
improving our service to society, an altruistic 
acknowledgement that others were entitled to discover what 
we did and how we did it, a determination to open to public 
scrutiny the high ethical ideals to which we aspired. In 
reality, however, the interest was more self-serving, its 
principal objective appearing to be to deflect the growing 
suspicion among legislators and the public in many countries 
that statistics and improved methods of data manipulation 
threatened privacy and civil liberty. The interest coincided 
with the introduction of data protection and privacy laws in 
Europe and America, some passed with the acquiescence of the 
statistical community, some without. The problem for the 
statistical community was that it did not have the 
opportunity to offer self-regulation as a realistic 
alternative to legislation because it had failed to adopt 
models or codes that would convince others that it had a 
well-formulated and robust set of protective mechanisms. 
To assert that statisticians worked within widely accepted 
professional constraints was not enough; documentary 
evidence was required and was simply not available. Unlike 
other professions and disciplines, we had no codes or 
statement, merely protestations that what we did was 
exemplary and threatened nobody. The result was that we were 
unconvincing, and we remain so. 
Collective self-interest is usually the principal motive for 
the development of a professional code. In our case, for 
instance, a code might serve to enlighten those who for too 
long have been allowed to characterize statistics as a 
mischievous and meddlesome discipline that harms rather than 
promotes society's interests; it might demonstrate the 
profession's concern about spurious uses of data and 
unwarranted intrusions into private domains; it might serve 
as a defence against improper pressure from clients, 
funders, employers or legislators. 
There would also be wider motives for adopting a code, 
perhaps the most obvious of which is the creation of a 
stronger professional identity among statisticians, despite 
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their diversity of interests, loyalties and activities. 
Indeed that is the traditional function of a code: to 
symbolize and consolidate a group's professional identity. 
But if we do seek to promote greater professional identity 
among statisticians (with or without a code) we need to 
decide what we mean by the word "professional". The word has 
several meanings - in English, at any rate - two of which 
concern us here. On the one hand, it refers to the handful 
of highly regarded occupations traditionally referred to as 
"the professions", which derive their status partly from 
their well-established and estimable codes. The Hippocratic 
Oath, for example, is widely known for the stringent moral 
standards it invokes for medical practitioners. Indeed, it 
elevates a doctor's duty to serve the community almost to 
the level of a creed, implying that medicine is at least as 
much a cause as a career. The main practical force of such 
an Oath nowadays seems to be to advance both the self-image 
and the public image of its signatories. 
If our primary motive for developing a code were to achieve 
this kind of status enhancement or occupational 
aggrandissement we would almost certainly be destined to 
fail. 
On the other hand, members of all occupational groups, 
humdrum or elite, can be described as being "professional" 
in their approach to work. Here the word conveys skill, 
efficiency, a commitment to high standard, probity and, 
above all perhaps, a sense of pride in the work itself and 
in the occupational group to which it attaches. If 
professional identity implies a commitment to these 
characteristics it is clearly worth pursuing. 
The collective and routine pursuit of high standards is, 
however, a very difficult cause for a code to advance. Even 
given the unlikely prospect of swift agreement on what 
constitutes high statistical standards, we would still be 
faced with the intractable problem of trying to reconcile 
individually acceptable but collectively conflicting 
standards. Take, for example, the pursuit of greater 
accuracy, or the propensity to undertake more and more 
refined analyses of available data. Such admirable motives 
may well be responsible for some of the most insensitive 
(even unethical) behaviour towards the subjects of research. 
The need for representativeness, for instance, is the usual 
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justification for undue pressure or deception to secure high 
response rates in sample surveys. The desire for penetrating 
analyses may lead to linkages of data that threaten the 
privacy of those to whom they relate. 
No code could legislate on the priorities inherent in such 
practices. Nor could it even suggest universal rules of 
"good practice" since too many statistical exercises present 
unique and complex ethical and technical problems that a 
generic code could neither predict nor cater for. 
Nonetheless, by exposing and publicizing professional 
dilemmas, by explaining ethical and technical conflicts, by 
providing a context within which newcomers and outsiders 
could understand the difficulties, a code would probably 
afford a modicum of protection to those who would otherwise 
be adversely affected by our potential excesses. In this 
respect professional interest and public interest coincide. 
So a code of practice would, I suggest, be valuable as long 
as it did not (as most codes admitteldy do) attempt to 
oversimplify and thereby deliberately falsify the world it 
referred to, as long as it recognized the inherent conflicts 
between goals and accepted the need for uneasy compromises. 
As Ladd has pointed out (1980 p. 155), "being a professional 
does not automatically make a person an expert in ethics, 
even in the ethics of that person's own particular 
profession". Ladd goes on to argue that organized rules of 
ethics are an intellectual and moral absurdity. As will 
become apparent, I share Ladd's aversion to the imposition 
of rules and sanctions to govern most of our professional 
responsibilities and regard the proper functions of a code 
as being explanatory and descriptive, not authoritarian or 
prescript ive. 
2. WHAT TYPE OF CODE? 
Most professional codes - or the provisions within 
them - can be caricatured as belonging to one of two broad 
classes: those that involve lofty ideals (which can be 
referred to as aspirational codes); and those that legislate 
on minute aspects of professional conduct (which can be 
referred to as regulatory codes). Diener and Crandall (1978) 
draw the same distinction but refer to the two classes as 
wisdom ethics and content ethics. The two types of 
provisions are not mutually exclusive and, indeed, many 
codes contain both. They are, however, based on different 
premises . 
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Aspirational provisions are expressions of often 
unattainable ideals; they are guides 
Consider, for example, the doctrine o 
which broadly refers to the right of 
rather than edicts. 
f informed consent, 
potential research 
subjects not only to refuse to participate but to know the 
material facts about the study before making their decision. 
An aspirational provision on informed consent might say that 
it is "the only honourable basis on 
human subjects can be undertaken". It 
about the "dignity and individuality" 
and so on. IL is widely known within 
informed consent is frequently neither 
Yet that sort of provision could sti 
expression of ideals to which we would 
absence of overriding technical (or 
considerations. 
Regulatory provisions, on the other 
which research among 
might go on to talk 
of research subjects, 
the profession that 
sought nor obtained. 
11 be adopted as an 
try to conform in the 
even other ethical) 
hand, are rules to 
govern behaviour, based on the premise that there are 
universal (and enforceable) models of appropriate practice. 
A regulatory provision on informed consent would probably 
start its life unambiguously, for example that "informed 
consent must always be obtained when 
subjects is being undertaken". But, to 
rule would almost certainly end its li 
of a qualifying phrase, such as 
research among human 
make it workable, the 
fe with the insertion 
: "unless special 
circumstances make this undesirable in a particular case". 
Typically, therefore, regulatory codes 
on important issues, reserving the less 
for minutiae. 
tend to be ambiguous 
ambiguous provisions 
The case against an international regulatory model for 
statisticians is overwhelming. Not only are there obvious 
cultural and political differences between countries, but 
there are also major variations in practice and convention. 
A set of universal rules would be very different to 
formulate, still more different to implement. Even if these 
problems could be solved, a regulatory code would inevitably 
be so qualified that its utility would be destroyed. It 
would contain little more than a collection of truisms. 
An international aspirational code could avoid these 
disadvantages, but its utility would be even more different 
to discern. Rhetorical or sanctimonious calls for moral 
fibre, altruism and high endeavour are hardly likely to 
induce more than a momentary inspirational glow. Worse 
still, they are likely to be transparently different from 
the world we actually inhabit and are of little practical 
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value to those who legitimately look to a code for 
information about, and justifications for, professional 
norms or ethical conventions. 
My bias must by now be apparent: if statisticians are to 
consider the adoption of professional code, they should 
reject both the aspirational and regulatory models. They 
should, instead, adopt a third model, which can be referred 
to as an educational code. Based on the twin premises that 
most ethical issues defy unambiguous regulation and that 
ethical decisions are matters for the individual rather than 
the group, an educational code would seek to describe and 
explain professional norms, expose inherent conflicts, and 
give guidance on possible approaches to their resolution. 
Its aim would be to ensure that individual ethical decisions 
are informed by professional experience, not governed by 
professional authority. 
An educational code would not be entirely new. Indeed, it 
could be described as an aspirational code with a major new 
element. Yet none of the codes I have located sets out 
specifically to structure its provisions to illuminate 
issues rather than to pronounce upon them. Most take as 
their implicit starting-point the need to control 
malpractice. An educational code would start from the 
premise that deliberate malpractice is almost impossible to 
control, even by law, and that the main function of a code 
is to enable the diligent professional to better understand 
the ethical components of his or her work. A strong 
indictment of the international statistical community is 
that it provides little or no systematic guidance to its 
newcomers as to how they might approach the ethical problems 
and dilemmas we all know they are likely to face sooner or 
later in their careers. 
Such a code could naturally not be enforced, nor could 
sanctions be imposed for breaches of its provisions. 
Consideration could, however, be given to inviting the main 
funders of statistical research (government, industry, 
foundations) to insist that recipients of grants or 
contracts should be signatories of the code. That would 
ensure at least that deviations from the guidelines were the 
result of individual deliberation rather than of innocence 
or ignorance. 
3. THE COVERAGE OF A CODE 
Statisticians, in common with most other groups, are 
employed in a variety of institutional settings: within 
government, industry, commerce, consultancy, universities, 
research institutes. They are required to perform a variety 
of roles: to offer advice, to collect and assimilate data, 
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to detect and interpret relationships, to identify and 
predict trends, to design experiments, to develop analytical 
tools. A professional code would need to be framed with that 
diversity in mind. 
At the same time, statisticians share common characteristics 
and concerns, principal among which is, perhaps, a concern 
with the tools of their trade or methodological issues. They 
also share the problem of being faced with at least four 
competing allegiances: 
to the individual sources of their data (respondents); 
to their employers or funders; 
to their peers (at their workplace, in the wider statistical 
community and in other disciplines); 
to society at large. 
It is with these four overlapping responsibilities that a 
professional code should largely concern itself. 
In this paper I can barely touch on the variety of ethical 
considerations in each relationship. Those interested in 
more detail can refer to the original paper, and to the 
references cited within it. 
4. STATISTICIANS AND RESPONDENTS 
Different writers classify the issues relating to the 
ethical treatment of respondents in different ways. Bower 
and de Gasparis (1978) list six issues; Diener and Crandall 
(1978) list eight. The issues can, however, be collapsed 
into four categories: intrusion and privacy, informed 
consent, anonymity and confidentiality, potential harm to 
respondents. 
4.1 Intrusion and privacy 
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference 
with this privacy ... Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference..." 
UN Declaration of Human Rights 
(As quoted in Dalenius, 1977). 
Do sample surveys "arbitrarily" interfere with privacy? To 
some extent they clearly do: samples are selected without 
the consent of their members, who then receive unsolicited 
letters, visits or telephone calls from determined 
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Interviewers. These may not be serious intrusions as long as 
we do not define privacy as the right to be left alone. And 
according to the (British) Committee on Privacy (1972 
p. 10), that interpretation would go "far beyond any right 
which the individual living in an organized society could 
reasonably claim". 
On the other hand, excessive intrusion through surveys may 
occur, and researchers must always be sensitive to the 
possibility of oversurveying certain groups of areas. "Most 
people see decent obscurity as an important part of their 
personal freedom" (Barnes, 1979 p. 56). 
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The difficulty researchers face is that there are no 
ready-made criteria for determining what approaches, methods 
or issues are likely to be sensitive, embarrassing or 
offensive to respondents. Individuals and cultures vary 
widely in their sensibilities. 
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The doctrine of informed consent was first implicitly 
invoked in the Nuremburg Code (1947) as part of the judgment 
of the war crimes tribunal on defendants accused of crimes 
involving experiments on human subjects. It was later 
explicitly incorporated into the World Medical Association's 
Declaration of Helsinki (1964, revised 1975) on biomedical 
research. The doctrine now has a prominent place in most 
codes of research ethics. 
The doctrine states that researchers should try to avoid 
both uninformed and misinformed participation by subjects in 
research. It also forbids actual or implied coercion. Its 
adoption by medical researchers marked a reaffirmation of 
the Hippocratic principle that the interests of the patients 
were paramount in any conflict between them and the 
interests of science. 
When social scientists borrowed the doctrine, they made no 
such affirmation about the interests of respondents 
vis-à-vis those of science or society. They adopted the 
doctrine's words and equivocated on its substance. That is 
still the case. Evidence of this equivocation can be found 
in much of the literature on research ethics and in many 
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professional codes. Once again, it stems mainly from a 
widespread reluctance to admit that there is no generic 
answer to the question of whose interests should prevail. 
Indeed regulatory codes cannot admit that possibility, and 
aspirational codes need not admit it. 
So most codes seem to lurch from strong endorsements of the 
principle that respondents' interests are paramount to 
strong endorsements of scientific predominance. And they 
achieve all this movement without even a passing reference 
to the uncomfortable journey. 
In reality, both consent and coercion can be informed, 
uninformed or misinformed. Censuses, for instance, are 
undertaken under conditions of informed coercion. In 
classifying studies on a continuum from informed consent to 
uninformed coercion, it is surprising to discover how many 
fail to achieve the condition of informed consent. 
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4.3 Anonymity and confidentiality 
Statistical data are, on the whole, unconcerned with 
individual identities. They exist to answer questions such 
as "how many?" or "what proportion", not "who?". They must 
be distinguished from administrative data whose main concern 
is to identify individual characteristics. But this 
distinction is confounded by the fact that statistical 
analysis is often based on data initially collected for 
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administrative purposes; and, even when it is not, the 
individual (or group or organization) is usually the initial 
source of data. 
Data protection laws are aimed primarily at administrative 
rather than statistical data. The report of the (British) 
Committee on Data Protection (1978), for instance, states 
positively that "the essential characteristic of statistical 
data is that they are concerned with groups of individuals 
and not with individuals themselves ... It follows that the 
use of personal information for statistical purposes carries 
few risks for privacy." 
But 
rath 
safe 
def i 
sour 
impl 
exis 
meas 
tech 
defi 
virt 
unwi 
fool 
the 
er t 
guar 
ne a 
ce c 
ici t 
t fo 
ures 
niqu 
ne a 
ue a 
11 in 
proo 
Commi 
han ρ 
ds aga 
s the 
an be 
or 
r pre 
to 
es. On 
s the 
s a s 
g brea 
f. 
ttee 
riva 
inst 
rel 
inf 
xpl i 
vent 
eve 
e o 
con 
ecur 
ches 
was 
cy. 
br 
ease 
erre 
ci t 
ing 
r m 
f th 
diti 
ity 
of 
actual 
In rea 
eaches 
of id 
d, when 
obiigat 
such b 
ore s 
ese me 
on whe 
system 
confid 
ly r 
lity 
of 
ent i 
suc 
ion 
reac 
ophi 
thod 
reby 
is 
enti 
eferri 
t her 
confid 
fied d 
h disc 
to the 
hes, f 
s t icat 
s is 
data 
that 
al i ty. 
ng to 
e can 
ent ial 
ata, o 
losure 
sourc 
rom s 
ed da 
anonym 
travel 
it he 
But 
confi 
be η 
ity -
r of 
cont 
e. Ma 
imple 
ta 
ity -
inco 
lps t 
it i 
dent i 
o abs 
wh i 
data 
raven 
ny me 
sec 
proce 
whi 
gnito 
o pr 
s far 
al i ty 
olut e 
eh I 
whose 
es an 
thods 
urity 
ssing 
ch I 
. Its 
event 
from 
The likelihood of identities being unwittingly disclosed is 
influenced by several factors, among which are the size of 
the population, its heterogeneity, the size of sample and 
the depth of information about each case. Curiously, some 
data protection laws exempt from control small-scale 
psychological and qualitative studies simply because they do 
not involve automated data processing. This reflects an 
unfortunate and longstanding emphasis on the computer's 
unique ability to threaten privacy rather than on its 
impressive potential for protecting it. Once data have found 
their way into computers they are usually fairly remote from 
their source (sometimes very remote, as in the case of 
"transborder flows"). In general, the more remote they are, 
the less serious are the consequences of inadvertent 
disclosure, although that does not apply, for instance, when 
the source is, say, a multi-national company. 
People or organizations are mostly asked to participate in 
statistical inquiries as if each inquiry was an end in 
itself, a self-contained exercise designed to advance 
knowledge within specified boundaries. 
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Flaherty (1979, p. 307) has argued persuasively that an 
"ultimate goal of public policy in every country should be 
to encourage custodians to disseminate data and researchers 
to use it". Provided that the individual is adequately 
protected, wider access to data will surely serve rather 
than threaten the cause of civil liberty and open 
government. 
4.4 Potential harm to respondents 
Respondents may be harmed by their participation 
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It is idle to attempt to legislate, as some codes do, 
against causing harm or distress to respondents. Even 
seemingly innocent questions about domestic arrangements, 
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job history and income may inflame or upset people in 
certain circumstances. It is much more helpful to attempt, 
as Levine (1975) has done, to produce guidelines for 
assessing in advance both the probability and the likely 
severity of harm in various research settings. 
The risks of collective stress or harm are still more 
intangible. Information provided and collected in good faith 
may be used against respondents' interests, not individually 
but as members of society. Such circumstances may derive 
from purely descriptive tags that turn into negative 
stereotypes or offensive labels, such as: "District X has 
the highest incidence of crime in the country", or "Women 
over 60 are the most likely victims of street crime". Or 
they may derive from social action - based directly on 
research findings - that ultimately harms the interests of a 
group to which some respondents belong. 
Statisticians may reasonably claim that, as individuals, 
respondents will not be victimized (or, for that matter, 
rewarded) as a direct result of participating in research. 
Such a claim is in any case implied in a pledge of 
anonymity. But they can rarely claim that respondents will 
be unaffected by the publication of statistical findings. To 
do that would be to disparage the value and influence of 
statistical work. 
5. STATISTICIANS AND EMPLOYERS OR FUNDERS 
Deming's personal Code of Professional Conduct (1972) offers 
an admirable model of the obligations that statisticians and 
their funders or clients should meet in their dealings with 
each other. It is explicit in its division of 
responsibilities and uncompromising in its defence of the 
statistician's right to determine statistical matters. I 
suspect, however, that only a statistician of Deming's 
standing could get away with such a code; the rest of the 
profession remains subject to far more pressure or undue 
influence from funders or employers than is, perhaps, 
healthy for the maintenance of high standards. Unlike 
Deming, some statisticians see themselves as belonging 
essentially to a service industry where the tradition of the 
customer's infallibility is rarely questioned. 
The reduction in funds for statistical work in many 
countries may place severe strains on standards of research. 
Even marginal diminutions in levels of quality control, or 
in sample sizes, or in budgets for research time, can have a 
cumulatively damaging (and possibly irreversible) impact on 
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Statistical practice. Moreover, in trying to sustain or 
restore programme budgets, statisticians may be tempted to 
exaggerate the explanatory powers of their data, or to 
accept contracts or grants that embrace dubious 
methodologies. The growth of these practices would harm the 
interests of funders and statisticians alike. 
A major professional concern should be the reinstatement of 
the role of the statistician as a designer of data 
collection methods and an interpreter of data, rather than 
as a slavish provider of data to predetermined 
specifications. A code might conceivably be a vehicle for 
reaffirming the principle (or aspiration?) that statistical 
research is concerned as much with ideas as with data. 
Relationships with funders involve mutual responsibilities. 
The funder is entitled to expect statisticians to possess 
attributes such as probity and objectivity, a command of 
their discipline, and candour in relation to costs, the 
limitations of their data and the availability of 
alternative methodologies. The statistician is entitled to 
expect funders to possess most of these qualities too, but, 
in addition, to observe the boundaries of the statistician's 
technical and ethical domains, and to respect the integrity 
of the data. 
Statisticians and their employers have a rather more complex 
relationship. Some of the same responsibilities apply but 
are complicated by the special factor of status. A junior 
statistician may believe, for instance, that he or she is 
being required to use methodology that is questionable, 
either from an ethical or from a technical standpoint. 
Resignation is an ultimate option, but hardly to be 
recommended in most circumstances. In the absence of 
reaching agreement on an alternative methodology, what 
options remain? The statistician can refuse to carry out the 
assignment, go along with it (perhaps on the grounds that it 
is someone else's responsibility), or "blow the whistle", 
thereby involving others in the argument. A code, even an 
educational code, could sometimes help to prevent such 
conflicts from becoming crises, simply by illustrating how 
similar problems have been faced and resolved before. But it 
could not be used successfully to arbitrate on fine ethical 
and technical choices. 
6. STATISTICIANS AND THEIR PEERS 
The obligations and rituals of what may be called 
professional citizenship are at the heart of many codes of 
practice: determination of authorship, criticism of learned 
work, rules against advertising or competition, conventions 
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of publication, establishment of review committees, and so 
on. Indeed, to judge from some codes, the professional often 
inhabits a world into which outsiders rarely intrude. So 
dominant are int ra-professional concerns that other 
considerations are only grudgingly granted entry. 
Other codes attempt to fulfil the role or moral tracts, 
exhorting their members to display qualities such as 
honesty, courtesy, consideration and propriety. It would 
admittedly be more comfortable if all statisticians were, 
say, considerate and courteous, but from a professional 
point of view it is far more important that they should be 
competent and scrupulous. The advocacy of any of these 
qualities in codes of practice is absurd and demeaning. 
Nonetheless, a statistician who blatantly breaches 
professional norms - say by fiddling data (and being 
found out), or by gratuitously inflicting harm on 
subjects - performs a potential disservice to others in the 
field. Ironically, it is partly for this reason 
that self-regulation of professions tends to be ineffective. 
Censure cannot erase the event and may well pollute the 
environment within which the remainder of the profession is 
attempting to operate. Thus, public criticism by fellow 
members is only rarely made. Such closing of ranks is 
probably self-defeating in the long run. In any case, it is 
intellectually and ethically hazardous for a profession to 
behave as if it were an extended family, the members of 
which should jump to each other's defence come what may. 
If we refer back to the purposes of an educational code, the 
scope of its provisions of professional relationships may 
become clearer: a code should inform the uninitiated, 
describe professional norms and highlight potential 
conflicts. So, in our case, a code should confine itself to 
norms such as the responsibility of statisticians to 
describe the limitations of their data, to disclose 
sufficient details of their methodology to permit informed 
academic scrutiny, to allow access to raw data within the 
constraints of confidentiality, to illuminate likely 
inaccuracies in their data, and so on. 
7. STATISTICIANS AND SOCIETY 
The phrase "information is power" usually refers to 
unpublished data held within large corporations or by 
governments. These data, it is argued, are equivalent to a 
secret weapon in the hands of "the establishment" that can 
be used at any time against the public interest. The best 
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defence, some claim, is to insist on openness and access. 
And there is certainly a strong case for all data collected 
at public expense to be publicly available. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
I have argued that many ethical goals frequently come into 
conflict with others and, as frequently, with technical 
goals. A regulatory code for statisticians would therefore 
face formidable obstacles. If it tried to regulate only on 
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seemingly uncontroversial issues, it would be very brief and 
undemanding; it might also, by omission, appear to endorse 
all practice to which it did not refer. On the other hand, 
if its regulations were more wide-ranging it would require 
vigilant enforcement (which is demonstrably impracticable) 
or risk being widely, and often justifiably, ignored. 
An aspirational code would face fewer obstacles, by 
referring only to ideals and broad moral duties, it would 
circumvent problems of definition and implementation. But 
with these omissions it would be unlikely to have any 
enduring impact. 
Both these models would have another serious drawback: they 
would be uninformative. Statistical practice involves 
inherent clashes of values, often between finely 
differentiated options. Any code that failed to recognize 
these conflicts would be unrealistic and ineffectual. 
I have therefore argued for an educational code covering 
relationships with respondents (or other sources of data), 
with funders, with peers and with society at large. Its aims 
would be to promote an appreciation of ethical and 
professional issues, to inform ethical choices and to 
document professional wisdom and experience. Its rationale 
would be that ethical judgements are best resolved by 
individual conscience rather than by collective edict. Its 
function would be to provide a framework and guidelines 
within which individual statisticians could make informed 
choices. Its only requirement would be that its signatories 
should read it and refer to it when faced with an ethical 
problem or dilemma. It would have to be revised at regular 
intervals. 
Such a code is appended. It is the draft code of the 
International Statistical Institute due to be considered for 
adoption next year. 
As will be seen, it consists of a codification of broad 
ideals under various headings, followed by a short 
discussion of how and why those ideals are difficult to 
fulfil in all circumstances. The statement does not attempt 
to conceal the fact that the ideals conflict with one 
another; on the contrary it tries to highlight the conflicts 
and to demonstrate that different routes would (and should) 
be taken in different circumstances. It is appended only as 
a model of one possible approach to breaking down the 
traditional resistance of statisticians to the codification 
of their professional norms. The ISI will in due course make 
its own decision on whether it is an appropriate model. 
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Whatever reactions there may be to the details of the 
statement, however, we must ask whether the time has not 
come for statisticians to provide tangible affirmation that 
they do have well-established and fairly universal 
professional values that are capable of being understood and 
appreciated by others. 
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Appendix 1 
NOT FOR CITATION OR QUOTATION 
DRAFT ISI DECLARATION ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
(For discussion prior to and at the 45th 
Session of the International Statistical 
Institute, Amsterdam, 1985) 
BACKGROUND MOTE 
This document arises from a decision of the 42nd Session of 
the ISI in Manila, 1979, to set up an Ethics Committee with 
the responsibility of formulating a declaration on ethics 
for possible adoption at the Centenary Meeting in Amsterdam 
in 1985. 
Following the Committee's appointment by the Bureau, a 
drafting sub-committee was formed whose meetings were funded 
by the Nuffield Foundation in Britain. 
This declaration is based on the approach advocated and 
supported at a plenary meeting of the 43rd Session of the 
ISI in Buenos Aires (A professional code for statisticians: 
some ethical and technical conflicts - Jowell, 1981). The 
Meeting of the 44th Session in Madrid 1983, where it was 
broadly endorsed. Various suggestions from those meetings 
have been taken into consideration. 
We are grateful to the British Social Research Association's 
Ethics Committe for their work on the bibliography and for 
their useful comments on our various drafts. 
We commend the declaration for adoption by the General 
Assembly and for subsequent distribution within the 
profession. 
R. Jowell (Chairman) ) 
H. Mühsam ) Drafting 
R. Padiou (co-opted) ) Group 
E. Rapaport ) 
E. Berumen Torres (co-opted) ) 
W.E. Deming ) Consulting 
A. Donda ) Group 
G. Motsemme (co-opted) ) 
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ISI DECLARATION ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
PREAMBLE 
Statisticians work within a variety of economic, cultural, 
legal and politcal settings, each of which influences the 
emphasis and focus of statistical inquiry. They also work 
within one of several different branches of their 
discipline, each involving its own techniques and procedures 
and its own ethical approach. Many statisticians work in 
fields such as economics, psychology, sociology, medicine, 
whose practitioners have ethical conventions that may 
influence the conduct of statisticians in their fields. Even 
within the same setting and branch of statistics, 
individuals may have different moral precepts which guide 
their work. Thus, no declaration could successfully impose a 
rigid set of rules to which statisticians everywhere should 
be expected to adhere, and this document does not attempt to 
do so. 
The aim of this declaration is to enable the statistician's 
individual ethical judgements and decision to be informed by 
shared values and experience, rather than to be imposed by 
the profession. The declaration therefore seeks to document 
widely held principles of statistical inquiry and to 
identify the factors that obstruct their implementation. It 
is framed in the recognition that, on occasions, the 
operation of one principle will impede the operation of 
another, that statisticians - in common with other 
occupational groups - have competing obligations not all of 
which can be fulfilled simultaneously. Thus, implicit or 
explicit choices between principles will sometimes have to 
be made. The declaration does not attempt to resolve these 
choices or to allocate greater priority to one of its 
principles than to another. Instead it offers a framework 
within which the conscientious statistician should, for the 
most part, be able to work comfortably. Where departures 
from the framework of principles are contemplated, they 
should be the result of deliberation rather than of 
ignorance. 
The declaration's first intention is thus to be informative 
and descriptive rather than authoritarian or prescriptive. 
Second, it is designed to be applicable as far as possible 
to different areas of statistical methodology and 
application. For this reason its provisions are fairly 
broadly drawn. Third, although the principles are framed so 
as to have wider application to decisions than to the issues 
it specifically mentions, the declaration is by no means 
exhaustive. It is designed in the knowledge that it will 
require periodic updating and amendment by a standing 
committee. Fourth, neither the principles nor the 
commentaries are concerned with general written or unwritten 
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rules or norms such as compliance with the law or the need 
for probity. The declaration restricts itself as far as 
possible to matters of specific concern to statistical 
inquiry. 
The text is divided into four sections, each of which 
contains principles or sets of principles followed by short 
commentaries on the conflicts and difficulties inherent in 
their operation. The principles are interrelated and 
therefore need to be considered together; their order of 
presentation should not be taken as an order of precedence. 
At the end of each section, a short annotated bibliography 
is provided* for those who wish to pursue the issues or to 
consult more detailed texts. 
1. OBLIGATIONS TO SOCIETY 
1.1 Widening the Statisticians should use the 
scope of possibilities open to them to extend 
statistics the scope of statistical inquiry, and to 
communicate their findings, for the 
benefit of the widest possible 
community. 
Statisticians develop and use concepts and techniques for 
the collection, analysis or interpretation of data. Although 
they are not always in a position to determine the scope of 
their work or the way in which their data are ultimately 
disseminated and used, they are frequently able to influence 
these matters. (See Clause 4.1). 
Academic statisticians enjoy probably the greatest degree of 
autonomy over the scope of their work and the dissemination 
of their results. Even so, they are generally dependent on 
the decisions of funders on the one hand and journal editors 
on the other for the direction and publication of their 
inquiries. 
Statisticians employed in the public sector and those 
employed in commerce and industry tend to have even less 
autonomy over what they do or how their data are utilized. 
Rules of secrecy may apply; pressure may be exerted to 
withhold or delay the publication of findings (or of certain 
findings); statistical series may be introduced or 
discontinued for reasons that have little to do with 
technical considerations. In these cases the final authority 
for decisions about an inquiry may rest with the employer or 
client. (See Clause 2.3). 
* The bibliography has not yet been compiled. 
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Professional experience in many countries suggests that 
statisticians are most likely to avoid restrictions being 
placed on their work when they are able to stipulate in 
advance the issues over which they should maintain control. 
Government statisticians may, for example, gain agreement to 
announce dates of publication for various statistical 
series, thus creating an obligation to publish the data on 
the due dates regardless of intervening political factors. 
Similary, statisticians in commercial contracts may specify 
that control over at least some of the findings (or details 
of methods) will rest in their hands rather than with their 
clients. The greatest problems seem to occur when such 
issues remain unresolved until the data emerge. 
1.2 Considering Statistical inquiry is predicated on the 
conflicting belief that greater access to well-
interests grounded information will serve rather 
than threaten the interests of society. 
Nonetheless, in planning all phases of 
an inquiry, from design to presentation 
of findings, statisticians should also 
condsider the likely consequences for 
society at large, groups within it, 
respondents or other subjects, and 
possible future research. 
No generic formula or guidelines exist for assessing the 
likely benefit or risk of various types of statistical 
inquiry. Nonetheless, the statistician has to be sensitive 
to the possible consequences of his or her work and should, 
as far as possible, guard against predictably harmful 
effects. (See Clause 4.4). 
The fact that statistical information can be misconstrued or 
misused is not in itself a convincing argument against its 
collection and dissemination. All information, whether 
systematically collected or not, is subject to misuse. And 
no information is devoid of possible harm to one interest or 
another. Individuals may be harmed by their participation in 
statistical inquiries (see Clause 4.4), or group interests 
may be damaged by certain findings. A particular district 
may, for instance, be negatively stereotyped by a 
statistical inquiry which finds that it contains a very high 
incidence of crime. A group interest may also be harmed by 
social or political action based on statistical findings. 
For instance, heavier policing of a district in which crime 
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is found to be high may be introduced at the expense of 
lighter policing in low crime districts. Such a move may be 
of aggregate benefit to society but to the detriment of some 
districts. 
Statisticians are not in a position to prevent action based 
on statistical data. They should, however, attempt to pre-
empt likely misinterpretations and to counteract them when 
they occur. But to guard against the use of their findings 
would be to disparage the very purpose of much statistical 
inqui ry. 
1.3 Pursuing While statisticians operate within the 
objectivity value systems of their societies, they 
should attempt to uphold their 
professional integrity without fear or 
favour. They should also not engage or 
collude in selecting methods designed to 
produce misleading results, or in 
misrepresenting statistical findings by 
commission or omission. 
Science can never be entirely objective, and statistics is 
no exception. 
The selection of topics for attention may reflect a 
systematic bias in favour of certain cultural or personal 
values. In addition, the employment base of the 
statistician, the source of funding and a range of other 
facts may impose certain priorities, obligations and 
prohibitions. Even so, the statistician is never free of a 
responsibility to pursue objectivity and to be open about 
known barriers to its achievement. In particular, 
statisticians are bound by a professional obligation to 
resist approaches to data collection, analysis, 
interpretation and publication that are likely (explicitly 
or implicitly) to misinform or to mislead rather than to 
advance knowledge. 
Annoted Bibliography: To follow. 
2. OBLIGATIONS TO FUNDERS AND EMPLOYERS 
2.1 Clarifying Statisticians should clarify in advance 
obligations the respective obligations of employer 
and roles or funder and statistician; they 
should, for example, refer the employer 
or funder to the relevant parts of a 
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professional code to which they adhere. 
Reports of the findings should (where 
appropriate) specify their role. 
2.2 Assessing Statisticians should consider the 
alternatives available methods and procedures for 
impartially addressing a proposed inquiry and should 
provide the funder or employer with an 
impartial assessment of the respective 
merits and demerits of alternatives. 
2.3 Pre-empting Statisticians should not accept 
outcomes contractual conditions that are 
contingent upon a particular outcome 
from a proposed statistical inquiry. 
2.4 Guarding Statisticians are frequently furnished 
privileged with information by the funder or 
information employer who may legitimately require it 
to be kept confidential. Statistical 
methods and procedures that have been 
utilized to produce published data 
should not, however, be kept 
confidential. 
An essential theme underlying each of the above principles 
is that a common interest exists between funder or employer 
and statistician as long as the aim of statistical inquiry 
is to advance knowledge. (See Clause 1.1). Although such 
knowledge may on occasions be sought for the limited benefit 
of the funder or employer, even that cause is best served if 
the inquiry is conducted in an atmosphere conducive to high 
professional standards. The relationship between funder or 
employer and statistician should therefore be such as to 
enable statistical inquiry to be undertaken as objectively 
as possible (See Clause 1.3) with a view to providing 
information or explanations rather than advocacy. 
The independent statistician or consultant appears to enjoy 
greater latitude than the employee-statistician to insist on 
the application of certain professional principles. In his 
or her case, each relationship with a funder may be subject 
to a specific contract in which roles and obligations may be 
specified in advance (see Deming 1972). In the employee's 
case, by contrast, his or her contract is not 
project-specific and generally comprises an explicit or 
implicit obligation to accept instructions from the 
employer. The employee-statistician in the public sector may 
be restricted further by statutory regulations covering such 
matters as compulsory surveys and official secrecy. (See 
Clause 4.4). 
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In reality, however, the distinction between the independent 
statistician and the employee-statistician is blurred by 
other considerations. The independent statistician's 
discretion to insist on certain conditions is frequently 
curtailed by financial constraints and by the insecurity of 
the consultant's status. These problems apply less to the 
employee-statistician, whose base is generally more secure 
and whose position is less isolated. The employee 
(particularly the government statistician) is often part of 
a community of statisticians who are in a strong position to 
establish conventions and procedures that comfortably 
accommodate their professional goals (See Clause 1.1). 
Relationships with funders or employers involve mutual 
responsibilities. The funder or employer is entitled to 
expect from statisticians a command of their discipline, 
candour in relation to limitations of their expertise and of 
their data (See Clause 3.1), openness about the availability 
of more cost-effective approaches to a proposed inquiry, 
discretion with confidential information. Statisticians are 
entitled to expect from the funder or employer a respect for 
their exclusive professional and technical domain and for 
the integrity of the data. Whether or not these obligations 
can be built into contracts or written specifications, they 
remain preconditions of a mutually beneficial relationship. 
A conflict of obligations may occur when the funder of an 
inquiry wishes to ensure in advance (say in a contract) that 
certain results will be achieved, such as particular finding 
or a minimum response level in a voluntary sample survey. By 
agreeing to such a contract the statistician would be 
pre-empting the results of the inquiry by having made 
implicit guarantees on behalf of potential subjects as to 
their propensity to participate or the direction of their 
response. To fulfil these guarantees, the statistician may 
then have to compromise other principles, such as the 
principle of informed consent. (See Clause 4.2). 
Above all, statisticians should attempt to ensure that 
funders and employers appreciate the obligations that 
statisticians have not only to them, but also to society at 
large, to subjects, to professional colleagues and 
collaborators. One of the responsibilities of the 
statistician's professional citizenship, for instance, is to 
be open about methods in order that the statistical 
community at large can assess, and benefit from, their 
application. Thus, insofar as it is practicable, 
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methodological components of inquiries should be free from 
confidentiality restriction so that they can form part of 
the common intellectual property of the profession. (See 
Clause 3.2). 
Annotated Bibliography: To follow. 
3. OBLIGATIONS TO COLLEAGUES 
3.1 Maintaining Statisticians depend upon the confidence 
confidence in of the public. They should in their 
statistics work attempt to promote and preserve 
such confidence without exaggerating the 
accuracy or explanatory power of their 
data. 
3.2 Exposing and Within the limits of confidentiality 
reviewing requirements, statisticians should 
methods and provide adequate information to 
findings colleagues to permit their methods, 
procedures, techniques and findings to 
be assessed. Such assessments should be 
directed at the methods themselves 
rather than at the individuals who 
selected or used them. 
3.3 Communicating To conduct certain inquiries 
ethical statisticians need to collaborate with 
principles colleagues in other disciplines, as well 
as with interviewers, clerical staff, 
students, etc. In these cases 
statisticians should make their own 
ethical principles clear and take 
account of the ethical principles of 
their collaborators. 
Each of these principles stems from the notion that 
statisticians derive their status and certain privileges of 
access to data not only by virtue of their personal standing 
but also by virtue of their professional citizenship. In 
acknowledging membership of a wider statistical community, 
statisticians owe various obligations to that community and 
can expect consideration from it. 
The reputation of statistics will inevitably depend less on 
what professional bodies of statisticians assert about their 
ethical norms than on the actual conduct of individual 
statisticians. In considering the methods, procedures, 
content and reporting of their inquiries, statisticians 
should therefore try to ensure that they leave a research 
field in a state which permits further access by 
statisticians in the future. (See Clause 4.1). 
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Statistical inquiries are frequently collaborative efforts 
among colleagues of different levels of seniority and from 
different disciplines. The reputations and careers of all 
contributors need to be taken into account. The statistician 
should also attempt to ensure that statistical inquiries are 
conducted within an agreed ethical framework, perhaps 
incorporating principles or conventions from other 
disciplines, and that each contributor's role is 
sufficiently defined. The World Medical Association's 
Declaration of Helsinki (1975), for instance, gives 
excellent guidance to statisticians working in the field of 
medicine. 
A principle of all scientific work is that it should be open 
to scrutiny, assessment and possible validation by fellow 
scientists. Particular attention should be given to this 
principle when using computer software packages for analysis 
by providing as much detail as possible. Any perceived 
advantage of withholding details of techniques or findings, 
say for competitive reasons, needs to be weighed against the 
potential disservice of such an action to the advancement of 
statistical knowledge. 
One of the most important but difficult responsibilities of 
the statistician is that of altering potential users of 
their data to the limits of their reliability and 
applicability. The twin dangers of either overstating or 
understating the validity or generalizability of data are 
nearly always present. No general guidelines can be drawn 
except for a counsel of caution. Confidence in statistical 
findings depends critically on their faithful 
representation. Attempts by statisticians to cover up errors 
(see Ryten, 1981), or to invite overinterprétât ion, may not 
only rebound on the statisticians concerned but also on the 
reputation of statistics in general. (See Clause 1.2). 
Anno t ated Bib1iography: To_fo11ow. 
4. OBLIGATION TO SUBJECTS* 
4.1 Avoiding undue Statisticians should be aware of the 
intrusion intrusive potential of some of their 
work. They have no special entitlement 
to study all phenomena. The advancement 
* This section of the declaration refers to human subjects, 
including individuals, households and corporate entities. 
For a set of guidelines on animal experimentation, for 
instance, see the Swiss Academy of Science (1983). 
225 
of knowledge and the pursuit of 
information are not themselves 
sufficient justifications for overriding 
other social and cultural values. 
Some forms of statistical inquiry appear to be more 
intrusive than others. For instance, statistical samples may 
be selected without the knowledge or consent of their 
members; contact may be sought with subjects without advance 
warning; questions may be asked which cause distress or 
offence; people may be observed without their knowledge; 
information may be obtained from third parties. In essence, 
people may be inconvenienced or aggrieved by statistical 
inquiries in a variety of ways, many of which are difficult 
to avoid. (See also Clause 1.3). 
One way of 
to make more 
new inquiry. 
of administ 
informat ion 
avoiding inconvenience to potential subjects is 
use of available data instead of embarking on a 
For instance, by making greater statistical use 
rative records, or by linking records, 
about society may be produced that would 
otherwise have to be collected afresh. Individual subjects 
should not 
ident i t ies 
stat istical, 
be affected by such uses provided that their 
are protected and that the purpose is 
not administrative. On the other hand, subjects 
who have provided data for one purpose may object to its 
subsequent use for another purpose without their knowledge. 
(See Clause 4.3 iii). This is particularly sensitive in the 
case of identified data. Decisions in such cases have to be 
based on a 
knowledge th 
4.4) . 
As Cassell 
being harmed 
treated as 
variety of competing interests and in the 
at there is no "correct" solution. (See Clause 
(1982) argues, people can feel wronged without 
by research: they may feel they have been 
objects of measurement without respect for their 
individual values and sense of privacy. In many of the 
stat istical 
issue has h 
private and 
by collectin 
whether or 
subjects to 
of selection 
that they di 
to criticism 
inquiries that have caused controversy, the 
ad more to do with intrusion into subjects' 
personal domains, or by overburdening subjects 
g "too much" information, rather than with 
not subjects have been harmed. By exposing 
a sense of being wronged, perhaps by the method 
or by causing them to acquire self-knowledge 
d not seek or want, statisticians are vulnerable 
. Resistance to statistical inquiries in general 
may also increase. (See also Clauses 3.1, 4.3c), 4.5 and 
4.6) . 
226 
4.2 Obtaining Statistical inquiries involving human 
informed subjects should be based as far as 
consent practicable on the freely given informed 
consent of subjects. Even if 
participation is required by law, it 
should still be as informed as possible. 
In voluntary inquiries, subjects should 
not be under the impression that they 
are required to participate. They should 
be aware of their entitlement to refuse 
at any stage for whatever reason and to 
withdraw data just supplied. Information 
that would be likely to affect a 
subjects's willingness to participate 
should not be deliberately withheld, 
since this would remove from subjects an 
important means of protecting their own 
interests. 
The principle of informed consent from subjects is 
necessarily vague, since it depends for its interpretation 
on unstated assumptions about the amount of information and 
the nature of consent required to constitute acceptable 
practice. The amount of information needed to ensure that a 
subject is adequately informed about the purpose and nature 
of an inquiry is bound to vary from study to study. No 
universal rules can be framed. At one extreme it is 
inappropriate to overwhelm potential subjects with unwanted 
and incomprehensible details about the origins and content 
of a statistical inquiry. At the other extreme it is 
inappropriate to withhold material facts or to mislead 
subjects about such matters. (See Clauses 4.3d) and 4.4). 
The appropriate information requirement clearly falls 
somewhere between these positions but its precise location 
depends on circumstances. The clarity and comprehensibi 1 i ty 
of the information provided are as important as the 
quant ity. 
An assessment needs to be made of which items of information 
are likely to be material to a subject's willingness to 
participate. The following items are among those that need 
to be considered. 
i) Purpose of study, policy implications, etc. 
ii) Identity of funder(s) 
iii) Anticipated uses of the data, form of publication 
etc. 
iv) Identity of interviewer/experimenter and 
organizational base 
v) Method by which subject has been chosen (sampling 
frame, etc. ) 
vi) Subject's role in study 
vii) Possible harm or discomfort to subject 
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viii ) 
ix) 
χ) 
xi) 
xii ) 
Degree of anonymity and confidentiality 
Proposed data storage arrangements, degree of 
security, etc. 
Procedures of study (time involved, setting, etc.) 
Whether participation is voluntary or compulsory: 
a) if compulsory, potential consequences of 
non­compliance 
b) if voluntary, entitlement to withdraw consent (and 
when that entitlement lapses) 
Whether material facts have been withheld (and when 
or if such facts will be disclosed). 
In selecting from this list, the statistician should 
consider not only those items that he or she regards as 
material, but those which the potential subject is likely to 
regard as such. Each party may well have special (and 
different) interests. As a means of supplementing the 
information selected, the statistician may choose to give 
potential subjects a declaration of their entitlements (see 
Jowell, 1981) which informs them of their right to 
information but leaves the selection of extra details in the 
subject's control. 
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On occasions, a "gatekeeper" blocks access to subjects so 
that statisticians cannot approach them directly without the 
gatekeeper's permission. In these cases, statisticians 
should not devolve their responsibility to protect the 
subject's interests onto the gatekeeper. They should also be 
wary of inadvertently disturbing the relationship between 
subject and gatekeeper. While respecting the gatekeeper's 
legitimate interests they should adhere to the principle of 
obtaining informed consent directly from subjects once they 
have gained access to them. 
The principle of informed consent is, in essence, an 
expression of belief in the need for truthful and respectful 
exchanges between statisticians and human subjects. It is 
clearly not a precondition of all statistical inquiry. 
Equally it remains an important and highly valued 
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professional norm. The acceptability of statistics depends 
increasingly not only on technical considerations but also 
on the willingness of statisticians to accord respect to 
their subjects and to treat them with consideration. (See 
Clause 4.1). 
4.3 Modifications Where technical or practical 
to informed considerations inhibit the achievement 
consent of prior informed consent from subjects, 
the spirit of this principle should 
still be adhered to, for example: 
a) Respecting In observation studies, where behaviour 
rights in patterns are recorded without the 
observation subject's knowledge, statisticians 
studies should take care not to infringe what 
■ay be referred to as the "private 
space" of an individual or group. This 
will vary from culture to culture. Where 
practicable, statisticians should 
attempt to obtain consent post hoc. In 
any event, they should interpret 
behaviour patterns that appear 
deliberately to make observation 
difficult as a tacit refusal of 
permission to be observed. 
b) Dealing In cases where a proxy is utilized to 
with answer questions on behalf of a subject, 
proxies say because access to the subject is 
uneconomic or because the subject is too 
ill or too young to participate 
directly, care should be taken not to 
infringe the "private space" of the 
subject or to disturb the relationship 
between subject and proxy. Where 
indications exist or emerge that the 
subject would object to certain 
information being disclosed, such 
information should not be sought by 
proxy. 
c) Secondary In cases where subjects are not 
use of approached for consent because a 
records statistician has been granted access, 
say, to administrative or medical 
records or other research material for a 
new or supplementary inquiry, the 
custodian's permission to use the 
records should not relieve the 
statistician from having to consider the 
likely reactions, sensitivities and 
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interests of the subjects concerned, 
including their entitlement to 
anonymity. Where appropriate, subjects 
ought to be approached afresh for 
consent to the new inquiry. 
d) Misleading In studies where the measurement 
potential objectives preclude the prior disclosure 
subjects material information to subjects, 
statisticians should weigh the likely 
consequences of any proposed deception. 
To withhold material information from, 
or to misinform, subjects involves a 
deceit, whether by omission or 
commission, temporarily or permanently. 
Such manipulation will face legitimate 
censure and should not be contemplated 
unless it can be justified. Instead, 
consideration should be given to 
informing subjects in advance that 
material information is being withheld, 
and when or if such information will be 
disclosed. 
A serious problem arises for statisticians when 
methodological requirements conflict with the requirement of 
informed consent. Many cases exist in which the provision of 
background information to subjects (say, about the purpose 
or sponsorship of a study), or even the process of alerting 
them to the fact that they are subjects (as in observation 
studies), would be likely to produce a change or reaction 
that would defeat or interfere with the objective of the 
measurement. These difficulties may lead statisticians to 
waive informed consent and to adopt either covert 
measurement techniques or deliberate deception in the 
interests of accuracy. 
The principles above urge extreme caution in these cases and 
advise statisticians to respect the imputed wishes of 
subjects. Thus, in observation studies or in studies 
involving proxies, the principle to be followed is that mere 
indications of reluctance on the part of an uninformed or 
unconsenting subject should be taken as a refusal to 
participate. Any other course of action would be likely to 
demonstrate a lack of respect for the subject's interests 
and to undermine the relationship between, say, proxy and 
subject on the one hand, and between statistician and 
subject on the other. 
Statistical inquiries involving deliberate deception of 
subjects (by omission of commission) are rare and extremely 
difficult to defend. Clear methodological advantages exist 
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for deception in some psychological studies, for instance, 
where revealing the purpose would tend to bias the 
responses. But, as Diener and Crandall (1978) have argued, 
"science itself is built upon the value of truth"; thus 
deception by scientists will tend to destroy their 
credibility and standing. (See Clause 3.1). If deception 
were widely practised in statistical inquiries, subjects 
would in effect, be taught not to "trust those who by social 
contract are deemed trustworthy and whom they need to trust" 
(Baumrind, 1972). 
Nonetheless, it would be as unrealistic to outlaw deception 
in statistical inquiry as it would be to outlaw it in social 
interaction. Minor deception is employed in many forms of 
human contact (tact, flattery, etc.) and statisticians are 
no less likely than the rest of the population to be guilty 
of such practices. It remains the duty of statisticians and 
their collaborators, however, not to pursue methods of 
inquiry that are likely to infringe human values and 
sensibilities. To do so, whatever the methodological 
advantages, would be to endanger the reputation of 
statistics and the mutual trust between statisticians and 
society which is a prerequisite for much statistical work. 
(See Clause 3.1). 
In cases where informed consent cannot be acquired in 
advance, there is usually a strong case, for the reasons 
above, for seeking it post hoc. Once the methodological 
advantage - of covert observation, of deception, or of 
withholding information - has been achieved, it is rarely 
defensible to allow the omission to stand. 
4.4 Protecting the Neither consent from subjects nor the 
interests of legal requirement to participate 
subjects absolves the statistician from an 
obligation to protect the subject as far 
as possible against potentially harmful 
effects of participating. The 
statistician should try to minimize 
disturbance both to subjects themselves 
and to the subjects' relationships with 
their environment. Statisticians should 
help subjects to protect their own 
interests by giving them prior 
information about the consequences of 
participating. (See Clause 4.2). 
Harm to subjects may arise from undue stress through 
participation, loss of self-esteem, psychological injury or 
other side effects. Various factors may be important in 
assessing the risk-benefit ratio of a particular inquiry, 
such as the probability of risk, the number of people at 
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risk, the severity of the potential harm, the anticipated 
utility of the findings, few of which are usually 
quantifiable. (See Levine, 1975). 
The interests of subjects may also be harmed by virtue of 
their membership of a group or section of society (see 
Clause 1.2). So statisticians can rarely claim that a 
prospective inquiry is devoid of possible harm to subjects. 
They may be able to claim that, as individuals, subjects 
will be protected by the device of anonymity. But, as 
members of a group or indeed as members of society itself, 
no subject can be exempted from the possible effects of 
decisions based on statistical findings. 
When the probability or potential severity of harm is great, 
statisticians face a more serious 
may, for instance, be involved in 
which risks of some magnitude to 
dilemma. A s t at is tician 
a medical experiment in 
subjects are present. If 
volunteers can be found who have been told of the risks, and 
if the statistician is convinced of the importance of the 
experiment, should he or she 
experiment in view of the risks? 
probably the best advice is to seek 
and others, especially from those 
parties to the study or experiment. 
nonetheless oppose the 
In these circumstances, 
advice - from colleagues 
who are not themselves 
4.5 Maintaining Statistical data are unconcerned with 
confidential- individual identities. They are 
ity of records collected to answer questions such as 
"how many?" or "what proportion?", not 
"who?". The identities and records of 
cooperating (or noncooperating) subjects 
should therefore be kept confidential, 
whether or not confidentiality has 
been explicitly pledged. 
4.6 Preventing 
disclosure of 
identities 
Statisticians should take appropriate 
measures to prevent their data from 
being published or otherwise released in 
a form that would allow any subject's 
identity to be disclosed or inferred. 
There can be no absolute safeguards against breaches of 
confidentiality, that is the disclosure of identified or 
identifiable data in contravention of an implicit or 
explicit obligation to the source. Many methods exist for 
lessening the likelihood of such breaches, the most common 
and potentially secure of which is anonymity. Its virtue as 
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a security system is that it helps to prevent unwitting 
breaches of confidentiality. As long as data travel 
incognito, they are more difficult to attach to individuals 
or organizations. 
There is a powerful case for identifiable statistical data 
to be granted "privileged" status in law so that access to 
them by third parties is legally blocked in the absence of 
the permission of the responsible statistician (or his or 
her subjects). Even without such legal protection, however, 
it is the statistician's responsibility to ensure that the 
identities of subjects are protected. 
Anonymity alone is by no means a guarantee of 
confidentiality. A particular configuration of attributes 
can, like a fingerprint, frequently identify its owner 
beyond reasonable doubt. So statisticians need to remove the 
opportunities for others to infer identities from their 
data. They may decide to group data in such a way as to 
disguise identities (see Boruch & Cecil, 1979) or to employ 
a variety of available measures that seek to impede the 
detection of identities without inflicting very serious 
damage to the aggregate dataset (see Flaherty, 1979). Some 
damage to analysis possibilities is unavoidable in these 
circumstances, but it needs to be weighed against the 
potential damage to the sources of data in the absence of 
such action. (See Finney, 1984). 
The widespread use of computers is often regarded as a 
threat to individuals and organizations because it provides 
new methods of disclosing and linking identified records. On 
the other hand, the statistician should attempt to exploit 
the impressive capacity of computers to disguise identities 
and to enhance data security. 
Annotated Bibliography: To follow. 
DISCUSSION 
Mr. PEARE (EUROSTAT) opened the discussion: 
He said that it had become very obvious during earlier 
discussion that the ethical aspects of the subject of the 
seminar was a major preoccupation of participants. He 
commented on the paper from two different viewpoints, 
firstly, as a member of that branch of the statistical 
profession known as official statisticians. It had been 
suggested that a sense of professional ethics had led 
official statisticians to dissent from changes made in the 
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role of official statistics in the UK. The existence of a 
code such as this could strengthen the hand of official 
statisticians in resisting what they regard as unwarranted 
(but legal) interference in their professional activities. 
Most of its proposals would probably be acceptable to the 
majority of official statisticians. In particular he 
welcomed the first sentence of section 1.2 "Statistical 
inquiry is predicated on the belief that greater access to 
well-grounded information will serve rather than threaten 
the interests of society". Together with the first sentence 
of section 4.5 "Statistical data are unconcerned with 
individual identities" he believed that this constituted the 
core of a declaration of statistical ethics which should 
reassure worried respondents, at least as to the motives of 
statist icians. 
Reassurance must, of course, go beyond motives and deal with 
the practical steps to be taken to ensure that these 
intentions are realized. The first three chapters seemed to 
represent admirable steps, of general applicability towards 
achieving this aim. Similarly section 4.1 which exhorted 
statisticians to be aware of the intrusive potential of some 
of their work seemed essential. However, sections 4.2 and 
4.3 caused some difficulties. Professor Jowell commented on 
the necessarily vague nature of the principle of informed 
consent. At a minimum, he felt that the qualification in 
section 4.3a which suggested that the "private space" of 
individuals would vary from culture to culture should be 
applicable throughout these two sections or to be more 
radical and that these two sections would be better placed 
as examples of how to achieve the exhortation of section 
4.4. To answer the question posed by Professor Jowell in the 
titel of his paper from the viewpoint of an official 
statistician he thought the answer should be yes and further 
that the proposed code was very close to a suitable code for 
such statisticians. 
His second viewpoint was that of a member of the statistical 
profession in the larger sense. Professor Jowell rejected 
analogies with codes of ethics for other professions such as 
medicine and law. However, he and his colleagues had 
implicitly accepted an invalid analogy between statistics 
and these other professions. Virtually all medical and legal 
practice was in the hands of members of those two 
professions but this was far from being the case for 
statistics. Even within government service, essentially 
statistical operations were being carried out by persons who 
would not regard themselves as statisticians and outside 
government service this phenomenon was widespread. This was 
not something to be discouraged but much of the adverse 
publicity which from time to time attached itself to 
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statistics arose from statistically unprofessional behaviour 
by persons who would not regard themselves as statisticians. 
Professor Jowell suggested that "the profession should take 
responsibility for its members' conduct". It would be 
difficult to dissent from this proposition but it did seem 
valid to ask whether the profession should also take 
responsibility for the conduct of non-members. The 
declaration on professional ethics had a feel of being 
drafted by statisticians for statisticians (Professor 
Jowell's earlier paper given at the ISI conference in Buenos 
Aires in fact had the title "A professional code for 
statisticians; some ethical and technical conflicts") and he 
wondered if it would receive wider attention were more 
emphasis placed upon it as a code for "statistical practice" 
rather than as a code for statisticians? 
Mr. BEGUE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
économiques) said: 
He wondered whom this code was destined for. Would it be 
issued to the general public which would immediately forget 
it? Would it be quoted if some major issue arose? This was 
akin to what statistical institutes did already. 
Prof. LOSANO (Università di Milano) said: 
There was no questioning the usefulness of a professional 
code of conduct of the kind proposed by Mr. Jowell. This 
would provide the statistician with a basic handbook in the 
event of doubts in the execution of his duties. A code of 
conduct entailed, however, two unavoidable risks which must 
be borne in mind when it was drawn up. On the one hand, how 
effective a professional code of conduct proved depended 
above all on the extent to which its clauses involved 
sanctions, not legal sanctions in this case, but "social" or 
"group" sanctions. The code could otherwise end up as what 
the author himself called an idealistic code. On the other 
hand, setting up a system of even minimal sanctions entailed 
bureaucratizing the profession; it woud lead to the creation 
of an order (of lawyers, notaries, journalists, business 
consultants, etc.) in which a disciplinary council would 
apply social sanctions to anyone infringing the professional 
code of conduct. In the climate of high unemployment, this 
trend could lead to the creation of closed corporations 
whose code of conduct would be stringently adhered to but 
access to which would be heavily bureaucratized. This 
observation related specifically to item 4.3a, which 
mentioned surveys conducted on the basis of observations of 
subjects without their knowledge. When this part of the code 
of conduct was being drawn up, due account should be taken 
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of the fact that certain national legislation prohibited 
this type of direct survey, at least for certain categories 
of subjects. For instance, Article 4 of the Italian Law 
known as the "Statuto dei Lavoratori" which covers workers' 
rights, etc. (and to which he referred in Section 2 of his 
report) explicitly prohibited all forms of monitoring of 
workers except in specific cases to which the trade unions 
had agreed. Any attempt at post hoc consent of the type 
presented in the proposed code of conduct would, in Italy 
spark off a serious trade union dispute. 
Mr. KEIDING (University of Copenhagen): 
He referred to the situation in regard to the Helsinki 
declaration on medical experimentation on humans. In 
continuation of Prof. Losano's remarks about the need for 
sanctions, the Helsinki declaration did play a role in 
medical research and was being enforced, mainly through 
review by ethical committees. He considered that there was a 
parallel between medical research and statistical privacy. 
Thus the British had few problems while in Denmark and other 
Scandinavian countries a very determined effort by the 
medical profession succeeded in preventing a major conflict 
arising on medical research. However, in the German Federal 
Republic a grave conflict between the legal profession and 
the medical researchers all but stopped randomized clinic 
trials in the early 1980's. He wondered whether the data 
protection personnel should also have some involvement with 
the proposed code of conduct. 
Mr. QUATRESOOZ (ESOMAR): 
He explained that he was representing ESOMAR, the European 
Society for Opinion and Marketing Research which had over 
2000 members. This society had published codes of ethics and 
of fair practice governing opinion surveys. These were, of 
course, binding on the members only but they had persuaded 
the managing director of major market research organizations 
to undersign the codes. Only these companies which had 
signed were mentioned in the ESOMAR handbook. A commission 
met annually and sometimes expelled members who did not 
observe the codes. Membership of ESOMAR was important to 
clients when commissioning surveys. The code was also taken 
into account in the courts when conflicts arose. 
236 
Mr. JOHNSTON (United Nations Statistical Office): 
He said that the international statistical community was 
greatly indebted to Prof. Jowell for having undertaken this 
very difficult and complex task, to which the paper made a 
great contribution. He wished to restrict his comments to 
the perspective of the present seminar, namely privacy of 
data processing in statistics, with special reference to the 
issues concerning population censuses. Prof. Jowell had 
certainly recognized the difficulty of designing one code to 
fit a tremendous variety of circumstances and situations, 
but it was nonetheless important to ask how well the draft 
code would do the job. He raised the following questions: 
Section 4.1 on "avoiding undue intrusion" made no mention of 
the inevitable intrusion which occurred if data response was 
obligatory, as in a census, nor did it offer any rationale 
in defense of such intrusion. In section 4.5 it was stated 
that "statistical data are unconcerned with individual 
identities," yet identification data were almost always 
collected in statistical injuries. Did this not seem 
contradictory to the public? Surely, data protection 
officials or a concerned public were not going to be 
convinced of the soundness of statistical ethics by such 
general and apparently contradictory positions as these. 
Likewise in section 4.6 the statisticians might be called on 
to state more clearly the extent and nature of 
confidentiality, even to provide examples of how it was 
ensured. The public could well wonder what a blanket 
statement of confidentiality really meant. 
He asked whether other complementary and perhaps more 
practical steps could be taken to define statistical ethics, 
within the larger context of defining and identifying 
statistics as a profession more explicitly. For example, 
statistical education could give explicit attention to 
ethical issues. Likewise, at a technical level, there would 
be much more explicit attention, from both professional and 
official perspectives, to ways and means of ensuring 
confidentiality as a practical matter, in the face of new 
computer technologies. 
The author replied to the discussion: 
He remarked that the code of ethics was intended to cover 
statistical practices and was not confined only to 
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professional statisticians or ISI members. He agreed that 
one of the purposes of the declaration was to convince the 
public. However, the main purpose was to influence 
statisticians. In many cases the educational programme of 
statisticians ignored questions of research ethics. He did 
not agree with Prof. Losano that the code was ineffective 
because sanctions were impossible. The ISI certainly could 
not apply sanctions but it hoped to pursuade national 
statistical institutes to adopt and promote the code. He was 
grateful for the suggestion that data protection agencies 
should be consulted about the code: this had not yet been 
done. So far only statistical groups had been consulted and 
the response had been overwhelmingly favourable. He was 
familiar with the ESOMAR code, which he considered excellent 
but which was mainly for commercial market research purposes 
and was too narrow to apply to statistical work in general. 
With regard to compulsory surveys, such as the census, the 
code laid down that the obligation to inform the respondent 
was in no way diminished. He recognized that the code was 
extremely limited on particular ways of ensuring 
confidentiality and the various drafts of the code had 
become successively shorter on this point. Practices 
favoured by one country were rejected by another. However, 
annexed to this code would be an extensive bibliography 
enabling people interested in this aspect to study the 
subject in depth and to see how ethical dilemmas had been 
dealt with. 
Mr. THYGESEN (Danmarks Statistik) subsequently furnished the 
fol lowing comments in writing: 
If we are not to have a common code of conduct it is 
essential that his code should be beneficial to the case of 
statistics: It would help to reassure the general public 
that the production of statistics is not a dangerous and 
harmful activity. The difference between statistics and 
administrative control should be spelled out very clearly. 
The present draft puts too much emphasis on the dangers of 
statistics and the many precautions that have to be taken by 
statisticians. This could very well have the opposite 
result. 
The code should only contain considerations and 
recommendations that statisticians can agree upon across the 
borders. The organization of society and of statistics 
differs greatly from country to country. Therefore, the code 
should concentrate on a few problems that are common to most 
types of statistical activity. 
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DATA PROTECTION AND THE STATISTICAL COMMUNITY 
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SUMMARY 
The statistical community tends to react negatively to the 
suggestion that it should be subject to data protection. 
Statisticians argue that the confidentiality of the data 
with which they work is adequately protected by existing 
laws and practices. Public reaction to census controversies 
suggest, however, that there is much scepticism about the 
ability of governments and their statistical agencies to 
protect personal information properly. The data protection 
movement is a response to this concern. Thus, it is argued, 
the statistical community should, in its own best interests, 
recognize the political ramifications of their data 
collection activities and adopt a more constructive attitude 
in their relations with data protection agencies. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The precise focus of this essay is the application of data 
protection principles and practices to the statistical 
community. But in order for my particular perspective and, 
indeed, biases to become clear to you, it is necessary to 
begin with a personal retrospective on my career as a 
privacy advocate. 
From 1974 to 1978 I was the co-principal investigator of an 
international research project on the problem of balancing 
the need to protect personal privacy and the need for access 
to government microdata for research and statistical 
purposes. Although I had some prior experience with the 
study of privacy issues, I had never before worked with 
national statistical agencies or on privacy and data 
protection issues outside North America. The research goal 
was to look at the implications for personal privacy of the 
collection and storage of personal information by government 
statistical agencies and the subsequent desire of the 
research community to use some of the same personal 
information, sometimes in identifiable form, for research 
and statistical purposes. 
The results of my research were published in 1979 as a 
series of case studies of five countries in a volume 
entitled "Privacy and Government Data Banks: An 
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International Perspective (1)". In retrospect, I regard this 
volume as too much of an apology for the point of view of 
national statistical agencies. I identified strongly, as I 
still do, with the societal importance of the work of 
government statisticians and researchers and in effect wrote 
a brief for the desirability of what they were doing. If 
anything, I regarded the activities of data protectors, in 
such countries as Sweden, as overly intrusive in the 
statistical field and, perhaps, even somewhat unnecessary. 
If I was then too much under the sway of statisticians and 
researchers, similar allegations can now be made about my 
current identification with data protectors at the national 
and state level. 
The research project described above enabled me to observe 
the development of data protection legislation in Sweden, 
West Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United 
States, especially from the point of view of statistical 
activity. In 1979-80 I decided to begin another comparative 
project on the implementation of such "privacy" laws during 
the process of moving from principles of data protection to 
actual practices. Since 1981 I have been studying the small 
bureaucracies created to oversee the implementation of data 
protection laws in Sweden, West Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. At this point in my 
research, I am a strong admirer of the data protection 
initiative, but somewhat sceptical about its long term 
impact on government personal information practices, because 
of the strong countervailing powers seeking to promote 
efficiency and cost reductions in the public sector (2). 
Since 1981 I have focused primarily on problems of data 
protection in administrative data bases, such as those 
maintained by the police. I have not had significant contact 
with statistical agencies, except with Statistics Sweden, 
where the monitoring of the relationship between this 
organization and the Data Inspection Board (DIB) is a good 
bellweather for how data protection is working in practice. 
But, because of my 1979 book, I have continued to be 
interested in the relationship between data protection and 
statistics, including the census controversies in West 
Germany and Sweden in 1983. 
In this essay I propose to comment on statistical activities 
from another perspective than the one I adopted in my 1979 
book. I now take a more clearly pro-privacy stance in my 
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research, in part because privacy advocates are a tiny 
minority in every country, and privacy interests need to be 
articulated on a continuing basis. I think I now have a 
clearer perspective on how statistics should or could fit 
into data protection activities and vice versa. Since I am 
not a government official but an academic, you will also 
notice my willingness to offer perspective comments about 
how other people should run their agencies. 
I propose to touch on the following issues in a somewhat 
comparative, but not comprehensive, perspective: 1) some 
observations on recent interactions between statisticians 
and data protectors in several countries: 2) why there 
continue to be negative reactions from the general public to 
statistical activities; and 3) how statistical agencies 
should fit into the overall scheme of data protection. In 
general it is my view that certain national statistical 
agencies have not been very sophisticated or sufficiently 
responsive to important national initiatives in data 
protection: my intention is to take a middle ground between 
statisticians and data protectors and to cast a few barbs in 
both directions. You may all then join together in making 
similar comments on the limits of the academic mentality. 
1. WEST GERMANY 
My earlier Privacy Project dealt directly with the 
regulation of the Federal Statistical Office (SB) and the 
Hesse Statistical Office by the emerging data protection 
institutions, but I have not had any direct contact with 
West Gemran Statisticians since 1978. A new federal law on 
statistics has been enacted and is in force (3). Section 11, 
paragraph 5 of this new law stipulates under what 
circumstnaces and in what form statistical offices may 
disseminate personal data. The Conference of Federal and 
State Data Protection Commissioners set up a working group 
to develop the application of data protection principles in 
the context of the statistics laws, especially as they 
relate to the transfer of personal information among the 
various statistical offices (4). In his 1980 annual report 
Professor Hans Peter Bull, who served as the Federal Data 
Protection Commissioner from 1978 to 1983, concluded that 
the Federal Statistical Office in Wiesbaden had made 
significant steps forward in implementing data protection 
(5). 
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Yet, as you all know, an enormous public controversy broke 
out in West Germany early in 1983 over the census of 
population scheduled for late April. This episode 
illustrates two themes: 1) the continuation of public 
anxieties about personal privacy; and 2) the failure of the 
Federal Statistical Office to take adequate account of 
public sensibilities and the implications of data protection 
in carrying out its preparations for the census, which in 
West Germany primarily means crafting a new special law for 
this particular data collection activity. 
The Federal Constitutional Court in effect postponed the 
West German census on April 13, 1983 on ground of potential 
invasion of privacy, despite the passage of the special 1983 
census law of March 25, 1982 by a unanimous legislature and 
the general support of major data protection officials for 
the census (6). The government had committed itself to going 
ahead with the census on March 29, 1983, and the Office of 
the Federal Data Protection Commissioner engaged in public 
relations in defence of the plans for the census. The suit 
arose when several citizens challenged the constitutionality 
of the census law on the grounds that it constituted an 
invasion of privacy under Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law 
(or constitution) of 1949, especially the paragraph in the 
statute dealing with the use of data to be collected. The 
Federal Constitutional Court received written comments and 
oral statements from the representatives of statisticians 
and from leading data protectors themselves. The initial 
case for statistics was not very well prepared by the 
federal Ministry of the Interior, it is suggested, and 
statisticians fell back on their usual arguments for 
carrying out their traditional activities. Certain of the 
data protection commissioners used the first hearing as an 
opportunity to explain to the highest West German court 
their continued concerns about certain aspects of the census 
law, especially the continuation of the practice of using 
census returns to correct local population registers (7). 
Continued public anxieties about even such a relatively 
innocuous and desirable activity as the taking of a census 
are a reminder of how much people continue to worry about 
the erosion of their personal privacy in an era of 
information technology. (I am well aware that the points 
will be most familiar to you, yet they need to be 
re-emphasized since they create the political culture in 
which statistical agencies have to operate, whether they 
like it or not.) Prof. Spiros Simitis, the Hesse Data 
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Protection Commissioner, has described the census 
controversy as the first mass movement for data protection 
in West German history. There were literally hundreds of 
phone calls to his office demanding limits on government 
information collection. Significant segments of the 
population rose up against the proposed census, because of 
its general fears about the use of computers in data 
process ing. 
Even though the case for society's need for a population 
census can be made successfully, even though the tradition 
of confidentiality at statistical agencies can be 
demonstrated, and even though some of the West German 
resistance to the census was motivated by political 
considerations and irrationality, the census provides a 
recurrent opportunity in every country for people to oppose 
the collection of personal information by all government 
agencies. The census is one of the very few universal data 
collection activities and is often carried out on a 
compulsory basis. It is well known that the censuses between 
1969 and 1971 in North America and Western Europe helped to 
spark the data protection movement in the first place. In 
late March 1983 a public opinion poll in West Germany 
indicated that 52* of the population mistrusted the census 
questions and that 25* of the 25 million German households 
would not complete the form (8). It was not enough for a new 
Minister of the Interior, Herr Zimmerman, to argue that 
people should trust the government, since Western 
populations are clearly not in a frame of mind to do so. The 
Federal Statistical Office was equally unprepared for the 
extent of public resistance, despite the number of warnings 
it had received, from data protectors in particular, about 
potential problems. 
It is ironic that the census controversy, which exposed the 
adequacies of data protection itself to public and judicial 
scrutiny, had the result of formally creating a new basis 
for data protection as a constitutional right. On December 
15, 1983 the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe ruled 
unanimously in the census case that West Germans have a 
constitutional right to self-determination about their own 
personal information (9). Although this right is not 
aboslute in the face of competing societal values, 
information use, the court ruled, has to occur on the basis 
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of established laws and in response to the overwhelming 
public interests of the community. The court's positive 
ruling on the census, despite the unconstitutionality of 
some of the provisions in the 1982 census law, is only a 
minor part of this momentous decision of Judge Bends and his 
eight colleagues. 
West German data protectors are not intensely preoccupied 
with interpretation of the implications of this decision for 
their work. The Federal Constitutional Court has in effect 
given constitutional status to data protection agencies. 
Their activities have been given strong reinforcement in the 
public sector by the court's decision, which has also routed 
the (few) critics and opponents of data protection 
activities. In April 1984 the Federal Justice Minister 
announced that he saw a need for a comprehensive overhaul of 
both the federal Data Protection Law and the 1982 census 
law. It is expected that, at the very least, the 
statisticians will now have to separate the collection of 
data for statistical purposes from the collection of 
information used for administrative purposes, a lesson that 
it seems rather late in the day to have to learn, especially 
given prior experience in other leading Western countries. 
West German statisticians at both the state and federal 
level now have all the more reason to pay very careful 
attention to the formal and informal advice of data 
protection officials, even though they have already 
functioned for years on the basis of special sectoral data 
protection laws. Although a citizen may have an absolute 
obligation to furnish data for the census, this can only 
occur for specific purposes specified by law and with 
adequate measures to protect against the unlimited 
collection, storage, use and transfer of personal data. In 
other words, West German statisticians have learned the hard 
way, and at substantial cost, that data protection is for 
real and that it responds to meaningful individual concerns. 
A final irony of the 1983 census controversy is that it 
occurred during the same period when Minister of the 
Interior Zimmerman was deciding not to renew the five-year 
term of Professor Bull as Federal Data Protection 
Commissioner, despite his alliance with the Minister in 
public defence of the census plans and census law. Bull's 
successor, Dr. Reinhold Baumann, a career civil servant, 
took office in the midst of the census controversy in May 
1983. If there had been fears that he might reduce the 
commitment and trust of his office to data protection, his 
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baptism of fire in the census controversy almost certainly 
guaranteed that this would not be the case. Moreover, his 
desire to make less use of the media than Bull dissipated in 
the course of a year of heavy involvement with the media. 
2. SWEDEN 
There is more experience with the interaction between 
statistics and data protection in Sweden than in any other 
country. The Data Inspection Board (DIB), which began to 
function in 1974, was the first national data protection 
agency. The Swedisch experience to data illustrates several 
relevant points. Certain data protectors do have a tendency 
to take an inordinate interest in statistical activities as 
opposed to becoming intimately involved in the much more 
sensitive and important issues of data protection that exist 
in administrative uses of data. They tend to be shocked at 
the amount of personal data held by a national statistical 
agency and poorly informed, at least at the start, about the 
difference between statistical and administrative uses of 
personal information. If most data protectors have to choose 
between doing battle with statisticians, as opposed to the 
police or a national security agency, for example, the 
choice seems obvious in terms of relative political power. 
It is also possible, based on the Swedisch experience, that 
data protectors will have their own views on the conduct of 
statistics, which may come as something of a surprise to 
professional statisticians. The views of Jan Freese, the 
Director General of the DIB, are a case in point; he has had 
both a peculiar preoccupation with Statistics Sweden and 
strong views on the conduct of statistics (10). 
The Swedish experience leads to the perhaps e 
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The DIB and Statistics Sweden have certainly worked 
out a mutual accommodation of their respective 
responsibilities (11). Censuses have been carried out with 
much less controversy in Sweden, since the DIB came into 
existence. The statistical agency can now tell the general 
public that the data protectors have put their good 
housekeeping seal of approval on census questionnaires and 
census practices. The successful conduct of the 1980 census 
of population again points to the positive benefits of 
consulting with the DIB about such an activity. In 1978 
DALK, the commission on revision of the data protection law, 
ruled against the automatic exemption of statistical 
registers from licensing provisions of the 1973 Data 
Act (12). The amendments to the Data Act, effective July 1 
1982, appear not to have changed the status of Statistics 
Sweden under the legislation. 
Nevertheless, some outstanding issues remain, which 
illustrate, among other things, the level of detailed 
problems at issue between statisticians and data protectors. 
Statistics Sweden wants to prolong the time period, with the 
permission of the DIB, for which the statistical agency is 
permitted to keep primary data on individuals on magnetic 
tapes. For one of these applications, which is very 
sensitive because it concerns tax assessment data, some 
prominent researchers and the two largest Swedish trade 
unions have written directly in support of the agency's 
applications (13). In a related area, the Official Secrets 
Act of 1 January 1981 still permits the disclosure of 
primary statistical data on individuals to courts of law 
under special circumstances; Parliament has requested the 
government to set up a commission of inquiry on this 
particular question, which deviates from the customary 
practice of building an absolute barrier around statistical 
data. 
At this point in my discussion of Sweden, some of you may be 
wondering how I plan to explain the huge fight that broke 
out in the summer and fall of 1983 about the conduct of the 
1984 census of population and housing, especially since it 
led to some heated exchanges and differences of opinion 
between Statistics Sweden and the DIB. Perhaps there are no 
simple explanations, but simply some lessons that the 
statistical community can learn. First, I would emphasize 
the issue of international contagion, especially within 
Western Europe. Newspapers like to write about problems with 
censuses, wherever they may occur. Whether consciously or 
sub-consciously, the West German debates of the spring of 
246 
1983 fed the Swedisch outbreak. The press also capitalized 
on the proximity of the year Orwell made famous. Secondly, 
it did not help to calm matters that Professor Sten 
Johansson, a sociologist at the University of Stockholm and 
a leading Social democratic thinker, became Director General 
of Statistics Sweden on August 1, 1983. Johansson, as a 
leading social researcher and user of data, had long been 
forthrightly critical of the utility and even need for the 
DIB. 
Lest you think it irrelevant to focus on personalities in 
this fashion, I want to emphasize that the issue is of the 
utmost relevance to understanding the relationship between 
data protection and the statistical community. Much of my 
current research concerns the ways in which data protection 
can be made as effective as possible, the personalities, 
political adroitness, and degree of commitment of data 
protectors and their staff members are critical ingredients 
in achieving success. Jan Freese stands out among data 
protectors internationally because of his longevity in the 
field, his influence, and his capacity as a publicist. He 
has given data protection a higher profile in Sweden than in 
any other country, but he also has what can only be called a 
special preoccupation with statistics. Thus when Freese and 
Johansoon locked horns over the 1985 census, the stage was 
set for what in fact became a series of head-to-head debates 
across Sweden through the fall and winter of 1983-84, which 
were even exported to other countries in speeches and 
magazine articles. They debated not only the proposed 
census, but whether or not Statistics Sweden even needed to 
be subject to the Data Act, the statute which created the 
DIB, and whether the DIB should even exist, given the 
competing problems in Swedish society. 
The case of Statistics Sweden and the 1985 census is 
especially interesting, because the agency is making 
fascinating efforts to take the census primarily on the 
basis of existing personal registers rather than requiring 
the population to undergo the periodic burden of filling out 
extensive mandatory forms. The Swedish refer to such a 
census as FOBALT. As a "paradise for personal registers", to 
quote Freese, Sweden is probably among the very few 
countries in which such a scheme could even be comtemplated. 
Yet when Statistics Sweden proposed such a census to the 
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government in January 1983, it was responding to 
governmental and parliamentary instructions dating back to 
1979. It was not until July 1983 that Svenska Dagblader, the 
conservative Stockholm newspaper, discovered the 1985 census 
proposal and raised a big fuss about it, once again 
demonstrating the vital role of the press in generating both 
good and bad debates about data protection. 
A difference of opinion exists as to whether the DIB was 
really opposed to the plans for FOBALT before the public 
eruption in the summer of 1983. Freese has stated publicly 
that he was surprised at the outbreak of the debate (14). 
But thereafter, he argued against the census process on 
several grounds, especially the fact that administrative 
files would have to be enriched with other personal data in 
order to make FOBALT possible. He argued that the 
traditional manual way of taking the census was cheaper, 
which is an example of the extent to which data protectors 
can choose to second guess almost any aspect of the conduct 
of statistics. Freese, in particular, wanted individual 
members of the population to give informed consent for the 
record linkages necessitated by FOBALT, a proposal that 
Statistics Sweden opposed on the grounds of cost (15). 
Fortunately, statistical and data protection decisions and 
opinions in Sweden are subject to the decisions of the 
government, which decided in December 1983 that the next 
population census would be modelled on the traditional 1980 
census. FOBALT will be delayed at least to 1990. It is again 
relevant to note that Freese's own general political views 
are not as close to the current government's as those of 
Johansson. 
Freese views the debate over the census as "a symptom 
concerning the computerized information society as a whole. 
The hurricane [debate] made the DIB feel stronger. And 
perhaps the DIB tried not only to protect the citizen's 
privacy but also the statisticians" (16). He also remains 
opposed to any revisions to the DA, as proposed by a 
government statistics planning committee, which would allow 
Statistics Sweden to process any personal information, 
including record linkages, without the permission of the 
DIB. Freese has called this idea "incredible" in light of 
the public debate about FOBALT. Given the continuing public 
anxieties about both privacy and statistical activities, it 
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would be very unwise, in my view, for national statistical 
agencies in any Western country to try to function outside 
the protective umbrella of national data protection laws. 
3. CANADA 
The most relevant issue in Canada in recent years has been 
the thwarted effort to breach the absolute (and essential) 
wall of confidentiality erected around Statistics Canada by 
section 16 of the Statistics Act. It illustrates, to my 
mind, the continuing pressure in every country for access to 
all kind of data bases for new administrative purposes, 
despite the existence of general data protection laws, such 
as the federal Privacy Act of 1982 in Canada. One of my 
reasons for raising this issue here is to encourage further 
discussion of strategies by which data protectors and 
government statisticians can resist such efforts 
success fully. 
On May 18, 1983 Sollicitor General Robert Kaplan, a Cabinet 
Member in Pierre Trudeau's long-lived Liberal government, 
introduced in the House of Commons Bill C-157 to establish 
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). A storm 
of controversy arose over this proposed legislation, which 
created a civilian security agency completely separate from 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). As part of 
sweeping investigatory power the the CSIS, Bill C-157 
contained an extraordinary override provision in 
clause 22(1), whereby "notwithstanding any other law", the 
Director of the new Security Service could seek a judicial 
warrant to "obtain any information, record, document or 
thing..." With such a warrant a representative of the CSIS 
could "search for, remove or return, or examine, take 
extracts from or make copies of or record in any other 
manner the information, record, document or thing". No other 
country I have studied, to my knowledge, has a comparable 
provision. 
The Canadian press quickly realized, and Kaplan 
acknowledged, that Bill C-157 would allow the Security 
Service access to data from the censuses of population that 
are intended to be absolutely confidential under the federal 
Statistics Act (17). The Act states that only employees, 
sworn to secrecy under section 6, may examine census data 
and that disclosures by such persons of any identifiable 
information are prohibited (18). The Chief Statistician of 
Canada indicated that such a provision would be contrary to 
the base interests of Statistics Canada, which had not been 
consulted on the matter. The McDonald Commission, which had 
conducted a wide-ranging inquiry into abuses of power by the 
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Security Services of the RCMP, had previously recommended 
that census information should remain off limits to the new 
civilian Security Service under any circumstances (19). 
Like many other Canadian newspapers, the Toronto Star on 
June 5, 1983 editorialized against making census data 
available to the Security Service, on the grounds that it 
would undermine the accuracy and honesty of responses from 
individuals to census questions: "1984 is only six months 
away anyway; Kaplan should not rush it". Given the 
historical tradition of absolute confidentiality for census 
data, it is not surprising that Bill C-157 produced such an 
outcry in the press; it is perhaps more surprising that the 
framers of the Bill thought they could obtain such a 
provision, although they had a natural inclination to equate 
census data with many other types of sensitive personal data 
held by the federal government, such as the tax returns of 
individuals. 
Critics of the proposed practice had to carry their fight to 
the federal Cabinet, which had to decide on changes proposed 
to Bill C-157. Although an argument could be made that the 
Security Service would not find access to data at Statistics 
Canada a very important source of information, (which makes 
it all the more odd to seek such access in the first place), 
the statistical agency does possess, for example, the latest 
population census ("information on the social and economic 
characteristics of every person in the country"), a Personal 
Income Tax Data Base ("all persons who file income tax 
returns for each tax (calendar) year"), an Integrated Vital 
Statistics Data Base ("integrated information obtained from 
the universal system for registration of births, marriages, 
deaths and still births"), and specific data bases on 
200,000 registered nurses, elementary and secondary teachers 
(all, except Québec), all university faculties, and all 
students currently enrolled in a university (20). The amount 
of personal information held by Statistics Canada, and the 
compulsory methods often used to collect it, explains the 
necessity and desirability of the historic development of an 
absolute prohibition against the disclosure of identifiable 
personal information under the secrecy clause of the 
Statistics Act (21). 
It is most likely that the Canadian Federal Government 
responded on this specialized issue more to pressure from 
statistics Canada and the Cabinet Member responsible for it, 
the Minister of Supply and Services, than to public or media 
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pressure, although media attention and support was probably 
essential to sensitizing politicians to the issue. The 
question of creating a civilian Security Service was very 
controversial in general. The issue of access to census data 
appears not to have arisen in Parliamentary committee 
discussions of Bill C-157, prior to the re-drafting of the 
Bill by the government to eliminate access to census data. 
The new version, Bill C-9, introduced on January 18, 1984, 
declared that a warrant would not be issued in respect of 
data subjects to the Statistics Act (22). In the Globe and 
Mail, Jeff Sallot explained that "Statistics Canada 
officials lobbied successfully behind the scenes in recent 
months to keep their records confidential. The statisticians 
argued that the reliability of the information citizens 
provide would decline if there were no iron clad legal 
guarantee that it would remain off limits to other 
government agencies" (23). 
One significant point that may be drawn from this incident 
is that the confidentiality of census data is perceived to 
be a political issue, since the census process generates 
private data that people do not want known outside of the 
statistical agency. It is also very important to recognize 
that Martin B. Wiik, the Chief Statistician, managed to sell 
the message internally to relevant Ministers, the Cabinet 
Committee on Security and Intelligence, and utlimately the 
Cabinet as a whole, that data held by Statistics Canada has 
to be handled and protected differently from all personal 
information held by the federal government. This should be 
recognized, in my view, as a considerable a success for the 
statistical community in avoiding one more attempt to gain 
access to statistical data from administrative purposes. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
I have no difficulty in agreeing with the general view that 
strong traditions of concern for confidentiality exist in 
national statistical agencies. As noted earlier, specialists 
like yourselves hold this perception but, because of general 
scepticism about governments, it is not shared by the 
general public to the same extent. For such a reason, 
statistical agencies have to be continually vigilant about 
how their data collection activities in particular may be 
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perceived by the general public and by politicians from the 
perspective of continued public concerns for the protection 
of privacy in an information society. Statisticians need to 
keep up the fight to maintain a clear functional separation 
between research and statistical and administrative uses of 
personal information. 
I believe that data protection measures are necessary for 
all personal information systems in the public sector, 
including data collected and used for statistical purposes. 
Given public sensitivities about statistics, data protection 
should be a significant way to reassure respondents that 
their privacy interests are being carefully and adequately 
protected. 
A primary goal of general data protection is to produce 
laws, principles, and information practices suited to each 
type of personal information system. In fact, the 
confidentiality provisions in most statistical and census 
laws are good examples of the kind of specialized measures 
for data protection that inevitably become the second 
generation in any data-evolving protection system for the 
public sector. 
Detai 
for s 
led practices f 
tatistical dat 
or data prot 
a from the 
information practices that can 
legis 
does 
learn 
is at 
may b 
their 
Such 
const 
data 
peopl 
what 
lation. As ill 
take some time 
to work with 
least a form 
e forgiven for 
ustrated by 
ection need to be worked out 
general principles of fair 
be found in the typical 
the Swedish experience, it 
for statisticians and data protectors to 
one another: 
of living t 
saying so, 
lack of desire for outsi 
an attitude towards 
ructive. The existence of 
used for both research and 
e; they ask le 
could happen, 
of confidentiality 
confi dentiality (24) 
if it is not a marriage, it 
ogether. Statisticians, if I 
are much like academics in 
de supervision of any sort. 
data protection is not 
massive amounts of personal 
statistical purposes worries 
gitimate hypothetical questions about 
under certain circumstances, to promises 
and to stat utes guaranteeing absolute 
In my (academic) judgement, statisticians need to be or to 
become good politicians, in the sense of having political 
judgments, in order to live in comfortable coexistence with 
data protectors, the general public, and professional 
politicians. It is not enough to trumpet one's current and 
past virtues in order to maintain public confidence in 
statistical activities; not the least of the reasons why is 
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that the general public has as little appreciation of 
statistical work as they have of research activities at 
universities. My advice is the same for data protectors: 
confrontational measures are a recipe for disasters. Data 
protectors have to make the effort over time to understand 
the world of statisticians and their normal practices; 
statisticians have to try to justify practices in handling 
personal information, such as the use of imputation, which 
may be hard to explain, to rationalize, or to sell 
successfully in a world more sensitive to the preservation 
of personal privacy than the past has been (25). 
One can predict problems for national statistical agencies 
when any country adopts data protection legislation for the 
first time. The United Kingdom is the latest prospect for 
the bemusement of experienced observers of survivors of 
previous wars. Problems will occur in the start-up phases, 
but experience in other Western European nations indicates 
that they are survivable, especially given some good 
judgement and sound common sense on both sides. Since 
statisticians can take some comfort that they are in fact 
starting from a base of fair information practices that has 
long been in existence, the likelihood of long-term battles 
with data protectors seem remote. 
Perhaps my final words should be for data protectors, who 
have to learn to be both political and professional in their 
dealings with the statistical community. The most 
experienced data protectors, such as the West Germans, have 
developed staff specialization in areas such as statistics 
and good working relationships with the regulators. The 
professionalization of the relationship can only help both 
sides. There are a lot of difficult detailed issues at stake 
in the relationship between data protection and statistics. 
My interests as an historian, for example, are directly 
challenged by the movement to anonymize census returns after 
a period of time or to destroy personal data. Although I am 
not enough of a specialist to have the answers to specific 
questions, I am fully persuaded that they can be settled in 
a rational manner by a process of private discourse between 
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DISCUSSION 
Mr. SCHOETTL (Conseil d'Etat) opened the discussion: 
He expressed general support for the views of Professor 
Flaherty. He referred to the fact mentiond by Mr. Begue 
that, in a recent survey in France, almost half of those 
questioned believed that censuses of population data were 
available to the tax authorities and police and this despite 
the firm legal guarantees of complete confidentiality 
operating over many decades of censuses in France. What was 
needed was not a further strengthening of the legal 
provisions regarding confidentiality but rather an active 
campaign to inform and interest the public in the census. 
The circle of users of census data should be extended to 
include writers, schools and universities, trade unions and 
commercial enterprises. Public curiosity should be aroused 
on topics involving international comparisons, e.g. numbers 
of women in employment. The importance to the State of good 
statistical data should be emphasized and contrasted with 
the lack of public spirit of people who refuse to supply the 
necessary information. It should be pointed out that the 
taxpayer has a right to expect government decisions based on 
sound information, that a sick person has a right to medical 
research, that the peaceful citizen has a right to crime 
prevention measures based on proper knowledge of the 
structure of society and generally that people in some way 
discriminated against, had the right to have their grievance 
demonstrated by official statistics. 
Mr. SUDFELD (Statistisches Bundesamt) remarked: 
The law covering the 1983 Census of Population in the 
Federal Republic of Germany was being considered, 
politicians, statisticians and data protection officials 
were one hundred per cent in favour. He considered that 
statisticians and data protectors were neither allies nor 
opponents, but simply groups with a concern in common. It 
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was clear that a much sharper division would have to be made 
in the future between statistical inquiries and the checking 
of administrative registers even though this might involve 
considerable extra expense. 
The author replied to the debate: 
He particularly welcomed the establishment of a Standing 
Committee on statisticians and data protectors in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and remarked that, if this 
committee had existed earlier, the problems with the 1983 
census might have been avoided. 
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PROTECTION OF PRIVACY, AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING AND 
PROGRESS IN STATISTICAL DOCUMENTATION 
G. CARIANI, G. GIACUMMO, P. LA CAVA 
Istituto Centrale di Statistica 
0. INTRODUCTION 
A feature of the present-day world is the production, 
dissemination and consumption of information on a scale, in 
a variety and with a speed hitherto unprecedented. At the 
heart of this phenomenon is the use of mass communication 
media such as the radio, the cinema, television and the 
computer. The demand for, and production, supply and 
consumption of, information have thus become part and parcel 
of every-day life, from whence the "right to information" 
has been recognized as indispensib1 e in the technological 
age . 
Technological progress in our lifetime has, however, 
introduced a new element in the field of information, namely 
that information can now be processed automatically, which 
explains the term "informatics", first coined in French as 
"informatique" by Philippe Dreyfus in 1962. 
The advance has been such that reference is now made to the 
computer's "artificial intelligence". What we have in fact 
is an electronic extension of human intelligence, enabling 
man to accumulate a vast store of information in minimal 
space and time. What is more, this information can be 
transmitted immediately to requesters via a network linking 
the mainframe computer to peripheral terminals: this is what 
is known as a telematic system. The computer is thus the 
hallmark of today's mass technology society. The very fabric 
of State administration is today considered by the new 
generation of political scientists as a large network of 
communication and processing of computerized messages. A 
gradual "computerization" of private life has thus taken 
place, not only as regards the number of subjects on whom 
information is stored, which could in future be exhaustive, 
but also as regards the increasingly detailed, specific and 
accurate nature of this information. 
Recently, however, not only have we witnessed a 
proliferation of State (and other) consumers or "owners" of 
information, but since the use of computers has become 
increasingly widespread the methods and the quality of data 
processing have fundamentally evolved, producing changes 
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affecting the relationship between central administration 
and the citizen. The new frontiers of technology determined 
by microelectronic and telematic systems seem destined to 
modify still further that relationship and social 
relationships in general. 
Much has been and can be said about the implications which 
new information technologies hold for the management of 
political systems, with the inevitable attendant and 
dangerous encroachment on individual freedoms. The question 
which this begs, however, is whether these new technologies 
are a boost or a threat to democracy. 
A quick look at experience in this field to date reveals 
undeniable interference between information technologies and 
the management of a political system. 
Use of the computer by central government to collect and 
process a growing corpus of information on persons has been 
seen to arouse concern for the violation of privacy in that 
it generates an acceleration of the authoritarian processes 
whereby citizens can be kept under surveillance, with all 
that this entails as regards the organization of political 
life. This way of perceiving the problem is of mainly 
European stamp. 
On the other hand, the findings of research conducted by 
American teams are less drastic and suggest rather an 
evaluation of the extent to which computers affect general 
government. While boosting efficiency, particularly in the 
traditional sectors, they alter its effects and 
socio-political implications. Whatever the case may be, as 
regards the political system specifically it is difficult to 
arrive at any final conclusions on the basis of the 
information we possess. The only certainty is that 
the computer is seen mainly as a means of enhancing 
the potential for governing complex societies, the 
stress - rightly so in many instances - being laid on the 
importance of systematic organization. 
1. AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING AND VIOLATION OF PRIVACY 
The natural tendency of present-day community-based society 
is for the reference data in the electronic memory to 
constantly increase. This artificial collective conscience 
of today's society in turn leads to what is in statistical 
terms an establishment of the lowest common denominator of 
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individual operations, which are thus taken out of the realm 
of confidentiality, while at the same time exposing the 
latter to the risk of violation. 
With the present state-of-the-art technology, privacy can be 
violated on three levels: 
a) physically, by using new optical and acoustic recognition 
methods ; 
b) psychologically, by means of the various investigation 
methods available today to get information from an 
individual which he would not under normal circumstances 
divulge or which he gives quite innocently, thus 
unwittingly divulging certain aspects of his private 
life; 
c) by crosschecks which can be carried out by collecting, 
comparing and aggregating a large number of detailed 
data, via the computer. 
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The private life of an individual could be kept under check 
in any country which keeps a health register for the 
purposes of a national health scheme. The same is true of 
tax and vehicle registers. 
Further substantial violations of privacy could arise in the 
wake of the emerging potential of large information 
processing systems. 
State-of-the-art systems to some extent offer, at least 
theoretically, linkups between available files, thus giving 
the potential user the ideal opportunity to piece together 
the various items of information relating to an individual. 
The sequence of the various events thus makes it possible to 
reconstruct in the right order, using any logical system 
(e.g. temporal), the "life" of subjects under observation. 
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At present the linkup potential between different files, 
even when these fall within the context of public agencies, 
comes up against substantial hurdles both from the point of 
view of compatibility between the different hardware systems 
used and on account of the lack of standardization in the 
collection of basic information. Problems also stem from the 
use of software which is frequently not standard. 
However, these problems are by no means insurmountable. 
In certain countries, for instance, some of them have 
already been solved by means of a personal identification 
number. Furthermore, there is no doubt that technology will 
offer increasingly sophisticated hardware with increasingly 
standardized applications languages which will overcome any 
remaining linkup hurdles. 
Progress accomplished in telecommunications technology and 
cable transmission and the enormous capacity of large 
computers together point to the likelihood of substantial 
changes in the future lives of individuals. We are already 
witnessing some of these applications, noteworthy examples 
of which are electronic newspapers, remote medical diagnoses 
and consultation systems, etc. The future will bring a whole 
host of other possible telecommunications applications, by 
means of VDUs installed in our homes. Other examples in 
addition to those already mentioned (bank transactions and 
all types of booking arrangements) are home security 
systems, sales and opinion polls. Not much further beyond 
the present horizon may also be the decentralization of 
certain occupations which can be carried out at home. 
These are just a few examples of what a telematic system can 
do, and in future a whole range of other services will 
probably be available through interactive home systems 
(hornetec). 
Information systems like this could generate such a 
substantial and detailed flow of information as to seriously 
jeopardize the privacy of any private citizen, if it is 
borne in mind that information of apparently no great 
intrinsic value can, when put together, enable any user to 
map out the profile - ideology included - of any citizen. 
2. THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING 
FREEDOM 
The computer thus makes it possible to get hold of 
information about the individual and his private life and 
thus subject him to a new form of social domination, which 
262 
could be called "information" power. For precisely this 
reason, the right to confidentiality has taken on a new 
dimension which it could not have had a century ago when it 
was first introduced. 
Confidentiality of personal information had until quite 
recently an undoubtedly negative connotation; it prevented 
others from invading privacy and especially from acquiring 
information for subsequent dissemination. In a word, the 
right to confidentiality was equated with the accepted 
definition of privacy in the sense of "to be let alone". 
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This right to monitor one's own personal data stored in an 
electronic file is part of the "right of information" and, 
when it comes to data processed automatically, constitutes a 
right to "informatics freedom": the freedom of any 
individual to decide when, how and to what extent 
information concerning him can be communicated to other 
people. This freedom is today acknowledged for individuals, 
groups associations and agencies in general. 
The foregoing considerations highlight how it has become 
necessary to set limits to "informatics power" in order to 
forestall any possible violation of privacy. 
This protection can be provided by guaranteeing the 
"security" of data processed automatically and, in 
particular, by introducing sound legal protection for 
confi dent i a 1 i ty. 
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3. THE SECURITY OF AUTOMATICALLY PROCESSED DATA 
The first requirement as regards the confidentiality of 
personal data processed automatically is their protection 
from persons not authorized to access, process, change and 
disseminate them. The first thing is therefore to establish 
rules concerning access to the data. 
From this point of view, protection can first and foremost 
be physical, i.e. relating to the hardware and the dataware. 
The premises must be safeguarded by traditional methods and 
access is by advanced technological means of control and 
recognition. These include: 
- requiring the authorized user to first insert a magnetic 
badge ; 
- to identify the person by means of an enlarged recording 
of fingerprints or handprints (length of fingers, 
t ranslucency), or by voice pattern or signature analysis. 
Protection is also logical in character, i.e. related to the 
item of data stored in a computer. All electronic files or 
data banks are structured or being structured so that 
protection of information is taken care of at the design 
state. 
Modern data b 
basic data 
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anks physically comprise a very large series of 
which, to be combined into intelligible 
require sets of codes identifying the logical 
each item of data within the bank itself. This 
means that only the computer can, by means of specific 
programs, trace all the basic data which in combination 
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been pointed 
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any unauthorized access would entail knowing 
access key to the computer but also the 
the file, and this structure, as has already 
out, will have had protective devices designed 
the outset. 
Access keys were mentioned in the last paragraph. These are 
specific protective devices external to the data bank and 
which differ according to whether they are expressed in 
terms of software or hardware. 
They may be passwords or badges. Both these protection 
systems are intended to restrict at various levels the right 
of access to the data bank and to subsequently resolve the 
issue of the level of restriction placed on the data in a 
given file. 
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Another solution is to authorize access to certain terminals 
only. The computer can thus vet the interrogator's right or 
non-entitlement to access the base and cut the user off 
should the latter attempt to identify a password or should 
an unauthorized badge be introduced. 
Data confidentiality must also be safeguarded when files are 
transferred from one computer to another. Substantial 
progress has been made in coding: the substitution of 
letters by symbols has given way to the use of numerical-key 
combinations and in order to get round the tedious computer 
runs needed to encode an outgoing file or decode an incoming 
file, specialized microprocessors have been manufactured 
which, installed at the input and output stages of the 
computer, can encode or decode with a minimum of delay. 
This gives some idea of what can be done from the 
informatics point of view to protect data and thus the 
privacy of the citizen from outside interference; in 
conjunction with hardware and software incompatibility 
between the managers of various files, this should allay 
certain misgivings as to the ease of unauthorized access. 
But it also shows that it is not on the technical side that 
the solution whereby the citizen can be shielded against any 
violation perpetrated by the managers of the data banks 
themselves is to be found. 
As was mentioned earlier, hardware and software 
incompatibility between files is a common problem, but we 
are well aware that these problems are - not easily, 
admittedly - surmountable and the hurdles which have 
prevented electronic superfiles from being set up have not 
been technical ones. 
4. LEGAL PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
In the more industrialized nations some of the situations 
and certain of the risks of violation of privacy mentioned 
earlier have become a reality. Efforts have therefore been 
under way for some time to bring the confidentiality of 
personal data stored in the various data banks under legal 
control . 
The essential instrument for safeguarding the personal data 
kept on natural persons (legal persons or also de facto 
undertakings) is the law. It is therefore up to the 
legislator to adapt legal guarantees on the inviolability of 
the individual's privacy to trends in the development and 
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utilization of the new automatic data processing systems 
summarily described above. He must guarantee the individual 
the above-mentioned right to control, i.e. the right to know 
what has been stored in the data bank concerning him and 
what use might be made of this information, a right which 
must take into consideration inter alia the facility for 
correcting inaccurate information and any information which 
could somehow or other infringe personal freedom. 
In any event, it should always be left to the judicious 
appreciation of the legislator to establish an equitable 
reconciliation of differing interests, the individual's to 
see his own privacy safeguarded and the collective one to 
acquire information on persons with the aim of catering for 
the interests of the community at large, which is the only 
consideration which would justify sacrificing the former for 
the attainment of the latter. 
It should also be noted that for obvious reasons wholesale 
prohibition to acquire and disseminate personal information 
is in today's world no longer conceivable and, in certain 
cases, not even necessary. There exists in our modern 
society certain information which, although relating to the 
individual, is in essence of the public domain (e.g. data in 
public registries which may be freely consulted by anyone) 
and the dissemination of which does not constitute any 
violation of rights and can therefore be permitted without 
the need for special authorization. 
The above considerations militate in favour of a legal 
framework for the information contained in the data bases, 
tailored in each case according to how deeply this 
information penetrates into privacy and according to the 
different types of information which could be categorized as 
fol lows : 
Where there is no possibility of identification, the 
information referred to in a) can be processed with more 
freedom than the other types of information. That reffered 
to in b) should be covered by specific regulation 
guaranteeing maximum caution as regards dissemination and 
maximum protection for the citizen when it comes to 
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utilization geared to the good of the community at large, 
safeguarding him from misuse of personal data. Lastly, the 
law should provide stringent control over the management and 
publication of the information referred to in c ) . 
This sector is as yet uncovered by any specific set of 
regulations in Italy and even the Constitution seems to have 
overlooked the very concept of confidentiality, except for 
the reference in Article 13 to personal freedom and breach 
of the same by "inspections" not provided for by the law. 
This concept of inspection may in fact cover investigation 
of the various physical and moral aspects which go to make 
up the profile of an individual. 
Apart from this indirect reference to the constitutional 
requirement, there are various other provisions which tackle 
the problem from the point of view of specific and sectoral 
aspects. For instance, there are the rules governing 
official secrets (1), according to which employees and 
public officials must maintain the strictest reserve 
concerning administrative arrangements and operations or 
information which come to their attention in the course of 
their duties, and the rules governing State records (2), 
which prohibit for a pre-established number of years the 
consultation of documents relating to foreign and domestic 
policy or the private situation of individuals. 
A first explicit formulation of the right to confidentiality 
is, moreover, contained in the Statuto dei Lavoratori (legal 
text on worker's rights)(3), where the employer is 
prohibited from using audiovisual devices to monitor the 
activities of workers and from screening their political, 
religious and trade union opinions or aspects of their life 
which bear no relation to their working activity. 
(1) Penal Code, Article 326 (divulging of official secrets) 
and Article 15 of Presidential Decree No. 3 of 
10 January 1957 laying down the Consolidated Text of the 
Provisions on Regulations Governing Civil Servants. 
(2) Article 21 of Presidential Decree No 1409 of 
30 September 1963 on the Rules on State Records. 
(3) Law No 300 of 20 May 1970, Articles 4, 5, 6 and 8. 
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Mention should also be made of a law issued by the Regional 
Government of Lombardy on "provisions governing the regional 
information system" (4), which lays down the rules governing 
the regional information network, covering also data banks 
and their legal regulation. 
A first sound step to bridge this yawning legal gap has been 
made thanks to the more systematic provisions - albeit 
geared to the requirements of a specific sector of public 
life - contained in the new rules governing law and order 
(5). Although this set of provisions sets out certain valid 
solutions to the problem (type of data collected, criteria 
for access, monitoring of activities of the EDP centre), it 
can by no means be considered as exhaustive even for that 
specific sector. 
In particular, Article 8 of this law provides for the 
establishment of an EDP centre at the Ministry of the 
Interior, obliging "every government body, agency, 
enterprise, association or individual setting up or holding 
for any reason magnetic files in which data and information 
of any type whatever are stored on Italian citizens, to 
declare the existence of such files to the Ministry of the 
Interior by 31 December 1981". 
This Ministry had by that deadline received roughly 100 000 
declarations concerning the existence of computerized files. 
This figure is symptomatic of the scale and complexity of 
the problem, which will have to be tackled by the legal 
system, bearing in mind that the number of data banks is 
likely to increase in the future as computers become more 
widespread. 
It should be pointed out at this juncture that legal 
protection of confidentiality should also be provided for 
the transfer of data from one country to another, inter alia 
to ensure the necessary free flow of information across 
front iers. 
An initiative intended to cater for this need, at least 
among the Member Nations of the Council of Europe, was the 
Convention approved on 22 September 1980 by the Committee of 
Ministers to "protect individuals vis-à-vis personal data 
processed automatically". This Convention stipulated the 
guidelines with which all States signatory to this 
Convention must comply, thus at the same time ensuring 
equality of treatment and freedom of exchange of 
informat i on. 
(4) Regional Law No 15 of 16 March 1981. 
(5) Articles 6 and 12 of Law No 121 of 1 April 1981 
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International agreements, it should be noted, tend to extend 
legal protection from natural persons (individuals) to legal 
persons (i.e. organizations, associations or enterprises), 
which are also interested in the protection of their data 
which, although not of a personal nature, have a claim to be 
considered as sensitive. 
Italy is not yet a signatory to this Convention, as 
Article 4 stipulates that each signatory State shall 
undertake to embody in its national laws the provisions 
necessary to implement the fundamental principles of data 
protection, as set out in the Convention. Furthermore, these 
provisions are to be implemented no later than the date on 
which the Convention becomes applicable in the country. 
Unfortunately, Italy is lagging behind as regards such 
legis lat ion. 
One may wonder at this juncture what is new in our legal 
system other than what has already been mentioned. It is 
high time that the Italian legal system fell into line with 
the more advanced nations. Three bills have been tabled in 
the last few years. 
The first is the Accame Bill (6) tabled in 1981. The 20 
articles of this Bill, rather than constituting an actual 
practical instrument, describe the guidelines of protection 
of privacy in the context of handling and automatic 
processing of data and information. 
The second is the Picaño Bill tabled in 1982 (7) and 
concerns the regulations for the protection of the right to 
confidentiality of natural persons vis-à-vis automatic data 
processing. It explicitly provides for a State supervisory 
body of the type "National Committee for Informatics and 
Freedom" answerable directly to Parliament. 
The same Bill provides for a detailed list of physical and 
logical safety measures capable of safeguarding data banks. 
The third and final bill is the Mirabelli Bill of 1983 (8). 
This is a ministerial initiative concerning the fostering 
and coordination of information activities in general 
government. Essentially, it calls for safeguarding of the 
rights of both natural and legal persons and for a 
supervisory body directly answerable to the Presidency of 
(6) Bill No 2552 of 21 April 1981. 
(7) Bill No 3195 of 24 February 1982. 
(8) Bill No 3331 of April 1983. 
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the Council of Ministers, and deals with related aspects of 
data protection and the relevant safety measures, and 
reciprocity of treatment at international level. 
The course to be charted is clear. It can only be hoped that 
the judiciary, aware of the need to bring this situation 
under control in good time, will get down as soon as 
possible to examining the problem outlined above and will 
promptly pass a systematic law to bring order into the 
sector at a very delicate phase of its expansion. 
5. SAFEGUARDING OF PRIVACY AND STATISTICS 
What has been said thus far grows in significance when we 
come to the sector of statistics in the broadest sense of 
the term. 
As in most countries, statistical confidentiality in Italy 
is the subject of a special law (9) which ensures that 
personal data is passed on only in aggregate form or, in any 
event, in a manner which makes it impossible to identify the 
subject. 
The growth of data banks has nevertheless taken us to a 
point which is just one step away from the fulfilment of 
what has long been the statistician' s dream, i.e. to link 
up the different files, most of which are now data bases, 
thus achieving a completely integrated system of statistics. 
As time goes by, however, this dream is slowly fading as 
misgivings concerning the violation of privacy percolate 
through public opinion. In recent years we have witnessed, 
particularly in the more progressive countries, the 
beginning of widespread rejection by public opinion of all 
types of statistical surveys. 
The assurances given by the powers -1 hat-be have not 
enough to allay these fears and uncertainties. 
been 
Does this have to mean a 
offered by technology? 
retreat despite the potential 
(9) Decree Law No 1285 of 17 May 
2238 of 21 December 1929. 
1929, enacted in Law No 
270 
Experience in Italy offers grounds for optimism. The census 
operations of 1981-1982 in that country did not elicit 
opposition from either the press or public opinion. 
On the contrary, the change which has taken place in the 
configuration of the State in the wake of the implementation 
of the regional government system with its attendant 
devolution of general government and legislative functions, 
the stepping up of sectoral intervention by central and 
local government and public agencies, the need on the part 
of private citizens for a more detailed knowledge of the 
actual socio-economic situation they have to face, have over 
the past decade been largely responsible for a further drive 
to make increasingly detailed information available. 
For aspects falling within its sphere of competence, the 
ISTAT has endeavoured to cater for such legitimate pressure 
through its terms of reference and using precisely the 
constraint of statistical confidentiality already referred 
to. 
A recent reflection of this is the legal framework provided 
by the law on the implementation and financing on the 1981 
general censuses (population and housing, industry and 
trade) and the 1982 census on agriculture (10), whereby 
local government authorities (regional and provincial 
governments and the municipalities) so requesting were given 
"depersonalized" data on individuals. 
The data banks which the ISTAT has set up and is at present 
updating, partly on the basis of the census results, raise 
similar problems. The most sensitive aspects of this source 
of information, to which government departments and private 
citizens now have access, is precisely the establishment of 
the levels of aggregation of these data bases. A logical 
level has in fact been determined which on the one hand 
permits a breakdown to satisfy user requirements and on the 
other prevents the dissemination of personal data, even when 
"depersonalized". 
The remaining fundamental problem is to reconcile the two 
aspects: the confidentiality of the information collected 
and the need to provide personal but non-identifiable data 
to as many users as possible. While it can in part be solved 
from the technical point of view by using security and 
confidentiality methods for on-line dissemination of data 
stored in the data base, it cannot be solved by means of the 
legal instruments in force. There is an undoubted need for 
(10) Article 2 of Law No 864 of 18 December 1980. 
271 
special legal provisions which take account of the corpus of 
information which the agency possesses and which ensures 
that optimum use is made of this information. 
These provisions should not, of course, be restricted to 
governing the right to confidentiality, but should embrace 
the very structure of the ISTAT so that it can fulfil two 
functions, i.e. to act as a State service producing official 
statistics and as a data bank at the service of both general 
government and private citizens. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
It was seen earlier that there has over the past few years 
been an increasing demand for information by both public and 
private users, while at the same time the statistical 
services which could cater for this demand are coming up 
against a twofold obstacle: the escalating cost of 
statistical surveys and the need not to unduly inconvenience 
enterprises and individuals with in situ surveys. 
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Moreover, if this materialized, computerized sampling 
systems could facilitate the setting up of a valid base on 
which to graft any type of sample survey designed to gain an 
in-depth knowledge of specific aspects of the different 
basic universes. 
Italy, for instance, has a long-established system of 
registers of resident population, which are now fully 
computerized in many of the major municipalities. It 
nevertheless seems difficult for the time being to use them 
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as an information base for certain socio-demographic aspects 
of the population, since their reliability leaves much to be 
desired, particularly as regards information such as 
occupation, educational qualification, etc. 
There are also other types of files such as those kept by 
the Ministry of Finance, concerning declarations of income 
by natural and legal persons, and those kept by the INPS 
(Italian social security organization) concerning 
social contributions by wage and salary earners and by 
self-employed persons. Both these sets of files, however, 
relate to only part (albeit the greater part) of the Italian 
populat ion. 
Be that as it may, they suffer from certain defects which 
are typical of any large-scale file, e.g. the effects of an 
inevitable accumulation of errors, high updating costs in 
terms of both money and time which rise more than 
proportionally to the increase in the number of units it 
contains and of data stored. 
As regards information systems based on files, the ISTAT 
started setting up in 1970, mainly for the purposes of 
current surveys, a register of enterprises employing over 
20 persons. In order to make good the up-dating shortfall 
which has inevitably built up over the years, the register 
has been extended to enterprises employing over 10 persons 
on the basis of the 1981 census of industry, trade, small 
industry and services. 
A similar register is currently being set up on the basis of 
the 1982 agricultural census. This register will provide the 
starting point for current surveys in the years ahead. 
The management of this type of information system is 
naturally a function of the quality of the basic files, the 
degree of computerization of the ancillary administrative 
structures and the efficiency of the national statistical 
network. As mentioned earlier, other public agencies and 
bodies hold information on individuals, households and 
enterprises in files which are computerized to some extent. 
The purposes of this documentation are mainly administrative 
and managerial, but utilization for statistical purposes as 
well cannot be ruled out. 
In order to attain this objective, suitable ways should be 
found for standardizing definitions, classifications, etc., 
offering the possibility of linking up the different systems 
through computerized files. 
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A drive in this direction would undoubtedly open up a 
promising prospect for the future and provide a valid 
alternative to censuses and to many of the current surveys, 
while at the same time achieving substantial savings of time 
and money. 
Implementing a solution of this kind is by no means a 
straightforward process in that it involves not only 
technical problems but also the legal problems inherent in 
the possible violation of the right to privacy of natural 
and legal persons. 
So while the process of coordination and integration of 
information systems intended to produce statistics continues 
and the technical aspects are improved, it is hoped that 
appropriate legal steps will be taken to protect the 
sensitive nature of the data managed by the bigger 
computerized files. This may be the only way in which the 
use for statistical purposes of files held by the various 
authorities can be placed on a sound footing. 
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DRAFT LEGISLATION IN ITALY 
ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA 
Prof. M. LOSANO 
Università di Milano 
1. CURRENT SITUATION 
While legislation safeguarding the confidentiality of 
personal data stored in data banks has existed for some time 
in the major industrialized nations, the situation in Italy 
is still sub judice. Regulations relating to the 
safeguarding of confidentiality do in fact exist, but these 
are to be found in laws governing other sectors; a specific 
law on confidentiality has not yet been passed but there are 
various bills, one of which is currently being examined by 
Parilament. 
At the beginning of 1984, matters were at a standstill. As 
bills lapse when the Houses of Parliament are dissolved at 
the end of the legislative period, the Accame bill 
(paragraph 3) and the Picaño bill (paragraph 4) have lapsed, 
and will have to be tabled again for debate. The text 
drafted by the Mirabelli Committee (paragraph 5) did not 
even reach the bill stage, as the dissolution of the Houses 
in May 1983 prevented the Minister of Justice from 
presenting it to them as a government-instigated bill. This 
bill was finally presented by the Minister for Justice, 
Mr. Martinazzoli, on 5 May 1984. He submitted the text 
drafted by the Mirabelli Committee but with some slight 
amendments. A few months previously another bill on this 
subject had been presented (paragraph 6 ) . Other bills are 
being drafted and will be presented in 1985. 
The first question which springs to mind is this: given the 
economic and political crisis which is besetting Italy in 
the early 1980s, do these bills have any chance of becoming 
laws soon? One cannot help thinking of similar cases, such 
as the anti-monopoly legislation imposed on Italy by the 
Treaty of Rome but still not implemented to this day. In the 
case of the law on confidentiality, however, we are faced 
with a different situation. States which already have 
legislation to safeguard privacy are anxious to prevent 
their regulations from being undermined by the transfer of 
data into data banks in foreign States with weaker, or 
altogether non-existent, laws to safeguard privacy. As a 
result, foreign legislation nearly always contains a clause 
prohibiting the transmission of personal data to those 
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States which cannot offer legislative guarantees equal to 
those of the State providing the data. Italy must, 
therefore, adopt a law on privacy in order to avoid being 
cut off from the transnational flow of personal data. What 
is more, such a law must not deviate too greatly from the 
models in force abroad, because discrepancies could lead to 
the clause prohibiting the transmission of personal data 
being invoked. 
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(1) On 23 September 1980, the OECD issued a recommendation 
entitled "Guidelines for the protection of privacy and 
transnational flows of personal data". The fact that 
Italy is a member of the OECD does not, however, raise 
problems similar to those caused by the Council of 
Europe Convention, because a recommendation, by its very 
nature, does not oblige the States to which it is 
addressed to implement specific legal measures. 
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This regulation leads us from international relations to 
domestic policies. Within any country, a law on the 
protection of personal data is an important guarantee of the 
citizen's basic liberties. This topic is so vast that we 
cannot concern ourselves with it here. It is nevertheless 
vital to point out that, even if it were not interested in 
providing within its own borders such guarantees of 
individual freedom, Italy would end up being forced to adopt 
legislation on privacy because it is part of a particular 
economic and political context and therefore has 
indissoluble links with other industrialized States. 
Sooner or later and in one way or another, then, we in Italy 
will also have a law on privacy. It is necessary, therefore, 
to examine the regulations already in force (even if 
contained in laws whose purpose is not connected with 
privacy) and those which are proposed. Having scanned these 
briefly, it will also be necessary to examine the degree of 
coordination between existing and proposed legislation and, 
finally, to see whether the proposed regulations can 
feasibly be applied. 
Since there is no law on privacy, strictly speaking, it 
seems pointless to dwell in detail on existing regulations 
and draft laws. That is why these concluding remarks can be 
only summary and indicative in nature, as this is inevitable 
in the case of a topic which has not yet been the subject of 
specific provisions. 
2. REGULATIONS ON CONFIDENTIALITY ALREADY IN FORCE 
The delay with which Italy is managing to put itself on an 
equal footing with other industrialized countries as far as 
legislation on privacy is concerned has forced Italian 
law-makers to anticipate some forms of personal data 
protection in the "Statuto dei Lavoratori" (legislation on 
workers' safety and rights) and, above all, in the public 
order reform law, which incorporates a veritable mini-law on 
safeguarding personal data. 
This anomalous practice seems destined to spread, being one 
of the few loopholes available when urgent solutions have to 
be entrusted to parliamentary majorities that are too 
small (2). 
Regulations of this kind are known as normae fugitivae, 
because, since they are not to be found where they should 
be, they escape detection and are therefore a source of 
potentially serious legal problems; indeed, subsequent 
(2) In the field of normae fugitivae, in addition to the 
public order text there is another one on investment 
funds, which itself contains regulations on securities 
not covered by the usual legislation. 
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legislation frequently forgets to take account of them and 
duplicate laws are therefore created which are quite often 
not consistent among themselves. The link between a future 
law on information and the "fugitive" text of the public 
order reform law will be examined shortly. Let us turn our 
attention now to the regulations on workers' safety and 
rights (3). 
a) The "Statuto dei Lavoratori" 
The "Statuto dei Lavoratori" (Italian Law No 300 of 20 May 
1970) prohibits, in Artide 8, inquiries into workers' 
political, religious or trade union persuasions, and into 
any other facts which are not relevant to an assessment of 
the professional behaviour of workers. Thus, any form of 
cataloguing of employees, whether by means of traditional 
files or with personal data banks, is unlawful. 
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Nowadays, in order to avoid a clash between the technical 
requirements of identification and statutory regulations, a 
group rather than an individual code is attributed; in this 
way it can be shown, for instance, that a maintenance team 
has been operating for a certain period, but it is not 
possible from this information to calculate the working 
hours of the individual members of the team. It could be 
that a future law on safeguarding personal data will make it 
possible to relax the prohibition of this form of 
supervision. If that happens, it will be necessary to amend 
this point in the "Statuto dei Lavoratori". 
(3) For the sake of completeness, I should also like 
to mention Law No 98 of 8 April 1974, governing 
t elephone-tapping. This has introduced Article 615 a) 
into the Penal code, entitled "Unlawful invasions of 
privacy". The provisions, although they are concerned 
with confidentiality, do not seem applicable to personal 
data banks and are therefore not dealt with in this 
documen t . 
278 
b) The public order reform law 
It will be easier to harmonize any future Italian law on 
confidentiality with the "Statuto dei Lavoratori" than with 
Law No 121 of 1 April 1981, entitled "New regulations 
governing the organization of public order". Articles 5 to 
12 of this Law contain provisions on the same matters which 
are the subject of the four draft laws examined later. These 
articles comprise the mini-law on the safeguarding of 
personal data which was mentioned at the beginning of this 
paragraph (4). The safeguarding of confidentiality provided 
for under this law is, however, confined to personal data 
that have been processed in a computer centre belonging to 
the police force. Consequently, these provisions cannot be 
invoked when individual confidentiality is violated by data 
banks belonging to private firms or public bodies. As is 
evident, the scope of this Italian mini-law is quite 
restricted and, what is more, incomparable with that of 
foreign laws. Indeed, foreign laws always exclude from their 
scope data banks belonging to the police and those set up in 
the interests of national defence. 
This law gives special powers on personal data banks to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, since it obliges public and 
private bodies to notify the Ministry of the existence of 
their data banks. In fact, a large number of Italian 
organizations and firms notified the Ministry as requested 
by the specified date of 31 December 1981. The reason why 
this information was collected is indicated in Article 8, 
where it is stated that by 31 December 1982 the government 
was to inform Parliament of the information thus gathered 
for the purposes of determining suitable legislation to 
safeguard the right of citizens to confidentiality. 
The first census of personal data banks in Italy gave the 
results set out in Table 1. The overall total of 
approximately 100 000 personal data banks seems rather low. 
Each body or firm is compelled to notify individually every 
personal data bank set up within its own organization. A 
large firm may have more than 100 such banks. It is probable 
that, already in this census, the dichotomy between large 
firms on the one hand and small and medium-sized firms on 
the other could be seen: it is in fact probable that a 
(4) These statutory provisions have to be incorporated into 
Presidential Decree No 378 of 3 May 1982, entitled 
"Regulations concerning the procedures for gathering, 
accessing, communicating, correcting, cancelling and 
incorporating data and information recorded in the 
computerized archives of the data-processing centre 
specified in Article 8 of Law No 121 of 1 April 1981". 
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significant, percentage of data banks have not been reported, 
partly in the belief of those concerned that their specific 
case is not relevant to the purposes of the law. 
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Table 1 
not 
Personal data banks in Italy (1981) 
Notifications by firms 
Notifications by private individuals 
Notifications by various bodies 
Notifications by public authorities 
Notifications by associations with no 
official status 
Total number of notifications 
Total number of personal data banks 
reported approx. 
55 
2 
1 
61 
105 
556 
900 
180 
728 
685 
049 
000 
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1983. 
The notification procedure has to be repeated every year and 
the public order reform law does not envisage that 
Parliament may promulgate a law on privacy. The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs probably intends to continue supplying 
parliament with census results, from which it can derive 
pointers for future law-making. In such a case, however, the 
text drafted by the Mirabelli Committee (with which we will 
be dealing shortly) would have to be coordinated with the 
public order reform law. The Mirabelli bill provides for the 
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setting up of a type of "computer technology magistrature" 
under the auspices of the Presidency of the Council 
governing body. Personal data banks would have to be 
reported to this body by 31 December each year. However, 
according to the public order reform law, this information 
would have to be reported to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs by the same date. 
This duplication would be eliminated by the Marinazzoli 
bill, which provides for a single notification procedure to 
be made to the future surveillance authorities. 
3. THE 1981 DRAFT LEGISLATION (THE ACCAME BILL) 
The first complete bill on safeguarding confidentiality was 
presented to Parliament in 1981 by Mr. Falco Accame (5). The 
Socialist bill originated from an awareness that 
technological developments had already created an 
opportunity for individuals' privacy to be invaded, without 
there being any legislation governing this matter. The 
introductory report points out that this meant that Italy 
was in a position similar to people who had already agreed 
to store explosives while still studying the safety 
instructions on how they should be kept and used. It can be 
said that the situation has not changed between 1981 and the 
present day. 
The Accame bill comprises about 20 articles and, 
consequently, offers some guidelines for safeguarding 
confidentiality rather than itself constituting an 
implementing instrument as such. 
Article 2 contains the basic definitions, from which it can 
be seen that the law is to be applied to data on physical 
persons, when such data have been processed electronically 
(Article 2 ) . Provision is, however, made for the extension 
of this protection to data on legal persons and to data 
processed manually, while the formulation of such provisions 
is delegated to another law. 
The determination of any penalties and the definition of 
exceptions to the law are both deferred to subsequent laws. 
Given such deferments, and the general way in which the 
various principles which inspired the bill are set out, it 
seems clear that the greatest use that can be made of the 
Accame bill today is as a reference point for amending the 
other bills. 
It must be pointed out that it is not clear which State body 
is to be responsible for ensuring that the regulations on 
confidentiality are complied with. From the context, it 
(5) Camera dei deputati, No 2552. Bill tabled by Mr. Accame 
on 21 April 1981, entitled "Provisions to safeguard 
the right to privacy with regard to computerized 
data-processing systems". 
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would appear that that responsibility would fall mainly on 
the Ministry of Justice. The committee referred to in this 
bill does not have any real tasks to perform but simply acts 
as an adviser to the Ministry itself, with a view to 
applying the law more effectively. 
4. THE 1982 DRAFT LEGISLATION (THE PICAÑO BILL) 
At the beginning of 1982, a group of nine Christian Democrat 
Members of Parliament tabled another bill on 
confidentiality (6). This bill contains only 18 articles but 
is more comprehensive than the Accame bill. It makes clear 
provision for a State authority to carry out the necessary 
surveillance. The name of this committee is reminiscent of 
an analogous French institution - the National Commission 
for Data Processing and Civil Liberties. It is interesting 
to observe that this body will not be run by the Government 
but will be the direct responsibility of Parliament. The 
Committee will have a directory of data banks divided into 
two categories: those which need only to be registered and 
those which - on account of the greater sensitivity of the 
personal data on file - are subject to both registration and 
authorizat i on. 
The bill also provides for penalties against those who are 
responsible for data banks and who do not adhere to the 
Committee's rules. However, these penalties are so 
inconsistent as to completely nullify the law: "Failure to 
register on the part of an owner of data or an incorrect 
declaration of information for the purposes of registration 
will incur an administrative fine of between one and three 
million lire, to be increased by a third in the case of 
false declarations" (Article 7 ) . It seems that the 
proponents of this law do not have a clear picture of the 
costs such a law on confidentiality imposes on firms. Faced 
with such light penalties, it may be more convenient for a 
firm to process data unlawfully and to pay a fine than to 
conform with the measures of protection laid down in the 
law. 
The handling of disputes is entrusted to ordinary 
magistrates, "who would have to hear the opinion of the 
surveillance authority" (Article 13). 
Finally, this bill gives a long list of physical and logical 
safety measures for the material protection of the personal 
data on file. 
(6) Camera dei deputati, No 3195. Bill tabled by Messrs. 
Picaño, Degan, Fiori Giovannino, Russo, Ferdianndo, 
Abete, Rubino, Gruppo, Lo Bello and Merolli on 24 
February 1982, entitled "Provisions protecting the right 
to confidentiality of physical persons with respect to 
the computerized processing of data and information". 
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5. THE 1983_ TEXT (THE MIRABELLI BILL) 
While the previous bills mentioned were introduced at the 
initiative of Members of Parliament, the draft legislation 
submitted in 1983 was to have been at the initiative of a 
ministry. In this case, we cannot really refer to it as a 
bill except incorrectly, as the early end of the legislature 
in May 1983 prevented it from being presented by Parliament. 
A committee of twenty lawyers drafted the text of 
37 articles which, given its scope and systematic character, 
supersedes the previous ones and is the obvious reference 
point for any future discussion by Parliament on the 
topic (7). It would take too long here to fully analyse this 
draft law, so I will confine myself to evoking the most 
important points. 
Firstly, in the context of international discussions on who 
the "person" is whose data must be protected, the Mirabelli 
Committee has adopted the widest definition: this law would 
protect data on both physical and legal persons. This 
solution has both advantages and drawbacks; while, on the 
one hand, it can be regarded as positive to extend to the 
maximum the protection conferred by any future law on 
privacy, on the other hand it is rather difficult to 
determine what data are "personal" when speaking about a 
legal person. For example, any large firm stores data on 
competitors, their products, their particular methods or 
organization, etc. In such cases what form would right of 
access on the part of a legal person whose data are stored 
by a competitor take? It is futile today to indulge in any 
abstract exercise predicting the future. Should the 
regulations be adopted, we will have to see what actually 
happens in practice. The fact that nothing might change can 
also not be excluded: any firm wanting to see the data on 
itself stored by another firm runs the risk of a reciprocal 
request and therefore of being obliged to open its own 
confidential archives for inspection. 
As is fitting for a draft law which is government-
instigated, the surveillance body would be directly 
responsible to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers 
(which will no doubt give rise to debates in Parliament). 
The staff of this surveillance body would be predominantly 
lawyers and its management would be the responsibility, 
primarily, of lawyers from the Court of Cassation. The 
practical implications of one aspect of this are not at all 
clear to me. 
(7) "Schema di diesgno di legge concernente l'esercizio 
delle banche di dati personali ad elaborazione 
informatica" ("Outline of a draft law concerning the 
running of computerized personal data banks"), La 
Giustizia, II, 1982, No 12, pp. 25-29. Apart from this 
outline, this issue also contains an accompanying report 
and a commentary by Giuseppe Mirabelli. 
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Two vital points do not seem to have been very well 
developed and it is to be hoped that a debate in Parliament 
will clarify these matters. 
In Article 12 (data custody), too little is said about the 
security measures which would have to be taken by a firm 
operating a personal data bank. This aspect of data 
protection is as fundamental as it is complicated; to solve 
all the problems involved with a single paragraph of only a 
few lines is possibly insufficient. 
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Let us consider a case in which the organization of the firm 
is such that no employee feels capable of assuming the title 
of the one who is "responsible for the data". In the absence 
of such an individual, and as the regulations state that the 
person signing the notification forra to be sent to the 
surveillance office is the one to be held responsible for 
the data, it could happen that notifications will no longer 
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be made, which is one of the crimes punished with the 
penalty stated above. Tn such a situation, to whom would the 
punishment be applied? To the manager of the EDP department? 
To his administrative representative? To the entire board of 
directors? As can be seen, there is scope here for endless 
disputes. What is more, disputes would he heard by ordinary 
magistrates whose proceedings, it must be recalled once 
again, are slow. In other words, there is a risk that the 
law will gradually cease to be applied. 
6. THE FIRST BILL OF 1984 (THE SEPPIA BILL) 
The work of the Mirabelli Committee had already been 
completed and a government-inspired bill was expected, when 
five Socialist members of Parliament presented a bill 
(surprisingly illiberal, to tell the truth) on "personal 
information systems" (8). This designation does not refer to 
"personnel information systems" (or, moro briefly, PIS), 
which have been the subject of heated protest, particularly 
on the part of the trade unions in recent times (9). The 
sponsors of the bill meant any personal data banks by their 
designation, not just those referring to the staff employed 
by a firm or organization, which are nowadays regarded as 
one of the essential tools of general management in a form 
or organization. 
The introductory report mentions two specific reasons for 
concern which led those responsible to draft the bill: the 
regulations contained in the public order reform law 
(already described in paragraph 2, b ) , and discussion 
surrounding the 1981 Italian census: "Worries and suspicions 
were aroused even as the national census form was being 
drawn up, because it was felt that electronic computers 
would be able to investigate an individual by following his 
life from cradle to grave in a modern and anomolous form of 
Welfare State". It should be pointed out, however, that the 
difficulties surrounding this census were in no way 
comparable with those wich accompanied the failure of the 
1981 Dutch and the 1983 German censuses. On those occasions, 
the very idea of the census was rejected lock, stock and 
barrel and as a result could not take place. In Italy, the 
subject of the controversy was much more circumscribed. The 
1981 census form had a box for indicating any vacant 
dwellings; staff employed temporarily to help citizens fill 
in the forms asked to be taken on permanently, took strike 
action and threatened to withhold the census forms and to 
(8) Camera dei Deputati, No 1210. Bill tabled by Messrs. 
Seppia, Alberini, Colucci, Amodeo and Poti and presented 
on 27 January 1984. Rules governing the use of personal 
information systems. 
(9) A brief account of a discussion held with Austrian, 
German and Scandinavian trade unionists can be found in 
my article entitled "Un difficile dibattito sui sistemi 
informativi del personale" (A difficult discussion 
regarding personnel information systems), "Data 
Manager", IX, July-August 1984, No 36, p. 26. 
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make public the data on vacant accommodation. The firm stand 
taken by the Public Prosecutor, who made it quite clear to 
these temporary staff what the consequences of their action 
could be, settled the dispute, but the general public was 
left feeling somewhat concerned. 
While this bill originated, then, from specific 
preoccupations, it was also put forward as a statement 
of highly general principles, concentrated in merely 
11 articles with a large number of internal subdivisions. 
The provisions viewed as a whole are probably more valid as 
a basis for a future Parliamentary debate than as a nucleus 
from which a true and proper law could be developed. I am 
therefore justified in confining myself here to indicating 
only its most characteristic element. 
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7. THE SECOND DRAFT LAW OF 1984 (THE MARTINAZZOLI BILL) 
On 5 May, a bill on the confidentiality of data was 
officially presented by the Government to the Italian 
Parliament (10). The text of the bill drafted by the 
Mirabelli Committee, stymied by the early elections of 1983, 
thus continues to make progress slowly. The number of its 
articles has risen from 37 to 38, since there is now one 
providing for financial cover for any future law. The most 
significant variations, however, can be found in the 
regulations instituting its surveillance body. 
The surveillance 
prepared. Hence 
body must be vigilant and technically well 
it comes as a great surprise to see the 
cumbersome mechanism 
While the person to 
with in six lines, 
detail, including a 
text. Let us examine 
set up by Article 5 of the draft law. 
be held responsible in a firm is dealt 
the surveillance body is described in 
regulation in a quite lengthy legal 
the kind of surveillance body wanted by 
the draft law under study. 
Article 5 states that the 
should be a magistrate 
specifying, however, that 
magistrate. This really is t 
early retirement, appeal ma 
director of such 
from the Court 
he may even 
oo much! Even if 
gistrates tend 
people. How is such a choice compatible wi 
and managerial requirements 
important surveillance body 
ordinary and administrative 
not stipulated in earlier 
In addition, non-managerial 
the State administrations, 
status, and from general 
demanded of such 
? The actual off 
magi strates an 
an organi zat ion 
of Cassation, 
be a reti red 
they have taken 
to be el der 1 y 
th the t echn ica1 
a techn ical and 
icials are to be 
d - an inclusion 
bills - State barr i s ters-at- 1 aw. 
staff can also b 
including those 
e enlisted (from 
with autonomous 
government agencies, including 
those concerned with economic and financial affairs). It is 
(10) Camera dei Deputati, No 1657. Outline of a law 
presented by the Minister of Justice (Mr. Martinazzoli) 
in collaboration with the Minister for Budgets and 
Economic Planning (Mr. Longo) and the Minister for the 
Treasury (Mr. Goria), on the setting up and operating 
of computerized personal data banks. Presented 5 May 
1984. 
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to be hoped that this provision will be sufficient to 
provide the surveillance body with the necessary number of 
technical and secretarial staff so that it can function as 
smoothly as possible. 
The entire staff of the surveillance office would be paid by 
the administrations to which they belong. This matter 
appears crucial enough to be repeated in two successive 
paragraphs with the same content. In fact, this provision 
makes it clear just how an office of this type could 
function with an annual appropriation of only 2 000 million 
lire, as stated in the article on financial cover. 
Indeed, it must be borne in mind that a large number of 
staff would have to make on-the-spot investigations and 
would therefore receive appropriate expenses for their 
assignments. What is more, the particular requirements of 
computer centres would frequently entail working outside the 
normal working hours; as a result, overtime would have to be 
paid. The payment of expenses and overtime fees would be 
borne by the surveillance office, while the original 
administrations would pay staff salaries. If one considers 
the number of staff needed as indicated in the bill, this 
system may give rise to some doubts. 
The organization would appear to be needlessly large. From 
Article 5 it can be calculated that the maximum number of 
staff is in fact 142 people, of whom 72 would have 
decision-making powers (see Table 2). 
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Table 2 
Composition of the surveillance body (Martinazzoli bill) 
D i rector 1 
Deputy Director 1 
State magistrates and barr is ters-at-law 20 
Managers from state administrations 30 
Non-managerial staff 70 
Qualified experts, including outside consultants 20 
Maximum number of staff 142 
The system for financing this future surveillance body is 
even more questionable. As has already been pointed out, the 
provisions state that any administration from which 
officials have been drawn will continue to pay their 
original salaries. This involves placing an additional 
burden on other public bodies, which will hardly be 
enthusiastic about collaborating; if they allow a person to 
go on secondment, they have to make provision for a 
replacement and thus find themselves paying two salaries for 
the same post. Is it possible that the administrations from 
whom technical staff would be drawn (because I persist in 
the hope that such people would be asked to work for this 
office) would be prepared to allow such employees to leave 
when they have always been rare birds in public 
administration? An examination of what is envisaged by the 
draft law may confirm such doubts. 
For the limitation of public experience, however, one must 
turn to the final article, which earmarks 2 000 million lire 
annually to run this surveillance office, drawing such money 
from the fund for supplementary payments of pensions to 
those living abroad. This figure is incompatible with the 
tasks and size of any future surveillance office. With such 
a limited budget, it is not possible to create offices for 
nearly 150 people, equip them with a large computer centre 
so that they can carry out effective controls and administer 
the mass of data which the law would oblige them to store. 
The risk is that the surveillance body, already rather 
unwieldy for its size, would work even more slowly because 
of its lack of technical facilities. 
It would, however, be futile to go into further detail in 
analysing this government-instigated draft law. It is quite 
likely that it will be amended when debated by Parliament 
and if alternative or supplementary bills are tabled. 
8. CONFIDENTIALITY OF STATISTICAL DATA IN THE MARTINAZZOLI 
BILL 
The confidentiality of statistics in Italy is not governed 
by only one law; its profile merges - from frequently vague 
surroundings - from a series of laws issued between 1880 and 
the present day. In this complex mosaic it is sufficient to 
study the most recent addition, that is to say the 
regulation which even nowadays deals with the 
confidentiality of statistics. Article 19 of Italian Decree 
Law No 1285 of 27 May 1929 states: "Items of information 
gathered by means of surveys, and tabulated by the central 
statistical office, whether directly or by means of 
delegated bodies, are to be safeguarded by the most 
scrupulous secrecy and shall not be disclosed, for 
whatsoever reasons, except in a collective form and in a way 
in which no references to individuals can be made. Such 
information may be communicated to judicial authorities only 
when the request is authorized by a summons, order or 
injunction issued in connection with legal proceedings". 
While, in the case of official secrets (Article 326 of the 
Penal Code) and professional secrets (Article 622 of the 
Penal Code) the qualification that the subject is aware of 
the data is essential, in the case of statistics the 
information collected is automatically secret. Riccardo 
Tomei, the author of a well-documented article on this 
subject, correctly observed: "With statistical 
confidentiality, a radical change is taking place in the 
form of a subjective approach, whereby anything learnt from 
a given subject automatically becomes secret, detaching 
itself from its object" (11). 
To guarantee the completeness and reliability of statistical 
data, therefore, the basic principle is that the data 
collected by Istat are generally and strictly confidential. 
Even the tax authorities have to halt before Istat's doors 
(12). However, the expansion of the tasks performed by the 
Welfare State, the demands of an economy which is even more 
closely linked with international markets, and increased 
activities on the part of local authorities (the institution 
of ordinary statute regions in 1971 should not be forgotten) 
all require the increased circulation of data collected by 
the central office. As a result, the principle of 
confidentiality has been subjected to numerous exceptions. 
The law on the organization of the 1981 census laid down an 
explicit exception to this principle, obliging Istat to 
provide "data made anonymous on individual survey units to 
be used for processing of local interest" to those communes, 
provinces and regions asking for them (13). This exception 
was also rendered necessary because it is not clear whether 
the regions are able to carry out sectoral censuses. 
Exclusive responsibility for this rests with Istat and can 
be traced to Law No 120 of 18 January 1934 (for industry and 
agriculture) and Law No 766 of 4 July 1941 (for the 
population). 
Nor is this the only exception to the principle of 
confidentiality of individual data. Each Italian commune 
keeps a register of its resident population; when a census 
(11) Roberto Tornei, Il segreto statistico, "I tribunali 
amministrativi regionali", 1984, No 5-6, p. 184; anyone 
wanting further and pertinent bibliographical 
references on secrecy in the public administration in 
Italy is referred to this text. 
(12) Article 51 of Presidential Decree No 633 of 26 October 
1972 and Article 32 of Presidential Decree No 600 of 
29 September 1973 expressly prohibit any investigation 
into or inspection of statistical data for the purpose 
of taxation. 
(13) Article 2 of Law No 684 of 18 December 1980, under 
which the general population and housing census for 
1981 and the agricultural census for 1982 were held. 
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is held, the Office of Registers uses census data to update 
its own registers (Law No 2228 of 24 December 1954). In a 
similar fashion, the Chambers of Commerce use data from 
industrial censuses to update their own registers of firms 
(Royal Decree No 29 of 4 January 1925). The reasoning behind 
these exceptions is clear: the data are not of a sensitive 
nature and their circulation promotes the proper functioning 
of the offices without harming those to whom the data refer. 
While the Council of State does admit the possibility of 
transmitting statistical data to third parties, it still 
tends to refer to the original principle of strict 
confidentiality, "precisely because of the potential risks 
connected with technological developments", and does so with 
the aim of protecting "primary interests, which are also 
protected by the constitution, of private citizens" (14). 
The debate on secrecy has been quite lively in recent years, 
not only because of the demands of statisticians and 
information agencies, but also because of arguments raised 
concerning the fight against terrorism and because of 
enquiries into irregularities on the part of the police 
forces. In 1981, there was even a conference on the problems 
of confidentiality in the Italian legal system (15). The 
political implications certainly did not facilitate 
discussion on statistical confidentiality. Nevertheless, the 
opinion that these restraints must be slackened to cope with 
today's economic and institutional demands must steadily 
gain ground from now on. 
A current in the opposite direction to this trend among 
statisticians is the Martinazzoli bill, characterized in 
Section IV (Dissemination and communication of data to third 
parties) by greater strictness. Reading the first two 
paragraphs of Article 17, we can note the parallelism with 
the already quoted law from 1929: 1) The subject to whom 
data refer may prohibit their dissemination or communication 
to given categories of third parties. 2) Such prohibition is 
presumed when the data have been collected with the declared 
purpose of a census, an opinion poll, market research or 
similar". The explanatory report appended to the bill 
specifies that in the latter cases "in the person providing 
the data, the conviction has taken root (from consistent 
laws on censuses and on practices in other fields) that the 
data are going to be used and disseminated in a 
depersonalized way; our intention, therefore, is to 
safeguard this trust". 
When safeguarding privacy, too, the rule which eliminates 
statistical secrecy applies only when a formal law exists. 
Indeed, the third paragraph of this' same article states 
(14) Opinion No 1379 of the Council of State, Section I, 
19 February 1982, quoted in the article by Tomei. 
(15) Cf. Atti del convegno nazionale (Rome, 26-28 October 
1982), Padua 1983, which I have not been able to see. 
291 
that: "this prohibition has no effect when the dissemination 
of communication is permitted by law and within the limits 
set down by the law". This provision sets out to facilitate 
the communication of useful data to certain individuals - as 
can be read in the report preceding the bill - "for example 
when exercising the right to news". 
Under the 1929 law, publication of data is permitted "in 
collective form, so that no reference to individuals can be 
made". Article 18 takes up again the spirit of this 
provision - backed up, as we have seen, by the Council of 
State - and states that: 1) Data whose dissemination is 
prohibited may be communicated when this is done in a way 
which makes it impossible to identify the subject and when 
the information is requested for the purpose of study, 
statistical research or similar". This regulation also seeks 
to avoid the formation of obstacles to sociological or 
historical research; in States which already have 
legislation on the confidentiality of personal data there 
have in fact been cases in which the authorities have 
refused to provide the data required, using such legislation 
on privacy as a pretext. In Italy, it will be necessary to 
see whether in practice the fact that communication is only 
"allowed" (but not "obligatory") will be sufficient to 
eliminate or at least to limit refusals on the part of lazy 
or apprehensive bureaucrats. 
The possibility of officials being apprehensive is not so 
fai—fetched. The Martinazzoli bill does not identify 
precisely (as seen at the beginning of the preceding 
paragraph) the person responsible for data, but it does 
state, in Article 19, when dealing with persons whose task 
it is to safeguard confidentiality, that: "The person 
responsible for the data banks shall be considered jointly 
liable with the defaultor for any compensation resulting 
from harm done to an interested party, unless he can prove 
that he did everything possible to prevent the data being 
communicated". This is therefore a civil penalty which is in 
addition to the several penal sanctions for the illicit 
communication of data: imprisonment of between 6 months and 
2 years as laid down in Article 27. 
A second exception to the prohibition of the dissemination 
of data is contained in the second paragraph of Article 18: 
"The communication of data whose dissemination is prohibited 
is nevertheless permitted when requested for purposes 
regarding the defence of the State or as evidence of crimes, 
provided the regulations governing this matter are 
observed". This definition seems to include infringements of 
tax laws, so that the confidentiality of personal data would 
seem to be more limited than that of statistical data. The 
"regulations governing this matter" must be those laid down 
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in the 1929 Law: an item of information can be passed on to 
the judicial authorities only if there is a formal warrant 
for it. For personal data obtained from the census, 
therefore, the same problem that arose from the 1929 Law 
when the 1948 Constitution of the Republic came into force 
crops up again: as a citizen is obliged by law to answer the 
questions in the census form, he can find himself in a 
situation where he is supplying declarations that can be 
used against him; this is, however, in sharp contrast with 
Article 24 of the Constitution, as well as with "the 
principle nemo tenetur prodere contra se ipsum, which, from 
the time of the English Revolution, has constituted a basis 
for all legal regulations in the civilized world and is 
thought to be in force in our own constitutional 
system" (16). 
A Parliamentary debate on these provisions contained in the 
Martinazzoli bill could therefore constitute an opportunity 
for airing a whole series of problems connected with 
obsolete Italian legislation on statistical secrecy while we 
wait for the reform of the public statistical system to take 
shape. 
9. TOWARDS SECOND-GENBRATION LAWS 
The delay with which Italian politicians are tackling the 
question of legislation on confidentiality is not 
necessarily a bad thing, even if within the EEC France has 
had a law on computers and civil liberties since 1978 and 
Germany since 1977. 
Italy may be lagging behind these States with regard to 
legislation, but it is still in time to take account of 
their experiences. Safeguarding personal data is an 
unexplored and tricky area in which good principles will 
often risk being sacrificed for the demands of reality. This 
is particularly true when reality is a long and serious 
economic crisis such as our country is experiencing in 1984 
without any end in sight. While the Italian Parliament is 
just receiving a draft law modelled on OECD proposals and 
which is in line with the other main European bodies of law, 
the latter are just about to be amended. Before the Italian 
bill is passed, it would be advisable to heed as much as 
possible innovations on the part of those who already have 
years of practical experience in the protection of personal 
data. 
A change of course in the laws on the protection of personal 
data is certainly not due to a lessening of interest in 
citizens' rights. In the last few years, there has been a 
steady increase in the amount of concern for and interest in 
(16) Sandulli and Baldassarre, Profili costituzionali della 
statistica in Italia, in "Diritto e società", 1973, 
p. 388. 
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problems linked with the spread of computer technology in 
daily life. Workers have learned to their cost how tightly 
the screws of control can be turned at the workplace if such 
control is entrusted to a computer. The individual citizen, 
as a user of public and private services, wonders with some 
concern what might become of the hundreds of "magnetic 
traces" which he leaves behind him when paying his taxes, 
enrolling in a union, subscribing to a newspaper, booking a 
flight, attending a school, participating in the public 
health scheme, and so on. Such fears were the source of the 
initial laws on safeguarding personal data. The passage of 
time has only confirmed them. Since the first discussions 
were held on these topics - around 1965 - the only thing 
that has changed is the technology of computers. Nowadays it 
is acknowledged that the laws from ten years ago were 
drafted to tackle a technological danger which turns out to 
be different from the one envisaged. 
People at that time started from the premise that it would 
be possible to have processors at the centre of a network of 
terminals, via which a computer's own data-processing 
capacity and data would be made available over a territory 
which would become ever larger until the whole world was 
included. It was thought that the trend in computer 
technology for centring large computers in a few places and 
from there disseminating the information stored, would 
persist. This proved to be wrong: computers have got smaller 
and have become more independent, more scattered throughout 
the country and more difficult to coordinate and to 
supervise. This development in the technology, which differs 
from what had been expected even up to ten years ago, 
threatens the laws on data protection which are already in 
force. 
Proposals have therefore been made to amend them to take 
account of new technological realities. Second-generation 
laws already conflict with those of the first generation, 
now superseded. 
A central point in any law on the confidentiality of 
personal data is the provision requiring any public or 
private body to report to a specially set up surveillance 
body, describing the content and purposes of the personal 
data banks that it manages. It is immediately obvious that 
the inspiration behind this regulation is a concept of 
computer technology which is now outdated. A system of 
notification (and related controls) would have been simple 
if the management of computers had been concentrated in a 
few computer centres of ever increasing size. Instead, since 
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we are in a situation where personal computers are becoming 
ever more widespread, there is a risk that surveillance 
offices will be swamped with irrelevant declarations, which 
will prevent their staff from dealing with really essential 
monitoring tasks. 
Of course, there are ways in which the flood of 
notifications could be stemmed. Very small firms and private 
individuals could be exempted; a simplified method of 
notification could be envisaged for certain categories of 
manufacturers, provided that the personal data which such 
people manage are not in fact too sensitive. 
Nevertheless, the spread of computers is creating new 
opportunities for attacks on personal data by making it 
possible to gain illegal access to them. Anyone with a 
personal computer linked up to a telephone line can try to 
break down the defences of any data bank. Such an activity 
may be deliberately unlawful, such as in the case of 
procuring information to be sold, or - as has been 
experienced in the United States - it may be purely a prank 
or vandalism. Some individuals get a thrill out of sneaking 
entry into economic data banks and changing the account 
figures of individuals or firms, thereby provoking enormous 
rows between litigants who are acting in perfectly good 
faith. Some people enjoy wiping out data on file, just as 
they might enjoy smashing up a park bench or telephone box. 
Since this is a reality, the legal protection of data on 
citizens must be backed up by a whole series of precise 
security measures. Physical and logical security implies the 
incorporation of protective measures into buildings and 
machines on the one hand and into programs on the other. 
Such security measures are becoming increasingly 
indispensable, but they are hardly mentioned in Italian 
draft legislation. 
One way of preventing the build-up of a mountain of 
notifications to the surveillance body would be by means of 
a software certificate. In other words, a company selling 
programs could ask the surveillance body to study its 
product and acknowledge that it conforms with the purposes 
of the law. Any firm using such a program would know that it 
was doing so in accordance with the law. For its part, the 
surveillance body would not have to ask for documentation 
from firms using programs which had already been approved. 
This subject is not tackled in the bill, but it would 
perhaps be worthwhile bearing it in mind when an 
implementing regulation is prepared in order to facilitate 
the tasks of any future surveillance office. 
The way in which such an office is to function is indeed the 
most delicate point of the entire draft law: if it is too 
slow in carrying out its work, the whole law will not only 
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be useless but could also be harmful if it causes holdups in 
the production of firms or impedes the work of public bodies 
involved in any disputes. 
I should like to conclude my remarks by pointing out the 
dangers of a failure to implement any future Italian law on 
confidentiality. While the Martinazzoli bill provides for 
severe penalties, some points of the law (if the currnet 
formulation is kept) will be difficult to apply and the law 
itself will need an implementing regulation to be issued by 
the Presidency of the Council. These and other reasons could 
lead to the law on the protection of personal data not being 
enforced. Basically, Italy must promulgate this law if it 
wants to participate freely in the transnational flow of 
personal data. At the moment international reciprocity is 
based on purely formal considerations: if there is a law 
safeguarding confidentiality and if there is a surveillance 
office to take care of its enforcement, reciprocity cannot 
be denied. The practical problems of the time taken to 
settle disputes and the actual application of the rules are 
separate from such considerations. 
As the risks raised by the use of computer technology are 
real, any future law on confidentiality will have to be more 
than just a screen behind which anything goes on. 
DISCUSSION 
Dr. DAMMANN (Referatsleiter, Bundesbeauftragter für den 
Datenschutz, Bonn) opened the discussion : 
He remarked that the situation described in the paper of 
Professor Losano was typical of that in a number of European 
countries in which a general data protection law still had 
to be prepared. However, there was sufficient time to draft 
data protection laws for certain subjects. He had the 
impression that Italy was making a virtue out of necessity 
and was formulating data protection rules for specific areas 
which would serve as models for other countries. 
It must be noted, and this applied not only to Italy, that 
among the motivating factors for data protection was the 
fear that national information processing industries might 
suffer in the field of international competition if no such 
legislation existed. The rumour would persist that there was 
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an exclusive club of European countries which, because of 
data protection arrangements, occupied a favoured position 
in this new and expanding market. In fact there were few 
countries which controlled cross-frontier data transfers and 
even here this was not in the form of legal restriction but 
simply as procedural rules supervised by data protection 
agencies. For the man in the street it would be regrettable 
if consideration of data protection were more influenced by 
economic factors than by questions of personal liberty in 
the computer era. The big difficulties and delays which data 
protection had encountered in some countries led one to 
believe that governments feared the subject almost as much 
as the public feared computers. The first data protection 
laws gave the impression that the subject had primarily a 
preventive function; active data protection should prvent 
stresses, frictions and injuries similar to those caused by 
damage to the environment arising in connection with files 
of information. Dr. Dammann remarked that Professor Losano 
in his presentation had proposed a second-generation data 
protection system and explained what he meant by this: 
(a) Data protection should not be based on the methods of 
yesterday involving large processing centres but rather 
on today's information techniques, wherever possible 
with an eye to their future development. 
Professor Losano suggested operating a modern, 
economic data-protection system with the help of 
software-certificates. The idea of data protection 
certificates could also be extended to hardware. These 
ideas were good in principle but because of particular 
factors, could lead only to limited gains. 
- Software, both job-related and system-related, needed 
to be updated frequently; the certificate must be 
updated likewise. 
- With regard to the capabilities of a large computer, 
it was very difficult to guarantee that undesirable 
operations were impossible on technical grounds. 
- Hardware and software were simply elements in a 
security system which also depended on organization, 
personnel and arrangement in the buildings themselves: 
total security was no better than the weakest link in 
the system. 
(b) Supervision played a vital role in the implementation of 
data protection. Dr. Dammann shared the concern that 
data protection might be condemned to failure by reason 
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of a bureaucratic structure in the arrangements for its 
supervision. In this context he referred to the changes 
in the technology for treating information. As automatic 
data processing became more and more widespread, there 
should be corresponding changes in the reaction of data 
protectionists. The supervision of data protection 
should not consist of the exhaustive noting, registering 
and sanctioning of every detail of processing 
procedures, but rather the selective examination of 
those sectors or applications which involved a heavy 
response burden, restriction of freedom or risk for the 
individual. Finally, those exercising supervisory 
functions should not only control and resolve 
difficulties but should, above all, give advice to data 
processing centres and thereby lead to a continuous 
improvement in practical data protection. 
(c) It was also true of the sanctions that what was needed 
was an optimum and not a maximum. Professor Losano 
rightly criticized the draconian penalties previewed by 
the Italian draft law not only for unauthorized 
disclosure but also the possession of data obtained 
improperly as well as errors arising from inadequate 
security measures. Had there been such laws in Germany, 
a large number of officials would have found themselves 
in prison after each data protection investigation. Dr. 
Dammann concluded with a question to the Italian 
representative: Article 17 of the Martinazzoli draft 
previewed statistical secrecy that should also cover 
scientific research and opinion surveys. Article 18, 
however, made an exception from the obligation of 
secrecy when a question of national defence or 
investigation of crime was involved. Were such 
wide-ranging exceptions really proposed? Did they apply 
to national statistics? Did this not involve a 
substantial reduction in force, which threatened 
confidence in the secrecy of statistical data? 
Mr. COX (U.S. Bureau of the Census) made two comments from 
the standpoint of statistical methodology relevant not only 
to Mr. Cariani 's paper but also more broadly: 
(1) It was found in the US Bureau of the Census that the 
statistical matching of data from different inquiries at 
different dates was very difficult in the absence of 
registration numbers and relying simply on names and 
addresses. Indeed, just comparing and matching address 
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lists to maintain the computerized geographic reference 
systems (which contained no information on persons) was 
an area of continuing serious research. 
(2) The US Bureau of the Census was the terminal point of a 
one-way-street in the decentralized US statistical 
system, so that all the data it released must be 
depersonalized. However, within the Bureau, and 
certainly within the US statistical system as a whole, 
the term "depersonalized" had no precise technical 
meaning.This was because measures of disclosure risk, 
whether de facto or absolute risk, were lacking. Studies 
were being pursued in this area. Regarding the 
discussion of the importance of public confidence and 
perception, it seemed that people in statistical offices 
must first convince others and be sure themselves that 
data on persons were secure and depersonalized. The way 
to do so was to develop standard, statistically 
defensible methods of measuring and reducing disclosure 
risk. Equally important, it should be possible to assess 
and measure the effects of such methods on data quality 
and completeness. Mr. Cox said that he would be most 
interested in mutual exchangee of information of a 
technical nature in the areas of data matching and 
disclosure avoidance. 
Mr. FERREIRA DA CUNHA (Istituto Nacional de Estatistica, 
Lisbon) made the point: 
A bill had been submitted to the Portuguese Parliament by 
the Government on the protection of personal data. The delay 
in comparison with other European countries was due to the 
fact that Portugal had signed Convention 105 of the Council 
of Europe only on 14 May 1981 and that, in accordance with 
its Article 4 which required the adaptation of internal 
legislation, this had been done in 1982 at the time when the 
Constitution was being revised. The constitutional law, 
contained in its Article 35 provided that: 
(1) All citizens had the right to be informed of the content 
of computer registers concerning them and, having regard 
to the purpose of the information, might demand any 
necessary rectifications. 
(2) The access of third parties to these registers was 
forbidden as was linkage between registers, and 
cross-frontier transfers of data except in circumstances 
specified by law. 
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(3) Computer processing could not be used for data 
concerning political, philosophical or religious views, 
nor for political or trade-union affiliations except in 
the case of anonymized statistical data. 
(4) The law defined the concept of personal data for the 
purposes of computer registers. 
(5) The attribution of a single national number to each 
citizen was forbidden. 
The National Institute of Statistics, Lisbon, participated 
in the work of the inter-ministerial informatics commission 
which was asked by the Government to give its opinion on the 
draft law on data protection. 
Mr. Ferreira da Cunha considered that statisticians, 
confronted with the new environment for the production of 
statistics, should make their voices heard on the subject of 
data protection legislation in the same way as for other 
proposals of a legal nature having a bearing on statistics. 
Mr. QUATRESOOZ (European Society for Opinion and Marketing 
Research, Amsterdam) remarked as fol lows : 
Having listened to the two days' discussion, it was clear 
that the market research organistions he represented shared 
many beliefs and concerns in common with official 
statisticians in facing the current situation. The 
parallelism with Mr. Cariani's paper was impressive and even 
striking. 
Following the sequence of the paper, he referred to a few of 
the concerns expressed and looked at them from the somewhat 
specific point of view of the market researcher. 
1. After describing the current EDP technological evolution, 
Mr. Cariani asked a question: would such an evolution 
reinforce the democratic process or would it work against 
it, weaken it? 
As far as ESOMAR's activities were concerned, they 
believed that they served the democratic thinking and 
interests of the public at large. They indeed provided to 
the silent majority the opportunity to express itself 
freely and to know - in return- something about the real 
state of public opinion (independent of what the media 
and other pressure groups wished to propose as the 
general convictions). 
300 
For example, carrying out on-line opinion polls using 
Minitel and providing the information to everybody helped 
to protect democracy against demagogy. Their profession 
was operating as a bi-directional transmitter. 
2. Attacks on private life were mentioned quite a few times, 
not only in the Italian paper but also during previous 
discussion. He felt they were of much less concern to 
ESOMAR because their activity was based on sample 
surveys. They were, in any case, primarily interested in 
the behaviour and the opinions of groups of people, not 
of individuals as such. As a result, their data could be 
made anonymous as soon as possible in the process of 
compilation; their code of ethics was coping with this 
point very precisely. 
3. The right for the public to be informed was also covered 
in the Italian paper. That was precisely what they wished 
to protect and what they were ready to fight for. There 
must be general freedom to collect and exchange 
information, provided that such information was obtained 
according to strict professional principles and was 
objectively and responsibly handled. The right of bona 
fide research should be available to any person or 
organization which conformed to accepted and acceptable 
professional practice. 
In some instances, legislation had tried to distinguish 
separately: 
- Scientific ... equated with Academic and/or Official 
and 
- Commercial ... i.e. profit-oriented and consequently 
not scientific! 
ESOMAR could not agree with any system which provided 
some organization or bodies with the exclusive right -
and the impressive power - of being the only institutions 
to know about, to report on (and to act on?) the state of 
public opinion. In any case, most of the research for 
public and academic bodies was in practice carried out on 
their behalf by private research companies and 
vice-versa, - academics took commercial clients. 
4. As far as security/protection of the files was concerned 
ESOMAR believed that the correct solution to the data 
privacy problem lay in strong and secure protection of 
the address files as such. Data should be made anonymous 
as soon as possible. Once they had been separated from 
the addresses, the data should not then need to be 
subjected to the same rigorous security controls. The 
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legislation went too far when it claimed that otherwise 
anonymous data were still to be treated as identifiable 
as long as names and addresses exist anywhere in the 
survey organization! 
The juridical protection of the confidentiality of 
personal data was definitely necessary but it should 
remain realistic and duly take into account other 
existing rights such as the freedom to conduct research 
and to report on it. The side-effects of data protection 
laws could, in the out-turn, create further dangers. It 
was important that the public should not get the 
impression that, because of such legislation, they should 
cease to provide any personal information whatsoever. 
ESOMAR experience had proven that the concerns and 
necessities of the profession could be duly taken into 
account in the development of appropriate and efficient 
data protection laws in countries where their 
representatives were involved in the preliminary 
discussion; the United Kingdom was a good example of that 
kind. In other cases, they had been threatened by 
legislation which was not originally directed against 
research but which introduced restrictive clauses asking 
for impossibilities, for example: 
a) The request to inform the respondent of the detailed 
aims and objectives of the research: 
The resulting dangers of biased answers, lack of 
objectivity in the research, etc. from such a 
requirement were obvious. It would alBO run the risk 
of discouraging the public from freely volunteering 
information in the ways they had been quite happy to 
do hitherto. ESOMAR must insist that such a 
requirement - especially in its more extreme forms -
would in practice make research less scientific. 
Indeed it would make some types of research virtually 
impossible, including certain research which the law 
courts and legislators themselves favoured (e.g. in 
cases of "passing off" substitute products, public 
awareness and understanding of various issues, 
potentially misleading advertising etc.) 
b) A requirement for the respondent's written consent to 
the interview: 
The likely effects of overall refusal rates, 
differential response among different groups of the 
population, etc. were again obvious. The respondent's 
power to stop the interview at any stage should be 
quite sufficient protection. ESOMAR surveys had always 
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been of the voluntary type! They protected this right 
and needed it! But they feared that the applications 
of such strict rules would run the risk of 
discouraging the public from freely volunteering 
information in the ways they had been quite happy to 
do hitherto. 
c) Limitations on the transfer to the researcher of data 
coming: 
- from the body commissioning the research 
- from public authorities 
- from other sources such as direct-mail providing 
address lists and similar information. 
d) Limitations on the transfer of data cross borders, 
even within the same organization. 
e) Regulations governing the release of research findings 
or even to subject these to a certain type of 
"censorship". 
ESOMAR could produce an even larger list of practical 
impossibilities. But these few examples were sufficient for 
illustrating the dangers their profession was currently 
facing in some countries ... and this quite often mainly 
because matters were being confused. In the current state of 
the art, the public was particularly apprehensive about the 
secondary uses governmental agencies could make of the 
personal information they provided. 
Mr. Quatresooz remarked that the levels of response rate 
they achieved when inviting people to comment, voluntarily, 
on their reading habits or their cars were much higher than 
those he had heard mentioned in several instances for 
official Censuses. People became, for example, more 
reluctant when asked if their car was equipped with a radio 
- simply because that might have some kind of relationship 
with taxation concerns! 
In summarizing the ESOMAR position, Mr. Quatresooz said 
that: 
- they were open to dialogue on the subject and wished to be 
involved in all preliminary work on legislation in 
development, 
- they were, in this context, delighted to have been invited 
to take part to this Seminar and expressed warm thanks to 
the EUROSTAT for this, 
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they had appointed a highly specialized lawyer - Dr. 
Schweizer, located in Munich, Federal Republic of Germany; 
with this help, ESOMAR acted as a clearing house and as a 
consultant for national research bodies; any kind of 
exchange of information with organizations participating 
in the Seminar would in the context be welcome, 
they would continue to press for the general acceptance 
that self-regulation procedures were adequate safeguards. 
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Professor Losano thought the gradual introduction of data 
protection through regulations relating to particular 
sectors would be beneficial, if these could ultimately be 
combined into a general framework of data protection 
legislation. However, he feared that such a development 
could not come about in this way in Italy as the legislation 
concerning data protection for the different sectors was the 
concern of different ministries, often with conflicting 
interests; there was no central authority to prepare the 
overall data protection legislation. 
With regard to the severe penalties mentioned in the draft 
legislation described in the paper, there was normally 
little possibility of these being applied, even if the 
legislation were enacted. As there were no special courts in 
Italy, all such laws would have to be enforced through the 
normal courts. The delays involved were likely to be so 
great as to defeat the purpose of the penalties. 
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THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF STATISTICAL DATA 
E. STILIARIS 
with the assistance of other NSSG officials 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF STATISTICAL DATA IN THE EEC 
Statisticians have always maintained that data 
confidentiality is a basic precondition for ensuring 
the accuracy and, in general, the success of statistical 
programmes. The guarantee of confidentiality creates 
an environment within which it is possible to ensure a 
high-level obligation to supply information, the success of 
a statistical programme largely depends on the voluntary 
cooperation of the respondents. One element which encourages 
this cooperation is the assurance given to the respondent 
that he will not be running any risk by replying correctly 
to the interviewer's questions in the course of a survey. 
The most usual and suitable way of providing this assurance 
is for the statistical service to ensure that the replies 
are kept confidential. 
In the Community Member States the confidentiality of 
statistical data is protected by statutes which lay down 
special rules on statistical secrecy, i.e. the conditions 
under which data gathered for statistical ends may be used. 
Statisticians in all the Member States are obliged to 
observe certain provisions concerning secrecy in respect of 
the information which they obtain in the exercise of their 
profession. This secrecy principle is encountered in many 
professions and, particularly in the case of civil servants, 
is often known as professional secrecy. Professional secrecy 
relates only to the individual who has an adequate amount of 
information. On the other hand, statistical secrecy 
reinforces professional secrecy and, we might say, 
transcends it. This is because statistical secrecy must be 
observed not only by the individual but by the statistical 
service itself. 
The legal provisions on statistical secrecy differ from one 
Community country to another. Although there are two extreme 
cases, most of these provisions refer briefly to a general 
principle of confidentiality, in accordance with which it is 
forbidden to divulge personal data. 
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2. THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF STATISTICAL DATA IN THE NATIONAL 
STATISTICAL SERVICE OF GREECE (NSSG) - MEASURES TO ENSURE 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
As we have already said, observance of the principle of 
confidentiality of statistical data contributes 
substantially towards the creation of a climate of 
confidence between the Statistical Service and those who 
provide the data, with the result that the data collected 
are more correct and more reliable. The management of the 
National Statistical Service of Greece also realize the 
importance of this principle and, shortly after the NSSG was 
reorganized, ensured that it was enshrined in Decree-Law No 
3627 of 1955. 
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Staff recruited by the National Statistical Service of 
Greece for the collection of data are strictly bound to 
statistical secrecy. Article 40 of Decree-Law No 3627 states 
that "any official of the Statistical Service responsible 
for the collection and processing of statistical 
information, who reveals confidential personal data to third 
parties or to another government service, shall be liable to 
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a fine of up to 10 000 metallic drachmas or to imprisonment 
of up to one year or to both of these penalties, and to the 
disciplinary penalties set out in Law No 1811/1951 on civil 
servants". 
In order to assist the NSSG in its mission and to facilitate 
the work of its interviewers, the law contains special 
provisions which stipulate that the various respondents must 
provide any data required by the NSSG in the context of 
compulsory surveys. In particular, Article 37 of Decree Law 
No 3627/156 makes it incumbent on all civilian authorities 
at national and local government level, and on all military 
and church authorities, on all State organizations and their 
staff, to provide any information required by the NSSG in 
the execution of its work. Article 38 of this Law places the 
same duty on all federations and guilds, cooperatives, firms 
and organizations and on all private individuals. In both 
cases severe sanctions may be imposed on persons who refuse 
to cooperate with the NSSG. Finally, Article 39 of 
Decree-law No 3627 provides for the imposition of sanctions 
on anyone who slanders the work of the NSSG or hinders the 
work of those responsible for collecting statistical data. 
Apart from the statutory measures for ensuring the 
observance of the confidentiality principle, the National 
Statistical Service of Greece also takes preventive measures 
to ensure statistical secrecy. It takes steps to convince 
the public that personal data will be treated as 
confidential. Thus the word "confidential" is printed on the 
questionnaires. Likewise in correspondence with respondents 
who are obliged to provide statistical information and in 
statements in the press and other mass media, it is made 
clear that personal data will not be used in such a way as 
to provide any opportunity for investigating the economic 
situation of the respondents and on a more general level, 
that their rights, priviliges and benefits will not be 
interfered with. In addition the enumerators and 
interviewers are given clear instructions to point out to 
respondents that their answers will be treated 
confidentially. 
Other non-statutory measures are also adopted by the NSSG in 
line with the nature and specific features of the survey in 
question. Specifically, in the Annual Industry Survey (AIS), 
data may be published on branches of economic activity in 
which there are fewer than three undertakings (firms). This 
is because when there is only one undertaking in a branch 
the data are personal and cannot be published. Similarly, 
when there are two undertakings in a branch, each of the two 
competitors can obtain data on the other by subtracting its 
own figures from the total. In the household budget survey 
and the consumer behaviour survey, the name and address of 
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Finally it should be pointed out that only staff who are 
directly concerned have access to the personal 
questionnaires used in the various surveys and censuses and 
that they are instructed to take care to avoid any leakage 
of personal data. 
Following our examination of Greek statutory measures to 
ensure the confidentiality of personal data and the measures 
taken by the NSSG with the same objective in mind, we may 
conclude that the secrecy of personal data is fully assured 
in Greece, in respect of information relating to both the 
private and economic sphere. In addition, the fact that up 
to now the Greek courts have never had to try a case 
involving the infringement of statistical secrecy further 
substantiates the above conclusion. 
II. THE GREEK EXPERIENCE 
1. WHAT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED AS CONFIDENTIAL? 
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In general, the NSSG treats all personal information as 
confidential. Almost all the NSSG's questionnaires in which 
personal data are collected bear the mention "confidential". 
However, there are cases in which only particular questions 
in a questionnaire are characterized as confidential. 
Specifically, in the questionnaire used in the census of 
industrial undertakings, the only data considered as 
confidential are those which relate to employment and the 
nature and magnitude of the energy sources used by the firm 
(undertak ing) . 
2. REACTION OF THE RESPONDENTS (HOUSEHOLDS, FIRMS, ETC.) TO 
THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE DATA, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE 
TO THE GENERAL POPULATION CENSUS 
The reaction of the various respondents (individuals, 
households, undertakings, etc.) to the obligation to provide 
statistical data is based on a general fear that the data 
which they provide for a particular end may be used in such 
a way as to affect their private, family, social or economic 
life. Primarily, this reaction is considered to be a 
function of the respondent's income and financial standing 
in general, and of his character, level of education, and 
the degree to which he is informed about the mission and 
work of his country's statistical service. 
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When the unit under investigation is the firm or undertaking 
(survey of retail sales, annual industrial survey, survey of 
products, labour cost survey, e t c . ) , reluctance to provide 
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The General Population Census is the largest survey 
conducted by the NSSG. It is the oldest survey in Greece and 
has always been carried out successfully. Great importance 
is attached to it, both by the statistical authorities and 
the government, and it is the best­known NSSG survey in 
Greece. Census day is the day of the Statistical Service in 
Greece. 
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Thus it may be superfluous to point out that the NSSG has 
very rarely encountered refusals to provide data during the 
General Population Census. Even 
people have refused to cooperate, 
confidentiality of personal data 
never been mentioned as a reason. 
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It should also be mentioned that apart from the restriction 
on statistical information and the impossibility of 
publishing the maximum amount of decentralized statistical 
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data, observance of the confidentiality principle leads to 
time lags in publishing the data, loss of valuable time for 
the NSSG, and financial burdens for the State in general. 
This is because the procedure of identifying the 
confidential data and of preparing the various groupings 
required in order to present the data in a manner suitable 
for publication is expensive both in terms of time and 
money. 
4. PRECONDITIONS FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA 
The principle of confidentiality should protect the 
respondents (private individuals, households, undertakings, 
etc.) from any consequences which might result from the 
disclosure of data which concern them. In this respect the 
NSSG must act with great circumspection and avoid any 
presentation or analysis of data which is not acceptable to 
the parties concerned. 
The NSSG can achieve this objective by assuring the 
respondents that no use will be made of their personal data 
by third parties without their personal consent. 
The NSSG can adopt this course in a number of cases. 
Specifically, in the products survey in the secondary 
sector, it is permissible to publish data on undertakings, 
even when there are fewer than three in a branch, but only 
after the respondents have given their personal consent in 
the form of a signed letter. Otherwise publication is not 
permitted. Thus, when we encounter the characteristic three 
dots in a NSSG publication, this means that data (on 
products) are available but that the respondent has refused 
to allow them to be published. 
It should also be pointed out that pursuant to Article 36(2) 
of Decree-Law No 3627/2956, the NSSG provides a certificate 
based on the respondent's personal questionnaire to the 
respondent only, who is free to use it as he chooses. 
Finally, it should be noted that, pursuant to Article 44 of 
Decree-Law No 3627/1956, confidential personal data to whose 
publication the respondent has not consented may be provided 
by the NSSG only to the Directorate of National Accounts at 
the Ministry of the National Economy (see below). 
5.OBSERVANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY VIS-A-VIS OTHER STATE 
AGENCIES (EXCEPT FOR TAX AUTHORITIES) - PROBLEMS 
ENCOUNTERED 
Observance of the confidentiality principle presupposes a 
certain fucntional independence of the Statistical Service 
from the administrative, judicial and police authorities, as 
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well as from the Government itself. The Statistical Service 
must not only be under an obligation but also in a position 
to refuse to communicate personal data to these agencies. 
For a government to use personal data gathered in the course 
of statistical surveys for administrative ends, e.g. in 
combating tax evasion, infringements of price controls, 
etc., would be a short-sighted policy which would ultimately 
be the end of the statistics. 
Despite this fact in a number of countries the law provides 
for the waiving of the principle of statistical secrecy in 
particular cases. Generally, such exceptions should be rare 
and justified. They include cases in which there is a need 
to provide confidential data to a government service and, 
while it is not planned to use these data at the expense of 
the respondents, the general confidentiality rule forbids 
disclosure. 
Article 44(7) of Decree-Law No 3627/1956 entitles the NSSG 
to provide the independent Directorate of National Accounts 
at the Ministry of the National Economy with any statistical 
information which it needs. The Decree-Law states that "with 
a view to fulfilling its objectives the Directorate of 
National Accounts may use information and personal and 
gérerai statistical data collected directly by the National 
Statistical Service of Greece or by its various services". 
6. THE NSSG AND DATA KEPT BY OTHER AGENCIES 
Statistical Services are free to use personal data which 
have been published by other agencies, provided they 
identify the source, in their publications and studies. In 
Malte, for example, foreign trade figures prepared by the 
customs authorities are published by the national 
statistical service under the responsibility of the customs 
authori ties. 
Cooperation between the various agencies which possess 
statistical data should not be restricted to publication of 
these data, as in the above case. 
Rather, this cooperation should be more far-reaching, 
extending to as many stages as possible, including the 
collection, processing, presentation and analysis of the 
statistical data. This is the way to improve statistical 
information both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Up to now it has not been possible to bring about such 
cooperation between the NSSG and the other bodies which keep 
statistical data in Greece. Shortcomings in organization, 
programming and coordination along with other practical 
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problems, such as the use of different coding systems, rule 
out an easy solution. However all the parties involved are 
endeavouring to improve the situation. 
7. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE GREEK EXPERIENCE 
The confidentiality of individual data relating to private 
and family life and of personal data of a purely economic 
nature is fully assured in Greece. 
Cases of refusal to furnish data, be it on the part of 
households or firms, are relatively rare. In the case of 
questions of a personal nature the reactions of respondents 
is conditioned by the degree to which they consider the 
questions indiscreet (e.g. in the fertility survey, 
respondents frequently refuse to answer the questions put to 
them, because of their particular nature). In the case of 
questions of an economic nature the responses depend on the 
extent to which the respondents are convinced that the 
Statistical Service will ensure that their answers remain 
completely confidential. 
Adequate and timely information of the public on the 
importance of collecting statistical data and on the NSSG's 
mission is of decisive importance in solving the problems 
which arise from public suspicion that personal answers will 
not be kept confidential. 
The principle of confidentiality of personal data restricts 
statistical information when the NSSG wishes to publish 
statistical data at a level of small geographical sub-units 
and branches of economic activity, because in these cases 
the data are personal. 
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contain data identifying the units interviewed (name, 
surname, address, etc.). In addition, during the various 
stages of computer processing of the respondents' personal 
data, only a very small number of specialized personnel have 
access to these data, and these personnel change from one 
stage to another. 
In the context ' of the new technology, the statistical 
services of various countries proceeded to create special 
data base management systems which have been geared to meet 
statistical requirements. These systems were first developed 
in the United States and Canada, where they have been 
operating very successfully. In Europe too, programmes for 
the organization and functioning of data base management 
systems are now being systematically developed, and data 
banks of this kind are already operating in most Community 
Member States. 
There are many convincing arguments for creating information 
systems based on operating statistical data banks. They 
include the need to make the best possible use of data 
derived from a wide range of statistics, the exploitation of 
chronological series of statistical data which have been 
stored in a large variety of magnetic carriers and the need 
for rapid production of statistics both at domestic and 
international level. In a computer centre with a large range 
of files it is very difficult to provide timely and accurate 
information to all users of statistics without a statistical 
data bank. One great advantage of such a data bank is that 
it provides greater assurance that respondent's personal 
data will not be revealed, i.e. that confidentiality will be 
observed, by the various users having different levels of 
access depending on the confidentiality level of the final 
data. 
2. THE GROWING CONCERN OF RESPONDENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
In recent years there has been growing concern about the 
possibility of linking computer-based statistical data 
systems in such a way as to create files containing personal 
information on private individuals and firms - information 
which, accordingly, is liable to be disclosed. There are 
fears that by identifying private transactions the secrets 
of the firms or individuals may be disclosed, along with 
their patterns of behaviour, activities which by definition 
are of a private nature. An equally disturbing fact, in 
particular for business people, is the fear that the data 
contained in these personal files may be used in such a way 
as to prevent them from obtaining credit, from employing 
personnel or from achieving various other objectives. 
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Similarly, many firms, while they do not doubt the goodwill 
of the Statistical Service, do not trust its personnel and 
fear that the statistics may be used for industrial 
espionage, something which is difficult to prove. The 
computer is seen as a device for comparing and analysing 
data on various aspects of the individual's economic and 
social relationships and for using this information to 
restrict the freedom - in the wider sense of the term - of 
the individual or firm. 
The above comments are indicative of the widespread public 
fear that the data people provide for statistical purposes 
may have adverse effects on themselves and they reflect 
respondents' concern for confidentiality. Accordingly, in 
developing statistical systems the following basic 
principles should be observed: 
1) when personal data for the statistical system are 
requested from private individuals or firms, the 
respondents should be informed, as to whether they are 
legally obliged to provide these data or not and as to 
the possible consequences for themselves which may arise 
from providing the information required or refusing to do 
so. 
2) The statistical service must assure the private 
individual or firm that no use will be made of their 
personal data without their personal consent. 
3) The statistical service must also state that personal 
data on private individuals and firms will not be 
communicated under the terms of any compulsory legal 
procedure, except when the interested parties have the 
opportunity to inspect these data prior to their being 
divulged. 
3. THE GROWING NEED FOR STATISTICAL DATA ON SMALL AREAS AND 
THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF DATA - ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS 
The drift of the population to urban centres, zoning trends 
and the cultural, social and general economic development of 
many countries have created particular problems. Thus the 
major strategic objective of these countries is to ensure 
decentralized regional development in all the abovement ioned 
fields. However, the realization of this goal demands proper 
regional planning, which presupposes the creation of 
decentralized regions for development purposes. Accordingly 
there is a large and urgent demand for data in this field, 
particularly in countries which are now endeavouring to 
upgrade the regions. 
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However, in the preceding section we saw that the principle 
of confidentiality of personal data places restrictions on 
the provision of decentralized data by the statistical 
authorities. These restrictions will depend on the size of 
the country, the specific nature of the statistics to be 
published (primary or secondary sector, etc.), and the level 
of geographical subdivision and breakdown on the subject 
matter. The Luxembourg tobacco industry consists of only one 
firm. Consequently it is impossible to publish the data on 
this industry as personal data, even at the whole-country 
level. In Greece, as we have seen, problems of this kind 
become particularly crucial when the NSSG wishes to publish 
data on processing or mining firms at the level of the 
regional development area, agricultural departments, nomos 
and branch of economic activity. 
However, similar cases are encountered in many other 
countries to a greater or lesser extent. Accordingly, 
various methods and measures have been adopted to cope with 
these problems. These measures, particularly in industry, 
include the principle of publishing data on particular firms 
only with their consent, whenever the number of units in 
each economic branch is less than a particular limit laid 
down by each country (e.g. four in Luxembourg, three in 
Greece, etc.). When consent is not forthcoming or when there 
is no provision for such a measure, the statistical service 
proceeds to group two or more related branches and to 
publish aggregated data on these branches. Finally, a number 
of countries classify as confidential only certain questions 
in a questionnaire, with a view to minimizing the number of 
cases in which it is impossible to publish personal data 
because of their confidentiality. 
IV. TACKL ING THE PROBLEM 
1. USE OF TECHNOLOGY WITH A VIEW TO AVOIDING THE DISCLOSURE 
OF CONFIDENTIALDATA DURING THE AUTOMATIC PROCESSING, 
STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL OF DATA 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the need to create 
information systems based on statistical data banks, taking 
advantage of the opportunities offered by modern 
technologies, is of vital importance for improving 
statistical information. Of equally decisive importance is 
the fact that the statistical data bank provides improved 
conditions for ensuring the safe keeping of the statistics 
in question. This feature, which mainly consists of avoiding 
the disclosure of confidential personal data, is provided at 
all stages in the production of the data, such as automatic 
processing, storage and retrieval of the data. 
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Because of these advantages most Community countries 
proceeded to set up statistical data banks. The experiences 
made in these countries showed that at least four years of 
systematic preparation are required in order to establish a 
functioning statistical data bank. 
The NSSG, bearing in mind the advantages of such a system 
and the experience of the Member States in which such banks 
have already been installed, proceeded to design such a 
system and to take the measures required with a view to 
establishing a statistical data bank in the NSSG's Computer 
Centre. Accordingly, in 1984 preparatory work was begun with 
a view to establishing a decentralized information system. 
The following steps have been taken: 
i) A feasibility study was 
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ntiality for the user. 
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twork. 
The establishment of an operational statistical data bank in 
the NSSG will bring Greece into line with the other EEC 
countries in the field of statistical information. 
INTRODUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DEFINING 
QUESTIONS AS CONFIDENTIAL WITHIN A QUESTIONNAIRE 
CERTAIN 
The Community Member States do not adopt a single approach 
as regards the definition of confidential statistical data. 
Certain countries are radical in this respect and define as 
confidential all personal data without exception. Some 
countries place more emphasis on personal data of an 
economic nature, whereas in others the law on statistics 
makes no reference at all to data confidentiality. Generally 
speaking the situation as regards the definition of 
confidential data differs from one country to another. 
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However, as far as firms are concerned the statistical 
services of the Member States seem to agree that the names 
and addresses of the firms should not be covered by 
statistical secrecy. This is because the disclosure of this 
kind of information is not such as to have adverse effects 
on the interested parties. The information that firm X is 
located at address Y not only does not damage the firm in 
question but advertises its existence to other firms and to 
consumers. 
The principle of defining certain questions within a 
questionnaire as confidential has been adopted in Germany, 
in which the name and address of the firm are not considered 
confidential data, while of the nine questions in the 
questionnaire used in the census of processing industries, 
only two have been defined as confidential (employment and 
the volume of energy used). 
By stipulating that only certain questions within a 
questionnaire are confidential, it is possible to minimize 
the amount of personal data which cannot be published for 
reasons of confidentiality. Specifically, such data are 
confined to those questions which the respondents are most 
reluctant to answer and for which they demand more 
assurances - assurances which are provided by ensuring that 
the answers to these questions are kept confidential. 
Accordingly, the best way of tackling the problem of not 
being able to publish confidential personal data is to 
expand the application of the above principle to households 
and to other categories of respondents, while restricting 
statistical secrecy to the smallest possible number of 
questions within a questionnaire. 
DISCUSSION 
Mr. EMBLETON (Central Statistics Office, Dublin) opened the 
discussion : 
The paper presented an interesting insight to the laws and 
practices relating to the protection of confidentiality in 
Greece. Moreover a number of relevant questions had been 
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posed in the context of the newer processing techniques 
which had become available to statisticians as a result of 
advancement in computer technologies. 
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clear that 
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Confidentiality vis-j^-vis other State agencies. Turning to 
the relationship with other State agencies, the access to 
and use of individual statistical information by such 
agencies raised issues in practically all countries. In 
Greece, specific provision was made to help the Directorate 
of National Accounts to fulfil its objectives. This was of 
course, a statistical objective and as such therefore the 
provision was not of an exceptional nature - it appeared to 
be necessary because the NSSG did not compile the national 
accounts. 
NSSG access to da 
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the impact of new technology on data confidentiality, 
Mr. Embleton did not fully share the view that one great 
advantage of the resultant ability to construct data banks 
was that these provided greater protection of personal data. 
He readily accepted that such data banks were less 
accessible in some respects than manual files but the 
facility to analyse more easily and quickly data in ever 
321 
gréa 
of 
resp 
poss 
grea 
exac 
whic 
note 
on 
enac 
take 
nece 
conf 
the 
resp 
ter d 
confi 
onden 
ibili 
ter 
erbat 
h add 
d in 
confi 
ted s 
acco 
ssary 
ident 
right 
onden 
etai 1 in 
dent ial 
ts were 
ty and di 
assurance 
ed by th 
ed to th 
the Greek 
den t i al i t 
ome 20 t 
unt of t 
assuranc 
i al i ty ha 
to pr i v 
ts were t 
crea 
inf 
be 
d no 
e po 
e f 
pap 
y· 
o 3 
he 
es . 
d to 
acy 
o be 
sed 
orma 
comi 
t vi 
f 
tent 
ear 
er, 
Exi 
0 ye 
new 
It 
be 
and 
all 
the 
tion 
ng 
ew c 
prot 
ial 
of 
was 
s t in 
ars 
envi 
was 
rein 
the 
ayed 
risk 
H 
i nere 
ompu t 
ect i o 
to 1 
the r 
gi v in 
g co 
ago, 
ronme 
his 
force 
righ 
of i 
e 
as i n 
er i ζ 
η . 
i nk 
espo 
g ri 
nf id 
nee 
nt 
view 
d an 
t to 
nadve 
belie 
gly 
ed fi 
The 
file 
nden t 
se to 
ent i a 
ded 
and t 
tha 
d ext 
know 
rt ent di 
ved to 
alert 
les as ρ 
pos iti 
s, a dev 
This, 
growi ng 
lity 1 
to be re 
hus pro 
t guaran 
ended to 
if the 
scio 
o 
to 
rovi 
on 
el op 
as 
con 
aws , 
vise 
vide 
tees 
inc 
fear 
sure 
that 
this 
ding 
was 
ment 
was 
cern 
if 
d to 
the 
of 
lude 
s of 
In this c 
111-2 appea 
The second 
individual 
personal d 
interpreted 
relat ing to 
granted to 
records was 
he felt his 
danger in 
under-ut ili 
of linkage 
col lection 
longi tudina 
anew for t 
such linkag 
discret ion? 
one-s ided. 
on t ex t 
red to 
pr in 
or fir 
ata w 
as ex 
the s 
the re 
invol 
pri vac 
such an 
zed. Wh 
arose 
(e.g. 
1 analy 
he nece 
es or 
The 
the 
cove 
cip le 
m tha 
i t hou 
tendi 
ame 
spond 
ved a 
y was 
arra 
at ha 
at a 
in 
ses ) 
ssary 
could 
issu 
basic 
r ade 
- t 
t no 
t the 
ng to 
indivi 
ent t 
nd wi 
threa 
ngemen 
ppened 
much 
the 
- wer 
cons 
the 
es ra 
pr in 
quat 
he 
use 
i r 
cov 
dua 1 
he r 
th t 
tene 
t wa 
for 
lat 
cas 
e r 
ent? 
stat 
ised 
ciple 
ely t 
assur 
woul 
pers 
er li 
or 
ight 
his , 
d. Fo 
s tha 
exam 
er st 
e of 
espon 
If 
ist ic 
wer 
s se 
he 1 
ance 
d b 
onal 
nkag 
conc 
to 
the 
r th 
t in 
pie 
age 
c 
dent 
not, 
al 
η 
t ou 
inkin 
to 
e ma 
con 
es o 
ern. 
know 
right 
e sta 
forma 
if th 
than 
ert ai 
s to 
did 
autho 
ot b 
t in 
g of 
the 
de 
sent 
f d 
This 
if 1 
to 
tist 
tion 
e po 
th 
η t 
be 
this 
ri t y 
y 
Sec 
reco 
pri 
of t 
ata 
i η 
inkag 
refus 
ician 
migh 
ss ib i 
e ac 
ypes 
conta 
prec 
exer 
ny m 
tion 
rds . 
vate 
he i r 
was 
sets 
t urn 
e of 
e if 
the 
t be 
lity 
tual 
of 
et ed 
lude 
cise 
eans 
Confident ial and η 
to the restrictio 
topics 
non-confi 
imagine a 
which the 
quest ions 
of these 
individua 
in ques 
dent ial, 
compuls 
guárante 
or topic 
might be 
1, might 
would inevitably 
protect in g respond 
on-confide 
η of confi 
t ionnaires 
a number 
ory or st 
es of conf 
s irrespec 
What wa 
not be s 
have excep 
ents, must 
nt ia 
dent 
w 
of a 
atut 
iden 
t ive 
s d 
o to 
tion 
be 
1 quest i 
iality t 
ith rema 
speets a 
ory stat 
t iali ty 
of how 
eemed c 
others 
s which, 
taken in 
ons . 
o sel 
in ing 
rose. 
is t ic 
did n 
innoc 
onf id 
. Any 
in t 
to ac 
Finali 
ect ed 
top 
It wa 
al in 
ot app 
uous a 
ent ial 
gene 
he int 
count. 
y tu 
sens 
ics 
s ha 
qui r 
ly t 
ny o 
by 
ral 
eres 
rning 
i t i ve 
being 
rd to 
y in 
o all 
r all 
one 
rule 
ts of 
322 
There was also the possibility that a combination of 
non-confidential characteristics could breach overall 
confidentiality - this was equally the case for surveys in 
which all information was treated as confidential. Thus the 
exemption from confidentiality of particular topics did not 
imply total freedom of publication. 
Further there were the effects on respondents of such 
practices. The dilution of confidentiality might readily 
suggest that the State's needs, in this case statistics, 
transcended the individual's right to privacy. This could 
not enhance the public standing of and trust in the national 
statistical service. Once diluted in this way, the question 
might be legitimately asked - where would it end? 
Mr. Embleton suggested that this was not a question 
statisticians could afford to have asked. 
Mr. WERNER (Statistisches Bundesamt) remarked: 
He noted a number of similarities between the Greek and 
German systems for protecting personal data. At one point in 
the paper however, because of the context in which a 
specific reference was made to the German situation, the 
danger existed that a wrong conclusion would be drawn 
concerning the German legal basis. It was stated that the 
principle that certain questions only in a questionnaire 
might be confidential was applied in Germany also and that 
name and address of an undertaking would not form part of 
the confidential data. It was described how, in the case of 
the last count of enterprises involving nine questions, two 
questions only were considered as confidential 
(section IV-2). In fact, Mr. Werner explained, in the 
Federal Republic of Germany all individual data entering 
into the federal statistics were confidential. This meant 
that there was no difference whether an item of data was 
more or less sensitive, the decisive factor was simply 
whether or not it was obtained in the course of a 
statistical inquiry. Normally to carry out a statistical 
survey of enterprises required knowing the names and 
addresses of the undertakings in advance so that these were 
not items of information collected for federal statistics. 
In this special case one could take the view that these were 
not subject to the special protection of statistical 
secrecy. 
The author replied to the di scussi on : 
Under Greek data protection legislation, the only person who 
was entitled to see an item of individual data was the 
person to whom it related, and that a formal application had 
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RECORD LINKAGE ν CONFIDENTIALITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE 
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 
DAWN D. NELSON 
Bureau of the Census 
SUMMARY 
Unlike some European Countries, the United States does not 
have a registration system in which people are identified by 
a number (1). The absence of a registration number, however, 
has not seriously limited the operational feasibility of 
linking individual record data from two or more files. 
Consequently, the United States, like European countries, is 
questioning whether such record linkages violate 
confidentiality guarantees made to respondents. This paper 
describes the way in which one U.S. Government agency, the 
Bureau of the Census, views this issue and copes with the 
problems. The discussion primarily refers to data on 
individuals. The specific iss'ues and problems associated 
with data on establishments are not addressed; however, 
there are many similarities. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The Census Bureau readily recognizes the benefits that are 
gained by linking an individual's survey record with records 
from other sources. In fact, the Bureau is authorized by law 
(Title 13, U.S.C.) to obtain statistical or administrative 
records to improve data quality and to reduce the amount of 
data collected and the collection costs. For example, we can 
verify the accuracy of respondent-reported data on the 
receipt of a government program benefit by comparing it with 
the program's records. We also can use program data to 
supplement household survey data, thereby reducing 
respondent burden and costs. Usually, however, the records 
from other agencies are used in studies to evaluate and 
improve the quality of the demographic censuses. 
1. CONFIDENTIALITY AT THE CENSUS BUREAU 
The records obtained by the Bureau are treated in the same 
manner as our confidential survey data. That is, the data 
are used for statistical purposes only and are not released 
in a form whereby any particular establishment or individual 
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can be identified. Furthermore, we have interpreted our 
confidentiality law (Title 13, U.S.C.) so strictly that we 
will not even return individually identifiable records in 
their original form to the agency that provided them. We 
also have implemented procedures regarding the release of 
Bureau-collected data that are designed to prevent linkages 
with records from other sources. 
The Bureau releases microdata files from its demographic 
censuses and surveys and from reimbursable household surveys 
conducted for other agencies. These microdata files consist 
of computerized records containing data for individual 
respondents. In compliance with our confidentiality law, 
direct identifiers such as name and address are remtved from 
the individual records b 
sufficient, however, to 
matching. The remaining 
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The disclosure risk associated with 
items depends upon many factors 
number of variables available for 
e resources needed to perform the 
the data, 4) the accessibility, 
reliability and completeness of the external file, and 5) 
the sensitivity or uniqueness of the data. The process used 
to consider these factors is primarily subjective. 
A number of actions, short of withholding the file, are 
possible if an item presents a disclosure problem. The 
easiest alternative probably is to delete the item(s), but 
it is perhaps the most detrimental to users. Another option 
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is to collapse data values into appropriately broad 
categories. For example, age might be provided in 5­year 
intervals instead of single years. Other techniques involve 
the introduction of ambiguities into the released data so 
that it will not correspond exactly to data in other files. 
These techniques include conventional rounding, random 
rounding, controlled rounding, and random perturbation. (For 
a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of each of 
these techniques, see Cox, et.al., 1984 (2)). 
Thus, depsite the Bureau' 
viewed as an obstacle to 
by others. We believe 
confidentiality policies 
s own 
ef f or 
use of record linkage, we are 
ts involvin 
, however 
and 
survey respondents usually 
receive no direct benefit 
ensure confidentiality, 
from 
there 
for· respondent s to cooperate 
We think our consistenti 
most household surveys ρ 
Consequently, the Bureau 
y hi 
rovid 
pract 
part 
part 
fore, 
and 
, tha 
ices 
icipat 
icipat 
g computer matching 
t our restrictive 
are essential. Our 
e voluntarily and 
ion. Our ability to 
is seen as an inducement 
to provide accurate data. 
gh response 
e con 
general ly 
that would weaken our confid 
way affect our ability 
respondents' data. 
en t ia 
to protect 
fi rmat 
has 
lity 1 
the 
rates (90­95*) in 
ion of this belief. 
opposed proposals 
aw or in any other 
confidentiality of 
2. CONFIDENTIALITY IN OTHER AGENCIES 
Argument s that ot: 
disclosure and 
convincing to the 
the U.S. 
confiden 
internal 
which do 
rely on 
to have 
disclose 
weakened 
Federal : 
tiality le 
rul es an' 
not adeq 
the Priva 
the ind iv 
d to anot 
, however, 
personally identif 
defined 
being co 
reques t 
inves t i g 
a priori 
11ected ; 
by anothe 
at ion of a 
her agencies c 
non­statistical 
Bureau. Only 
statist ical sy 
gislation. Mos 
d régulât ions 
uately protect 
cy Act of 1974 
idual 's consent 
her agency. Τ 
by two excepti 
i ab 1 e i nforma t i 
as a "routine 
or 2) the disc 
r agency for i 
speci fie viola 
oui d 
usa 
a few 
stem 
t oth 
regar 
stat 
protect our data from 
ges have not been 
other agencies within 
have equally strong 
er agencies rely on 
ding confidentiality, 
istical data. Or, they 
, which requires the agency 
to a 
his 
ons . 
on if 
use" 
llow information to be 
requirement has been 
An agency may disclose 
: 1) the disclosure is 
for which the data are 
losure is in response to a 
nformation related to the 
tion of law. In the absence 
327 
of a confidentiality law to the contrary, an agency can 
establish computer matching as a routine use of personal 
records by simply publishing a statement to this effect (in 
a government publication called the Federal Regis t er 1 (3) . 
Finally, in all but a few agencies such as the Census Bureau 
and the Internal Revenue Service, the promise of 
confidentiality can be overridden by the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). The FOIA requires the disclosure of 
existing agency records upon request unless it can be 
demonstrated that the disclosure would be a "clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy". This vague 
language has resulted in some, although not many, court 
orders to reveal information collected in confidence. 
As a result, if identifiable data were to leave , h e Census 
Bureau, we could not be assured of its protection. In many 
cases, the receiving agency could release the data to 
another agency or even to someone in the private sector. 
Credit, banking, insurance, and other kinds of records in 
the private sector are not subject to Federal protective 
statutes. Therefore, these record-holders probably would be 
very interested in obtaining Bureau records for matching 
projects. As the number of people with access to Bureau data 
increased, the risk of actual or perceived misuse of the 
data would also increase. 
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In addition, there are instances of the government using 
computer matching to identify suspected law violators, or 
other types of fraud or abuse. Several instances were 
recently described in an article on this subject (5). The 
examples included a matching project designed for the 
Department of Health and Human Services to discover double 
payments to doctors. Apparently, some doctors submit bills 
for the same service to two different medical care programs 
(Medicare and Medicaid). That Department also has recently 
started to compare records of persons receiving benefits 
against records of deceased persons. This is an effort to 
discover cases where the agency is not notified of a death, 
and the payments are being collected illegally by another 
person. Matches of this type usually only involve 
administrative record data, but the public may perceive them 
as 'a step towards the creation of a data bank containing 
information from many sources. 
Also, statistical data are used occasionally in a manner 
that makes it appear that a match has been performed. For 
instance, the Internal Revenue Service compares summary 
census information on small geographic areas with Federal 
income tax returns for the same area. A person's reported 
income is compared to the income level in his/her 
surrounding community. An individual reporting an income 
that deviates substantially from the expected may become the 
object of further investigation. Press reports of these 
activities are easily misunderstood by the general public 
and create the perception that individual statistical 
records are being used for enforcement purposes. 
The effects of this distrust are not well-known; however, 
the Bureau has assumed that the consequences are lower 
response rates and poorer quality data. Concern over public 
opinion and perception appears to be wel1-jus t i fied, 
especially in light of recent events. The power of the 
public was recently exhibited by the postponement of the 
West German census due to fears over potential misuses of 
the data by the government. In the U.S., public protests 
played a large role in defeating a proposal designed to 
facilitate the sharing of confidential data among Government 
agencies. 
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This proposal was supported by many of the statistical 
agencies; however, the Census Bureau did not support it. The 
Bureau believed that the safeguards against disclosure were 
inadequate. Also, a number of operational difficulties were 
anticipated given the nature of the decentralized 
statistical system in the U.S. Consequently, we thought the 
risk of losing public confidence and respondent cooperation 
would be increased (7). 
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The Bureau has established broad criteria to guide the 
microdata release process in relation to confidentiality 
issues. Summarized briefly, there are two basic criteria: 
1) no geographic area with fewer than 100 000 inhabitants 
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can be identified, and 2) the subject content of survey 
design cannot present an unusual risk of individual 
disclosure. Depending on the file content, the geographic 
limitation may be raised to decrease the likelihood that an 
individual could be identified by others. The rationale for 
this is that an individual is less likely to be unique 
within a larger population group; that is, more than one 
individual probably will have the same combination of 
characteristics provided on the file. 
Prior to 1981, the geographic limit was 250 000 persons. 
This was lowered to be more responsive to users who need 
detailed geographic information for small area data 
analyses. The lowering of the geographic criterion made it 
necessary to reduce the amount of detail that might be 
available to identify an individual. As a result, the Bureau 
established a Microdata Review Panel to ensure that 
appropriate disclosure-avoidance measures are taken before a 
file is rel eased. 
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Also, we assume that it will provoke less reaction from the 
public than a proposal leading to the widespread exchange of 
personal information about individuals. This limited 
proposal might be a first step in reaching agreement on the 
way to provide greater access to records for statistical 
purposes without reducing our ability to protect the 
individuals who provided the data. 
Notes and References 
(1) There is a numbering system associated with the U.S. 
Social Security Program that shares some similarities 
with a population registration system; however, every 
individual does not have a Social Security Number. 
(2) Cox, Lawrence H.; Johnson, Bruce; McDonald, 
Sarah-Kathryn; and Nelson, Dawn D. (1984), 
"Confidentiality Issues at the Census Bureau". Paper 
currently in preparation for presentation at the Census 
Bureau's first Annual Research Conference in 1985. 
(3) Shattuck, John (June, 1984), "Computer Matching is a 
Serious Threat to Individual Rights", Communications of 
the ACM, Volume 27, Number 6, 538-541. 
(4) Harris, Louis and Associates, Inc. (1983), The Road 
After 1984. A survey on the Impact of Technology on 
Society sponsored by Southern New England Telephone 
Company. 
(5) Kusserow, Richard P. (June, 1984), "The Government Needs 
Computer Matching to Root Out Waste and Fraud", 
Communications of the ACM, Volume 27, Number 6, 542-545. 
(6) Clark, Cynthia Z.F., and Coffey, Jerry L. (1983), "How 
Many People Can Keep a Secret? Data Interchange Within a 
Decentralized System" Proceedings of the Survey Research 
Methods Section - American Statistical Association, 
Washington D.C., 580-585. 
(7) Kincannon, C.L. (1983) "Discussion", Proceedings of the 
Survey Research Methods Section - American Statistical 
Association, Washington, D.C., 608-610. 
333 
DISCUSSION 
Mr. FORECAST (Central St at istical Office, London) opened the 
discussion : 
He remarked on similarities between the situation in the 
U.S. described in the paper and that existing in the U.K. 
Both countries had highly decentralized statistical systems 
and neither had registration systems involving personal 
identification numbers. Although the paper had suggested 
that record linkage on the basis of name and address was 
found by the Bureau of the Census to be relatively easy, 
subsequent remarks during the seminar had nevertheless 
identified certain difficulties. This confirmed the U.K. 
experience which had established that linkage between 
different statistical records was an expensive operation in 
the absence of a personal number. 
Mr. Forecast described two experiments in record linkage in 
the U.K. The first was the Office of Population Censuses and 
Surveys longitudinal study which followed up the experience 
of a one per cent sample of persons drawing from the 1971 
census, using registration data for births, marriages and 
deaths. The second was a study of a 10* sample of school 
leavers, following their subsequent experience in higher 
education. Neither had given rise to objections on ground of 
confidentiality and, although the matching procedures were 
very successful, they were expensive. Both had the feature 
that the work was entirely within one Department, namely the 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys in the one case 
and the Ministry of Education in the other. As in the U.S., 
proposals for inter-departmental record-linkage had been 
rejected. Mr. Forecast drew two general conclusions from 
this experience. Firstly, record linkage should be done on a 
sample basis only: the public would have much less fear of 
possible official misuse of such linkage if it were on a one 
per cent than on a 100% basis. Secondly, administrative data 
might be used for statistical purposes but not vice-versa. 
Mr. BARNES (Office of Popula t ion Censuses and Surveys) 
remarked as fol lows : 
There was an apparent contradiction between the remark in 
Section 1 of the paper to the effect that the good 
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confidentiality record of the Bureau contributed to its high 
survey response rates and the statements later in the paper 
concerning public scepticism regarding confidentiality. 
Mr. BEGUE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
économiques): 
He noted the statement in Section 1 of the paper that the 
controls applied by the Bureau to eliminate the possibility 
of matching in microdata supplied to users were essentially 
subjective. Returning to the question in Section 5, the need 
was mentioned of finding objective criteria for this 
purpose. Mr. Bégué doubted whether such objective criteria 
could be found because there was no way of knowing what 
other information might be available to the recipients of 
the microdata. The development of technology risked making 
out of date very quickly objective methods developed today. 
In any case, it was inadvisable to draw up restrictive rules 
based on such methods. The important thing was to firmly 
establish and guarantee the principle of confidentiality and 
leave statisticians a certain flexibility in its 
appiicat ion. 
Mr. HARRIS (EUROSTAT) remarked as follows: 
The impact on the compilation of statistics of public 
concern about confidentiality had not been nearly so great 
in the U.S. as in Europe. This was, in part, due to the 
greater size of the country with a greater openness towards 
information. This was well illustrated by the willingness on 
the part of firms to provide for statistical purposes the 
type of information which it was impossible to obtain in 
Europe. He commented that the opening paragraphs of 
section 5 summarized the entire problem of statisticians in 
striking a balance between respondent confidentiality and 
the informational needs of society. 
Mr. COX (US Bureau of the Census) remarked as fol 1ows: 
Regarding the points raised in discussion to the effect that 
the development of generalized disclosure avoidance methods 
and software, such as were being pursued in the United 
States, would lead to rigid disclosure avoidance procedures, 
with negative consequences, he believed that this was a 
potential problem at worst and that it could be managed. It 
was considered that the gains achieved by developing 
Superior disclosure avoidance methods - improved 
confidentiality protection, more uniform criteria applied 
uniformly, and due to their repeatability, the 
ability to evaluate these methods scientifically (to 
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name but three) - far outweighed potential problems in 
their use. Having developed such methods, a statistical 
agency knew rather than speculated about their efficiency 
and effectiveness and effects upon data quality and 
completeness. In their absence, this was not possible. The 
ideal siuation would be to have automated methods invoked 
interactively by a data analyst, thereby combining 
statistical methodology and the power of the computer with 
human expertise. 
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Mrs. Nelson thought it was worthwhile pursuing the search 
for objective standards for preventing the inadvertant 
disclosure of confidential data. The main problem was the 
cost of such a study or of writing computer programs for the 
job . 
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THE SITUATION IN SWITZERLAND 
H. BRUENGGER 
Office statistique fédérale, Berne 
Switzerland is not regarded as one of the most progressive 
countries as far as statistics are concerned. The malicious 
comment made by some of our compatriots is that Switzerland 
is prosperous precisely because there are so few statistics. 
These people, however, do not realize that agriculture, for 
example, is a thriving industry in Switzerland even though 
(or because) it is in the exceptional position of being the 
suhject of a great many, high quality statistics. 
Nevertheless, Switzerland clearly lags behind other European 
countries in providing legislation for statistics and data 
protection. At national level, the legal basis for official 
statistics is fragmentary, heterogeneous and in most cases 
dates back to a period in which concepts such as "data 
protection" or "personal data" were completely unknown. Two 
years ago, we therefore made public the draft of a new 
Statistics Act and this has been accorded a surprisingly 
large measure of approval. This bill could have been put 
before Parliament had the Government, because of pressure of 
parliamentary business, not refused to give it urgent 
status. 
A similar stage has been reached in data protection 
legislation at national level. Here too, the bill was made 
public a year ago and met with a very varied response. The 
major bones of contention were, however, legislation 
covering data protection in the private sector, i.e. in 
companies, and the constitution and jurisdiction of a data 
protection commission to ensure proper protection of data in 
both the private and public sectors. There has, however, 
been less controversy about the data protection provisions 
in the actual Federal order. Again, it will be some years 
before this Act can come into force. 
The fact that work on two bills was carried on almost in 
parallel necessitated closer coordination and, looking back, 
it is interesting to see how close and effective the 
cooperation became between the National Statistical Office 
and the authorities responsible for data protection. This 
personal relationship has made it possible for us to 
influence the draft Data Protection Act so that matters of 
particular statistical interest can be taken into account. 
These include, in particular: 
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1) the option of using administrative data for statistical 
analyses even where no express mention was made of 
statistical use at the time that the data were obtained; 
2) the possibility, while respecting certain provisos and 
conditions, to provide third parties conducting their own 
statistical work with individual data from statistical 
studies ­ these data being shorn of names and addresses 
but not rendered completely anonymous. Cantonal and 
municipal statistical offices comprise some of these 
third parties, others being scientists and researchers; 
3) the decision not to grant individuals the right of access 
to data about them or the right of correction where these 
data are unsatisfactory. This provision does not apply to 
the company register but I would like to point out that, 
in the field of personal rights, Swiss law does not 
distinguish between physical and legal persons so that 
data protection regulations are just as applicable to 
data about individual companies. 
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The above analysis shows that we in Switzerland are moving 
towards legislation that strikes a balance between the needs 
of the data protection and statistics. 
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CLOSING REMARKS 
G. ALS 
Service Central de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, 
Luxembourg 
It is difficult to distil the results of some two and a half 
days of wide-ranging discussion into a reasonable compass. 
These closing remarks will therefore not be comprehensive 
but will rather concentrate on a number of different 
aspects. The task of making a selection has not been easy: 
the seminar aroused great interest and opinions based on 
quite different viewpoints were expressed by the different 
groups of participants. Inevitably there is a risk of being 
somewhat subjective and these remarks will indeed be the 
observations of an official statistician very much concerned 
with the dilemma in which official statisticians now find 
themselves. 
In order to appreciate the present situation, it is 
necessary to cast a backward glance at how the situation has 
developed over the last decade. The concern of statisticians 
to maintain the secrecy of information about individuals and 
individual businesses is traditional and well known. 
Historically, official statisticians have jealously guarded 
the confidentiality of the individual information entrusted 
to them. They have developed techniques to avoid not only 
direct disclosure of information, but also to avoid risk of 
indirect disclosure, say by the calculation of differences 
between tabulations which may cover slightly different 
areas. Conventions have been developed about the minimum 
number of observations to be included in published 
aggregates and legislation has laid strict obligations on 
enumerators so as to prohibit voluntary disclosure or 
misuse. In some countries indeed, the statistical services 
have been given a certain measure of independence from 
Government so as to demonstrate their impartiality and 
integrity. In general, high standards of professional 
secrecy have been set and maintained. This concern with 
confidentiality has indeed been seen by statisticians as an 
essential prerequisite for carrying out their statistical 
work. The success of any statistical survey depends on the 
cooperation of respondents and an important element in 
securing such cooperation is the guarantee that the replies 
will be kept confidential. 
It could seem at least possible that the general 
satisfaction of statisticians with their achievements in 
respect of confidentiality may have led to a certain 
smugness. Be that as it may, the concern over privacy which 
developed suddenly in some countries during the 1970s caught 
many official statisticians by surprise. The composition of 
the seminar ensured some airing of all points of view. 
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Academics, data protection officials and statisticians were 
all present. Inevitably, the statisticians predominated in a 
seminar organized by the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities and this meant perhaps that the dialogue with 
the data protectionists was not taken as far as it could 
have been. Nevertheless, there was a general agreement that 
the papers produced by countries setting out the position in 
individual countries with regard to data protection 
legislation and the general account of the state of the art 
in reaching accommodation with the legislation would provide 
an invaluable reference library. 
Six general conclusions emerge from the seminar. 
1. The first basic conclusion was that statisticians and 
data protection officials needed to cooperate in order 
to fulfil their respective tasks and in order to clear 
up misunderstandings and reduce tension. Confrontation 
would be a recipe for disaster. It had to be recognized 
that the conflict between several elements in current 
thinking had yet to be adequately resolved. These 
elements included the political need to protect 
individual privacy, the need to maintain the flow of 
information for government decision making, and the need 
for the public to be aware of how government decisions 
are made. Beyond the needs of government, there were the 
reasonable needs of social and other researchers to be 
taken into account. If the needs of government and the 
wishes of the public generally were to be met, it was 
necessary to strike a balance between requirements which 
were in some sense in conflict. It was comforting to 
note that recent laws on the protection of privacy have 
generally - though not always - involved consultation 
with statisticians prior to enactment. It was 
particularly reassuring and encouraging to note that in 
France it was the data protectionists themselves who 
began such discussions with a view to having the 
existing legislation modified in order to take greater 
account of statisticians' needs. Such legislation 
was referred to during discussion as second-generation 
laws. Statisticians can perhaps take some encouragement 
from such developments. 
2. Statisticians recognize that - like true scientists -
they have been living for far too long in an ivory tower 
from which they need to emerge. Speakers suggested that 
they should become politically expert or if that were 
too much to ask, they should at least acquire a 
commercial consciousness and play an educational role. A 
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paradoxical situation has come about, namely that while 
all Governments affirm that statistics are indispensib le 
for helping them draw up rational policies, 
statisticians themselves experience great difficulty in 
convincing the public of the usefulness of statistics. 
Undoubtedly statistics provide an infrastructure for 
decisionmaking but it is difficult to explain this to 
the man in the street. 
It is important to 
the general public 
administrative ins 
by the politician 
their integrity a 
where methods a 
instances, now 
administrative ins 
lent extra weigh 
confidentiality, w 
suppliers of data. 
t 
s 
n 
make 
that 
itut 
but 
d in 
clear both 
stat 
ions . 
istical 
to poli 
office 
Certainly the 
they have 
depen dence, 
re concerned, 
t 
t 
h 
become 
itut 
by 
ich 
ions . 
the 
stat 
scient 
This 
since 
perhap 
and ha 
if ic 
specie 
principle o 
isticians guar 
ticians and to 
s are not just 
y were created 
demons t rated 
s particularly 
ve, in many 
rather than 
1 status was 
f statistical 
antee to all 
Statisticians are at present in a critical situation in 
some countries and potentially in all countries. On the 
one hand, they have to contend with a lack of funds, 
people's reluctance to provide information, and pressing 
demands to process administrative data rather than 
organize surveys and censuses. On the other hand, they 
see new barriers going up against them when they try to 
get access to administrative data sources. There is here 
a dialectical contradiction which can be resolved only 
by a revolution in attitudes. 
Karl Marx taught that there is a dialectic of history: 
thesis - antithesis - synthesis. Statistics are now at 
the antithesis stage. During the seminar the position 
was stated more simply, it being described as a swing of 
the pendulum. The pendulum has swung too far. It will 
return sooner or later, but not under its own momentum. 
It needs a push from the statisticians. From this point 
of view, it is reassuring to note that the formulation 
of recent laws on the protection of privacy have 
involved consultations with statisticians. 
The final general conclusion concerns the relative 
interpretations of constitutional rights guaranteeing 
privacy and individual freedom. In Germany, it has taken 
more than 30 years to arrive at the present 
interpretation of the constitution. In many other 
countries the same constitutional rights are interpreted 
in a way which is more favourable towards statistical 
work. 
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SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 
The seminar also produced a number of specific conclusions: 
7. Advantages of the new legislation 
Although in many cases the new laws on the protection of 
privacy have made the statistician's work more 
difficult, they have also brought certain advantages: 
they have obliged statisticians to give even deeper 
thought to the question of statistical confidentiality, 
induced them to bring in even stricter rules 
concerning enumerators, and made them re-examine 
their arrangements for working with local 
administrations in the collection of statistics. 
8. Statistical confidentiality 
The seminar made very clear that there is no general 
agreement among statisticians on the importance of 
statistical confidentiality. Many countries spoke on 
this subject - the United Kingdom, Belgium, Greece, the 
Netherlands, France, etc. It is firmly established that 
statisticians interpret confidentiality as meaning they 
must on no account disclose personal data to third 
parties, including Ministers of State. 
9. Depersonalizing files and historical needs 
Several seminar participants stated that depersonalizing 
computer files went against the interests of historical 
research and the needs of future generations. However, 
two separate points emerged from the discussions: 
- original documents containing personal details remain 
in the State archives. As for computer files 
assuming they still contain personal details - it was 
wondered whether the technology was not developing at 
such a pace that future generations would no longer 
have the outmoded equipment necessary for reading 
them. 
- any advantage there might be in keeping computer files 
containing personal data would tend to be of a short-
term nature: it would mean that longitudinal analyses 
and other studies of the data could still be carried 
out in the more immediate future. 
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10. Unscheduled statistics 
It was pointed out that when a major statistical census 
is undertaken it is impossible to predict every single 
table which the results may yield. Statisticians 
therefore need to be able to compile and extract from 
the tapes statistical tables which were not scheduled at 
the outset without contravening the principle of 
finality laid down in the Strasbourg Convention. 
11. Samples taken from the population census 
In general, problems of data protection do not arise in 
connection with surveys where the national statistical 
offices themselves make use of samples taken from the 
population censuses. The question is whether such 
samples may be supplied to third parties. In principle, 
there is obviously a problem of confidentiality here, 
because the samples contain personal details. But things 
are not quite so simple as that, because the details 
involved are fairly innocuous: name and address, sex and 
age, all details which are more or less public. In 
addition, the samples would be used for purely voluntary 
surveys. The actual situation differs from country to 
country: some see no objection to supplying such samples 
for scientific purposes, while others at present feel 
unable to do so. In France the CNIL (Commission 
nationale de l'informatique et des libertés) is looking 
at ways of changing the law on this particular issue. 
12. One-way transmission of personal data 
On this subject there is agreement between 
statisticians, but not always between statisticians and 
the data protection institutions. The former consider 
that the specific nature of statistics justifies 
transmission of personal administrative data to 
statistical offices, on the understanding that this is 
strictly one-way with no question of the inverse 
procedure being allowed. The situation differs from 
country to country, but there is a marked tendency 
towards allowing these one-way data transfers. 
- in Denmark they are at the very heart of the 
statistical system 
- in Germany one-way transmission is possible provided 
it is authorized by a law, which is a general rule of 
the German statistical system 
- in France it is either prohibited or limited for the 
moment, but the CNIL is considering ways of changing 
the legislation on this particular issue. 
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13. The "forbidden fruit" of statisticians 
Generally it was agreed that official statisticians 
should not ask questions on people's private lives nor 
on their religious, political or philosophical beliefs. 
The Strasbourg Convention allows for exceptions to this 
prohibition in cases where the national legislation 
concerned provides appropriate safeguards. Several 
countries stated that they do ask some such questions 
but leave the reply optional. 
The final conclusion to be drawn from the seminar is 
that it has been an extremely worthwhile exercise, 
clarifying many urgent present-day problems and 
sometimes indicating paths towards their solution. 
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